DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT  ? 


AN  EXAMINATION 


OP  THE 


EFFECT  OF  DIFFERENT  FORMS  OF  TARIFF 
UPON  AMERICAN  INDUSTRY. 


UJ 

I  • 


BY 


W.  M.  GROSVENOR, 


EDITOB  OF  THE  ST.  LOUIS  DEMOCRAT 


NEW  YORK: 
D.    APPLETON     AND     COMPANY, 

90,  92  &  94  GEAND  STEEET. 
1871. 


ENTERED,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1870,  by 

D.  APPLETON  &  CO., 
In  the  office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


To  THE  AMERICAN  FREE  TRADE  LEAGUE,  t 

Whose  earnest  efforts  to  diffuse  information  have 
awakened  multitudes  to  examine  the  results  of  the  system  of 
protection,  and,  having  examined,  to  perceive  'the  failure  of 
that  system,  and  whose  ready  contributions  have  secured  a  wide 
circulation  for  the  reports  of  Commissioner  Wells  and  for  the 
writings  of  other  inquirers  like  myself,  this  book  is  dedicated  with 
great  respect. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 

INTKODUCTIOX, 7 

CHAP.  I. — NATURE  AND  OBJECT  OF  THE  INQUIRY,    .        .        .        .  11 
II. — PROTECTION  DOES  NOT  PREVENT  OVERTRADING,  .        .        .13 

III. — CURRENCY  AND  IMPORTS, 25 

IV. — HIGH  TARIFFS  CHECK  EXPORTS, 45- 

Y. — SHIP-BUILDING,         ........  61 

VI. — INTERFERENCE  WITH  NATURAL  LAWS,          ....  68 

VII. — POPULATION  AND  WEALTH, 79 

VIII. — AGRICULTURE, 85 

IX. — MECHANICS  AND  NATURAL  MANUFACTURES,     .        .        .  114 

X. — THE  COTTON  MANUFACTURE, 122 

XI. — THE  WOOLLEN  MANUFACTURE, 135 

XII. — THE  WOOL-GROWER, 157 

XIII. — IRON — HISTORY  OF  THE  IRON  MANUFACTURE  PRIOR  TO  1833,  168 

XIV.— IRON— THE  COMPROMISE  TARIFF, 188 

XV.— IRON— THE  TARIFF  OF  1842, 202 

XVI.— IRON— HISTORY  SINCE  1846, 223 

XVII. — ARE  MONOPOLIES  BLESSINGS  ? 239 

XVIIL— THE  SALT  MANUFACTURE, 252 

XIX. — SKILLED  LABOR  PROTECTS  ITSELF, 262 

XX. — SHALL  OUR  LABOR  BECOME  PAUPER  LABOR  ?  .        .        .  267 

XXL— WAGES  AND  PRICES  IN  1845, 284 

XXII. — PROTECTION  AND  NON-PROTECTION  CONTRASTED,  j  -.        .  303 

XXIIL— THE  PRESENT  SITUATION, .311 

XXIV.— THE  LABOR  BAROMETER,          .        .   '     .        .        .        .  335 

XXV.— CONSUMPTION, 345 

XXVI.— CONCLUSION, 35T 

INDEX  OF  STATISTICAL  TABLES, 363 


IN  T E  O  D II 0  T I O m  ;  ;•.;  :•,  ; 


TEN  years  ago  a  Representative  in  Congress,  when  called  to  ac 
count  by  his  constituents  for  his  vote  on  a  tariff  bill,  replied,  "  I 
don't  know  any  thing  about  the  tariff,  and  I  never  pretended  to." 
Yet  this  was  a  member  from  one  of  the  largest  commercial  cities  in 
the  country,  and  nearly  half  of  his  constituents,  by  their  votes  soon 
afterward,  testified  that  they  preferred  as  their  Representative  a 
man  who  knew  nothing  about  the  tariff. 

It  has  been  fashionable  to  know  nothing  about  this  question. 
For  nearly  twenty  years  this  country  has  been  engaged  in  solving 
another  problem,  and  men  have  been  preferred  for  all  positions,  from 
lowest  to  highest,  for  qualifications  quite  distinct  from  those  which 
enable  a  man  to  vote  intelligently  on  a  tariff  bill.  It  has  been  fash 
ionable,  but  it  will  be  so  no  longer,  to  treat  the  tariff  question  as  of  lit 
tle  consequence.  Everywhere  men  now  begin  to  realize  that  business, 
industry,  and  individual  well-being,  are  materially  affected  by  legis 
lation,  and  demand  of  each  Representative  not  only  the  devoted 
loyalty  of  a  patriot  and  the  sincere  purpose  of  an  honest  man,  but 
the  ability  and  the  disposition  to  so  shape  legislation  as  to  promote 
national  prosperity.  Labor  conventions  assemble ;  powerful  leagues 
are  formed  in  cities  and  States  ;  audiences  settle  to  the  deepest  at 
tention  whenever  the  speaker  touches  upon  the  method  of  taxation  ; 
official  documents,  crowded  with  statistics  once  thought  dry,  are 
sought  for  with  unwonted  eagerness  ;  and  public  servants  will  hence- 


8  INTRODUCTION. 

forth  need  not  only  opinions  but  reasons  for  them.  If  any  politicians 
fancy  that  a  few  well-turned  phrases,  or,  at  most,  a  few  fragments 
of  fact  picked  hurriedly  from  the  ruins  of  theories  overturned  by  the 
war,  will  serve  their  turn  because  "  the  people  know  nothing  about 
this  question,  and  never  will  understand  it,"  they  will  surely  learn 
their  mistake.  In  some  degree,  the  people  have  learned  the  respon 
sibility  which  self-government  imposes ;  they  begin  to  see  that  men 
do  not  really  govern  themselves  who  do  not  understand  the  ques 
tions  qpoil  tv.ilk'h  ;they  are  voting,  and  they  feel  that,  if  they  are  to  be 
lit  to  govern  themselves,  they  must  at  least  be  able  to  determine 
\  \  t« !  whether  tfce  $mccth  speech  or  the  spicy  article  contains  fact  or  fal 
lacy,  sense  or  nonsense.  Hence,  from  all  quarters  there  is  heard  a 
demand  for  information  upon  this  question,  and  those  who  examine 
it  in  earnest  find  it  neither  an  inscrutable  mystery  nor  an  uninterest 
ing  topic. 

I  feel  sure  that  my  own  experience  has  been  that  of  many 
others.  Born  of  Whig  parents,  trained  under  influences  wholly  fa 
vorable  to  the  system  of  protection,  and  thrown,  when  I  began  life 
for  myself,  into  editorial  association  with  an  able  and  experienced 
advocate  of  that  policy,  I  rather  borrowed  than  formed  an  honest  be 
lief  that  it  was  the  wisest,  and  joined  with  sincerity,  if  not  with  clear 
understanding,  in  efforts  to  secure  "  protection  for  American  indus 
try."  When  the  'war  closed,  and  we  returned  to  peaceful  pursuits, 
reconstruction  engrossed  attention.  But,  in  the  readjustment  of  in 
dustry,  and  in  legislation  since  the  war,  prompted  by  frequent  ap 
peals  by  those  interests  which  had  been  most  favored,  I  saw  reason 
to  doubt  whether  the  trial  of  the  protective  system  had  entirely  jus 
tified  the  anticipations  of  its  advocates.  It  seemed  to  me  strange 
that,  if  protection  had  the  desired  effect,  favored  interests  should  be 
constantly  demanding  more  protection,  and  I  began  to  look  into  the 
question  for  myself.  These  pages  are  the  result,  and  they  are  pub 
lished  in  the  hope  that  in  some  measure  they  may  shorten  the  labor 
or  aid  the  judgment  of  others  who  are  honestly  seeking  to  under 
stand  the  tariff  question. 

It  has  not  been  my  purpose  to  assail  any  theory,  to  defend  any 


INTRODUCTION.  9 

theory,  or  to  set  up  any  theory  of  my  own.  If  any  new  idea  is 
advanced,  it  is  one  which  the  facts  have  suggested.  My  object  has 
been  to  ascertain  facts.  Having  been  somewhat  familiar  with  writ 
ings  of  advocates  and  opponents  of  protection,  I  have  been  often 
annoyed  at  the  incompleteness  of  the  facts  presented  by  each. 
When  Prof.  Perry  exhibited  a  specimen  of  cloth,  saying,  "  Duty 
eighty  per  cent. ;  excluded,"  I  was  hungry  to  know  what  a  similar 
cloth  of  American  manufacture  cost  now  and  under  low  duties. 
When  Mr.  Greeley  stated  that  a  yard  of  some  woollen  cloth  cost  not 
more  in  gold  in  1869  than  did  the  same  quality  in  1860, 1  did  not  dis 
pute  his  fact,  but  regretted  that  he  had  not  also  stated  how  much  the 
material  cost  per  pound,  how  many  pounds  were  used  per  wrd,  or  how 
much  similar  cloth  cost  in  other  countries  in  1860  and  in  li 
given  only  one  fragment  of  a  fact ;  it  seemed  a  pity  tl 
given  the  whole  fact.  These  morsels  of  information  01 
but  did  not  satisfy  the  appetite.  With  rare  exceptions, 
to  start  with  a  theory  fully  formed,  and  to  pick  out  here  and  there 
such  facts  as  would  support  it,  but  did  not  give  complete  colloca 
tions  of  facts  needed  to  decide  questions  at  issue.  Many  honest  de 
baters  on  either  side  seemed  to  have  formed  their  opinions  before 
they  began  to  ascertain  the  facts.  Now,  a  fixed  theory  possesses  a 
more  than  magnetic  power  of  drawing  to  itself  congenial  facts,  and 
repelling  all  others.  This  world  has  all  sorts  of  facts  in  it,  and  the 
man  who  searches  with  a  fixed  idea  in  his  head  will  always  find  facts 
to  fit  that  idea.  In  questions  of  political  economy,  this  method  may 
be  called  the  seductive — and  that  science  demands  the  inductive. 
He  who  would  arrive  at  truth  must  invite  all  facts,  and  be  content 
to  take  such  theories  as  they  may  bring  with  them.  I  have  honestly 
endeavored  to  follow  this  method ;  to  obtain  full  records  bearing 
upon  each  point  of  inquiry,  and  to  present  them  with  such  sugges 
tions  as  the  facts  themselves  seem  to  warrant. 

I  need  not  say  that  the  information  gathered  is  far  less  complete 
than  I  wish.  To  those  who  have  had  experience  of  the  difficulty  of 
collecting  statistics,  who  know  what  strange  contradictions  occur  be 
tween  authorities  deemed  most  reliable ;  who  have  spent  days  in 


10  INTRODUCTION. 

searching  old  pamphlets  or  musty  files  for  a  single  item,  I  need  not 
apologize  for  imperfections. 

It  should,  however,  be  stated  that  this  work  was  substantially 
completed  and  prepared  for  publication  early  in  January,  1870,  and, 
though  other  duties  delayed  arrangements  for  publication  several 
months,  I  have  not  had  time  to  gather  and  add  statistics  of  later 
date  than  January  1st. 


DOES  PKOTECTION  PEOTECT? 


CHAPTER  I. 

NATTJEE   A1O>   OBJECT   OF  THE   INQUIRY. 

are  living  under  a  high  "  protective  tariff."  What  does  the 
phrase  mean  ?  The  theory  of  its  advocates  is  that  the  industry  of 
this  country  cannot  prosper  in  competition  with  "  the  pauper  labor  " 
of  Europe,  and  that  certain  products  of  foreign  labor  must  therefore 
be  excluded,  or  so  increased  in  cost  that  they  cannot  compete  with 
similar  products  of  domestic  labor.  The  avowed  object  is  to  check 
or  prevent  competition.  But,  if  competition  is  prevented,  to  that 
extent  importation  of  foreign  products  must  be  prevented ;  and,  if 
importation  of  any  foreign  products  is  prevented,  to  that  extent 
revenue  by  duties  on  imports  must  be  sacrificed.  With  the  pro 
tective  tariff,  therefore,  the  controlling  object  is  protection — restraint 
or  prevention  of  competition.  To  that  object  it  makes  some  sacri 
fice  of  revenue.  With  a  revenue  tariff,  on  the  contrary,  the  con 
trolling  object  is  to  secure  duties  with  the  least  burden,  and  to  that 
object  it  sacrifices  the  idea  of  excluding  foreign  competition.  <  Every 
revenue  tariff  protects  as  far  as  it  prevents  foreign  competition,  or  ] 
checks  its  force  by  enhancing  the  cost  of  foreign  products.  But  its 
duties  are  adjusted  with  intent  to  secure  the  largest  revenue  at  the 
smallest  cost  to  the  people.  On  the  other  hand,  a  protective  tariff 
secures  revenue  only  by  virtue  of  provisions  which  do  not  exclude 
competition.  J  But  the  theory  of  its  advocates  is  that,  when  our 
industry  is  fostered  by  preventing  or  checking  competition,  our 
people  are  so  prosperous  that  they  buy  more  largely  of  foreign 
articles  not  excluded  by  duties,  and  that  the  revenue  is  thus  in 
creased.  The  protective  system  seeks  first  to  check  competition. 
The  revenue  system  seeks  first  to  fill  the  treasury. 


12  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

We  have  been  living  since  1861  under  tariffs  intended  to  be 
protective.  Whenever  it  has  appeared  that  an  important  industry 
was  still  exposed  to  serious  competition,  that  fact  has  been  usually 
regarded  as  justifying  an  increase  of  duties.  Eleven  changes  of 
the  tariff  have  thus  been  made  since  the  adoption  of  the  act  of 
March  2,  1861,  and  these  frequent  changes  and  the  present  con 
dition  of  our  industry  have  aroused  men  to  inquire  whether  the 
protective  system  itself  is  in  fact  beneficial  to  the  country. 

National  economy  presents  three  methods  of  testing  the  pros 
perity  of  a  country.  The  first  is  by  the  balance-sheet  between  that 
and  other  countries.  The  second  is  by  ascertaining  the  increase  in 
the  production  of  wealth.  The  third  is  by  ascertaining  the  distribu 
tion  of  wealth.  If  a  nation  imports  in  the  way  of  trade  more  than 
it  exports,  due  allowance  being  made  for  the  profits  of  trade  and 
for  freights,  it  is  running  into  debt.  But  a  debt-involving  purchase 
may  so  increase  the  productive  power  of  the  purchaser  as  to  enable 
him  to  pay  with  interest,  and  realize  ample  profit.  The  second  in 
quiry,  whether  the  production  of  wealth  by  domestic  industry  is 
increased,  is  thus  suggested.  But  the  true  national  economy  re 
gards  the  welfare  of  the  individuals  who  compose  the  nation  rather 
than  the  aggregate  of  wealth.  England's  wealth  is  England's 
shame,  if,  in  Spite  of  great  accumulation  of  property,  the  proportion 
of  paupers  is  increasing.  In  the  end,  the  richest  country  will  be 
that  in  which  the  average  condition  of  the  laboring  population  most 
steadily  and  rapidly  improves ;  for  in  that  country  the  productive 
energies  of  the  people  are  most  fully  employed  and  stimulated. 
When  the  labor  of  a  country  is  improving  in  condition,  and  thus 
gaining  both  the  power  and  the  desire  to  produce  more  largely,  the 
nation  is  enlarging  its  sources  of  wealth,  though  the  balance  of 
trade  may  be  against  it,  or  its  production  of  wealth  may  be  tempo 
rarily  checked.  But  when  the  natural  improvement  in  the  condition 
of  the  laboring  people  of  any  country  is  retarded  or  stopped,  that 
country  is  growing  poorer;  the  very  sources  of  its  wealth  are 
choked ;  and  only  a  change  in  the  condition  of  its  labor  can  save  it 
from  decay.  It  matters  not,  then,  how  largely  the  balance  of  trade 
may  be  in  its  favor,  or  how  vast  may  be  the  accumulations  of  wealth 
in  the  hands  of  a  class.  The  power  of  growth  and  progress  dies 
with  the  deterioration  of  the  laboring  people,  and  the  loss  of  oppor 
tunity  or  stimulus  to  employ  their  energies  to  the  utmost.  Hence, 
to  ascertain  the  present  condition  of  a  country,  we  examine  its 
balance  of  trade  and  its  production  of  wealth.  But,  to  determine 


PROTECTION  DOES  NOT  PREVENT  OVERTRADING.      13 

whether  seeming  prosperity  is  real,  whether  its  apparent  progress 
involves  future  disaster,  whether  the  country  is  living  within  its 
income,  and  adding  to  its  productive  power,  or  wasting  its  very 
capital,  and  drying  up  the  sources  of  its  wealth,  we  must  study  the 
condition  of  its  laboring  population. 

Tried  by  these  tests,  how  is  the  condition  of  this  country  affected 
by  the  system  of  protection  ?  It  is  not  denied  that  many  unfavor 
able  symptoms  appear.  The  balance  of  trade  is  against  us.  Most 
important  branches  of  industry  are  checked  in  their  progress.  The 
Special  Commissioner  of  the  Revenue,  in  his  report  of  January, 
1869,  presented  statements  which  attracted  very  general  attention 
in  regard  to  the  condition  of  the  laboring  class.  But  it  is  said  that 
each  of  these  unfavorable  symptoms  is  due  to  other  causes,  and  that 
the  tariff  has  not  produced,  but  has  greatly  diminished  disasters. 
To  test  the  correctness  of  this  reasoning,  it  is  necessary  to  trace  the 
effect  of  different  tariff  systems  in  other  times,  to  ascertain  whether, 
other  causes  being  absent,  similar  duties  have  in  other  times  pro 
duced  results  such  as  we  now  witness. 

Taking  each  of  the  three  tests  in  order — foreign  trade,  produc 
tion  of  wealth,  and  distribution  of  wealth — we  shall  endeavor  to 
ascertain  what  results  have  been  produced  in  common  by  the  present 
and  by  former  protective  tariffs,  and  to  compare  them  with  the 
effects  of  tariffs  for  revenue.  In  brief,  does  the  protective  system 
benefit  American  industry  ? 


CHAPTER   II. 

PROTECTION  DOES   NOT  PREVENT  OVERTRADING. 

DURING  the  twelve  months  ending  June  30,  1869,  we  imported 
merchandise  and  specie  of  the  invoiced  value  of  8437,026,541  in 
gold.  In  the  same  time  we  exported  foreign  and  domestic  goods 
and  specie  valued  at  8438,999,349  in  currency.  Reducing  this  to 
gold,  we  have  8343,233,932  of  exports,  against  8437,026,541  of  im 
ports,  and  a  balance  against  us  for  the  year  1869  *  of  893,792,609  in 
gold. 

*  In  these  pages,  instead  of  "  the  fiscal  year  ending  June  30,  18 — ,"  the  phrase 
"  the  year  18 — "  will  be  commonly  used. 


14  DOES  PROTECTION   PROTECT? 

It  is  true  that  exports,  if  trade  between  this  and  other  countries 
be  profitable,  have  a  purchasing  power  in  foreign  ports  considerably 
greater  than  their  valuation  in  our  own.  The  merchant  who  ships 
a  cargo  of  wheat  or  cotton  to  Liverpool  expects  to  sell  it  there  for  a 
sum  larger  than  its  value  here — enough  larger  to  cover  the  cost  of 
freight  and  yield  a  profit.  But  a  large  share,  both  of  freight-money 
and  of  profits,  goes  to  foreigners.  The  report  for  the  year  1869 
states  that  69  per  cent,  of  our  imports  and  67  per  cent,  of  our  ex 
ports  were  in  foreign  vessels,  but  the  proportion  of  freight-money 
paid  to  foreign  vessels  is  still  larger,  for  the  more  expensive  trans 
atlantic  trade  is  done  more  largely  in  foreign  bottoms  than  the 
traffic  with  Canada,  the  West  Indies,  Mexico,  and  South  America. 
Treasury  returns  do  not  enable  us  to  ascertain  accurately  either  the 
aggregate  of  freight-money,  or  the  proportion  paid  to  foreign  ves 
sels,  but  the  aggregate  has  been  estimated  at  sixty  millions,  and,  if 
that  estimate  is  correct,  more  than  forty  millions  must  be  yearly 
paid  for  freight  to  foreign  vessels.  Of  the  profits  of  foreign  trade, 
it  is  probable  that  a  proportion  equally  large  goes  to  foreign  dealers, 
who  have  many  agencies  and  branch  houses  in  New  York.  What 
ever  difference  there  may  be  between  the  returned  value  of  our  ex 
ports  and  their  purchasing  power  when  delivered  abroad,  not  less 
than  two-thirds  of  it  goes  to  foreigners,  either  in  the  form  of  freight- 
money  or  of  profits,  and  not  more  than  one-third  can  be  regarded  as 
applied  to  payment  for  our  imports.  Omitting  reexports,  and  de 
ducting  them  from  foreign  imports  also,  we  have  net  imports  for  the 
year  $411,896,374,  and  domestic  exports  $318,103,765  in  gold.  It 
will  hardly  be  supposed  that  the  exports  were  enhanced  in  value  fay 
transportation  more  than  18  per  cent,  in  the  average,  and,  if  we  add 
one-third  of  this,  6  per  cent.,  or  $19,086,225,  to  the  value  of  domes 
tic  exports,  we  have  $337,189,990  as  the  purchasing  power  of  those 
exports  delivered  in  foreign  ports.  But  the  goods  purchased  were 
valued  in  foreign  ports  at  $411,896,374. 

Not  only  are  we  buying  each  year  more  than  we  sell,  but  we  have  a 
large  foreign  debt  on  which  we  pay  interest.  It  has  been  estimated 
that  at  least  six  hundred  millions  of  United  States  bonds  are  held 
abroad,  and  we  have  also  State  and  city,  railroad,  and  other  corpo 
ration  bonds  held  in  Europe  to  an  amount  not  known,  on  which 
some  interest  is  paid.  In  September  Mr.  Greeley  estimated  that  our 
whole  bonded  indebtedness  to  Europe  was  over  one  thousand  mill 
ion  dollars.  In  his  report  for  1870,  Special  Commissioner  Wells  es 
timates  that  indebtedness  at  $1,400,000,000.  If  we  suppose  the 


PROTECTION  DOES  NOT  PREVENT  OVERTRADING.      15 

lower  estimate  approximately  correct,  the  interest  on  this  sum, 
about  sixty  millions,  must  be  paid  by  our  exports.  Let  us  suppose 
that  we  actually  send  abroad  for  interest-money  only  fifty  millions ; 
deducting  this  sum  from  the  purchasing  value  of  our  exports,  we 
have  $287,189,990  in  gold  to  pay  for  imports  valued  at  $411,896,374, 
and  the  balance  of  trade  against  us  for  the  year  appears  to  be 
$124,706,384.  Not  even  this  large  sum,  it  is  believed,  fully  repre 
sents  the  real  balance  against  us.  It  is  known  that,  in  many  cases, 
foreign  goods  are  invoiced  at  prices  below  their  true  value,  to  escape 
part  of  the  duty.  A  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  has  declared  his  be 
lief  that  this  undervaluation  amounts  to  not  less  than  fifty  millions 
yearly.  The  actual  balance  against  us  may  upon  these  estimates 
be  placed  at  one  hundred  and  seventy-five  millions  in  gold. 

In  the  statement  of  domestic  exports  was  included  the  sum  of 
$37,301,426  in  specie  exported.  If,  instead  of  treating  gold  as  mer 
chandise,  we  regard  it  as  money,  the  balance  against  us  will  appear 
still  greater.  Our  net  imports  of  merchandise  exceeded  our  exports 
of  merchandise  of  domestic  production  by  $131,094,035.  Making  the 
same  estimates  as  before  for  the  increased  value  of  exports,  freight, 
profits,  interest,  and  undervaluations,  the  balance  due  from  this  to 
other  countries  appears  to  have  been  not  less  than  $212,007,810,  of 
which  we  remitted  $37,301,426  in  specie. 

Never  before,  since  this  nation  first  declared  its  independence, 
has  the  balance  against  us  been  as  large.  In  1864  the  merchandise 
balance  was  larger  by  over  eighteen  millions,  but  we  remitted  over 
ninety-two  millions  of  specie,  and  had  much  less  to  pay  on  account 
of  interest.  In  1866  our  imports  were  larger,  but  we  exported  so 
largely  that  the  merchandise  balance  was  only  eighty-nine  millions, 
and  we  remitted  over  seventy-five  millions  in  specie.  Prior  to  the 
war,  the  merchandise  balance  against  us  was  never  sixty-two  mill 
ions,  and  we  were  then  exporting  only  our  surplus  of  gold.  In  a 
word,  our  foreign  trade  has  never  before  presented  as  unfavorable 
an  aspect  as  in  the  fiscal  year  1869. 

The  people  of  this  country  have  been  taught  by  the  advocates 
of  a  protective  tariff  that  it  would  check  overtrading,  diminish  im 
ports,  and  cause  them  to  be  exceeded  by  exports,  and  thus  turn  the 
balance  of  trade  in  our  favor.  From  the  earliest  days,  men  de 
servedly  honored  for  ability  and  sincere  patriotism  have  argued  that 
high  duties  on  imports  must  check  purchases  of  foreign  goods,  and 
stimulate  the  production  of  needed  wares  and  fabrics  at  home. 
Through  years  of  heated  political  strife,  this  was  ever  a  main  and 


, 


16  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

very  effective  argument  in  behalf  of  the  protective  ^system.  It 
seemed  consistent  with  the  teachings  of  common-sense.  »  Plain  men, 
who  did  not  think  they  fully  understood  the  tariff  question,  still 
thought  it  clear  that  a  high  duty  on  one  foreign  article  must  check 
its  importation,  and  hastily  jumped  to  the  conclusion  that  high 
duties  on  all  would  check  the  importation  of  aIL_^  So  widely  has  this 
argument  gained  lodgment  in  the  minds  of  men  that  to-day,  when 
ever  it  is  shown  that  we  are  buying  more  than  we  can  pay  for,  and 
running  into  debt  to  Europe,  not  a  few  instinctively  say,  "  We  must 
shut  out  these  foreign  goods  by  a  higher  tariff !  "  Nor  is  this  the 
reasoning  of  those  only  who  have  not  studied  the  question.  Mr. 
Greeley  has  been  for  many  years  prominent  in  discussion  of  this  sub 
ject,  and  has  gained  much  reputation  by  an  adroit  use  of  facts, 
which  has  seemed  to  many  readers  to  prove  that  he  was  fully  and  cor 
rectly  informed.  Undoubtedly  there  are  few  men  in  the  country  who 
have  given  to  the  subject  more  labor.  In  his  work  on  "  Political 
Economy,"  the  ripest  fruit  of  many  years  of  investigation,  he  con 
stantly  betrays  the  presence  and  mastery  in  his  mind  of  one  fixed 
idea,  that  a  high  tariff  will  diminish  imports.  Thus,  in  his  seven 
teenth  chapter,  he  says :  "  When  we  had  low  tariffs,  we  increased 
debts  abroad,"  and  urges  adherence  to  the  essential  provisions  of 
the  existing  tariff,  "  with  no  expectation  of  supplying  all  our  wants 
from  domestic  sources,  but  with  a  resolute,  firm,  intelligent  purpose 
that  our  exports  shall  soon  be  made  to  overbalance  our  imports, 
so  that  we  may  cease  transmitting  to  Europe  bonds." 

We  are  living  to-day  under  the  highest  tariff  ever  enforced  in  this 
country.  Beginning  with  a  law  deemed  fully  protective  in  1861, 
in  order  to  still  more  effectually  exclude  foreign  goods,  we  have  made 
eleven  amendments  or  revisions,  each  raising  the  duties  on  some  ar 
ticles,  and  several  adding  materially  to  the  general  average  of 
duties.  In  1868  the  amount  collected  by  duties  was  44  per 
cent,  of  the  entire  value  of  imports,  and  48  per  cent,  of  the 
value  of  all  dutiable  imports.  The  attempt  to  shut  out  foreign 
goods  and  diminish  importations  has  been  faithfully  made,  and  per 
sisted  in  for  nine  years,  and  yet  we  find  that  in  the  last  year  the 
balance  of  trade  against  us  is  greater  than  it  has  ever  been  before, 
under  any  tariff,  since  the  earliest  settlement  of  the  country.  If, 
under  the  highest  duties  ever  imposed,  the  balance  of  trade  against 
us  becomes  larger  than  ever  before,  must  we  not  conclude  that  a 
high  tariff  does  not  prevent  overtrading  ? 

The  advocates  of  the  existing  tariff  reply  that  the  excess  of  im- 


PROTECTION  DOES  NOT  PREVENT  OVERTRADING.  17 

ports  is  caused  entirely  by  the  inflation  of  the  currency  and  the  re 
cent  war.  The  correctness  of  this  explanation  may  be  tested  by 
examining  the  effect  of  similar  tariffs,  in  times  when  there  had  been 
no  recent  war,  and  when  the  currency  was  not  inflated.  At  the  close 
of  this  chapter  will  be  found  a  table  of  exports  and  imports  since  the 
organization  of  the  government,  with  the  excess  of  either. 

When  the  war  of  the  Revolution  ended  in  acknowledgment  of  the 
independence  of  these  colonies,  we  had  no  central  government  em 
powered  to  control  commerce  with  foreign  nations,  and  the  power  of 
taxing  imports  was  exercised  at  pleasure  by  the  different  States.  In 
those  dark  days,  the  comparative  liberality  of  New  York  encouraged 
foreign  trade,  and  laid  the  foundation  of  her  commercial  supremacy. 
With  the  formation  of  a  government  empowered  to  regulate  com 
merce  began  the  history  of  our  tariffs.  Much  stress  has  been  laid 
upon  the  fact  that  the  founders  of  the  republic  imposed  duties  upon 
imports.  Their  example  is  not  necessarily  an  unerring  guide.  The 
nation  was  then  weak ;  its  industry  was  in  its  infancy.  It  does  not 
appear  that,  in  all  the  discussions  of  those  times,  any  of  those  promi 
nent  in  the  formation  of  the  government  ever  advocated  discrimi 
nating  duties  except  as  a  temporary  measure,  adapted  to  the  condi 
tion  of  a  people  just  beginning  national  existence.  Still  less  does 
it  appear  that  of  these  patriots  there  was  a  single  one  who  imagined 
that  it  was  possible  to  protect  every  branch  of  industry  at  once. 
Arguments  offered  in  favor  of  any  protection  whatever  contemplated 
only  a  temporary  discrimination  in  favor  of  a  few  of  the  most  im 
portant  branches  of  industry.  Whether  these  fathers  of  the  repub 
lic  believed  in  duties  prohibitive  in  purpose,  or  tariffs  averaging 
44  per  cent.,  we  may  judge  from  the  fact  that  until  1807,  when 
those  difficulties  with  European  powers  began  which  led  to  em 
bargoes  and  war,  the  duties  actually  imposed  never  averaged 
higher  than  16  per  cent,  of  the  value  of  imports,  and  were  usu 
ally  about  10  per  cent.,  and  in  six  years  even  less.  Yet  we  had 
just  emerged  from  the  war  of  the  Revolution,  with  a  heavy  debt,  and 
wrere  then,  if  ever  in  our  history,  in  a  position  to  need  protection  for 
infant  industries.  The  result  proved  the  wisdom  of  moderate  du 
ties.  A  vast  carrying-trade  fell  into  our  hands ;  the  commerce  of  the 
young  nation  excited  the  envy  and  roused  the  fear  of  the  most  pow 
erful  ;  our  imports  for  the  years  1800  to  1807,  inclusive,  exceeded 
eight  hundred  millions  of  dollars.  Nearly  forty  years  after,  during 
the  eight  years  ending  with  1845,  they  were  but  little  greater.  Nor 
was  this  rapid  growth  of  commerce  due  to  the  carrying-trade  alone. 
2 


18  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

In  those  early  days  we  exported  domestic  produce  worth  forty  or 
fifty  millions  yearly,  and  our  progress  in  domestic  industry  was  yet 
more  wonderful.  "  Never  in  the  history  of  the  world,"  says  Seybert, 
"was  there  a  more  rapid  and  extraordinary  prosperity."  Those 
great  branches  of  manufacture,  which  have  since  been  thought  to 
need  so  much  aid,  then  rapidly  advanced  under  competition,  and  in 
1810  were  thought  to  be  firmly  established.  The  war  interrupted 
our  commerce,  and  caused  a  fatal  inflation  of  our  currency.  Its  close 
was  followed  by  the  extravagant  importations  which  inflation  in 
vites,  by  the  depreciation  and  abandonment  of  the  currency,  by  pros 
tration  of  banks  and  of  business,  and  by  general  distress.  The  first 
tariff  for  protection  was  passed  in  1816.  The  fact  that  this  distress 
followed  it  only  deserves  mention  as  showing  that  protective  duties 
do  not  prevent  the  disastrous  effects  which  naturally  flow  from  a  cor 
ruption  of  the  currency  and  an  overthrow  of  the  banking  system. 

The  detailed  records  of  the  Treasury  commence  with  1821.  In 
that  year  the  country  was  still  suffering  from  the  disorder  already 
described.  But,  as  soon  as  it  began  to  revive,  importations  in 
creased.  Demands  for  heavier  duties,  to  shut  out  foreign  goods, 
were  answered  by  the  higher  tariff  of  1824.  Four  years  proved 
that  it  was  not  satisfactory,  and  a  still  higher  tariff  was  granted  in 
1828.  In  the  first  period,  1821  to  1824  inclusive,  the  imports 
were  $303,955,539,  and  exports,  $287,820,350 ;  excess  of  imports, 
$16,135,189.  In  the  second  period,  1825  to  1828  inclusive,  under 
higher  duties,  imports  were  $349,305,444,  and  exports,  $331,720,223  ; 
excess  of  imports,  $17,585,221.  In  spite  of  the  increased  duties, 
imports  had  increased  more  than  exports.  Then  the  extreme  pro 
tective  tariff  was  adopted,  Congress  being  determined,  it  would 
seem,  to  test  the  theory  then  held  by  advocates  of  protection,  and 
still  adhered  to  by  Mr.  Greeley,  that  high  duties  would  make  our 
exports  exceed  our  imports.  Accordingly,  with  "  a  firm,  intelligent 
purpose  "  of  that  sort,  the  experiment  was  made,  and  in  the  third 
period,  1829  to  1832  inclusive,  imports  were  $349,589,837,  and  ex 
ports  were  only  $314,695,705 ;  excess  of  imports,  $34,894,132.  It 
is  true,  imports  were  reduced  in  the  first  and  second  years  under  this 
tariff,  but  in  the  third  rose  to  a  larger  value  than  had  ever  been  im 
ported  in  any  year  since  the  war.  Meanwhile,  exports  had  been 
reduced,  and  the  balance  of  trade  against  us  was  increased  from  the 
seventeen  millions  of  the  preceding  period  to  nearly  thirty-five 
millions. 

Never  in  our  history  have  we  given  to  any  policy  a  longer,  more 


PROTECTION   DOES  NOT  PREVENT  OVERTRADING.  19 

uninterrupted,  and  faithful  trial  than  we  then  gave  to  the  plan  of 
causing  exports  to  exceed  imports  by  means  of  protective  duties, 
increased  from  time  to  time  at  the  desire  of  protected  interests.  Is 
it  not  plain  that  the  effort  failed  ?  Our  imports,  three  times  tempo 
rarily  checked,  had  each  time  recovered  more  than  they  had  lost,  and 
during  the  whole  period  of  twelve  years  had  largely  increased.  But 
our  exports  had  been  checked,  and,  as  compared  with  1818,  when 
the  second  protective  tariff  was  passed,  or  1825,  the  year  after  the 
third  increase  of  duties,  had  been  actually  reduced.  Meanwhile,  no 
inflation  of  the  currency  had  existed  to  account  for  these  events. 
The  protective  system  had  been  thoroughly  and  fairly  tried.  If 
history  teaches  any  thing,  if  fair  trial  can  prove  any  thing,  it  surely 
was  proved,  by  the  experiments  of  1818  to  1832,  that  high  duties  do 
not  permanently  shut  out  importations,  but  do  check  exports  of 
domestic  products;  and  that  protection,  therefore,  does  not  cause 
exports  to  exceed  imports.  The  people  of  that  time,  at  any  rate, 
seem  to  have  learned  the  lesson,  for  they  demanded  and  obtained  a 
change  of  policy. 

We  are  seeking  to  ascertain  the  effect  of  former  protective 
tariffs,  in  times  when  the  currency  was  not  inflated.  The  tariff  of 
1833-1842  was  not  protective,  and  during  the  years  1833-1837 
occurred  a  remarkable  inflation  of  the  currency,  accompanied  by 
excessive  importations,  which  will  be  considered  at  a  proper  time. 
The  currency  was  not  restored  to  a  proper  level  until  the  closing 
years  of  that  tariff,  when  imports  fell  below  exports,  and  the  years 
1840-1842  inclusive  show  a  balance  of  twenty-three  millions  in  our 
favor.  Nor  did  the  protective  tariff  of  1842  immediately  work  a 
.change ;  for,  in  the  first  year  of  its  operation,  the  balance  in  our 
favor  was  about  twenty  millions.  But  in  1844  this  balance  was  re 
duced  to  less  than  three  millions ;  in  1845  the  situation  was  so 
changed  that  imports  exceeded  exports  by  nearly  three  millions; 
and  in  1846  the  balance  against  us  was  over  eight  millions.  The 
system  was  then  a  second  time  abandoned.  This  second  experi 
ment,  adopted  at  a  time  when  exports  exceeded  imports,  in  its  first 
year,  by  twenty  millions,  in  less  than  four  years  worked  such  a 
change  that  imports  exceeded  exports  by  over  eight  millions.  In 
this  case,  also,  it  is  impossible  to  say  that  inflation  of  the  currency 
produced  the  result.  For  the  currency  in  circulation  was  actually 
less  in  1846,  when  the  excess  of  imports  was  eight  millions,  than  it 
was  in  1840,  when  the  exports  exceeded  imports  by  twenty-five 
millions.  And  in  this  instance,  too,  the  same  phenomenon  is  a 


20  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

second  time  presented — imports  increased  in  spite  of  duties  intended 
to  check  them ;  but  exports  were  checked,  remained  almost  station 
ary  during  the  four  years,  and  were  smaller  in  1846  than  they  had 
been  in  1840,  and  smaller  for  the  last  three  years  of  that  tariff  than 
they  had  been  for  the  last  three  years  of  the  tariff  of  low  duties 
which  had  preceded. 

The  non-protective  tariff  of  1846  continued  in  operation  until 
1857,  and  was  then  changed  for  another  of  similar  character,  but 
lower  duties.  The  closing  years  of  this  period,  the  seven  years 
1855  to  1861  inclusive,  deserve  mention  as  the  first  in  our  history  in 
which  the  balance  of  trade  was  turned  decidedly  in  our  favor.  For 
the  first  time  our  exports  exceeded  our  imports  every  year,  and  the 
balance  in  our  favor  during  the  seven  years  named  was  one  hundred 
and  eighty-four  millions.  Thus  ended  the  first  serious  trial  of  the 
non-protective  policy.  And,  whereas  the  mere  approach  of  that 
policy  in  1840-'42  gave  us  the  first  three  years  of  peace  in  which 
the  aggregate  of  exports  exceeded  the  aggregate  of  imports,  the 
fair  trial  of  that  policy  gave  us  in  its  last  seven  years  a  balance  of 
one  hundred  and  eighty-four  millions  in  our  favor.  Toward  the 
close  of  the  fiscal  year  1861,  the  protective  system  was  again 
adopted.  Since  that  time  we  have  endeavored  most  faithfully, 
by  frequently-increased  duties,  to  exclude  foreign  goods.  Both 
in  frequency  of  changes  and  in  severity  of  imposts,  this  period 
surpasses  any  other  in  our  history.  Its  result,  reducing  exports 
to  gold  values,  and  including  specie,  has  been  as  follows  :  imports, 
$2,598,849,217;  exports,  $1,796,988,873;  balance  against  us, 
$284,600,939.  But  of  this  aggregate  of  exports  $517,259,405  has 
been  in  gold.  The  balance  of  trade,  not  counting  gold  as  merchan 
dise,  has  therefore  been  $801,860,344,  or  one  hundred  millions  a  year 
against  us.  Or,  comparing  this  period  with  the  preceding  period 
of  non-protection,  the  account  stands  thus :  Non-protection,  seven 
years,  balance  one  hundred  and  eighty-four  millions  in  our  favor ; 
protection,  eight  years,  balance  two  hundred  and  eighty-four  millions 
against  us. 

The  first  period,  1821-1824,  of  moderate  protection,  gave  a 
balance  against  us  of  sixteen  millions. 

The  second  period,  1825-1828,  of  higher  duties,  gave  a  balance 
against  us  of  over  seventeen  millions. 

The  third  period,  1829-1832,  of  extreme  protection,  gave  a 
balance  against  us  of  nearly  thirty-five  millions. 

The  fourth  period,  1843-1846,  of  high  protection,  changed  the 


PROTECTION  DOES  NOT  PREVENT  OVERTRADING.  21 

situation  from  a  balance  in  our  favor  of  twenty  millions  to  a  balance 
against  us  of  eight  millions.  ( " 

The  fifth  period,  1862-'69,  of  increasing  anci  extreme  duties,  has 
given  a  balance  against  us  of  two  hundred  and  eighty-four  millions, 
although  in  the  seven  years  preceding,  under  low  and  non-protective 
duties,  the  balance  in  our  favor  was  one  hundred  and  eighty-four 
millions. 

If  it  be  possible  for  any  theory  to  be  refuted,  conclusively  and 
forever,  by  official  records,  surely  the  theory  that  high  protective 
duties  check  overtrading,  prevent  imports,  and  turn  the  balance  of 
trade  in  our  favor,  is  so  refuted.  And  any  man  who  clings  to  the 
protective  system,  "  with  a  firm,  intelligent  purpose "  to  cause  ex 
ports  to  exceed  imports,  has  studied  facts  with  little  benefit,  and  his 
right  to  call  his  purpose  "  intelligent "  may  well  be  doubted.  In 
deed,  the  facts  are  so  conclusive  that  the  ablest  writers  who  support 
protection  now  maintain  that  a  high  tariff  not  only  permits,  but  en 
courages  and  even  causes  increased  importations,  or,  in  the  words 
of  Mr.  Carey,  that  a  protective  is  the  only  true  revenue  tariff. 

It  will  be  observed  that  it  is  not  denied  that  inflation  of  currency 
stimulates  increased  importations,  nor  that  inflation  has  increased 
the  recent  extravagant  overtrading.  But,  by  comparison  with  other 
periods  in  which  the  currency  was  not  inflated,  it  has  appeared  that 
high  tariffs  check  importations  only  for  a  single  year  or  two,  if  at  all, 
and  that  the  accompanying  decrease  of  exports  has  left  the  balance 
of  trade  against  us  larger  in  each  period  of  high  duties  than  in  a 
corresponding  period  of  lower  protective  or  non-protective  duties. 
From  these  facts  it  follows,  not  only  that  high  tariffs  do  not  prevent 
overtrading,  but  that  they  do  not  effectually  shelter  our  industries 
against  competition.  If,  in  spite  of  them,  or  as  Mr.  Carey  reasons, 
because  of  them,  our  people  buy  more  largely  of  foreign  products  in 
the  aggregate  under  high  duties  than  under  low  duties,  is  there  not 
already  reason  to  suspect  that  a  protective  tariff,  from  some  cause 
or  other,  tends  to  defeat  its  own  object  ?  It  aims  to  exclude  foreign 
goods.  The  facts  prove  that  in  the  aggregate  it  does  not  exclude, 
but  permits,  if  it  does  not  cause,  an  increased  importation  of  them. 
If  the  importation  of  some  is  lessened,  that  of  others  is  increased 
still  more  largely,  and  hence,  while  some  interests  may  be  favored, 
the  competition  which  American  industry  in  the  aggregate  has  to 
meet  from  foreign  industry  is  increased  rather  than  diminished. 
That  this  inference  is  not  erroneous,  will  appear  when  the  progress 
of  manufactures  is  examined. 


22  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT 

v^x  % 

"But  can  a  high  tariff  possibly  cause  increased  importations?" 
it  will  be  asked.  In  two  ways.  It  may  increase  prices,  secure  arti 
ficial  profits  to  particular  industries  at  the  expense  of  the  community 
at  large,  increase  the  cost  of  living  and  the  cost  of  production  and 
of  materials,  so  that  the  cost  of  our  manufactured  product  is  increased 
more  than  the  duty  adds  to  the  cost  of  the  foreign  article.  On  the 
other  hand,  Mr.  Henry  C.  Carey,  whose  acknowledged  ability  and 
vigor  have  made  him  the  leader  of  the  modern  advocates  of  protec 
tion,  maintains  that  a  high  tariff  confers  such  blessings  on  a  people, 
so  stimulates  their  industry,  so  fully  employs  their  labor,  and  secures 
to  all  such  ample  reward,  as  to  enable  them  to  buy  of  foreign  nations 
more  than  they  can  under  any  other  system.  Both  of  these  theories 
so  far  accord  with  the  actual  increase  of  importations  after  the  effect 
of  high  duties  is  felt,  that  we  may  ascribe  them  to  some  examination 
of  facts,  rather  than  to  that  preconceived  notion  of  what  a  tariff 
ought  to  do  which  alone  can  account  for  the  idea  that  high  duties 
prevent  overtrading.  But  the  theory  of  Mr.  Carey  does  not  account 
for  the  decrease  of  exports.  In  1817,  we  were  exporting  $87,671,560, 
and,  at  the  close  of  the  long  era  of  progressive  protection  in  1832, 
we  were  exporting  only  $87,176,943.  Yet  during  that  time  popula 
tion  had  increased  from  8,918,687  to  13,698,665.  In  the  only  period 
of  long-continued  low  duties,  our  exports  increased  from  one  hun 
dred  and  nine  millions  in  1846,  to  three  hundred  and  seventy- 
four  millions  in  1861,  a  gain  of  more  than  two  hundred  per 
cent,  in  fifteen  years,  while  in  the  fifteen  years  under  prottfction 
exports  actually  decreased !  Moreover,  if  Mr.  Carey's  theory  be 
accepted,  it  proves  too  much,  for  imports  were  vastly  greater  in  1837 
and  1857,  under  low  duties,  than  in  any  year  prior  to  the  war  under 
high  duties.  If  we  are  to  ascribe  increase  of  importations  to  a  con- ' 
dition  of  prosperity,  in  which  labor  is  well  rewarded,  and  people  are 
able  to  buy  largely,  then  a  condition  of  far  greater  prosperity  appears 
to  have  existed  under  low  duties,  in  the  years  mentioned  and  others, 
than  in  any  time  of  high  duties.  A  different  explanation  is  needed 
to  account  for  all  the  facts. 


PROTECTION  DOES  NOT  PRETEXT  OVERTRADING. 


23 


Exports  and  Imports,  Gross  Value,  from  the  Beginning  of  the  Government  to  June  30,  1869. 


EXPORTS. 

Domestic. 

Foreign. 

Total. 

E*ce«Expts. 

1790   

$19,566,000 

$539  156 

$20  205  156 

$23  000  000 

$2  794  844 

1791  
1792 

18.500.000 
19  000000 

512,041 
1  753  098 

19,012.041 
20  7">3  098 

29.200.000 
31  500  000 

10.187,959 
10  746  902 

1793  

24.000,000 

2  109.572 

26.109  572 

31.100,000 

4  990  428 

1794  

26.500.000 

6  526  233 

33  026  233 

34  600  000 

1  573  767 

1795    

39  500,000 

8  489  472 

47  989  472 

69  756  268 

21  766  796 

1796... 

40,764.097 

26.300,000 

67.064.097 

81.436.164 

14  372  067 

1797  

29.850.206 

27  000,000 

56  850  206 

75,379  406 

18  529  200 

1798  

28.527.097 

33  000  000 

61  527  097 

68  551  700 

7  024  603 

1799  
1800... 
1801... 

83,142.532 

31,840,903 
47.473.204 

45.523,000 
39.130,877 
46,642.721 

78,665.522 
70,971,780 
94,115,925 

79,069.148 
91,252,768 
111.363.511 

403,626 

20,280.988 
17  247  586 

1802  

36,708.189 

35  774  971 

72  483  160 

76  333  333 

3  850  173 

1803   .  .  . 

42.205,961 

13  594  072 

55  800  033 

64  666  666 

8  866  633 

1804  

41.467  477 

36  231  597 

77  699  074 

85  000  000 

7  300  926 

1805 

42  387  002 

53  179  019 

95  566  0^1 

120  600  000 

2o'033'979 

1806  

41,253,727 

60,283.2315 

101  536,963 

129,410,000 

17  873'037 

1807  

48,699.592 

59  643  558 

108  343  150 

138  500  000 

30  156  850 

1808  ... 

9,433546 

12  997  414 

22  430  960 

56  990  000 

34  559  040 

1809  

31.405.702 

20,797,531 

52.203.233 

59,400.000 

7,196  767 

1810  

42.366.675 

24.391.295 

66,657,970 

85  400  000 

18  742  030 

1811  

45.294.043 

16  022  790 

61  316  833 

53  400  000 

$7,916  833 

1812  

30.032  109 

8  495  127 

38  527  236 

77  030  000 

38  502  764 

1813... 

25.008.132 

2,847,865 

27.855.927 

22  005  000 

5,850,927 

1814 

6  782  272 

145  169 

6  927  441 

12  965  000 

6  041  559 

1815  

45,974,403 

6.583.350 

52,567  J58 

113!041^274 

60,483,521 

1816 

64,781  896 

17  138  156 

81  920  452 

147  103  000 

65  182  548 

1817  

68.313,500 

19358  069 

87  671  560 

99  250  000 

11  578  440 

1818  

73,854,437 

19  426  696 

93  281  133 

121  750  000 

28  468  867 

1819  
1820 

50.976,838 
51  683  640 

19.165,686 
18  008  029 

70.142.521 
69  691  669 

87,125.000 
74  450  000 



16.982.479 
4  758  331 

1821  
1822  

48,871,894 

49,874079 

11,808,488 

22  286  202 

64,974.382 
72  160  281 

62.ft85.724 
83  241  541 

2,088,658 

11  081  260 

1823   

47  155  408 

27  543  622 

74  699  030 

77  579  267 

2  880  237 

1824    

50  649  500 

25  337  157 

75  986  657 

89  549  007 

" 

13  562  350 

1S25 

66  944  745 

32  590  643 

99  535  388 

9g'g4o'o75 

3  195  313 

1826... 

53.055.710 

24.530.612 

77,595.322 

84,974^477 

7,379,155 

1827  
1828 

53,921.691 
50  669  669 

23.403.136 
21  595  017 

82,324.727 
72  264  686 

79,484,068 
88  509  8°4 

2,840,659 

16  245  138 

1829  
1830  

55.700.193 
59462029 

16,658,478 
14,387  479 

72.358,671 
73  849  508 

74,492.527 
70  876  920 

2972  588 

2,153,856 

1831   

61  277  057 

20  033  526 

81  310  583 

103  191  124 

21  880  541 

1832 

63  137  470 

24  039  473 

87  176  943 

101  029  966 

18  852  •;•>•;! 

1833  

70.317,698 

19  822  735 

90  140  443 

108'll8?311 

17  977  868 

1834 

81  024  162 

23  312  811 

104  336  973 

126  521  332 

22  184  359 

1835  

101.189.082 

20,504.495 

121,693,577 

149,895.742 

28  202  165 

1836  

106.916.680 

21,746  3(50 

128  663  040 

189  980  035 

61  316  995 

1837  

95,564414 

21  854  962 

117  419  376 

140  989  °17 

23  569  841 

1838 

96  033  821 

12  45''  795 

108  486  616 

113  717  404 

5  230  788 

1839  

103.5,33,891 

17,494  525 

121,028  416 

162  092  132 

41  063'716 

1840  

113,895.634 

18  190  312 

132085936 

107  141  519 

24  944  417 

1841    .  .. 

106,382  722 

15  469  081 

121  851  803 

127  946  177 

6  094  374 

1842 

92  969  996 

11  701  538 

104  691  534 

100  162  087 

4  529  447 

1843  

77,793,783 

6  552  697 

84  346  486-  - 

64753  799 

19  592  681 



1844  

99,715,179 

11  484  867 

111  200  04ft- 

108  435  035 

2  765  Oil 

1845  
1846 

99.299,776 
1"2  841  893 

15,346,830 
11  346  623 

114,646,606 
113  488  516 

117,254,564 
121  691  797 

2.607,958 
8  203  281 

1847  
1848   

150.637,464 
132  904,121 

8,011.158 
21  128  010 

158.648,622^- 
154  032  131 

—146.545,638 
154  998  928 

12,102,984 

966  797 

1849  
1850  

132,666,955 
136,946.912 

13.088,865 
14.951,808 

145,755.820 
151,898,720 

147,857,439 
178,138.318 



2,101619 
26,239,598 

1851  

196,689,718 

21  698  293 

218  388  Oil  

-216  224  932 

2  163  079 

1852  

192  368  984 

17  289  382 

209  658  366 

212  945  442 

3  287  076 

1853  
1854 

213.417,697 
253  390  870 

17,558,460 
24  850  194 

230.976,157 
278  241  064 

267.978,647 
304  562  381 



37.002,490 
26,821  317 

1855  
1856  

1857 

246,  708.553 
310,586,330 
338  985  065 

S8,U8\m 

16.378.578 
23  975  617 

275.158,846 
326.964,908- 
36°  %0  682 

261,468.520 
314,639,942 
360  890  141 

13.688,326 
12,324.966 
2  070  541 

1858 

293  758  279 

30  886'  142 

304  fin  401 

28'-*  613  150 

42  031  271 

1359  

335  894,385 

20  895  077 

356  789  462-- 

838  768  130 

18  021  332 

1860  .  ... 

346  256  252 

26  933  0°2 

373  189  274 

362  166  254 

11  023  020 

1861  

36-2,191.047 

20,645,427 

382,836  474* 

352  739  387 

30  097,097 

1862 

199  107  587* 

14  145  973 

213  253  560* 

275  446  939 

62  193  379 

1863  

214,283.928* 

26  123  584 

240  407  512* 

252  919  920 

12,512,408 

1864  

221  710  108* 

20  256  940 

241  967  048* 

329  565  134 

87  598  086 

1865  

164  121  298* 

32  114  157 

196  235  455* 

248  555  652 

52  320  197 

1866  
1867  

402.399,967* 
313,739,145* 

14,742.117 
20.611,508 

417,142,084* 
334  350  653* 

415.512,158 
411  733  309 

28,370.074 
77,382.656 

1868  

330.592.764* 

22.195  438 

352  788  202* 

373409^*48 

20,621,246 

1869  

318,103,765* 

25.130,167 

343.233.932* 

437.026,541 

93,792,609 

*  Merchandise  export*  since  I860,  reduced  to  gold  values. 


24 


DOES  PROTECTION   PROTECT? 


EXPOKTS  AND  IMPORTS,  COIN  AND  MERCHANDISE,    FROM  1821  TO  1868, 

INCLUSIVE. 


YEAR. 

IMPORT  ENTRIES. 

TotaL 

RE-EXPORTS. 

Net  Imports. 

COIN. 

Specie. 

Merchandise. 

Specie. 

TotaL 

Domestic  Exp. 

1821.. 
1822.. 
1823.. 
1824.. 
1825.. 
1826.. 
1827.. 
1828.. 
1829.. 
1830.. 
1831.. 
1832.. 
1833.. 
1834.. 
1835.. 
1836.. 
1837.. 
1838.. 
1839.. 
1840.. 
1841.. 
1842.. 
1843.. 
1844.. 
1845.. 
1846.. 
1847.. 
1848.. 
1849.. 
1850.. 
1851.. 
1852.  . 
1853.. 
1854.. 
1855.. 
1856.. 
1857.. 
1858.. 
1859.. 
I860.. 
1861.. 
1862. 
1863. 
1864. 
1865. 
1866. 
1867.. 
1868.. 
1869.. 

$8.064,890 
3,369,846 
5,097.896 
8,379,835 
6,150,765 
6,880,966 
8,151.130 
7,489,741 
7,403,612 
8,155,964 
7,305,945 
5,907,5  >4 
7.070,368 
17,911,632 
13,131.447 
13,400,881 
10,516,414 
17,747,116 
5.595,176 
8,882,813 
4,988.633 
4,087,016 
22,390,559 
5,830,429 
4,070,242 
3,777,732 
24.121.289 
6,360,284 
6.651,240 
4,628,792 
5,453,592 
5,505,044 
4.201,382 
6,939,342 
3.659,812 
4.207,632 
12,461,799 
19,274,496 
7,434,789 
8,550,135 
46,339.611 
16,415,052 
9,584,105 
13,115,612 
9,810,072 
10,700,092 
22,070,475 
13,702,928 

$54,520,834 
79,871,695 
72,481,371 
81,169,172 
90,189,310 
78.093,511 
71,332,938 
81,020,083 
67,088,915 
62,720.956 
95,885,179 
95,121,762 
101,047,943 
103,609,700 
136,764,295 
176,579,154 
130,472,803 
95,970,288 
156,496,956 
98,258,706 
122.957,544 
96,075,071 
42.363,240 
102,604,606 
113,184,322 
117,914,065 
122,424.349 
148,638,644 
141,206,199 
173,509.526 
210,771,340 
207,440,398 
263.777,265 
297,623,039 
257,808,708 
310,432,310 
348,428,342 
263,338,654 
331,333,341 
353,616,119 
306,399,776 
259,031,887 
243,335,815 
316,449.522 
238,745,580 
434,812,066 
389,662,834 
359,706,520 

$62,585,724 
83,241,541 
77,579,267 
89,549,007 
96,340,075 
84,974,477 
79,484.068 
88,509.824 
74,492,527 
70,876,920 
103,191,1-^4 
101,029,266 
108,118,311 
126,521,332 
149,895,742 
189,980,035 
140,989,217 
113,717,404 
162,092.132 
107,141,519 
127,946,177 
100,162,087 
64,753,799 
108,435.035 
117,254,564 
121,691,797 
146,545,638 
154,998,928 
147,857,439 
178,138,318 
216,224,932 
212,945,442 
267,978,647 
304,562,381 
261.468,520 
314,639,942 
360.890,141 
282,613,150 
338,768,130 
362.166,254 
352,739,387 
275,446,939 
252,919,920 
329,565,134 
248,555,652 
445,512,158 
-411,733,309 
373,409,448 
437,026,541 

$10,478,059 
10,810,180 
6,372,897 
7,014,552 
8,797,055 
4,098,678 
6,971,306 
7,550,439 
4.311,123 
1,241,622 
6,956,457 
4,245.399 
2,244.859 
1,676,258 
5,748.174 
3,978.598 
4,692,730 
3,035,105 
6,868.385 
6,181,941 
7,287.846 
3,642.785 
1,413.362 
5,270,809 
7.762,049 
3,481,417 
1,844,404 
13,141,204 
4,447,774 
5,476,315 
11,403,172 
5,236,298 
3,938,340 
3,218,934 
2,289,925 
1,597,206 
9,058,570 
10,225,901 
6,385.106 
9,599,338 
5,991,210 
5,842,989 
8,163,049 
4,922,979 
3,025,102 
3,400,697 
5,892,176 
10,038,127 

$21,302,488 
22,286.202 
27,543,622 
25.337,157 
32,590,643 
24530.612 
23,403,136 
21.595,017 
16.658.478 
14,387,479 
20,033,526 
24.039,473 
19.822,735 
23,312,811 
20,504.495 
21,746,360 
21,854,962 
12,452,795 
17,494.525 
18,190,312 
15.469.081 
11,721,538 
6.552,697 
li;484,867 
15,346,830 
11,346,623 
8,011,158 
21,128,010 
13,088,865 
14,951,808 
21.698.293 
17,289,382 
17,558,460 
23,748,514 
28,448,293 
16,378,578 
23.975,617 
30,886,142 
20,895,077 
26,933,022 
20.645.427 
14,145,973 
26.123,584 
20,256,940 
32,114,157 
14,742,117 
20,611,508 
22,195,438 
25,130,167 

$41,283,236 
60,955,339 
50,035,645 
64,211,850 
63,749,432 
60,443,865 
56,080,932 
66,914,807 
57,834,049 
56,489,441 
83,157,598 
76.989.793 
88,295,576 
103,208,521 
129,391,247 
168,233,675 
119,134,255 
101,264,609 
144.597,607 
88,951.207 
112,477.096 
88,440,549 
58,201,102 
96,950,168 
101.907,734 
110,345,174 
138,534,480 
133,870.918 
134,768,574 
163,186,510 
194,526.639 
195,656,060 
250.420.187 
280,813,8(57 
233,020,227 
298,261.364 
336,914,524 
251.727,008 
317,873,053 
335.233,232 
a32,093.960 
261,300,966 
226.796,336 
309,308,194 
216,441,495 
430,770,041 
391,121,801 
351,214,010 
411,896,374 

$605,855 
1,043,574 
693,037 
612,886 
937,151 
2,058,474 
1,410,941 
366,842 
400,500 
729,601 
345,738 
1,2*3,519 
472,941 
1,998,358 
2,235,073 
2,746,487 
1,170,754 
107,429 
183,405 
844,446 
423,851 
62,620 
2.700,412 
956,874 
2,046,679 
18,069,580 
37,437,837 
23,548,535 
38,062.570 
53.957,418 
44,148,279 
60,078,352 
42,407,246 
57,502,305 
56,946,851 
23,799,870 
31,044,651 
55,993,562 
100,321.371 
64,618.124 
82,643.374 
54,976,196 
83,746,161 

CURRENCY  AND  IMPORTS.  25 

CHAPTER    III. 

CURRENCY    AND    IMPORTS. 

No  one  who  attentively  considers  the  record  of  our  foreign  trade 
fail  to  observe  that  the  influence  of  changes  of  tariff,  either  to 
check  or  to  stimulate  importations,  has  been  much  less  than  has 
commonly  been  supposed.  Great  changes  in  the  current  of  trade, 
for  which  no  tariff  accounts,  have  already  been  observed.  The  geol 
ogist,  as  he  searches  the  surface  of  the  earth  for  traces  of  its  history, 
finds  here  and  there  paltry  mounds  which  human  hands  have  reared ; 
here  and  there  ridges  or  indentations  which  tell  of  the  action  of 
winds  or  waters.  But,  when,  in  his  journeyings,  he  reaches  the 
frowning  mountain-ranges,  stretching  from  continent  to  continent, 
where  the  very  foundations  of  the  earth  have  been  uplifted,  he  reads 
there  the  working  of  tremendous  forces  which  lie  imprisoned  within 
the  earth  itself;  compared  with  which  the  waves  and  their  ridges, 
the  currents  and  their  indentations,  and  the  human  hands  which  have 
heaped  up  little  mounds,  seem  alike  insignificant.  In  searching  the 
history  of  commerce,  we  find  slight  changes  which  may  be  traced  to 
the  action  of  tariffs,  or  to  temporary  conditions  in  this  country  or  in 
Europe.  But  there  are  also  mighty  upheavals  which  tell  of  a  power 
greater  than  any  of  these.  The  line  of  our  commerce  now  rises,  in 
majestic  swell,  for  a  period  of  many  years,  and  then  suddenly  drops 
again,  as  if  the  very  foundations  of  trade  had  given  way.  Reading 
the  record  in  the  light  of  tariffs  only,  we  are  like  those  who  puzzle 
over  some  hieroglyphic  writing  of  which  the  key  is  yet  unknown. 
The  growth  of  imports  from  1830  to  1837,  the  sudden  collapse  in 
1837  and  1838,  the  advance  of  fifty  millions  in  1839,  and  the  fall  of 
nearly  sixty  millions  which  followed — these  changes  are  not  consistent 
with  the  regular  reduction  of  duties  by  only  two  per  cent.,  and  they 
tell  of  a  power  far  greater  than  these  paltry  changes  of  tariff  which 
then  occurred.  Equally  inexplicable,  if  we  have  only  the  tariff  to 
guide  us,  are  the  sudden  fall  of  eighty  millions  in  imports  in  the  year 
1858,  and  the  sudden  recovery  in  1859.  To  explain  these  changes, 
we  must  seek  for  a  power  more  mighty  in  its  influence  over  the 
prosperity  and  commerce  of  a  country  than  any  changes  of  tariff. 
We  all  know  that  in  1837  and  1857  there  were  great  changes  in  our 
currency.  Prior  to  those  years  there  had  been  expansion  of  cur 
rency,  and  our  imports  had  also  been  largely  increased.  In  those 


20 


DOES  PROTECTION   PROTECT? 


years  the  banks  suspended,  the  currency  was  violently  contracted, 
and  imports  were  suddenly  reduced.  These  coincidences  suggest 
some  comparison  of  the  changes  of  currency  with  the  changes  in  our 
importations. 

During  the  War  of  1812,  our  currency  increased  from  about 
forty  millions  to  about  one  hundred  millions  in  1816,  and  was  then 
reduced,  by  general  overthrow  of  banks,  to  about  fifty-five  millions 
in  1820.  In  like  manner,  our  imports  for  domestic  consumption,  which 
in  1807  had  been  about  seventy  millions,  as  soon  as  the  war  closed 
rose  to  over  one  hundred  millions,  and  to  one  hundred  and  thirty 
millions  in  1816,  and  were  then  reduced  to  about  sixty  millions  in 
1820.  From  1820  to  1833  the  currency  increased  a  little  faster 
than  population,  and  our  imports  increased  in  like  proportion. 
From  1833  to  1837  the  currency  rose  very  rapidly  to  two  hundred 
and  twenty-two  millions,  and  the  imports  were  in  like  manner  in 
creased  from  eighty  to  one  hundred  and  sixty-nine  millions.  From 
1837  to  1843  the  currency  was  contracted  from  two  hundred  and 
twenty-two  to  one  hundred  and  twenty-eight  millions,  and  imports 
shrank  from  one  hundred  and  sixty-nine  to  fifty-eight  millions. 
Again,  from  1843  to  1857,  the  currency  was  expanded  from  one  hun 
dred  and  twenty-eight  to  four  hundred  and  seventy-four  millions, 
and  the  gross  imports  rose  from  sixty-four  to  three  hundred  and 
sixty  millions.  In  1857  the  currency  was  violently  contracted,  and 
imports  were  instantly  reduced.  For  more  accurate  comparison  a 
diagram  is  necessary.  The  quantity  of  currency  actually  in  circula 
tion  at  different  periods  it  is  not  possible  to  ascertain  with  certainty 
or  exactness.  But,  from  estimates  by  Secretaries  of  the  Treasury, 
especially  Gallatin  and  Crawford,  from  reports  of  congressional 
committees,  and  estimates  of  statistical  writers,  the  following  fig 
ures  have  been  gathered,  which  probably  approximate  as  closely 
to  the  actual  circulation  in  the  years  mentioned  as  it  is  now  possible 
to  do.  The  figures  are  millions  and  decimals  : 

CIRCULATION. 


YEARS. 

Specie. 

Paper. 

Total. 

Currency. 

Imports. 

1790  

16. 

3. 

19. 

22. 

22.4 

1792  

12. 

7. 

19. 

24. 

29.7 

1804  

17.5 

13. 

30.5 

42. 

48.7 

1808 

14 

22  7 

36  7 

60  7 

78  8 

1816 

7  5 

110 

117  5 

136 

129  9 

1819 

8. 

62. 

70 

109  5 

67  9 

1820 

16 

44. 

60. 

89  4 

56  4 

1829  

8.5 

52.7 

.      61.2 

95.7 

57.8 

CURRENCY  AND  IMPORTS.  27 

The  irfiports  for  1807  are  given ;  our  trade  in  1808  was  inter 
rupted  by  the  embargo.  No  other  reliable  statistics  or  estimates 
have  been  found,  except  the  estimates  of  Gallatin  for  the  years  1814 
and  1815,  which  are  of  no  value  for  our  purpose,  for  our  foreign 
commerce  in  those  years  was  not  uninterrupted.  It  is  not  supposed 
that  the  figures  given  are  absolutely  correct,  nor  is  it  possible  to  ob 
tain  exact  information  of  the  amount  of  specie  and  paper  in  actual 
circulation  in  those  early  times,  but  the  aggregates  of  actual  circu 
lation  and  of  currency  in  the  country  are  sufficiently  reliable  to  show 
that  there  was  a  remarkable  parallelism  between  the  currency  of  the 
country  and  its  imports  for  consumption.  In  every  case  an  increase 
or  decrease  of  circulation  and  of  currency  is  accompanied  by  a  cor 
responding  increase  or  decrease  of  imports.  Were  statistics  ob 
tainable  for  the  years  of  peace  not  given,  it  is  probable  that  the  co 
incidence  would  be  still  more  striking.  And  the  increase  of  imports 
bears  a  general  proportion  to  the  increase  of  currency,  especially 
where  the  statistics  of  currency  are  most  reliable. 

From  the  year  1830  onward,  more  complete  information  of  the 
amount  of  currency  is  obtained.  The  following  table  is  based  main 
ly  upon  one  prepared  from  the  official  records,  by  the  New  York 
Economist.  In  this  table  only  bank-notes  and  specie  are  included 
as  currency.  It  has  been  carefully  verified  by  comparison  with  such 
records  as  the  writer  has  been  able  to  obtain,  additions  having  been 
made  for  the  years  1829,  1831,  1832,  and  1834,  for  which  the  Econ 
omist  gave  no  figures.  Treasury  reports  of  1834  and  1836,  with  a 
calculation  of  the  quantity  of  specie  in  the  country,  and  comparison 
of  returns  of  the  banks  of  the  different  States,  as  far  as  those  could  be 
found,  supply  data  sufficiently  complete  to  justify  the  figures  given. 
Thus  the  returns  of  the  Massachusetts  banks  (given  at  the  close  of  the 
chapter)  show  an  increase  of  circulation  from  $5,124,070  in  1830  to 
$7,739,317  in  1831,  and  a  decrease  to  87,122,856  in  1832.  Returns 
of  other  banks  show  similar  changes ;  while  the  specie  in  the  coun 
try,  estimated  at  thirty-three  millions,  in  1830,  by  Gallatin,  was  de 
creased  $1,708,986  by  exportation,  but  increased  nearly  as  much  by 
the  discovery  of  gold  in  North  Carolina,  which  increased  the  coinage 
at  the  mint  to  nearly  four  millions.  In^J1834  the  circulation  of  the 
banks  was  reported  as  $94,839,570,  and  the  specie  in  the  country  had 
been  increased  by  January  of  that  year,  by  imports  and  yield  from 
the  mines,  then  delivering  a  million  a  year,  to  over  forty-four  mill 
ions.  With  similar  data  the  figures  of  the  Economist  have  been 
compared,  and  their  substantial  correctness  may  be  accepted  with 


28  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

qualification  as  to  the  years  1838,  1839,  1840,  and  1855.  'The  quan 
tity  of  paper-money  in  the  country,  after  the  first  suspension  of  the 
banks  in  1837,  by  no  means  accurately  indicates  the  quantity  accept 
ed  as  currency,  for  the  notes  of  many  banks  were  altogether  refused, 
while  the  notes  of  others  were  passed  only  at  a  discount.      The 
specie  in  the  country  was  increased  by  importation  of  $14,239,070, 
so  that  it  was  probably  eighty-five  millions  by  the  beginning  and 
about  ninety-two  millions  by  the  middle  of  the  year  1838  ;  but  the 
paper  in  circulation,  reported  as  $116,138,910  at  the  beginning  of 
the  year,  probably  includes  at  least  twenty  millions  of  notes,  which 
were  actually  refused,  and  not  effective  as  currency.     With  these 
data,  the  effective  currency  for  that  year  may  probably  be  placed  at 
one  hundred  and  eighty-two  millions.     Nor  were  all  the  dead  notes 
in  circulation  quickened  by  the  temporary  resumption  of  the  next 
year,  or  accepted  as  currency ;  and,  though  the  quantity  of  paper 
•returned  was  $135,170,995,  it  is  probable  that,  of  paper  effective  for 
currency,  there  was  not  more  than  one  hundred  and  fifteen  millions, 
which,  with  eighty-nine  or  ninety  millions  of  specie,  would  give  an 
effective  currency  of  two  hundred  and  five  millions.     The  second 
suspension  reduced  the  paper  circulation  reported  to  $106,986,572; 
but   of  this   quantity,   again,  it   is   probable   that   a   considerable 
proportion   was    ineffective — perhaps    twenty-five    millions.      The 
quantity  of   paper  kept  afloat  by  banks,  which  were  not  entirely 
thrown    out   before   the   year   1842,   was    only  eighty-three   mill 
ions;  and,  if  we  suppose  that  not   more  than  eighty  millions  of 
the  quantity  in  circulation  in  1840  was  accepted  as  currency,  and 
add  ninety  millions  of  specie,  we  have  an  effective  circulation  of  one 
hundred  and  seventy  millions.     For  the  year  1855  the  figures  of  the 
Economist  are  four  hundred  and  forty-four  millions,  an  increase  of 
twenty-six  millions,  as  compared  with  1854.     But  the  paper  in  cir 
culation  was  eighteen  millions  less  in  1855  than  in  1854,  namely, 
only  one  hundred  and  seventy-eight  millions.     And  the  quantity  of 
specie  was  reduced  by  the  export  of  $52,587,531,  while  the  coinage 
was  also  less  than  in  1854.     No  estimate  of  the  quantity  of  specie 
in  circulation  will  warrant  placing  the  currency  for  1855  higher  than 
three  hundred  and  ninety-four  millions,  and  these  figures  are  there 
fore  substituted  for  those  of  the  Economist.     In  the  second  column 
we  have  placed  the  imports  of  merchandise  for  consumption,  and  in 
the  third  and  fourth  are  given  the  rate  of  currency  per  capita,  and 
of  imports  per  capita. 


IMPORTS  AND  CURRENCY,  PER  CAPITA,  FOR  THIRTY-TWO  YEARS,  1829-'61. 

The  dotted  line — 1837  to  1841 — represents  the  supposed  quantity  of  effective  currency 
(gold  and  paper  in  circulation)  during  suspension  of  specie  payments.  It  should  be  re 
membered  that  imports  are  for  fiscal  years,  from  September  until  1843,  and  thence  from 
June  30th.  But  estimates  of  currency  and  bank  returns  are  mainly  from  January  to  Janu 
ary.  Thus  the  currency,  about  January,  1837,  was  $222,000,000,  but  contraction  began,  and 
the  banks  suspended  several  months  before  the  fiscal  year  1837  closed. 


Net  Imports, 
per  capita.. 


1829  '30  '31  '32  '33  '31  '35  '30  '37  '38  '39  '40  '41  '42  '13  '44  '45  '46  '47  '48  '49  '00  '51  '52  '53  '54  '55  '56  '57  '56  '59  '60  '61 


CURRENCY  AND  IMPORTS, 
MOVEMENT  OP  CURRENCY  AND  IMPORTS  COMPARED. 


29 


TEAK. 

Currency. 

Imports. 

PER  C 

APITA. 

Currency. 

Imports. 

1829  

$95,700,000 

$57  834  049 

7  70 

4  61 

1830 

93  000  000 

56  489  441 

7  20 

4  31 

1831 

117  ooo'ooo 

83  157  598 

8  80 

6  95 

1832 

112  000  000 

76  98°)  793 

8  20 

5  61 

1833  
1834 

119,000,000 
139  000  000 

88,295,576 
103  °08  521 

8.50 
9  60 

6.25 
7  09 

1835    ..  . 

183  000  000 

1°9  391  247 

12  40 

8  64 

1836  

205  000  000 

168  233  675 

13  30 

10  93 

1837  

222,000,000 

119  134  255 

14  00 

7  53 

1838  

203,000,000 

101  264,609 

12.50 

6  23 

1839  

222,000,000 

144  597,607 

13.40 

8  68 

1840 

190  000  000 

88  951  207 

11  20 

5  21 

•  1841 

187  000  000 

112  477  096 

10  70 

6  38 

1842  
1843 

143,700,000 
128  500,000 

88,440,549 
58  201  102 

8.00 
6  90 

4.87 
4  15 

1844 

175  000  000 

96  950  168 

9.10 

5  03 

1845    ..  . 

186,000  000 

101  907  734 

9.40 

5  15 

1846  . 

202,500  000 

110  354  174 

9.90 

5  42 

1847  

225,500  000 

138  534  480 

10.70 

6  60 

1848  

240,000,000 

133  870  918 

11.10 

6  25 

1849  

234,700,000 

134  768,574 

10.50 

6.13 

1850  

285,000,000 

163,186,510 

12.20 

7.03 

1851  

341,000,000 

194,526,639 

14.20 

8.14 

1852  

360,000,000 

195,656,060 

14.50 

7.95 

1853 

380  000  000 

250  420  187 

14  80 

9  88 

1854 

418  600  000 

280  813  867 

15  80 

10  71 

1855 

394  600  000 

233  020  227 

14  50 

8  67 

1856 

446  200  000 

298  261  364 

16.10 

10  77 

1857 

474  300  000 

336  914  524 

16.70 

11.81 

1858  

406  600,000 

251,727,008 

14.00 

8.57 

1859  

458,800,000 

317,873,053 

15.80 

10.50 

1860  

457,000,000 

335,233,232 

14.50 

10.80 

The  returns  of  imports  are  for  fiscal  years  ending  in  September 
prior  to  1843,  and  June  30th  since ;  the  statements  of  currency  are 
from  returns  near  the  1st  of  January  in  the  years  named. 

It  will  at  once  be  observed  that  there  exists  an  astonishing  cor 
respondence  between  these  records.  Every  expansion  of  currency  is 
found  to  be  accompanied  by  an  increase  of  imports,  and  every  con 
traction  by  a  reduction  of  imports,  except  in  the  years  1840  and  1848. 
For  1840,  if  we  substitute  the  estimate  already  given  of  effective  cur 
rency,  the  correspondence  is  exact.  The  currency  in  1848  was  af 
fected  by  the  famine  and  disasters  in  Europe.  In  every  other  year 
since  1829,  as  in  every  year  prior  to  that  of  which  we  have  records 
of  currency,  a  contraction  of  currency  is  accompanied  by  a  reduc 
tion  of  imports  and  an  expansion  of  currency  by  an  increase  of  im 
ports.  But  the  relation  of  long  columns  of  figures  to  each  other  is 
not  easily  borne  in  mind ;  therefore  a  diagram  is  given,  representing 
by  two  lines  the  changes  of  currency  and  of  imports,  each  per  capita. 


30  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

Both  lines  are  drawn  in  fidelity  to  the  table  just  given,  and  upon  the 
same  scale,  though  for  convenience  they  are  brought  near  each  other 
the  base-line  representing  $3  per  capita  for  imports,  and  $5  per 
capita  for  currency.  For  1838,  1839,  and  1840,  a  dotted  line  is 
given  for  the  effective  currency  per  capita,  according  to  the  esti 
mates  already  made. 

No  reasoning  being  can  study  this  remarkable  correspondence 
of  facts  without  attributing  it  to  a  relation  of  cause  and  effect. 
One  or  two  coincidences  might  be  ascribed  to  chance.  But  chance 
does  not  trace  such  lines  as  these.  Nothing  less  than  an  irresistible 
law  by  which  one  series  of  events  has  controlled  the  other,  or  both 
have  been  alike  controlled  by  a  third,  can  account  for  the  fact  that 
during  thirty-two  years,  under  tariffs  of  all  kinds,  from  the  highest 
to  the  lowest,  in  spite  of  the  wonderful  development  of  our  resources 
and  growth  of  our  manufactures,  and  in  spite  of  famines  or  com 
mercial  revulsions  on  either  side  of  the  ocean,  the  lines  of  imports 
and  of  currency  follow  each  other  in  every  rise  and  fall  as  if  chained 
together.  In  every  change,  for,  when  such  absolute  correspondence 
appears  elsewhere,  the  correctness  of  the  estimates  of  effective  cur 
rency  in  the  years  1838-'42  is  strongly  confirmed  by  the  fact  that 
these  estimates  correspond,  while  the  record  of  aggregate  currency, 
effective  and  non-effective,  does  not  correspond,  with  the  changes  of 
foreign  trade  in  those  years.  But  the  correspondence  at  all  other 
points,  between  records  extending  for  thirty-two  years,  is  surely  con 
vincing  enough.  If  there  can  be  absolute  demonstration  of  cause 
and  effect,  we  surely  have  it  in  this  marvellous  parallelism.* 

Which  is  cause  and  which  effect  ?     Is  the  quantity  of  currency 
controlled  by  the  increase  or  decrease  of  importations  ?    A  moment's 

*  Since  this  chapter  was  completed,  the  attention  of  the  writer  has  been  called 
to  a  very  similar  diagram  and  demonstration  in  the  elaborate  work  of  Hon.  Amasa 
Walker,  entitled  "  The  Science  of  Wealth."  Mr.  Walker,  however,  includes  as  cur 
rency  the  bank  circulation  and  deposits,  so  that  the  figures  given  differ  materially. 
Yet  the  correspondence  remains,  and  that  writer  holds  it  demonstrated  "  beyond 
cavil  that  the  demand  for  foreign  merchandise  depends  upon  the  quantity  of  cur 
rency  in  the  country."  It  may  justly  be  observed  that  this  conclusion  is  not  logi 
cally  unavoidable  ;  that  some  other  cause  may  have  controlled  both  the  changes  of 
the  currency  and  the  movement  of  imports.  It  is  not  the  intention  of  this  work  to 
affirm  or  deny  the  conclusion  at  which  Mr.  Walker  arrives ;  for  the  present  purpose 
it  is  enough  to  prove  that  the  movement  of  imports  is  not  controlled  by  changes  of 
the  tariff,  but  corresponds  so  perfectly  with  changes  of  the  currency  as  to  demon 
strate  that  imports  are  either  controlled  by  the  currency,  or  that  both  are  controlled 
by  some  third  cause  independent  of  changes  of  the  tariff. 


CURRENCY  AND  IMPORTS.  31 

consideration  will  remove  that  idea  from  the  mind.  The  currency  is 
used  in  performing  the  domestic  exchanges  of  the  whole  country, 
and  these  amount  to  thousands  of  millions  in  value,  while  importa 
tions  amount  only  to  hundreds  of  millions.  In  foreign  exchanges, 
only  a  small  part  of  our  currency,  namely,  the  specie,  could  be  used, 
and  it  will  appear  that  the  quantity  of  specie  in  the  country  has  va 
ried  very  differently  from  the  quantity  of  currency.  Yet  the  changes 
o£^  currency  not  used  in  foreign  trade  correspond  exactly,  while  the 
quantity  of  specie  which  may  be  used  in  foreign  trade  does  not 
correspond  with  the  movement  of  imports.  It  is  not  reasonable  to 
suppose  that  the  variations  of  a  currency  used  for  domestic  exchanges 
amounting  to  thousands  of  millions  have  been  controlled  by  a  foreign 
trade  amounting  to  hundreds  of  millions  only,  in  which  that  currency 
has  not  been  used,  while  the  movement  of  specie,  which  may  have 
been  used  in  those  foreign  exchanges,  has  not  been  so  controlled. 
Yet  the  correspondence  of  facts  demonstrates  that  some  relation  of 
cause  and  effect  exists.  We  are  forced  to  believe,  either  that  the 
quantity  of  imports  for  consumption  is  controlled  by  the  quantity  of 
currency,  or  that  both  4are  alike  controlled  by  some  other  cause.  If 
the  latter  hypothesis  be  adopted,  it  is  enough  for  the  present  purpose 
to  know  that  this  other  cause  cannot  be  the  changes  of  the  tariff. 
A  comparison  of  the  lines  representing  the  movement  of  currency 
and  of  imports  with  the  diagram  showing  the  percentage  of  duties 
to  imports  under  different  tariffs  will  show  how  complete  is  the  lack 
of  correspondence,  and  will  convince  every  mind  that  the  controlling 
cause  of  fluctuations  in  the  currency  or  in  imports,  whatever  it  may 
have  been,  has  certainly  not  been  the  change  in  tariffs.  These  com 
parisons  show  that  imports  have  repeatedly  increased  or  decreased 
greatly,  while  the  tariff  has  remained  substantially  the  same,  and 
that  increase  of  duties  has  neither  been  followed  uniformly  by  de 
crease  nor  by  increase  of  imports,  nor  has  decrease  of  duties  been 
followed  uniformly  by  increase  or  decrease  of  imports.  In  short, 
whatever  the  real  cause  of  large  importations  may  be,  whenever  that 
cause  has  existed,  imports  have  increased  in  spite  of  high  duties  or 
low  duties,  tariff  reduction  or  tariff  increase,  and,  whenever  that 
cause  has  been  removed,  imports  have  fallen  off  whether  the  duties 
have  been  heavy  or  light,  increasing  or  decreasing.  But,  in  each 
of  these  changes,  imports  have  corresponded  with  the  changes  of  cur 
rency. 

When  currency  is  expanded,  money  is  plenty,  and  is  easily  ob 
tained  for  tlic  transaction  of  business — including  the  importation  of 


32  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

foreign  goods.  High  prices  and  expansion  of  currency  occur  contem 
poraneously,  and  when  currency  is  contracted  low  prices  prevail. 
But  high  prices  invite  the  seller.  Whenever  prices  in  this  country 
are  higher  than  in  other  countries,  importation  becomes  profitable, 
and  goods  rush  hither  for  sale.  At  such  times,  also,  abundance  of 
money  stimulates  other  branches  of  business,  people  'feel  able  to 
consume  more  largely  of  foreign  products,  and  have  plenty  of  money 
with  which  to  buy.  There  is  an  easy  money-market  for  borrowers, 
a  profitable  margin  for  importations,  and  a  quick  sale.  If  water  will 
run  down-hill,  foreign  goods  will  flow  into  a  country  where  these 
conditions  exist.  But,  when  the  currency  is  contracted,  and  low 
prices  prevail,  the  margin  of  profit  in  importations  narrows  or  closes, 
the  seller  is  repelled,  money  is  scarce  for  borrowers,  and  there  exists 
a  general  contraction  of  business  and  purchases.  Thus  it  is  easy  to 
see  that  the  condition  of  the  currency  must  affect  importations,  while 
the  facts  prove  that  in  all  changes  the  correspondence  has  been  com 
plete.  It  is  not  necessary  in  this  inquiry  to  enter  upon  that  much- 
debated  question  whether  expansion  of  currency  is  a  cause  or  con 
sequence  of  high  prices,  nor  to  ask  whether  some  other  cause,  con 
trolling  at  once  domestic  exchanges,  foreign  importations,  and 
movements  of  currency,  may  not  produce  the  parallelism  observed 
in  the  phenomena.  But  the  parallelism  between  these  events,  and 
the  non-correspondence  between  changes  of  importations  and  changes 
of  tariff,  leave  no  room  to  doubt  that  the  tariff  does  not  control  im 
portations,  and  that  they  are  controlled  either  by  the  currency  or  by 
some  other  influence  coinciding  and  cooperating  with  that,  and  not 
coinciding  with  the  tariff  in  effect. 

It  has  been  claimed  that  the  great  periods  of  inflation,  specula 
tion,  and  subsequent  prostration,  occurring  under  low  tariffs,  have 
been  caused  by  the  tariff;  that  excess  of  foreign  importations  has 
produced  bankruptcy ;  and  that  these  disorders  can  be  prevented 
only  by  protective  duties.  If  the  conclusions  be  accepted  to  which 
facts  have  led  us,  it  will  be  conceded  that  the  excess  of  importations 
was  a  consequence  and  not  a  cause  of  the  expansion  of  the  currency; 
that  changes  in  foreign  trade  amounting  to  hundreds  of  millions  can 
not  have  produced  an  inflation  of  the  currency  used  in  domestic 
exchanges  amounting  to  thousands  of  millions ;  and  that  the  low 
tariff,  if  it  has  in  any  manner  contributed  to  cause  the  inflation,  can 
have  done  so  only  by  producing  such  activity  of  domestic  business, 
such  vigor  of  production,  such  a  demand  for  consumption,  and  such 
rapidity  of  the  societary  circulation,  as  to  bring  about  expansion  of 


CURRENCY  AND  IMPORTS.  33 

currency  and  rise  of  prices.  In  other  words,  low  duties  so  greatly 
promoted  the  prosperity  and  stimulated  the  business  and  industry  of 
the  country,  that  men  anticipated  too  bright  a  future,  that  credit 
was  too  widely  extended,  that  currency  expanded  beyond  the  limit 
of  safety,  and  some  temporary  revulsion  became  necessary  to  correct 
the  evils  engendered  by  a  prosperity  too  great  and  too  rapidly  at 
tained.  If  the  advocate  of  protective  duties  is  driven  to  this  position, 
it  will  rest  with  him  to  show  that  we  cannot  secure  all  the  wonder 
ful  growth  resulting  from  low  duties,  without  the  disasters  which 
have  followed,  by  legislative  barriers  against  undue  expansion  of  the 
currency.  It  will  rest  with  him  to  show  that  the  evils  which  he 
ascribes  to  the  tariff  were  not  wholly  attributable  to  the  lack  of  a 
'  proper  system  of  currency  and  banking.  It  will  rest  with  him  to 
show,  also,  that  the  marvellous  progress  under  low  duties  was  more 
than  balanced  by  the  disasters  of  subsequent  prostration.  But  these 
periods  of  inflation  deserve  separate  consideration. 

COMMERCIAL   CKISES. 

No  discussion  of  the  tariff  question  is  conducted  without  frequent 
reference  to  the  great  commercial  disasters  of  1817,  1837,  and  1857. 
Other  seasons  of  prostration  have  indeed  occurred,  but  they  have 
been  less  severe,  less  extended  in  effect  upon  different  industries, 
and  are  therefore  less  frequently  referred  to  in  discussion.  Before 
proceeding  further,  we  may  well  notice  briefly  the  nature  and  causes 
of  these  revulsions.  It  may  appear  that,  in  selecting  these  for  fre 
quent  reference,  both  advocates  and  opponents  of  protection  have 
given  peculiar  attention  to  those  very  disasters  which  were  in  the 
least  degree  produced  by  changes  of  duty.  In  each  case,  unnatural 
expansion  of  the  currency  and  the  credit  system  and  the  resulting 
failure  of  banks  were  the  immediate  causes  of  disaster,  but  it  is  main 
tained  by  writers  of  reputation  that  the  speculation  and  expansion 
were  produced  or  greatly  increased  by  unrestricted  importations, 
and  that  the  flood  of  foreign  goods,  breaking  down  our  domestic 
industry,  caused  the  subsequent  failure  of  banks  and  contraction  of- 
currency. 

Of  the  revulsion  of  1817,  at  least,  this  cannot  be  pretended  with 
any  regard  to  the  facts.  The  expansion  began,  and  extended  so  far 
as  to  cause  general  suspension  of  the  banks,  during  the  war,  when 
our  foreign  trade  was  almost  wholly  interrupted.  The  suspension 
of  banks  began  in  Philadelphia,  August  29,  1817,  and  the  banks  of 
Xew  York  and  Maryland  followed  September  1st.  In  that  same 


34  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

year  the  imports  were  only  $12,965,000 — less  than  in  any  other  year 
in  our  whole  history.  The  treaty  of  peace  was  signed  on  the  24th 
of  December,  and  in  the  next  year,  after  the  suspension  of  the  banks, 
the  flood  of  foreign  goods  came  in.  It  cannot  be  said,  then,  that  the 
expansion  or  suspension  was  caused  by  any  excessive  importations. 
In  fact,  they  were  caused  by  the  measures  used  by  the  government 
to  carry  on  the  war ;  the  loans  amounting  to  over  sixty-two  millions 
in  the  three  preceding  years,  and  to  thirty-five  millions  in  1815 ; 
the  charter  of  countless  banks,  and  the  authorization  of  banking, 
manufacturing,  and  even  bridge  corporations,  to  issue  paper-money. 
Forty-one  banks  were  authorized  in  the  State  of  Pennsylvania  alone, 
within  the  six  months  preceding  the  suspension.  In  consequence, 
specie  bore  a  premium  of  about  twenty  per  cent,  before  the  banks 
failed,  and  the  revival  of  foreign  trade  with  a  flood  of  depreciated 
paper-money  in  circulation,  and  with  all  prices  enormously  high,  was 
necessarily  most  injurious  to  industries  already  much  embarrassed. 
Relieved  of  all  obligation  to  pay  in  specie,  the  banks  loaned  without 
measure,  and  increased  their  issues  greatly,  and  a  year  or  two  of 
fictitious  prosperity  followed,  but  the  attempt  to  resume  specie  pay 
ments  brought  all  the  unsoundness  to  light,  and  caused  terrible  dis 
tress.  The  government  refused  to  receive  paper-money  after  Feb 
ruary  20,  1817;  the  United  States  Bank  and  branches  went  into 
operation  at  the  same  time,  forcing  other  banks  to  resume ;  and  in 
the  December  previous  the  Bank  of  England,  after  suspension  since 
1797,  began  to  pay  specie  for  small  notes.  These  measures  brought 
on  a  general  bankruptcy,  a  suspension  of  business,  domestic  and 
foreign,  and  severe  sufferings,  which  lasted  until  1820.  Thi§  brief 
review  shows  that  no  excess  of  foreign  importations  caused  the  infla 
tion  and  the  breaking  of  the  banks,  but  it  occurred  under  a  suspen 
sion  of  foreign  trade  more  complete  than  the  highest  tariff  could  have 
produced ;  that  the  flood  of  foreign  goods,  which  continued  until  the 
resumption  of  specie  payments  and  the  violent  contraction  of  the 
currency,  was  caused  by  the  inflation  and  the  attendant  high  prices ; 
that  the  contraction  was  not  caused  by  any  change  of  tariff,  but  by 
the  refusal  of  paper  by  government  and  the  United  States  Bank,  and 
that  the  contraction  of  currency  brought  with  it  bankruptcy  and  dis 
tress,  as  well  as  a  decrease  of  importations. 

Scarcely  less  clear  is  it  that  the  inflation  which  culminated  in  the 
panic  of  1837  was  caused  not  by  the  tariff,  but  by  other  agencies. 
It  occurred  in  a  time  of  wonderful  prosperity,  and  when  duties  had 
been  not  violently  but  gradually  reduced  from  the  maximum  at- 


CURRENCY  AND  IMPORTS.  35 

tained  in  1832.  That  the  reduction  of  duties  caused  neither  the 
excessive  importations  nor  the  expansion  of  currency  appears  from 
the  fact  that  both  began,  as  has  been  shown,  in  1830,  before  any 
reduction  of  duties  took  place  (except  on  coffee,  tea,  and  molasses, 
duties  on  which  were  reduced  in  that  year),  and  that  neither  con 
tinued  as  the  reduction  of  duties  progressed  after  1837.  Indeed,  so 
plain  is  it  that  excessive  importations  did  not  prostrate  our  industry, 
that  Mr.  Carey,  in  a  pamphlet  discussing  the  history  of  the  iron 
manufacture,  absolutely  ignores  the  panic  of  1837,  and  does  not  dis 
cover  that  there  was  any  difficulty  until  1839  or  1840.  His  readers 
were  doubtless  astonished  to  find  the  great  collapse  of  1837  sup 
pressed  by  a  writer  so  distinguished,  but  they  will  search  his  reply 
to  Mr.  Wells,  and  some  other  pamphlets  by  him,  in  vain  for  any 
evidence  that  he  had  ever  heard  of  that  event.  The  reason  is  ob 
vious.  The  production  of  iron  continued  to  increase,  in  spite  of  re 
duced  duties  and  foreign  importation  s^  until  1839  or  1840,  and  that 
writer  therefore  found  it  inconvenient  to  refer  to  the  prostration  of 
1837  without  suggesting  another  and  more  reasonable  cause  for  the 
embarrassments  of  1840  than  the  reduction  of  duties. 

By  all  writers  of  that  time,  the  unsoundness  of  the  currency  is 
regarded  as  the  main  cause  of  the  disaster.  But,  in  the  heated  con 
tests  of  those  days,  the  cause  of  that  unsoundness  does  not  seem  to 
have  been  clearly  set  forth.  Intense  hostility  to  the  National  Bank, 
or  to  the  State  banks  selected  for  custody  of  the  deposits,  led  people 
to  ascribe  all  disasters  to  official  action  in  one  direction  or  another. 
Nor  can  it  be  doubted  that  the  distribution  of  twenty-eight  millions 
of  the  surplus  revenue  to  certain  State  banks,  with  scarcely-needed 
injunction  to  loan  it  liberally,  poured  oil  on  flame  already  too  fierce. 
But  the  main  cause  of  the  inflation,  as  the  records  of  that  time  seem 
to  prove  beyond  doubt,  wTas  the  speculation  in  Western  and  South 
ern  lands.  This  speculation  was  in  part  the  effect  of  causes  easily 
discovered.  The  Erie  Canal,  completed  in  1825,  soon  began  to  in 
crease  very  rapidly  the  value  of  Western  lands,  to  attract  immigra 
tion  to  the  Western  country,  and  to  build  up  thriving  towns  along 
the  lakes.  In  1830  the  steamboats  on  the  Western  rivers  numbered 
130,  and  their  tonnage  was  63,053 ;  in  1834  the  number  was  230, 
and  the  tonnage  122,474;  and  in  1837  the  tonnage  had  increased  to 
153,661.  Thus  the  successful  and  extensive  use  of  steam-vessels, 
and  the  building  of  canals,  the  Erie  and  others,  had  greatly  increased 
the  value  of  Western  lands.  At  the  same  time  the  price  of  cotton 
rose  in  Liverpool  from  six  to  eight  and  ten  cents  for  uplands,  and 


36 


DOES  PROTECTION   PROTECT? 


the  price  of  cotton  lands  was  greatly  increased.  Every  natural  and 
legitimate  increase  in  the  value  of  a  species  of  property  induces 
speculation  in  that  property  in  anticipation  of  further  advance,  and 
that  speculation  itself,  increasing  the  demand,  contributes  to  produce 
a  further  advance.  Thus  there  sprang  up  a  traffic  in  land  of  which 
the  following  record  of  the  receipts  from  sale  of  public  lands  gives 
proof:* 

RECEIPTS  FROM  SALE  OF  PUBLIC  LANDS,  t 


YEAR. 

Amount. 

YKAB. 

Amount. 

YEAH. 

Amount. 

1796 

$4  836  13 

1821 

$1  212  966  46 

1845 

$2  077  022  30 

1797  

83,540  60 

1822  

1,803,581  54 

I  1846  

2,694,452  48 

1798 

11  963  11 

1823 

916  523  10 

1847 

2,498,355  20 

1799 

1824 

984,418  15 

1  1848 

3  328  642  56 

1800 

443  75 

1825  . 

1,216,090  56 

!  1849  

1,688,959  55 

1801 

167  726  06 

1826 

1,393  785  09 

1850    

1,859,894  25 

1802 

188,628  02 

1827  

1,495,845  26 

1851  

2,352,305  30 

1803 

165,675  69 

1828   

1,018,308  75 

1852  

2,043,239  58 

1804 

487  526  79 

1829 

1,517  175  13 

1853    ..  . 

1  667,084  99 

1805 

540  193  80 

1830 

2  329  356  14 

1854 

8  470  798  39 

1806 

765,245  73 

1831  . 

3,210,815  48 

1855  

11,497,049  07 

1807 

466  163  27 

1832 

2,623  381  03 

1856   .  . 

8,917,644  93 

1808 

647,939  06 

18,33.. 

3,967,682  55 

1857... 

3,829,486  64 

1809 

442,252  33 

1834  

4.857,600  69 

1858  

3,513,715  87 

1810 

696  548  82 

1835 

14  757  600  75 

1859 

1,756,687  30 

1811 

1  040  237  53 

1836 

24  877  179  86 

1860  . 

1  778  557  71 

1812 

710,427  78 

1837   

6,766,236  52 

1861  

870,658  54 

1813 

835,655  14 

1838 

3  081  939  47 

1862    .  .. 

152,203  77 

1814  

1815   * 

1,135.971  09 
1  287^959  28 

1839  
1840 

7,076,447  35 
3,292,683  29 

1863  
1864  

167,617  17 
583,333  29 

1816 

1  717  985  03 

1841  

1  365  627  42 

1865   

966,553  31 

1817.  .  . 

1,991,226  06 

1842  

1,335,797  52 

1866  

665,031  03 

1818  
1819 

2,606,564  77 
3274,422  78 

1843  
1844  ..  .  . 

897,818  11 
2,059  939  80 

1867  
1868  

1,163,575  76 
1,348,715  41 

1820  

1,635,871  61 

It  appears  that  the  receipts  prior  to  1830  had  never  been  two  mill 
ions  in  any  year  except  in  1818  and  1819,  although  the  minimum  price 
prior  to  1820  was  $2  per  acre,  and  from  1820  onward  only  $1.25 
per  acre ;  that  in  the  year  1830  there  began  a  purchase  of  lands 
more  than  double  the  average  of  preceding  years,  doubtless  owing 
to  the  actual  enhancement  in  the  value  of  Western  lands  by  cheaper 
transportation ;  that  in  1833  the  receipts  were  about  four  millions, 
and  in  1834  about  five  millions ;  that  a  speculative  demand  then 
grew  up,  and  in  1835  the  receipts  mounted  suddenly  to  over  four 
teen  millions,  and  in  1836  to  nearly  twenty-five  millions.  During 
the  whole  decade  prior  to  this  speculation  there  had  never  been  more 
than  two  millions  of  acres  sold  in  a  year,  but  in  1835  there  were  sold 
twelve  millions,  and  in  1836  about  twenty  millions  of  acres.  Not 
all  the  enormous  immigration  since  that  day,  not  all  the  excitement 

*  In  the  chapter  on  immigration,  Diagram  X.,  will  be  found  a  representation  of 
the  sales  of  public  lands  at  different  periods. 
|  Report  of  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  1868. 


CURRENCY  AND  IMPORTS. 


37 


caused  by  the  discovery  of  gold  and  silver,  not  even  the  enormous 
increase  in  the  value  of  Western  lands,  after  the  building  of  new 
railroads  in  1854  and  1855,  caused  sales  of  land  in  any  year  one-half 
as  great  as  those  of  1836.  This  record  will  recall  to  the  minds  of 
those  who  remember  that  time  the  mad  speculation  which  raged 
throughout  the  country.  The  sales  by  government  were  but  the  be 
ginning  of  transactions  of  enormous  magnitude.  Paper  cities  sprang 
up  at  the  West  and  South  by  the  hundred.  The  lands  for  which 
forty  millions  of  dollars  were  paid  to  government  in  the  two  years 
1835  and  1836  were  quickly  sold  and  sold  again,  doubtless  for  four 
or  five  times  that  sum,  and  for  all  these  transactions  the  currency 
and  the  credit  were  supplied  by  the  banks.  Enormous  sums  were 
loaned  upon  real-estate  security,  and  the  lands  were  accepted  at  the 
imaginary  value  which  speculation  had  given  to  them.  Of  the  three 
hundred  millions  then  loaned  by  the  banks,  much  the  greater  part 
had  no  better  security  than  government  lands  thus  extravagantly 
valued,  paper  cities  projected  thereon,  and  corner  lots  and  eligible 
locations  in  every  Western  and  Southern  city.  For  the  speculation 
was  not  confined  to  wild  land  or  cities  "  in  nubibus"  as  may  be  in 
ferred  from  the  following  record  of  the  valuation  of  real  estate  in 
Mobile,  and  the  assessment  of  property  for  taxation  in  New  York 
City: 


YEAR. 

3 
Polls. 

lOBELE. 
Real  Estate. 

NEW  YORK. 

Assessed  Value. 

YEAR. 

MOBILE. 

NEW  YORK. 

Assessed  Value. 

Polls. 

Real  Estate. 

1820.. 

88 

$493,300 

$69.530,753 

1836.. 

617 

$18,050.080 

$309.500.920 

1821. 

211 

403.200 

68,285.070 

1837.. 

836 

27,482,961 

263,837.350 

1822. 

287 

419^550 

71,289.144 

1838.. 

1,487 

20.407:435 

264.  152.941 

1823. 

as2 

989.350 

83.431.170 

1839.. 

1,725 

21,098,915 

266.789,130 

1824. 

512 

832.125 

87,480.026 

1840.. 

1.453 

13.441,783 

252,8-13.163 

1825. 

334 

1,519,765 

101,160,046 

1841.. 

1,372 

17,601,950 

251,771,702 

1826. 

407 

1,535,640 

107,447.781 

1842.. 

1,615 

16,138.643 

237.806.901 

1827. 

471 

1.408,327 

112.211,926 

1843.. 

855 

14,773,470 

228.001.889 

1828. 

527 

1,483.168 

111,130.240 

1844.. 

452 

14.053.056 

235;960:047 

1829. 

402 

1,891,760 

112,526,016 

1845.. 

943 

12.622,085 

239.995.517 

1830. 

531 

2.162.770 

125.288,518 

1846.. 

12,854,650 

244,952,404 

1831. 

417 

1,294,810 

139,280,314 

1847.. 

8,638,250 

247.152.3a3 

1832. 

764 

2.623,110 

146,302,618 

1848.. 

l',2i7 

8.943.810 

254,192.027 

1833. 

898 

3,377,649 

166,495,187 

1849.. 

1,607 

9,300,930 

256.217.093 

1834.. 

980 

4,611,950 

186.548.511 

1850.. 

1,400 

8.577.025 

286.085.416 

1835.. 

788 

6,414,425 

218,723,703 

1851.. 

1,554 

11,698,045 

320,108,358 

The  official  assessments  for  taxation  are  given,  the  only  records 
accessible,  although  they  do  not  accord  with  actual  values,  because 
they  probably  bear  nearly  the  same  relation  in  different  years  to  the 
supposed  value.  Mobile  and  New  York  probably  represent  two 
extremes ;  the  former,  a  class  of  cities  in  which  speculation  was 
most  wild,  and  the  latter,  those  older  cities  which  were  affected  by 


38  DOES  PROTECTION   PROTECT? 

the  mania  in  a  less  degree.  In  New  York,  however,  the  valuation 
began  a  natural  increase  in  1829,  and,  during  the  speculation,  more 
than  doubled  in  four  years.  But  in  Mobile,  where  the  valuation 
was  larger  than  ever  before  in  1832,  and  was  then  only  $2,623,110, 
it  rose  to  six  and  a  half  millions  in  1835,  to  eighteen  millions  in 
1836,  and  to  twenty-seven  millions  in  1837.  Not  less  than  twenty 
millions  of  this  increase  was  imaginary,  and  the  population,  as  indi 
cated  by  the  polls,  had  scarcely  increased  at  all.  If  we  suppose  that 
a  large  part  of  the  land  taken  from  government  was  held  at  similar 
extravagant  prices ;  that  land  in  other  Western  and  Southern  towns 
and  cities  was  bought  and  sold  in  the  same  wild  fever ;  and  that 
even  in  the  oldest  Eastern  States  the  valuation  of  property  doubled 
in  four  years,  we  shall  understand  what  pressure  there  was  in  every 
quarter  for  loans  of  money,  and  on  what  imaginary  security  all  loans 
were  based.  To  this  insane  passion  for  gambling  in  real  estate,  and 
to  the  enormous  loans  made  on  property  valued  at  fictitious  rates, 
whether  in  city,  projected  city,  town,  or  prairie,  are  directly  trace 
able  the  inflation  and  the  subsequent  explosion  of  1837.  Will  any 
one  pretend  that  this  speculation  was  caused  by  the  tariff  ?  Was 
there  at  that  time  any  extravagant  importation  of  foreign  lands  ? 

By  writers  who  do  not  trouble  themselves  to  consult  facts,  it  has 
indeed  been  suggested  that  this  speculation  was  caused  by  the  with 
drawal   of   capital  from  manufacturing,  which  importations,  it   is 
imagined,  had  rendered  unprofitable.     But  two  facts  make  an  end 
of    that   theory.      The    speculation,   increased   valuation,  and    in-|^ 
creased  purchase  of  lands,  as  -the  statistics  given  prove,  actually  | 
commenced  in  1830,  two  years  before  the  tariff  was  changed ;  and  ' 
in  every  branch  of  manufactures  there  were  great  prosperity  and 
rapid  growth  during  the  whole  period  of  inflation;  so  that  more 
capital  was  invested,  and  the  product  yearly  increased,  as  will  fully 
appear  when  the  progress  of  manufactures  is  discussed.     Indeed, 
it  is  because  this  increase  in  manufactures  cannot  be  denied  or 
explained  away  that  Mr.  Carey  takes  pains  to  forget  that  there  was 
any  panic  in  1837  ! 

The  cause  of  the  inflation  has  been  ascertained.  It  only  remains 
to  show  that  the  tariff  was  equally  guiltless  of  the  subsequent  ex 
plosion.  Indeed,  no  argument  is  needed  to  prove  that  the  explosion 
of  such  a  bubble  was  an  inevitable  consequence,  not  of  low  duties 
or  large  importations,  but  of  the  hollowness  of  the  whole  system 
of  currency  and  credit.  Loans  and  paper-money  alike  had  corner 
lots  in  paper  cities  for  their  only  security.  Increase  of  the  circula- 


CURRENCY  AND  IMPORTS.  39 

tion  swelled  values,  and  thus  enticed  thousands  more  into  the  mad 
whirlpool.  Paper-money  pervaded  the  air.  The  government  threw 
its  surplus  revenue  into  the  vortex,  and  begged  the  banks  to  lend 
it.  For  a  few  short  months  everybody  went  on  getting  enormously 
rich,  in  dreams,  and  then  the  bubble  burst,  and  with  it  exploded 
almost  every  bank  in  the  country.  Shall  we  ask  what  caused  the 
bubble  to  burst  ?  "What  explodes  the  boiler  when  the  captain  has 
been  sitting  on  the  safety-valve  ?  Failure  of  crops  helped  both  to 
produce  the  explosion  and  to  aggravate  its  effects.  But  the  main 
cause  was  the  steam  in  the  boiler — the  expansive  force  of  a  crazy 
laud  speculation. 

A  partial  resumption  was  reached  in  1838 ;  but  the  volume  of 
currency  and  the  load  of  debt,  sustained  only  by  imaginary  pros 
perity,  were  too  vast.  A  second  suspension  was  followed  by  a 
throwing  out  of  worthless  banks  and  their  notes,  and  a  shrinkage 
of  currency  and  prices.  Then,  thousands  of  firms  were  driven  to 
bankruptcy,  and  manufacturing  establishments,  which  had  thriven 
when  foreign  importations  were  large,  went  to  ruin  when  those 
importations  had  almost  ceased !  And  this  prostration  of  industry, 
which  did  not  precede,  but  followed  the  shrinkage  of  values  and  the 
bankruptcy  of  firms  and  banks,  is  the  event  which  Mr.  Carey  regards 
as  the  cause  of  the  disaster.  Ignoring  the  panic  of  1837,  and  the 
fact  that  our  industry  had  continued  to  thrive  until  after  foreign 
competition  had  been  checked,  that  writer  and  others  point  to  the 
prostration  of  1841  and  1842  as  proof  that  the  tariff  of  1833  was 
fatal  to  our  manufactures. 

With  a  like  indifference  to  facts,  they  ascribe  the  subsequent 
recovery  to  the  tariff  of  1842.  If  a  whole  people  stop  gambling 
and  wasting,  and  begin  earning  and  saving,  the  inevitable  effects 
are,  first,  dulness  of  trade  and  revival  of  industry;  and  second, 
steady  and  sure  revival  of  both.  The  people  had  stopped  gambling 
and  wasting  before  the  tariff  of  1842  was  adopted.  They  had 
begun  to  earn  and  to  save.  Many  records  prove  that  the  revival  of 
industry  had  already  begun,  and  of  these  some  will  appear  in  con 
nection  with  the  history  of  manufactures.  Two  items  here  must 
suffice.  In  1841  there  were  224,176  tons  of  freight  moved  from 
Western  States  or  Canada  eastward  over  the  Erie  Canal,  and  in 
1842  there  were  221,477,  though  in  1840  there  were  only  158,148, 
and  in  1839  only  121,671.  Receipts  of  flour,  wheat,  and  other 
products  at  Buffalo,  from  the  West,  also  show  a  steady  increase  from 
1840  onward.  The  number  of  vessels  built  for  domestic  trade, 


40  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

including  sloops,  canal-boats,  and  steamers,  was  largely  increased  in 
1842,  and  137  steamers  were  built  in  that  year  against  78  in  1841, 
and  63  in  1840.  Our  foreign  trade  revived  less  promptly  ;  but  the 
recuperation  of  domestic  industry  began  as  soon  as  the  banks  re 
sumed  specie  payments,  and  that  was  before  the  tariff  of  1842  went 
into  effect.  The  sure  revival  came  because  people  had  begun  to  live 
economically,  and  to  earn  their  living  by  honest  labor.  Knowing 
that  economy  had  begun,  that  specie  payments  had  been  resumed, 
and  that  industry  had  revived  months  before  the  tariff  went  into 
operation,  we  may  unhesitatingly  assert  that  prosperity  would  have 
come  had  no  change  in  the  tariff  been  made.  To  doubt  it  is  to 
doubt  that  honesty  and  industry  will , earn  a  living.  To  deny  it  is  to 
deny  that  economy  and  faithful  labor  will  secure  prosperity  to  any 
people. 

The  panic  of  1857  was  neither  long  continued,  nor  did  it  mate 
rially  affect  the  productive  power  of  the  country.  It  was  a  collapse 
of  the  credit  system  rather  than  of  the  currency,  and  its  cause  is 
easily  ascertained.  Those  who  ascribe  it  to  the  importations  of  the 
preceding  years  seem  to  forget  that  those  imports  were  more  than 
paid  for  by  our  exports  of  surplus  products.  It  was  not  a  bankruptcy 
caused  by  buying  more  than  we  could  sell ;  on  the  contrary,  our 
foreign  trade  was  then  in  a  peculiarly  healthy  condition.  During 
the  years  1851-1857  inclusive,  we  exported  of  merchandise,  of 
domestic  production,  $1,476,672,650,  and  of  specie,  $269,616,413. 
The  merchandise  was  valued  in  our  own  ports ;  its  purchasing 
power  or  exchange  value  in  foreign  ports  was,  at  least,  15  per  cent, 
greater;  and,  adding  this,  we  have  merchandise  valued  abroad 
at  $1,718,873,547  to  exchange  for  imports  valued  abroad  at 
$1,783,926,710.  Thus,  in  these  seven  years  we  almost  paid  for  our 
entire  imports  in  exports  of  merchandise  alone,  without  counting  the 
surplus  of  gold.  Nor  was  the  gold  needed  here ;  our  production  was 
greatly  in  excess  of  our  capacity  to  .use  it  as  currency  or  otherwise, 
and  though  $264,616,413  was  exported — much  of  it  to  pay  interest 
on  loans,  or  dividends  on  investments,  by  European  capitalists — there 
still  remained  in  the  country  more  than  we  could  advantageously 
use. 

The  value  of  precious  metals  produced  and  added  to  our  supply 
after  the  discovery  of  mines  in  California  cannot  be  accurately  ascer 
tained,  but  official  estimates  place  the  product  of  the  years  1848- 
1857  inclusive  at  not  less  than  five  hundred  millions,  and  the  records 
of  the  mint  show  that  four  hundred  and  thirty-eight  millions  had 


CURRENCY  AND  IMPORTS.  41 

passed  through  that  institution  and  its  branches.  It  is  safe  to  say 
that  the  product  was,  at  least,  four  hundred  and  eighty  millions ;  and, 
as  only  two  hundred  and  eighty  millions  were  exported,  there  were 
added  to  the  circulation  or  supply  of  precious  metals  in  this  country 
not  less  than  two  hundred  millions — a  sum  equal  to  the  entire  cur 
rency  of  the  country,  specie  and  paper  included,  in  1846.  At  the 
same  time  the  paper  circulation  was  also  increased.  The  currency 
thus  became  greatly  expanded;  primarily,  by  the  flood  of  gold 
thrown  into  circulation.  Certainly  no  tariff  caused,  and  none  yet 
known  among  men  could  have  prevented,  this  inflation ;  but,  if  the 
tariff  of  1846  stimulated  importations,  and  facilitated  the  exchange 
of  this  superfluous  metal  for  iron  rails,  to  that  extent  it  checked  the 
inflation,  and  lessened  the  consequent  disaster.  For  every  increase 
oTcurrency,  whether  in  specie  or  paper,  tends  to  increase  prices,  and 
every  increase  of  prices  prompts  to  speculation  in  the  hope  of 
further  increase.  In  its  origin,  then,  the  inflation  prior  to  1857  was 
a  gold  inflation. 

But  a  second  cause  operated  more  powerfully  to  accelerate  the 
expansion,  and  produced  the  subsequent  explosion.  With  the  set 
tlement  of  new  States,  the  rapid  extension  of  the  boundaries  of 
civilization,  the  large  immigration  which  followed  the  European 
famine  of  1847,  and  the  political  disturbances  on  the  Continent,  came 
both  the  demand  and  the  labor  for  the  building  of  railroads.  The 
flood  of  gold  made  money  plenty.  A  low  tariff  made  iron  cheap. 
Roads  built  to  supply  the  most  immediate  necessities  were  at  once 
prosperous.  Lands  in  the  neighborhood  were  greatly  enhanced  in 
value.  Then  came  a  rush  into  railroad-building  and  land  specula 
tion.  Statistics  of  receipts  from  sale  of  public  lands  already  given 
(page  36)  show  that  the  amount  more  than  quadrupled  in  1854, 
reached  eleven  and  a  half  millions  in  1855,  and  was  about  nine  mill 
ions  in  1856.  But  this  movement  was  altogether  subordinate  to 
the  growth  of  the  railroad  system.  On  page  42  will  be  found  sta 
tistics  of  the  number  of  miles  of  railroad  built  each  year,  and  the 
diagram,  "  Iron,  Coal,  and  Railroads,"  page  350,  will  clearly  pre 
sent  the  facts  to  the  eye.  Only  four  hundred  miles  were  built  in 
1848 ;  then  the  number  suddenly  rose  to  1,369  in  1849 ;  to  1,656 
in  1850 ;  to  1,961  in  1851 ;  to  1,926  in  1852  ;  to  2,452  in  1853 ;  and 
to  3,643  in  1856.  In  the  years  1849  to  1857  inclusive,  18,212  miles 
of  railroad  were  built,  and  the  average  outlay  for  track,  rolling-stock, 
buildings,  equipments,  and  repairs,  was  not  less  than  $50,000  a  mile. 
We  have  here  an  actual  expenditure  of  $910,600,000  for  railroad 


42 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


RAILROAD-BUILDING. 


Statement  of  the  Number  of  Miles  of  Railroad  in  Operation,  and  Increase  of 
Mileage  each  Year,  since  1830. 


TEAR. 

Miles  in 
Operation. 

Increase  of 
Mileage. 

YEAR. 

Miles  in 
Operation. 

Increase  of 
Mileage. 

1830 

23 

1850  

9,021 

1  656 

1831  

95 

72 

1851  

10,982 

1,961 

1832 

229 

134 

1852  

12,908 

1  926 

1833  

380 

151 

1853  

15,360 

2,452 

1834 

633 

253 

1854  , 

16,720 

1,360 

1835 

1  098 

465 

1855 

18  374 

1  654 

1836 

1  273 

175 

1856  

22,017 

3,643 

1837  

1,497 

224 

1857  

24,508 

2,491 

1838  

1,913 

416 

1858  

26,968 

2,460 

1839 

2  302 

389 

1859 

28  789 

1  821 

1840  

2  818 

516 

I860  

30,635 

1,846 

1841  

3,535 

717 

1861  

31,256 

621 

1842 

4026 

491 

1862  

32,120 

864 

1843  

4,185 

159 

1863  

33,170 

1,050 

1844 

4  377 

192 

1864  

33,908 

738 

1845  

4,633 

256 

1865  

35,085 

1,177 

1846 

4  930 

297 

1866  

36,827 

1  742 

1847   

5,599 

669 

1867  

39,276 

2,449 

1848 

5  996 

397 

1868  

42,255 

2  979 

1849  

7,365 

1,069 

purposes.  Of  this  vast  sum,  nearly  one  thousand  millions,  it  is  well 
known  that  a  large  proportion  was  invested  in  works  not  immediately 
profitable;  indeed,  few  of  the  roads  returned  fair  dividends  until 
after  the  crash  of  1857.  A  sum  so  enormous  could  not  be  directly 
withdrawn  from  the  productive  capital  of  the  country,  and,  of  neces 
sity,  most  of  the  roads  then  built  were  constructed  mainly  on  credit. 
Stocks  and  bonds  were  thrown  upon  the  market,  or  used  as  securities 
to  sustain  loans,  and  to  meet  the  demand  the  banks  *  expanded  their 
circulation  from  one  hundred  and  twenty-eight  millions  in  1848,  to 
$214,778,822  in  1857,  and  their  current  credits  from  two  hundred 
and  eighty-one  millions  to  four  hundred  and  forty-five  millions.  Thus 
rapidly  expanding  to  sustain  these  enterprises,  the  whole  banking 
system  soon  came  to  depend  for  its  stability  upon  the  value  of 
railroad  securities.  When  loans  were  not  made  directly  upon  stocks 
or  bonds,  the  banks  loaned  to  individuals  or  corporations  whose 
whole  capital  or  more  was  so  invested ;  brokers  were  sustained  whose 
operations  in  stocks  went  far  beyond  their  actual  means ;  and  thus, 
directly  or  indirectly,  the  whole  credit  system  of  the  country  became 

*  See  table  of  the  condition  of  the  banks  at  different  periods,  following  this 
chapter. 


CURRENCY  AND  IMPORTS.  43 

dependent  upon  the  success  of  new  railroads  which  were  being  built 
through  half-settled  regions  at  the  rate  of  three  thousand  miles  a 
year !  Can  any  one  wonder  that  the  collapse  came  ?  Most  of  the 
railroads  did  not  pay.  The  stocks  and  bonds  lost  value.  Individuals 
and  firms  became  bankrupt.  Finally,  with  the  fall  of  a  prominent 
institution  which  had  speculated  largely,  general  prostration  came. 
Yet  this  is  the  panic  which  Mr.  Carey  and  others,  with  prodigious 
stride  of  logic,  attribute  to  the  reduction  of  duties  in  1846,  eleven 
years  before ! 

Every  reader  will  judge  for  himself  whether  the  cause  of  this 
disaster  was  a  foreign  trade  which  gave  a  balance  of  two  hundred 
millions  in  our  favor — exchange  value  of  merchandise  being  allowed 
— or  the  investment  of  one  thousand  millions  of  dollars  in  roads 
temporarily  unprofitable. 

It  will,  however,  be  said,  and  said  with  truth,  that  the  country 
would  not  have  built  so  many  railroads  had  not  the  iron  been  ad 
mitted  at  low  duty.  It  is  true  that,  if  iron  had  then  cost  what  it 
costs  now,  the  vast  net- work  of  railroads  built  in  1849-'57  would 
not  now  be  in  existence.  Would  the  country  be  the  gainer  ?  Thou 
sands  of  men  sunk  their  property  in  these  enterprises,  but  was  not 
the  nation  enriched  and  strengthened  beyond  all  estimate?  Let 
those  answer  whose  farms  have  been  quadrupled  in  value !  Let 
those  answer  who  have  since  been  enabled,  by  those  very  railroads, 
to  develop  mines  and  erect  factories  and  mills,  in  regions  before 
inaccessible !  The  railroads  constructed  in  that  period  have  done 
more  to  protect  American  industry,  by  building  up  a  home  market 
and  rendering  possible  an  increased  production  of  wealth,  than  all 
the  tariffs,  high  or  low,  ever  yet  adopted.  To  those  railroads  we 
owe  the  growth  of  manufactures  in  spite  of  the  war,  in  spite  of  em 
barrassing  duties  on  almost  every  material,  and  in  spite  of  large  im 
portations  which  an  inflated  currency  has  invited,  and  which  no 
protective  tariff  can  shut  out.  To  them  we  owe  no  small  share 
of  the  enormous  immigration  which  adds  yearly  to  our  population  a 
quarter  of  a  million  of  workers.  To  them  we  owe,  in  no  inconsider 
able  measure,  the  stability  of  the  Union  itself,  for  the  railroads  of 
the  North  multiplied  its  forces,  and  made  possible  some  of  its  best 
feats  of  generalship. 

The  phenomenon  of  1837  was  the  explosion  of  a  currency  sj^stem 
corrupted  by  speculation  in  real  estate.  The  phenomenon  of  1857 
was  the  explosion  of  a  credit  system  built  upon  an  investment  of 
one  thousand,  millions  of  dollars  in  eighteen  thousand  miles  of  new 


44 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


railroad  through  a  half-settled  country.  The  first  originated  in  the 
legitimate  increase  in  the  value  of  Western  lands  by  the  opening  of 
the  Erie  Canal  and  other  improved  facilities  of  communication.  The 
second  originated  in  the  flood  of  gold  from  California.  In  both  cases 
the  increase  of  importations  was  a  consequence  and  not  a  cause  of 
the  inflation,  and  the  bursting  of  the  babble  and  suspension  of  the 
banks  would  have  occurred,  in  both  cases,  as  the  suspension  did  in 
1814,  although  foreign  trade  had  been  wholly  stopped.  In  each 
case,  also,  the  suspension  was  followed  by  an  attempt  to  go  on  with 
out  material  reduction  of  values,  and  by  the  failure  of  that  attempt. 
In  each  case,  the  people  came  back,  before  any  change  of  tariff,  to 
more  solid  values,  to  more  real  business,  and  began  again  that  sober 
industry  and  economical  life  which  make  prosperity  certain. 

BANKS  OP  THE;  UNITED  STATES— CONDITION  AT  DIFFERENT  TIMES. 


YEAB. 

Specie. 

Circulation. 

Deposits. 

Current  Credits. 

1811 

$15,400,000 

$28,100,000 

1815  . 

17,000,000 

45,500,000 

1816 

19,000,000 

68,000,000 

1820..  .  . 

19,820,240 

44,863,344 

$  35,950,470 

$80,813,814 

1830 

22,114,917 

61,323,898 

55  559  928 

116  883  826 

1833.  .. 

30,600,000 

80,000,000 

1834.  . 

35,000,000 

94  839  570 

75  666  986 

170  503  556 

1835.  . 

43,937,625 

100,602,405 

83,034,365 

131  773,860 

1836  
1837..  . 

40,019,594 
37,915,340 

140,301,038 
149,135,990 

115,104,420 
127,397,185 

276,495,478 
276  533  075 

1838  . 

35,184  112 

116,138  910 

84  691  184 

200  830  694 

1839  

45,132,763 

135,170,995 

90,240,146 

225,411  141 

1840 

33,165,155 

106  986  572 

75  696  857 

182  665  439 

1841  

34,818,913 

107,290,214 

64  890,101 

172  180315 

1842  

28,440,423 

83,734,011 

62,498,870 

146,142,881 

1843  

33,515,806 

58,653,603 

56  163,623 

114  732  231 

1844  
1845  

49,898,269 
44,241,242 

75,167,646 
89,608,711 

84,550,785 
83  020,646 

159,718,431 
177  629,357 

1846..   . 

42,012  095 

105  552  427 

97  918  020 

202  465  497 

1847 

35  132  516 

105  519  766 

91  792  533 

197  312  299 

1848 

46,369,765 

128  596  091 

108  226  177 

281  732  263 

1849 

43  619  863 

114  743  415 

91  178  623 

205  922  033 

1850  
1851  

45,379,345 
48,671,048 

131,366,526 
155,165,251 

109,586,595 
128  957,712 

240,953,121 
284  122  963 

1854  

59,410,253 

204  689  207 

188  188  744 

392  877  951 

1855 

53,944  546 

186  952  223 

190  400  342 

377  352  565 

1856  

59,314,063 

195,747  950 

212  705  662 

408  753  612 

1857 

58,344,838 

214  778  822 

230  351  352 

445  130  174 

1858  

74,412,832 

155,208,344 

185,932  049 

341  140  393 

1859 

104  537,818 

193,306  818 

259  568  278 

452  875  096 

I860  

83,594,537 

207,102,477 

253,802,129 

460  904  606 

1861 

87,674,507 

202,005,767 

256  229  562 

459  235  329  ' 

1862  

102,146,215 

183,792,079 

297,322,408 

480  114487 

1863  

101,227,369 

238,677,218 

393,686,226 

632,363,444 

HIGH  TARIFFS  CHECK  EXPORTS. 
MASSACHUSETTS  BANKS. 


45 


TEAR. 

Bills  in  Circulation. 

TEAK. 

Bills  in  Circulation. 

1815     

$2,605,611  00 

1834  

$7,650,146  75 

1816 

2,332  100  00 

1835  

9,430,357  72 

1817  

2,482,500  00 

1836  

10,892,249  50 

1318  

2,631,150  00 

1837  

10,273,118  71 

1819  

2,437,802  00 

1838  

9,400,512  75 

18°0  . 

2  562  000  00 

1839  

7,875,322  50 

1821  

2,859,540  00 

1840  

9,112,882  25 

1822 

3,096  800  00 

1841  

9,509,112  00 

1823  

3,145,010  00 

1842  

8,049,906  75 

1824 

3,742,231  00 

1843  

9,219,267  50 

18-^5  

3,508,100  00 

1844  

12,183,158  25 

1896 

3,644,400  00 

1845  

14,339,686  00 

1827 

6  567  606  50 

1846  

14  591  914  50 

1828 

5,034,593  50 

1847  

17,196,362  25 

1829 

4  747  784  50 

1848  .  . 

13  196  029  00 

1830  

5,124,090  00 

1849  

15,700,935  25 

1831 

7  739  317  00 

1850.. 

17,005  826  25 

1832 

7  122  856  00 

1851 

19  694  698  25 

1833  

7,889,110  67 

CHAPTER    IV. 

HIGH   TARIFFS   CHECK   EXPORTS. 


Ix  every  fluctuation  imports  follow  currency.  With  the  certainty 
of  a  law  of  Nature,  goods  are  attracted  to  the  market  where  expanded 
currency  and  high  prices  exist,  just  as  water  runs  down-hill,  or  air 
forces  its  way  into  a  vacuum.  But  it  has  already  appeared  that  ex 
ports  do  not  obey  the  same  influence,  and  that  in  certain  periods  of 
high  duties  or  high  prices  our  exports  have  been  checked,  while  our 
imports  have  increased,  thus  turning  the  balance  of  trade  against  us. 
What  laws,  then,  govern  our  exports  ? 

An  examination  of  the  table  of  total  exports  and  imports  will 
suggest  the  fact  that,  except  under  unusual  circumstances,  imports 
have  always  exceeded  exports  in  such  proportion  as  to  indicate  a 
mutual  exchange  of  products.  To  present  the  facts  to  the  eye,  a  dia 
gram  has  been  prepared  (Plate  II.),  in  which  imports  for  each  year 
since  1800  are  represented  by  a  full  and  exports  by  a  dotted  line,  both 
being  drawn  on  the  same  scale.  The  perpendicular  lines  opposite 
certain  years  indicate  movements  of  specie ;  the  full  line,  imports;  and 
the  dotted,  exports,  and  are  also  in  proportion  to  the  aggregates.  By 


46  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

this  diagram,  the  history  of  our  exchanges  with  other  nations  during 
the  current  century  is  presented  in  a  form  to  be  readily  understood. 
The  interruption  of  our  commerce  during  the  War  of  1812,  the  de 
pression  of  1843,  and  the  prostration  during  the  recent  war,  at  once 
attract  attention,  as  well  as  the  period  of  prosperity  before  the  em 
bargo  of  1808,  the  inflations  of  1816  and  1836,  and  the  enormous  de 
velopment  of  our  commerce  during  the  decade  1850-'60.  Less  im 
portant  changes  next  attract  notice  ;  the  year  of  prostration  and  the 
year  of  attempt  to  go  forward  without  readjustment  of  values,  which 
follow  each  inflation  ;  and  the  minor  depressions  of  1829  and  1830, 
of  1849  and  1855.  Then  the  fact  will  be  observed  that,  prior  to 
1855,  when  gold  began  to  overflow,  our  imports  always  exceeded  our 
exports,  except  in  certain  years.  Omitting  the  period  of  the  War  of 
1812,  we  find  that  exports  first  rose  above  imports  in  the  year  1821, 
the  year  of  greatest  depression  after  the  suspension  of  1814.  The 
next  instance  was  in  1825,  when  a  peculiar  demand  existed  in  Eu 
rope.  For  the  same  reason,  1847,  the  year  of  famine,  may  be  omit 
ted  from  further  consideration.  In  1827  and  1830  our  industry 
was  greatly  depressed.  In  1840  culminated  the  disasters  caused  Iby 
the  land  mania.  Thus,  prior  to  the  overflow  of  gold,  our  imports  never 
fell  below  our  exports  except  in  years  of  famine  abroad  or  prostration 
and  disaster  at  home.  The_jear^  of  jgrostration  and  disaster  are 
years  of  extreme  low  prices,  which  favor  exports  but  repel  imports. 

Our  foreign  trade,  except  in  such  periods  of  disaster,  is  an  ex 
change  of  products,  in  which  the  imports  valued  abroad  naturally 
exceed  the  exports  valued  here.  Unless  under  stress  of  commercial 
disaster,  we  cannot  sell  more  than  we  buy.  But  we  can  and  do  buy 
more  than  we  sell,  especially  in  every  period  of  inflation.  Then 
prices  here  are  high,  so  that  exportation  of  our  products  becomes  un 
profitable,  except  as  the  foreign  price  of  those  products  may  be  con 
trolled  by  our  own.  And,  even  then,  the  enhanced  price  tends  to 
check  foreign  consumption.  Accordingly,  periods  of  inflatioji  are 
those  in  which  imports  most  largely  exceed  exports.  Hogk-prjces 
here,  as  compared  with  prices  in  other  countries,  favor  the  foreign 
industry  and  operate  against  our  own  industry. 

It  will,  however,  be  said  that  this  idea  of  exchange  is  not  con 
sistent  with  rules  generally  accepted ;  that  Mr.  Mill  and  other  dis 
tinguished  authors  teach  that  a  nation  cannot  buy  more  than  it  sells, 
and  that  our  imports  must  therefore  by  controlled  by  our  exports. 
It  would,  doubtless,  be  a  mistake  to  suppose  that  any  eminent  writer 
had  overlooked  the  fact  that  of  two  nations  trading  with  each  other 


HIGH  TARIFFS   CHECK  EXPORTS.  47 

it  is  impossible  that  the  imports  of  each  should  be  controlled  by  its 
exports.     If  we  exchange  cotton  for  cotton  goods  with  England,  a 
refusal  on  our  part  to  take  goods  must  cause  England  to  diminish 
her  purchases  of  raw  cotton,  until  an  equal  market  for  her  products 
should  be  opened  elsewhere,  and  thus,  in  this  case,  our  imports  con 
trol  our  exports,  while  Britain's  exports  control  its  imports.     But 
Mr.  Mill  undoubtedly  teaches  that  in  the  long-run  a  nation's  pur 
chases  will  not  exceed  its  power  to  pay  by  its  exports.     There  is  a 
feature  in  our  condition  which  may  render  the  rule  less  applicable  to 
us  than  to  older  nations.    This  is  a  new  and  rapidlv-^rrowing  country, 
and  offers  a  peculiarly  inviting  field  for  foreign  investments  or  loans 
of  capital"."" 'Tri'  times  of  rapid   development,  when   lands   quickly 
double  in  value,  when  mines  of  vast  wealth  are  opened,  or  when 
railroads  are  pushed  forward,  making  business  for  themselves  and 
creating  civilization  as  they  advance,  it  is  natural  that  foreign  capi 
talists  desire  to  share  in  the  enormous  profits,  and  it  is  certain  that 
our  people,  needing  increased  capital,  have  both  sought  and  found  it 
in  Europe.     The  sale  of  bonds  or  shares,  though  not  represented  in 
our  export  account,  is  in  fact  an  important  and  constant  element  in 
our  transactions  with  Europe,  and  especially  important  in  times  of 
speculation  or  rapid  development.     Prices  here  being  unnaturally 
high,  the  importer,  S.,  will  import  as  largely  as  he  can.    Speculation 
being  rife,  the  real  estate,  or  railroad,  or  mining  operator,  R.,  will 
desire  to  place  bonds  or  shares  or  to  effect  loans  in  Europe.    Interest 
here  being  high,  and  the  rapid  growth  of  the  country  giving  com 
parative  certainty  to  enterprises  which  might  otherwise  be  hazardous, 
European  capitalists  are  prompted  to  invest.    S.  buys  an  enormous 
stock  of  goods,  and  at  the  same  time  R.  sells  abroad  a  quantity  of 
shares  or  bonds.     S.  buys  in  the  New- York  market  a  draft  on  Lon 
don  to  pay  for  his  goods,  and  at  the  same  time  R.  sells  in  the  New- 
York  market  the  draft  which  he  has  received  in  payment  for  bonds 
or  shares.     Thus  it  happens  that  the  importer  has  not  run  into  debt, 
but  is  doing  a  prosperous  business,  while  the  country  has  imported 
more  than  it  can  pay  for ;  in  other  words,  we  have  bought  goods  or 
iron,  and  paid  in  bonds  or  shares.     Our  imports  may  have  created  in 
England  an  increased  demand  for  raw  materials,  and  may  thus  in 
crease  exports  as  far  as  we  supply  that  demand,  but  the  same  inflation 
has  so  enhanced  the  price  of  those  of  our  products  which  can  be 
elsewhere  produced  as  to  prevent  our  exports  from  rising  in  propor 
tion  to  our  imports.     Precisely  this  phenomenon  we  have  observed 
as  occurring  in  1836,  and  in  recent  years. 


48  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

Not  only  in  times  of  inflation,  but  under  ordinary  circumstances, 
our  rapid  growth  and  healthy  progress  invite  investment  of  foreign 
capital.  This  country,  always  needing  capital,  constantly  seeks  to 
borrow  as  largely  as  anybody  will  lend.  J^Tor  is  this  altogether  an 
evidence  of  folly  :  our  resources  yet  undeveloped  are  so  great,  and 
our  progress  is  so  rapid,  that  many  millions  can  at  any  time  be 
invested  in  enterprises  reasonably  certain  of  ultimate  profit,  though, 
in  older  countries,  similar  undertakings  might  be  most  hazardous. 
Hence,  as  a  nation,  we  are  naturally  and  legitimately  borrowers, 
and  the  loans  of  foreign  capital  form  a  fund  upon  which  we  can  con 
stantly  draw  for  payment  of  imports  in  excess  of  exports.  In  the 
end,  perhaps,  we  must  repay  in  profits,  dividends,  interest,  and  prin 
cipal,  as  much  as  we  borrow ;  but  that  fact  has  never  yet  restrained 
us  from  importing  more  than  our  exports;  nor  will  it  until  this 
ceases  to  be  a  country  where  capital  can  be  profitably  invested.  If 
these  reasonings  are  correct,  and  applied  to  the  condition  of  this 
country  thus  far  they  certainly  accord  with  ascertained  facts :  it 
follows  that,  in  any  year,  or  during  any  ordinary  term  of  years, 
our  imports  have  not  been  limited  by  our  exports,  while  our  exports 
have  been  limited  by  the  law  of  exchange. 

Let  us  now  inquire  what  effect,  if  any,  tariffs  have  had  upon  our 
exports.  It  is  plain  that  if  they  have  diminished  our  importation 
of  manufactured  products,  they  may  have  checked, the.  .exportation 
of  the  materials ;  and,  if  they  have  increased  prices,  or  caused  infla 
tion,  they  have  checked  exports,  and  placed our  industry  at  a (iigadr^ 
vantage  in  foreign  markets.  TtTis  important,  first,  to  separate  the 
exports  of  specie  from  those  of  merchandise.  No  tariff  gives  us  the 
specie-producing  power.  It  may  be  doubted  whether  any  tariff  can 
cause  specie  to  flow  into  a  country,  or  arrest  its  outflow,  and,  whether, 
could  either  be  done,  it  would  be  advantageous.  Specie,  beyond 
the  quantity  needed  to  facilitate  exchanges,  is  a  non-productive 
investment,  and  may  be  advantageously  exchanged  for  any  products 
of  other  countries  which  enable  us  to  increase  the  production  of 
wealth,  which  improve  the  condition  of  the  people,  or  which,  being 
necessary  for  use,  can  be  obtained  cheaper  than  we  can  produce  them, 
thus  enabling  our  own  labor  to  be  more  profitably  employed.  The 
table  on  page  49,  of  exports  and  imports  of  specie  since  1820,  gives 
only  the  excess  of  either  in  each  year,  showing  at  a  glance  the  move 
ment  at  different  periods,  and  in  the  third  and  fourth  columns  is  shown, 
for  each  year,  the  aggregate  excess  of  imports  or  exports  from  1820 
to  1869.  These  tables  show  that  under  the  protective  system, 


HIGH  TARIFFS  CHECK  EXPORTS. 


49 


MOVEMENT  OF  SPECIE. 


YEAR. 

Excess  of 
Exports. 

Excess  of 
Imports. 

Balance  of 
Exports. 

Balance  of 
Imports. 

1821 

$2,413,169 

$2413,169 

1822 

7  440  334 

9  853  503 

1823 

1,275,091 

11  128,594 

1824  

$1,366,148 

9,762,446 

1825 

2,646,290 

12  408,736 

1826  

2,176,433 

10,232,303 

1827 

136,250 

10,096,053 

1828 

753  735 

10  849  788 

1829 

2,479,592 

8,370,196 

1830  

5,977,191 

2,393,005 

1831       

1,708,986 

-  4,101,991 

1832  

251,164 

3,850,827 

1833  .     

4,458,667 

$607  840 

1834       .... 

15,834,874 

16442  714 

1835 

6  633  672 

23  076  386 

1836 

9,076,545 

32  152931 

1837  

4,540,165 

36,693,096 

1838 

14,239,070 

50932  166 

1839       

3,181,567 

47,950,599 

1840 

465,799 

48  216  398 

1841  

6,045,699 

43,170,699 

1842 

726  523 

42  444  176 

1843       

20,869,768 

63,313,944 

1844 

376  215 

63  690  159 

1845 

4  536,253 

59,164,906 

1846 

127536 

59  037  370 

1847       .... 

22,214,265 

81,251,635 

1848 

9481  392 

71  770,243 

1849 

1,246,592 

73,016,835 

1850 

2  894  202 

70  122  633 

1851 

24,019,160 

46,103,473 

1852 

37  169091 

8,934,382 

1853 

23  285  493 

14  351  111 

1854 

34  342  162 

48  693  273 

1855 

52,587,531 

101  280,804 

1856 

41  537  853 

142  818  657 

1857       

56,675,123 

199,493,780 

1858 

33  358  651 

232852431 

1859       

56,452,622 

289,305,053 

I860 

57  996  104 

347301,157 

1861    

16,548,431 

330,752,726 

1862 

20472688 

351,225,414 

1863       

54,672,506 

424,005,791 

1864 

92  128  738 

515,975,835 

1865  .      

57,833,154 

573,808,989 

1866 

75  343  979 

649,152,968 

1867    

38,797,897 

687,950,865 

1868 

80081  660 

768,032,225 

1869  

37,301,426 



805,338,651 

from  1820  to  1825  inclusive,  gold  flowed  out  of  the  country  to  the 
amount  of  twelve  and  a  half  millions ;  that  the  higher  tariff  of  18M 
but  slightly  reduced  the  excess  of  exports — to  about  eleven  millions 
in  1828 ;  and  that  the  extreme  protective  tariff  then  reduced  it  to 


50  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

about  four  millions  in  1832.  The  first  year  of  the  compromise  tariff, 
1833,  is  also  the  first  year  in  which  the  balance  was  turned  to  the 
side  of  imports,  and,  from  that  time,  imports,  every  year  until  1838, 
raised  the  excess  of  imports  to  fifty-one  millions.  The  years  1839 
and  1841  reduced  this  excess  by  more  than  eight  millions,  but  the 
year  of  extreme  depression,  1843,  raised  it  again  to  sixty-three 
millions.  The  other  years  of  the  tariff  of  1842  caused  a  slight 
reduction ;  but  the  famine  in  England  lifted  the  balance  to 
$81,251,635 — the  highest  point  of  excess  of  imports.  At  that  point, 
the  supply  of  California  gold  changed  the  current,  and  by  the  year 
1854  the  exports  had  again  exceeded  imports.  Since  1850  we  have 
been,  exporting  gold  largely  in  every  year,  except  1861 — 'another 
year  of  great  depression. 

Since  the  discovery  of  gold  in  California,  an  outflow  of  that  metal 
has  been  not  only  natural,  but  necessary.  The  effects  of  different  tariff 
systems  can  only  be  inferred  from  the  movement  prior  to  that  event. 
The  record  indicates  a  more  steady  influx  of  gold  under  the  compro 
mise  tariff  than  under  either  of  the  protective  tariffs ;  but  it  must 
be  observed  that  the  influx  was  greatest  in  the  year  of  extreme 
prostration  after  the  protective  tariff  of  1842  was  adopted.  These 
facts  warrant  only  negative  inferences — that  an  influx  of  gold  is 
neither  an  unerring  symptom  of  health,  nor  of  disease  ;  that  it  has 
not  been  caused  exclusively  by  any  form  of  tariff;  and  that  the 
"  drain  of  gold,"  which  some  writers  ascribe  to  the  system  of  low 
duties,  has  existed  only  in  their  imaginations — unless,  indeed,  they 
mistake  the  overflow  since  the  opening  of  California  mines  for  an 
unnatural  drain.  If  so,  the  outflow  since  1861  has  been  still  greater. 
But,  if  we  observe  the  large  importations  of  gold  in  years  of  disaster 
— in  1829  and  1830,  in  1838  and  1843,  and  in  1861 — we  shall,  per 
haps,  be  inclined  to  regard  an  influx  of  gold  as  a  very  questionable 
boon.  Spain  has  done  much  to  teach  civilized  nations  the  folly  of 
trying  to  hoard  gold.  Her  many  and  stringent  laws,  designed  to 
prevent  the  outflow  of  precious  metals,  have  not  made  Spain  either 
prosperous  or  wealthy. 

Having  examined  the  movement  of  specie,  we  may  now  ascertain 
the  effect  of  tariffs  upon  exports  of  other  products  of  our  industry. 
In  a  table  at  the  close  of  this  chapter  will  be  found  a  statement  of 
exports  of  domestic  products,  other  than  specie,  each  year  since 
1820 — earlier  Treasury  records  do  not  distinguish  specie — com 
pared  with  imports  for  consumption  of  foreign  products,  other  than 
specie.  For  the  present  purpose,  however,  the  following  table  will 


HIGH  TARIFFS  CHECK  EXPORTS. 


51 


be  more  convenient,  in  which  the  rate  per  capita  of  net  exports  and 
imports  of  merchandise  is  presented,  with  the  excess  of  net  exports 
or  imports  of  merchandise  for  each  year.  The  exports  since  1861 
are  reduced  to  specie  values,  and,  as  the  Treasury  year  1843  contained 
only  nine  months  (September  30th  to  June  30th),  the  figures  per 
capita  given  are  four-thirds  of  the  rate  for  actual  exports  and  imports 
during  these  months.  The  table  thus  constructed  gives  a  complete 
record  of  our  exchanges  of  merchandise  with  foreign  nations  com 
pared  with  the  progress  of  population.  It  is  proper  to  remark  that, 
in  many  of  the  Treasury  reports,  in  tables  of  "  foreign  merchandise 
consumed,"  specie  has,  by  some  curious  error,  been  included. 

EXCESS  OF  IMPORTS  AND  EXPORTS,  AND  THE  RATE  OF  EACH  PER  CAPITA. 


TEAR. 

MERCHANDISE. 

SAMB 
CAP 

,  ' 

Expt's. 

,    PER 
ITA. 
» 

Impt'a. 

YEAR. 

MEBCHANDISE. 

SAMI 
CAI 

i  

Expt's. 

:,  PEB 

ITA. 

J  , 

Imp'ti. 

Excess  Export*. 

Excess  Imp'ts. 

Excess  Exports. 

Excess  Imports. 

1821.. 
1822.. 
1823. 
1824. 
1825. 
1826. 
1827. 
1828. 
1829. 
1830. 
1831 



$  24.511 
18,521.594 
4,155,238 
3,197,067 

5,202,723 

16,998,873 

$4.38 
4.84 
4.45 
4.64 
5.98 
4.56 
4.86 
4.09 
4.40 
4.53 
4.45 
4.50 
4.99 
5.56 
6.69 
6.92 
5.97 
5.97 
6.12 
6.56 
5.92 
5.09 
*5.51 
5.24 
5.05 

$4.39 
6.64 
4.84 
5.77 
5.92 
5.01 
4.58 
5.49 
4.38 
3.91 
6.22 
5.50 
5.96 
5.99 
8.13 
10.31 
7.17 
5.41 
8.79 
5.07 
6.56 
4.88 
2.68 
5.07 
5.41 

1846.. 
1847.. 
1848.. 
1849.. 
J1850.. 
1861.. 
1852.. 
1853.. 
1854.. 
1855.. 
1856.. 
1857.. 
1858. 
1859.. 
I860.. 
1861.. 
1862.. 
1863.. 
1864.. 
1865.. 
1866.. 
1867.. 
1868.. 
1869.. 

$34,317,249 

$8,331,817 

10,448429 
1,055.027 
29,133.800 
21.856.081 
40,456,167 
60.287.983 
61,937,155 
38,899.205 
29,212,887 
54,604,582 

$5.08 
7.34 
6.09 
6.00 
5.87 
7.50 
6.30 
7.50 
8.27 
7.19 
9.61 
9.78 
8.58 
9.21 
10.07 
11.09 
7.75 
7.56 
5.24 
4.39 
9.42 
7.65 
7.17 
7.13 

$5.50 
5.67 
6.57 
6.05 
7.13 
8.42 
7.94 
9.89 
10.65 
8.64 
10.67 
11.70 
8.28 
10.49 
10.71 
9.02 
10.66 
9.23 
11.11 
699 
11.92 
10.27 
9.27 
10.52 

$549,623 
3,977,669 

'  345',  736 
8,949,779 

23.589',527 

8  672,626 

1832. 
1833. 
18:34. 
1835. 
1836. 
1837. 
1838. 
1839. 
1840. 
1841. 
1842. 
1843. 
1844. 
1845. 

9,608,282 
25,410,226 

3,80l',924 
40,462.449 
3,141,226 

13,601,159 
13,519.211 
6,349.485 
21,548,493 
52,240,550 
19,029,676 

38,431,290 
20,040,062 

6"  29l',045 

68,519.944 
40,961,330 
159.469,884 
78.039,194 
88,971,936 
95.569,045 
78,507,168 
131,094,035 

44,245,283 

11,140,073 

7,144,211 

There  have  been  only  twelve  Jj^j^^HJ  ^L8*0'?!  ,smce  1820  in 
which^ffTeTex'ports  of  domestic  products  have  exceeded  imports  for 
consumption,  and  six  of  these  were  in  times  of  protective  duties ; 
but  all,  except  1847,  were  years  of  panic,  distress,  or  prostration  of 
our  hifTustry,  and  1847  was  the  year  of  famine  in  Europe.  Those 
who  cherish  "  a  firm  and  intelligent  purpose  "  that  our  exports  shall 
exceed  our  imports,  must  therefore  desire  to  bring  about  a  state  of 
perpetual  prostration,  a  chronic  paralysis  of  our  industry. 


*  Four-thirds  of  the  actual  rate. 


52  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

Under  the  protective  system,  from  1821  to  1832,  inclusive,  our 
exports  barely  kept  pace  with  the  increase  of  population.  They  were 
$4.38  per  capita  in  1821,  and  only  $4.50  per  capita  in  1832.  In  like 
manner,  the  protective  tariff  of  1842  only  reduced  our  exports  from 
$5.09  in  that  year,  and  $5.51  in  1843  (allowing  for  twelve  months 
instead  of  nine),  to  $5.08  in  1846,  the  last  year  of  its  operation. 
And  under  the  protective  system  now  in  force  our  exports  have  been 
reduced  from  $11.09  in  1861,  to  $7.13  per  capita  in  1869.  This  was 
not  because  our  imports  had  been  stopped,  so  that  the  law  of  ex 
change  restrained  exports.  For  in  1821  our  imports  were  $4.39  per 
capita,  and,  though  twice  temporarily  checked  in  their  natural  in 
crease,  they  were  $5.50  in  1832.  In  1843  they  were  $2.68  per  cap 
ita  (for  the  nine  months  only  $2.01),  and  in  1846  they  were  $5.50. 
In  1861  they  were  $9.02  per  capita,  and,  in  spite  of  eleven  additions 
to  the  tariff,  in  1869  they  were  $10.52  per  capita.  With  a  natural 
and  unrestricted  exchange,  imports  increasing  would  have  caused  a 
larger  exportation  of  our  products.  But  the  high  tariffs,  while  their 
power  to  stop  importations  is  quickly  expended,  so  that  in  the  long- 
run  they  do  not  prevent  increased  imports,  do  have  this  effect :  they 
prevent  any  like  increase  of  exports.  Intended  to  prevent  purchases 
of  foreign  goods,  the  protective  tariff,  reduced  to  its  simplest  terms, 
says  to  the  American  producer,  "  Thou  shalt  not  export !  " 

As  a  nation  progresses  in  growth,  refinement,  prosperity,  and  in 
dividual  well-being,  its  people  desire  new  or  increased  supplies  of 
foreign  products,  and  become  able  to  consume  a  larger  quantity  in 
proportion  to  population.  If  they  are  truly  prosperous,  they  must 
in  like  proportion  increase  in  their  power  to  produce  a  surplus  of 
goods  to  exchange  with  foreign  nations  for  those  which  they  de 
sire.  rThus  a  reasonable  and  healthy  increase  per  capita  of  exports 
and  of  imports  is  at  once  a  result  and  a  proof  of  the  progress  of 
a  country  in  civilization  and  real  prosperity.  In  every  period  of 
relaxation  of  duties,  a  rapid  increase  of  exports  bears  testimony  to 
the  vigor  of  our  industry  and  the  increased  prosperity  of  our  peo 
ple.  When  the  protective  system  was  abandoned  in  1832,  our 
exports  instantly  rose  from  $4.50  per  capita  in  1832  to  $4.99  per 
capita  in  1833,  to  $6.56  per  capita  in  1840,  and,  in  spite  of  the  de 
pression  of  our  industry,  were  $5.09  in  1842.  Again,  upon  the 
second  abandonment  of  the  system,  our  exports  rose  from  $5.08  in 
1846  to  $11.09  in  1861.  These  contrasts,  and  the  changes  of  each 
year,  may  be  most  easily  observed  in  the  accompanying  diagram,  in 
which  the  rate  of  net  exports  and  imports  per  capita,  specie  ex- 


HIGH  TARIFFS  CHECK  EXPORTS.  53 

clubed,  is  traced  year  by  year  according  to  the  table  already  given. 
The  lower  line  also  represents  the  exports  of  manufactured  prod 
ucts,  to  which  we  shall  presently  refer.  Remembering  that  the 
years  1825  and  1847  were  years  of  peculiar  demand  from  Europe 
for  our  products,  and  that  the  sudden  rise  in  1866  was  largely 
owing  to  the  escape  of  cotton  worth  over  two  hundred  and  eighty 
millions  of  dollars,  much  of  which  had  been  confined  during  the 
war,  we  may  trace  year  by  year  the  effects  of  the  currency  on  the 
one  hand,  and  of  tariffs  on  the  other,  upon  our  exports  and  im 
ports. 

\~During  the  twelve  years  of  protection,  with  which  the  record 
begins,  our  imports,  repeatedly  depressed  for  one  year  or  two,  al 
ways  recovered,  and  were  higher  per  capita  at  the  end  than  at  the 
beginning  of t  the  period.  But  our  exports,  in  spite  %of  the  increase 
of  currency  in  1831,  remained  about  the  same  during  the  whole  pe 
riod,  though,  as  soon  as  the  duties  were  removed,  they  rose  rapidly, 
and  in  1834  reached  the  natural  limit  of  exchange  value.  The  ex 
pansion  which  followed  increased  them  some,  but  imports  far  more, 
and  the  depression  of  exports  which  followed  was  due  in  part  to 
failure  of  crops.  Again,  through  all  the  tariff  of  1842,  our  exports 
slightly  declined  in  rate  per  capita,  although  imports,  forced  down 
to  the  lowest  point  in  1843,  the  first  year  of  the  tariff,  more  than 
recovered  at  once,  and  were  higher  at  its  close  than  in  1842.  But 
the  instant  that  tariff  was  removed,  exports  rose  rapidly — not  only 
in  the  year  of  famine,  for  they  were  higher  in  1850  than  in  any 
year  under  protection — and  from  that  time  moved  naturally  and  reg 
ularly  in  sympathy  with  imports,  year  by  year,  until  the  panic  of 
1858.  Here  the  law  of  exchange  was  free  to  operate,  and  exports 
and  imports  both  increased  rapidly  and  harmoniously.  But  under 
each  protective  tariff  that  law  of  exchange  has  been  interrupted; 
imports,  obeying  lawTs  more  powerful  than  any  tariff,  have  risen  in 
spite  of  temporary  depression,  while  the  natural  tendency  to  in 
crease  exports  in  like  proportion  has  been  thwarted.  Omitting  the 
year  1866,  for  the  reason  given,  we  find  that  our  exports  since  the 
war  are  lower  than  they  were  in  any  year  since  1853,  before  the 
war.  But  our  imports,  cut  down  in  18C1  to  89.02  per  capita,  in 
stantly  ;rose  to  $10.66.  Higher  duties  cut  them  down  to  89.23,  but 
in  the  very  next  year  they  rose  again  to  $11.11.  Then  came-one 
more  effort  to  shut  out  foreign  goods,  and  duties,  intended  and  be 
lieved  to  be  almost  prohibitory,  cut  down  imports  to  $6.99  per  cap 
ita.  But  in  the  very  next  year  they -rose  to  811.92 — higher  than 


54  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

ever  before  in  our  history.  And  the  last  tariff,  which  reduced  im 
ports  to  $9.27  in  1868,  seems  already  to  have  lost  nearly  all  its 
force,  for  in  1869  we  find  an  increase  to  $10.52.  Meanwhile  our  ex 
ports  are  decreasing,  and  the  gap  to  be  filled  every  year  with  gold 
and  bonds  grows  wider.  Is  it  not  wide  enough  already  ? 

It  will  be  said,  however,  that  the  recent  decrease  of  exports  is 
owing  to  the  changes  at  the  South,  which  have  reduced  the  cotton 
crop.  During  the  war,  when  our  exports  sank  to  $4.39  per  capita — 
almost  precisely  the  point  at  which  the  record  starts,  forty-eight 
years  ago — the  cotton  crop  was  indeed  interrupted.  But  it  must 
be  observed  that  the  records  before  us  are  of  values,  not  quantities, 
and  the  cotton  crop  since  the  war  has  actually  sold  for  nearly  as 
much  money,  and  therefore  added  nearly  as  much  to  our  exports  J>er 
capita,  as  it  di4  in  the  years  before  the  war.  In  1866  our  exports  of 
cotton  were  valued  at  two  hundred  and  eighty-one  millions,  or  in 
gold  at  two  hundred  and  two  millions ;  in  1860  at  only  one  hundred 
and  ninety-one  millions.  During  the  four  years  1866-'69,  inclusive, 
we  have  exported  cotton  valued  at  seven  hundred  and  ninety-seven 
millions,  or  in  gold  at  five  hundred  and  seventy-four  millions.  Dur 
ing  the  four  years  1857-'60,  inclusive,  we  exported  cotton  worth  six 
hundred  and  sixteen  millions,  so  that  the  loss  on  this  crop  is  only 
forty-two  millions  in  four  years,  or  ten  millions  a  year — less  than 
thirty  cents  per  capita.  Neither  has  the  loss  been  in  tobacco ;  in 
1869  we  exported  of  that  article  more  than  twenty  millions'  worth, 
and  in  1860  less  than  sixteen  millions.  Nor  has  it  been  in  bread- 
stuffs.  In  1860  we  exported  of  wheat  to  the  value  of  four  millions, 
of  flour  fifteen  millions,  and  of  corn  two  and  a  half  millions ;  in  1869 
we  exported  of  wheat  over  twenty-four  millions,  of  flour  nearly  nine 
teen  millions,  and  of  corn  nearly  seven  millions.  And  in  1868  the 
values  were :  of  wheat,  thirty  millions ;  of  flour,  twenty  millions ; 
and  of  corn,  thirteen  millions. 

It  is  the  theory  of  the  advocates  of  protection  that  by  high  duties 
we  build  up  a  home  market  for  the  farmer,  enable  the  country  to 
consume  its  own  breadstuffs,  and  thus  save  the  transportation  to  Eu 
rope  on  these  and  other  bulky  products,  while  we  export  more  of 
finished  products  of  industry.  It  is  very  plain  that  protection  for 
eight  years  has  not  rendered  our  farmers  more  independent  of  for 
eign  markets  for  their  breadstuffs.  It  is  very  plain  that  the  reduc 
tion  of  our  exports  has  not  been  in  the  raw  materials  chiefly  ex 
ported.  Let  us  see  whether  the  tariff  actually  does  enable  us  to  ex 
port  a  larger  proportion  of  manufactured  products,  and  a  smaller  pro- 


HIGH  TARIFFS  CHECK  EXPORTS.  55 

portion  of  raw  materials.  It  must  be  admitted  that  this  is  a  crucial 
test.  If  protection  has  failed  in  this,  it  has  utterly  failed  to  justify 
the  theory  of  its  advocates. 

It  has  been  stoutly  asserted  by  Mr.  Carey  and  others  that  our 
exports  of  manufactured  products  are  now  greater  than  ever  before. 
If  this  were  true,  it  would  not  sustain  their  reasoning.  As  a  nation 
grows  in  population  and  in  commerce,  its  exports  of  manufactured 
products  ought  to  increase  in  at  least  equal  ratio,  and,  if  it  progresses 
at  all  in  civilization  and  mechanic  arts,  in  a  greater  ratio.  W^ere 
the  statement  true,  therefore,  it  would  only  prove  that  our  manufac 
tures  have  not  been  conspicuously  prostrated  by  a  system  especially 
designed  to  develop  them.  But  it  is  not  the  fact ! 

«-At  first  glance,  the  records  published  by  the  Treasury  Depart 
ment  seem  to  sustain  the  assertion.  The  aggregate  value  of  the 
exported  articles  now  classed  as  manufactures  is  reported  as  greater 
than  the  reported  value  of  articles  exported  before  the  war,  and  then 
classed  as  manufactures.  Thus  when  the  Treasury  tables  assert  that 
the  value  of  manufactured  exports  in  1867  was  $74,796,531,  we  look 
in  vain  to  any  former  year  for  figures  as  large.  In  1860  the  reported 
value  was  only  $48,090,640.  But  a  moment's  reflection  suggests 
tljgtthe  exports  of  1867  were  valued  in  a  currency  worth  only  seventy- 
Qne^cents  tojthe  Mlar™aiid, ''"reducing"  th"e ^seventy-four  millions  in 
pjaper  to  gold  values,  we  have  only  fifty-three  millions — an  increase 
of  o^nlyjive  millions  in  nine  years.  Now,  the  nation  has  increased 
more  than  ten  per  cent,  in  population,  and  would  naturally  have 
increased  more  than  ten  per  cent,  in  productive  power. 

But  when  we  look  into  the  items  now  classed  as  manufactures, 
and  compare  them  with  those  of  manufactured  exports  in  1860,  we 
find  that  the  tables  are  quite  curiously  constructed.  The  eye  pres 
ently  reaches  the  item,  "  Petroleum  " — exported  over  twenty-four 
millions  in  1867  !  Now,  we  did  not  export,  nor  in  any  considerable 
quantity  produce,  petroleum  in  1860.  This  enormous  item  is  simply 
added  to  our  exports  of  manufactured  articles,  and  the  record  is  then 
quoted  with  infinite  zest,  as  proving  that  our  industries  have  been 
vastly  benefited  by  high  duties.  \\IJiattariff,  then,  claims  the  honor 
ot_Drake!s.-discovery  ?  What  tarin^ia7n5ore"d"'^We1ts'1  "to"  '£Ke "great 
reservoirs  of  oil  ?  Or  did  some  very  high  protective  tariff,  far  back 
in  ages  of  the  world's  infancy,  store  away  in  caverns  for  the  use  of 
man  these  inexhaustible  deposits  of  light  and  heat  ?  Only  by  this 
addition  of  all  exports  of  petroleum,  crude  or  refined,  have  our  ex 
ports  of  manufactures  been  thus  apparently  increased.  Such  a  table 


56  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT  ? 

evidently  gives  no  just  test  of  the  effect  of  the  present  system  upon 
our  manufactures.  Further,  it  appears  that  all  exports  of  lumber, 
timber,  masts,  spars,  shocks,  staves,  and  headings,  are  now  classed 
as  manufactures.  Whether  such  classification  be  proper  or  not,  it  is 
certainly  not  calculated  to  help  to  a  correct  understanding  of  the 
progress  of  what  are  usually  regarded  as  manufactures.  And  it  will 
be  observed  that  exports  of  lumber  have  increased  from  six  millions 
in  1860  to  over  ten  millions  in  1867  and  1868,  so  that,  deducting 
these  and  the  exports  of  petroleum,  we  have,  in  1860,  exports  valued 
at  forty-two  millions  in  gold,  against  exports,  in  1867,  valued  at  forty 
millions  in  paper,  and  in  1868  valued  at  forty-one  millions  in  paper^ 
Now,  the  forty-two  millions  of  exports  in  1860,  of'ar-ticles  legiti 
mately  classed  as  manufactured  products,  were/uS-J-  per  cent,  of 
our  whole  domestic  exports  in  that  year.  But  the""forty-one  mil 
lions  in  paper,  or  twenty-nine  millions  in  gold,  of  manufactured 
exports  in  18  G8,..  were  -only  10  percent,  of  our  domestic  exports  for 
that  year.  So  that  the  exact  result  of  nine  years  of  protection  has 
been  to  reduce  the  proportion  of  our  manufactured  exports,  and 
increase  the  proportion  of  exports  of  raw  materials..  It  happens, 
indeed,  that  these  nine  years  of  protection  have  pushed  us  back 
farther  than  we  were  in  1846,  for  then,  after  only  four  years  of  pro 
tection,  our  exports  of  the  same  ^manu£tctured  articles  were  only 
$11,139,582,  or  almost  11  per  cent.  ol\onr  domestic  exports. 
From  that  time  to  1860,  without  protection,  bur  manufactured  ex 
ports  advanced  from  11  to  over  13  per  cent.,  an4,  from  18&Qv  to 
1868,  the  export  of  the  same  articles  has  declined  to  pnly  10  per 
cent. !  Surely  these  facts  do  not  justify  the  assertion  that  our  ex-  - 
ports  have  been  checked  by  the  tariff  only  because  we  have  been 
sending  away  less  of  raw  materials.  For  the  contrary  is  proved  by 

the   Statistics:   thfi   forifE-J3aa~uQt--nnly  p.hpp.kpr|    pypnrffijjrnfji-.  has 

retarded  our  exports  of  manufactured  more  than  our  exports  of  raw 
products. 

But  it  will  be  said  that  these  selected  facts  may  not  fairly  repre 
sent  the  whole  history,  and  that  there  has  been  just  complaint  of 
other  writers  on  that  score.  Let  us,  then,  present  a  complete  record 
of  our  exports  of  manufactures,  from  the  earliest  day.  The  following 
table  is  compiled  from  official  records :  *  the  data  for  the  years  prior 
to  1847  are  taken  from  the  Treasury  reports  of  that  period,  and  do 

*  On  Diagram  III.  (page  52),  the  lower  line  represents  the  exports  of  manufac 
tured  products. 


HIGH  TARIFFS  CHECK  EXPORTS. 


57 


not  include  exports  of  lumber,  timber,  and  shooks  ;  the  data  for  the 
years  subsequent  to  1847  are  taken  from  the  Treasury  reports  of 
1866  and  later,  and  do  include  exports  of  lumber,  timber,  shooks, 
and  also  two  small  items,  ashes  and  sperm  candles,  which  were  not 
classed  as  manufactures  prior  to  1847.  There  is  thus  a  break  in  the 
continuity  of  the  record  at  that  point — an  apparent  increase  caused 
by  including  for  the  first  time  the  articles  named.  The  values  for 
recent  years  are  reduced  to  gold,  and  exports  of  petroleum  are  of 
course  excluded — not  because  refined  petroleum  may  not  be  called  a 
manufactured  product,  but  because  the  object  is  to  compare  the  effect 
of  tariffs  in  different  years  upon  those  branches  of  industry  commonly 
spoken  of  as  manufactures,  and  which  may  be  affected  by  them. 
Against  the  amount  exported  each  year,  since  1821,  will  be  found  in 
another  column  the  amount  per  capita. 

VALUE  OP  MANUFACTURED  PRODUCTS  EXPORTED. 


YBAB. 

Value 
per  Cap. 

Value. 

YEAR. 

Value 
per  Cap. 

Value. 

1821  

$  .28 

$2,752,631 

1845  

&  .53 

$10  329  701 

1822 

.30 

3  121  030 

1846   .  ... 

55 

11  139  582 

1823  

.29 

3,139  598 

•J-1847  

.76 

15  756  814 

1824 

45 

4  841  383 

1848 

.89 

19  249  896 

1825  

.51 

5,729,797 

1849  

.73 

16  116  400 

1826 

.48 

5  495  130  •« 

—1850  

67 

15  414  222 

1827 

47 

5  536  651 

1851 

1  15 

27  317  107 

1828 

.44 

5  548  359 

1852.  

1.02 

25  284  123 

1829 

42 

5  412  320 

1853 

1  12 

29  255  104 

1830  .  . 

.41 

5  320  980 

1854  

1  40 

36  380  397 

1831 

38 

5  086  890 

1855 

1  34 

35  999  387 

1832  

.36 

5,050  633 

1856  

1.32 

36  612  053 

1833 

46 

5  557  080 

1857 

29 

36  655  296 

1834  

.43 

6,247,893 

1858  

.23 

35  853  693 

1835 

51 

7  694  073 

1859 

32 

39  934  373 

1836  

.40 

6,107,528 

U.860.  . 

.53 

48  090  640 

1837 

46 

7  136  997 

i86i  —  rrrrT 

33 

43  190497 

1838  

.51 

8,397,078 

1862  

11.36 

32  026  250 

1839 

50 

8  325  082 

1863 

1  54 

37  549  508 

1840  

.58 

9,873,462 

1864  

.88 

24  122  859 

1841  .  . 

57 

9  953,020 

1865   

79 

23  932  073 

1842 

47 

8  410  699 

1866 

81 

29  019  254 

1843 

*48 

6  779,527 

1867   ...  . 

98 

35  818  949 

1844  

.50 

9,579,724 

1868  

.96 

37,163,465 

In  1803,  prior  to  the  complete  Treasury  records,  it  is  mentioned 
that  the  exports  of  manufactured  products  were   but  $1,355,000, 

*  For  the  year  1843  four- thirds  are  allowed,  the  Treasury  year  embracing  only 
nine  months. 

f  Change  of  items  included. 

\  Population  within  military  lines,  as  per  table  elsewhere ;  values  reduced  to  gold. 
5 


58  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

or  23  cents  per  capita,  and  that  they  then  rose,  before  our  commerce 
was  interrupted,  to  $2,963,000,  or  45  cents  per  capita  in  1806.  This 
was  without  any  such  tariff  as  is  now  called  protective,  either  to  help 
or  to  embarrass.  The  seas  were  not  free  to  our  commerce  again 
until  1815,  and  in  that  year  the  record  starts  with  only  $2,051,000, 
or  24  cents  per  capita,  increased  the  next  year  to  27  cents,  and  the 
next  to  28.  But  at  this  point  begin  the  first  duties  for  protective 
purposes,  and,  after  an  increase  to  30  cents  in  1818,  there  is  a  sudden 
decrease.  From  1821  the  records  of  the  Treasury  are  complete,  and 
we  find  that  manufactured  exports  again  rose  to  45  cents  per  capita 
in  1824,  and  to  51  cents  in  1825,  when  the  protective  tariff  of  1824 
began  to  be  felt.  From  that  time,  with  irfcreasing  duties  to  protect 
our  manufactures,  there  is  a  curiously  steady  and  regular  decrease,  a 
little  every  year,  in  the  power  of  our  manufacturers  to  compete 
in  foreign  markets.  Exports  of  manufactured  products  fell  from 
$5,729,797,  or  51  cents  per  capita  in  1825,  to  $5,050,633,  or  36  cents 
per  capita  in  1832,  the  last  year  of  that  tariff.  Instead  of  decreasing, 
they  should  have  increased,  if  natural  progress  of  industry  had  been 
left  to  work  its  legitimate  results. 

It  is  equally  interesting  to  notice  how  promptly  exports  of  man 
ufactured  products  increase  when  the  duties  begin  to  decline.  In 
1833,  the  first  year  of  the  compromise  tariff,  the  exports  increased 
over  a  million  and  a  half,  or  from  36  to  46  cents  per  capita.  The  inflation 
of  1836  and  1837,  and  the  consequent  panic,  checked  this  progress, 
but  in  1840  we  were  exporting  of  manufactured  products  $9,873,462, 
and  in  1841,  $9,953,020.  Thus,  in  spite  of  the  great  panic,  our  ex 
port  of  manufactures  had  almost  doubled  in  nine  years.  We  shall 
see  that  a  still  more  surprising  progress  followed  the  removal  of  pro 
tection  in  1846. 

During  the  tariff  of  1843-'46,  as  has  been  already  explained,  the 
country  was  steadily  recovering  from  the  effects  of  the  bank  explo 
sion,  and  exports  of  manufactures  rose  from  ten  millions  in  1841  to 
eleven  millions  in  1846.  The  low  figures  for  1843,  it  will  be  remem 
bered,  represent  only  nine  months.  A  gain  of  little  more  than  a 
million  in  five  years,  or,  population  growing  more  rapidly,  a  decrease 
per  capita  from  58  to  55  is  the  result  in  that  period. 

In  the  next  year  the  ad  valorem  tariff  took  effect,  and  we  have 
also  a  change  in  the  items,  as  already  stated.  Starting,  then,  with 
lumber,  ashes,  and  sperm  candles  included,  we  have  in  1847  an  ex 
port  of  $15,756,814,  or  76  cents  per  capita.  For  three  years  our 
manufactures  were  affected  by  foreign  competition,  but  then  began 


HIGH  TARIFFS  CHECK  EXPORTS.  59 

to  grow  in  earnest.  By  1854  our  exports  of  the  same  products  had 
reached  $36,380,397,  or  an  increase  of  nearly  150  per  cent,  in  four 
years.  The  exports  per  capita  reached  the  highest  point  then  ever 
attained,  $1.40  per  capita,  and,  though  interrupted  again  by  the  dis 
aster  of  1857,  they  more  than  kept  pace  with  population,  reaching 
$1.53  per  capita  in  1860.  At  that  time  the  export  of  the  manufac 
tured  products  was  $48,090,640,  an  increase  of  more  than  200  per 
cent,  in  ten  years. 

We  have  now  to  observe  the  steady  decline  under  protection  to 
$23,932,070  in  1865,  a  loss  of  more  than  50  per  cent,  in  five  years. 
But  it  is  unjust  to  ascribe  this  wholly  to  the  tariff;  it  is  also  the  ef- 
~fect  of  the  withdrawal  of  a  large  number  of  men  from  production, 
and  of  the  high  prices  caused  by  an  inflated  currency.  The  amount 
per  capita  is  calculated  for  the  number  of  persons  estimated  in  Treas- 
ory  reports  as  being  within  our  military  lines  and  supplied  by 
our  trade  each  year,  and  this  causes  the  figure  for  1863  to  rise 
too  high,  as  compared  with  other  years.  During  the  war,  when  the 
Southern  population,  never  largely  engaged  in  manufacturing,  was 
not  consuming,  while  the  force  producing  was  not  materially  dimin 
ished  by  their  isolation,  and  the  population  by  which  we  divide  was 
much  reduced,  the  rate  per  capita  was  high,  but  the  restoration  of 
the  Southern  population  to  the  computation  makes  the  test  of  com 
parison  of  years  since  with  the  years  before  the  war  a  fair  one. 
Though  we  have  been  slowly  recovering  in  exports  of  manufactured 
products,  we  are  still  more  than  eleven  millions  behind  the  point 
reached  in  1860,  and  in  1868  exported  only  96  cents  per  capita. 
The  diagram  (opposite  page  52)  will  enable  every  reader  to  mark,  first, 
the  steady  decrease  under  protection  to  1832,  and  the  rapid  increase 
following  the  abandonment  of  protection ;  second,  the  slight  increase 
under  the  tariff  of  1842,  compared  with  the  rapid  growth  after  1850 ; 
and,  finally,  the  condition  to  which  our  industry  has  now  been 
brought  by  nine  years  of  protection,  as  compared  with  the  progress 
attained  under  low  duties  prior  to  1860. 

Is  not  this  test  a  decisive  proof  that  high  duties  render  our  indus 
tries  less  able  to  compete  in  open  markets  with  those  of  other  coun 
tries  ?  Is  it  not  proof  that  high  duties-  do  not,  as  has  been  claimed, 
reduce  our  exports  of  raw  materials  and  increase  our  exports  of  man 
ufactured  products?  Does  it  not  clearly  appear  that  the  protective 
system  thus  fails,  tested  by  facts,  to  sustain  the  expectations  of  its 
advocates  ? 


60  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

NET  IMPORTS  AND  EXPORTS  OF  MERCHANDISE  ONLY. 


YEAR. 

Exports. 

Per  Capita. 

Imports. 

Per  Capita. 

1821 

$43,671,894 

$4.38 

$43,696,405 

$4.39 

1822  

49,874,079 

4.84 

68,395  673 

6.64 

1823  

47,155,408 

4.45 

51,310,646 

^4.84 

1824  . 

50,649,500 

4.64 

53,846,567 

4.89 

1825.'  

66,944,745 

5.98 

66,395,722 

.   5.92 

1826  

52,449,855 

4.56 

57,661,577 

5.01 

1827  

57,878,117 

4.86 

54,901,108 

4.58 

1828  

49,976,632 

4.09 

66,975,505 

5.49 

1829  

55,087,307 

4.40 

54,741,571 

4.38 

1830...   

58,524,878 

4.53 

49,575,099 

3.91 

1831  

59,218,583 

4.45 

82,808,110 

6.22 

1832  

61,726,529 

4.50 

75,327,688 

5.50 

1833  

89,950,856 

4.99 

83,470,067 

6.96 

1834  

80,623,662 

5.56 

86,973,147 

5.99 

1835  

100,459,481 

6.69 

122,007,974 

8.13 

1836  

106,570,942 

6.92 

158,811,492 

10.31 

1837  
1838  

94,280,895 
95,560,880 

5.97 
5.97 

113,310,571 
86,552,598 

7.17 
5.41 

1839  

101,625,523 

6.12 

145,870,816 

8.79 

1840  

111,660,561 

6.56 

86,250,335 

5.07 

1841  
1842  

103,636,236 

91,799,242 

5.92 
5.09 

114,776,309 

87,996,318 

6.56 

4.88 

1843  

77,686,354 

*4.21 

37,223,905 

2.01 

1844  

99,531,774 

5.24 

96,390,548 

5.07 

1845 

98  455  330 

5  05 

*  105  599  541 

5.41 

1846  

101,718,042 

5.08 

110,048,859 

5.50 

1847  

150,574,844 

7.34  ' 

116,257,595 

5.67 

1848  

130,203,709 

6.09 

140,651,838 

6.57 

1849.. 

131  510,081 

6  00 

132  565  108 

6  05 

1850  

134,900,233 

5  87 

164,034,033 

7.13 

1851  

178  620,138 

7  50 

200  476  219 

8  42 

1852  

154,931,147 

6.30 

195,387,319 

'  7.94 

1853  

189  869,162 

7  50 

250,151  145 

9  89 

1854.. 

215  156  304 

8  27 

277  093  459 

10  65 

1855  

192  751,135 

7.19 

231,650,340 

8  64 

185'6. 

266438  051 

9  61 

295  650  938 

10  67 

1857  

278,906,713 

9.78 

333,511,295 

11  70 

1858  

251  351  033 

8  58 

242  678  413 

8.28 

1859  

278,392,080 

9.21 

316,823,370 

10.49 

I860  

316  242  423 

10.07 

836,282  485 

10  71 

1861  

359,036,604 

11.09 

291,745,559 

9.02 

1862  

182  208  909 

7.75 

250,728  903 

10.66 

1863  

184,413,850 

7.56 

225,375,280 

9.23 

1864  

141645  677 

5.24 

801,115,561 

11  11 

1865  

131,617,331 

4.39 

209,656,525 

6.99 

1866  

334498  710 

9.42 

423,470,646 

11.92 

1867....  

279,374,457 

7.65 

374,943,502 

10.27 

1868  
1869... 

269,042,041 
275.187.799 

7.17 
7.13 

847,549,209 
406,281.834 

9.27 
10.52 

*  Per  capita  estimated  for  number  within  United  States  lines  during  the  war,  as 
per  table  of  population.  Rate  for  1843,  if  four-thirds  of  the  year  be  allowed  :  Ex- 
ports,  $5.51 ;  imports,  $2.68. 


SHIP-BUILDING.  61 

The  examination  of  our  exchanges  with  foreign  nations  has  es 
tablished  certain  facts : 

1.  That  the  protective  system  does  not  prevent  overtrading. 

2.  That  high  duties  check  imports  only  temporarily,  and  their  ef 
fect  is  lost  after  one  or  two  years. 

3.  That  any  decrease  of  imports  so  caused  is  purchased  at  the 
cost  of  a  greater  decrease  of  exports. 

4.  That  every  period  of  high  duties  has  checked  the  natural  in 
crease  of  our  exports. 

5.  That  in  every  such  period  our  exports  of  manufactured  prod 
ucts  have  been  checked,  and  our  industry  has  been  rendered  less 
able  to  compete  with  that  of  other  nations. 

6.  That  the  present  tariff  has  increased  the  proportion  of  raw  ma 
terials,  and  decreased  the  proportion  of  manufactured  products'  ex 
ported,  and  rendered  the  farmer  more  largely  dependent  upon  foreign 
markets  for  his  products  than  he  was  before  the  war. 


CHAPTER    V. 

SHIP-BUILDING. 

IT  may  now  be  confidently  asserted  that  our  prosperity,  as  af 
fected  by  foreign  exchanges,  is  not  increased,  but  is  retarded  in  its 
natural  growth,  by  high  duties  on  imports.  Yet  it  may  be  true  that 
those  duties  so  stimulate  home  industry  and  domestic  commerce  as 
to  confer  benefits  more  than  compensating  for  disadvantages  result 
ing.  "  Protection  to  home  industry  " — the  idea  has  an  almost  magi 
cal  fascination.  By  many  the  policy  bearing  that  name  is  thought 
to  have  a  magical  effect.  Some  have  called  it  the  American  policy, 
but  neither  its  virtues  nor  its  vices  are  our  own.  It  comes  from 
Europe,  was  practised  by  European  nations  long  before  this  nation 
was  born ;  and  has  descended  to  us  of  modern  times,  a  relic  of  the 
dark  ages  when  the  germs  of  civilization,  struggling  up  through  the 
mould  of  barbarism  and  the  wreck  of  feudalism,  deemed  it  necessary 
to  shelter  every  industry  with  the  strictest  laws.  Indeed,  it  has  in 
spirit,  if  not  in  form,  a  still  older  exemplar  in  that  nation  which  pro 
tected  her  industries  by  walls  of  stone  instead  of  legislative  barriers. 
Unconsciously,  they  borrow  Celestial  ideas  who  say,  "  What  need 
we  care  for  foreign  commerce  ?  Let  us  build  up  within  this  country 


62  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

industries  to  supply  all  our  wants,  for  thus  only  can  we  achieve,  in 
peace  or  in  war,  a  true  national  independence." 

One  industry,  however,  we  do  not  stimulate.     To  the  enlightened 
protectionist,  foreign  commerce  is  a  waste  of  human  effort,  and  ships 
are  a  waste  of  the  raw  material.     The  object  of  his  system  is  to 
eliminate  the  cost  of  transportation,  and  a  perfectly  protected  coun 
try  ought  to  have  no  use  for  a  sailor.     So  much,  at  least,  we  might 
almost  infer  from  the  coolness  with  which  the  advocate  of  protection 
contemplates  the  decline  of  our  shipping  and  ship-building.     Our 
ship-yards  become  desolate;  our  seamen  seek  service  under  other 
flags ;  and  our  best  vessels  find  owners  in  foreign  ports ;  but  Mr. 
Greeley  quietly  remarks  that  this  interest  cannot  be  expected  to 
prosper  at  present.     Yet  our  naval  power  depends  upon  the  growth 
of  our  commercial  shipping.     Our  fisheries,  so  long  encouraged  with 
liberality  by  government  as  a  school  for  seamen,  no  longer  meet  the 
needs  of  modern  times.     Our  coasting  service  has  been  greatly  con 
tracted  by  the  rapid  growth  of  railroad  communications.     Our  for 
eign  merchant-ships  alone  provide  the  trained  seamen  who  can  be 
called  to  man  our  vessels  in  time  of  conflict.     Foreign  commerce 
alone  can  keep  in  existence  those  magnificent  ship-yards  from  which, 
in  former  time,  went  forth  stanch  and  swift  vessels,  everywhere  en 
vied  in  peace  and  dreaded  in  war.     No  one  who  wishes  to  see  our 
flag  respected  by  foreign  powers  can  witness  without  regret  the  de 
cline  of  our  shipping  interest,  the  abandonment  of  yards,  the  sale  of 
ships,  and  the  expatriation  of  hardy  and  trained  seamen.     What 
manufacture  deserves  protection  more  than  the  manufacture  of  ships  ? 
No  small  share  of  our  success  in  the  recent  struggle  we  owe  to  the 
readiness  of  our  ship-yards,  the  genius  of  our  architects,  and  the  skill 
of  our  mechanics.     But  to-day  that  great  interest — the  only  arm  with 
which  we  can  strike  any  foe  of  importance — is  crippled,  and  that  in 
dustry  is  almost  annihilated.    The  immense  yards  and  iron-works,  from 
which  years  ago  we  sent  ships  and  engines  of  matchless  excellence 
to  all  countries,  are  closed  and  silent.     In  September  there  were  but 
two   sea-going   steamers    for  commercial  purposes   being    built   in 
all  our  ports.     Nor  is  this    strange.     The  wonder  is  that  any  are 
built,  when  the  cost  of  every  material,  iron,  copper,  cordage,  duck, 
and  timber,  is  so  great.     It  is  a  singular  proof  of  the  superiority  of 
our  workmen,  that,  in  spite  of  these  disadvantages,  they  can  still 
build  any  class  of  vessels  within  20  per  cent,  of  the  cost  in  foreign 
ports.     In  Nova  Scotia,  wooden  vessels  can  be  built,  it  is  stated, 
nearly  30  per  cent,  cheaper  than  in  this  country.     On  the  Clyde,  for 


SHIP-BUILDING. 


63 


miles,  the  ear  is  stunned  with  the  clang  of  hammers,  and  iron  ships 
by  the  hundred  are  built  at  rates  with  which  our  builders  cannot  now 
compete. 

If  it  is  desirable  or  possible  to  "  protect  American  industry,"  this 
particular  industry  of  all  others  deserves  its  full  share  of  favor.  The 
artisans  of  our  ship-yards,  the  machinists  of  our  great  iron-works, 
were  not  these  also  American  laborers  ?  Were  not  they  entitled  to 
some  thought  from  a  paternal  government  which  holds  it  a  duty  to 
secure  plenty  of  work  at  high  wages  to  American  workmen  ?  Or 
do  we  intentionally  selectj  as  the  one  industry  which  we  will  not 
protect,  that  very  one  upon  which  our  national  honor  and  safety 
most  depend  ? 

Prior  to  1855,  wooden  vessels  were  mainly  used ;  since  that  time 
they  have  been  rapidly  superseded  by  iron.  At  the  point  of  change, 
during  the  years  1856  and  1857,  our  foreign  tonnage  declined,  but  it 
began  to  recover  again  in  1858,  and  increased  in  1859,  1860,  and 
1861,  iron  ships  being  built  with  success  in  our  ship-yards.  The  two 
periods,  then,  are  to  be  considered  separately,  and  in  the  following 
table  will  be  found  the  registered  tonnage  for  each  year  since  the 
War  of  1812,  the  proportion  of  tonnage  to  population  expressed  in 
thousandths  of  a  ton  per  capita,  and  the  number  of  ships,  barks,  and 
brigs,  built  each  year  since  1821.  Of  schooners,  sloops,  and  steam 
ers,  a  large  proportion  has  been  used  in  the  coasting,  lake,  or  river 
traffic,  and  it  is  with  foreign  tonnage  only  that  we  have  to  do  at  this 
time. 

TONNAGE— VESSELS    BUILT. 


YEAR. 

Registered. 

Tonnage 
per  Cap. 

Ships  and 
Barks. 

Bripu 

YEAR. 

Registered. 

Tonnage 
per  Cap. 

Ships  and 
Barks. 

Brigs. 

1815. 

854,294 

.101 

1840.   . 

899,765 

.053 

97 

109 

1816. 

800.760 

.092 

1841.   . 

845,803 

.048 

114 

101 

1817. 

809,725 

.091 

1842.  . 

975,359 

.054 

116 

91 

1818. 

606.089 

.067 

1843.   . 

1,009,315 

.054 

58 

34 

1819. 

612,930 

.065 

1844.   . 

1.068,765 

.056 

73 

47 

1820. 

619,047 

.064 

1845.   . 

1,095,173 

.056 

124 

87 

1821. 

'    619,896 

.062 

1846.   . 

1,130,286 

.056 

100 

164 

1822. 

628.150 

.061 

64 

131 

1847.   . 

1,241,313 

.060 

151 

168 

1823. 

639,921 

.060 

55 

127 

1848.   . 

1,360,887 

.663 

254 

174 

1824. 

669,973 

.060 

56 

156 

1849.   . 

1,438.942 

.065 

198 

148 

1825. 

700,787 

.062 

56 

197 

1850.   . 

1,585,711 

.069 

247 

117 

1826. 

737,978 

.064 

71 

187 

1851.   . 

1,726,307 

.072 

211 

65 

1827 

747,170 

.062 

55 

153 

1852.   . 

1,899,448 

.077 

255 

79 

1828. 

812,619 

.066 

73 

108 

1853.   . 

2,103,674 

.080 

269 

95 

1829. 

650,142 

.052 

44 

58 

1854.   . 

2,333,819 

.089 

334 

112 

1830. 

576,675 

.045 

25 

56 

1855.   . 

2,535,136 

.094 

381 

126 

1831. 

620,452 

.047 

72 

95 

1856.  . 

2,491,402 

.090 

306 

103 

1832. 

686,989 

.050 

132 

143 

1857.   . 

2,463,967 

.086 

251 

58 

1833. 

750,026 

.053 

144 

169 

1858.   . 

2,499,742 

.085 

122 

46 

1834. 

857,438 

.059 

98 

94 

1859.   . 

2.507,402 

.083 

89 

28 

1R35. 

885,822 

.060 

25 

50 

1860.   . 

2,546,237 

.081 

110 

36 

1836. 

897,774 

.  .058 

93 

65 

1861.   . 

2,642,628 

.081 

110 

38 

1837. 

810,447 

.051 

67 

72 

1862.   . 

2,291,251 

60 

17 

1838. 

822,592 

.051 

66 

79 

1863.  . 

2,026,114 

97 

34 

1&39. 

834,244 

.050 

83 

89 

64  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

At  the  close  of  the  War  of  1812,  our  registered  tonnage  was 
854,294  tons,  or  11Qy5-  of  a  ton  per  capita.  As  there  is  no  other 
method  of  reaching,  even  approximately,  the  amount  of  tonnage 
employed  in  foreign  trade,  we  may  treat  the  registered  tonnage  as 
foreign,  and  may  suppose  that  the  number  of  ships,  barks,  and  brigs 
built  affords  a  fair  basis  of  comparison  for  the  whole  number  of  sea 
going  vessels  put  afloat.  Never,  since  1815,  has  our  registered  ton 
nage  been  as  great  in  proportion  to  population  as  it  was  in  that  year. 
Under  the  tariff  of  1816  there  was  a  sudden  decline  to  606,089 
tons,  or  iljjjo  per  capita  in  1818 ;  and  from  this  time  until  1828 
there  was  an  increase  almost  exactly  proportioned  to  that  of  popu 
lation—from  yf £5-  to  y!-^  of  a  ton  per  capita.  The  tariff  of  1828 
affected  this  interest  just  as  it  did  others ;  it  produced  a  rapid  decline 
and  general  prostration  in  1829  and  1830,  after  which  imports 
revived,  and  shipping  also.  In  1830,  tonnage  fell  to  576,675,  or 
TtHhr  Per  capita,  its  lowest  point  in  our  history  since  the  war.  Four 
teen  years  of  protection  had  reduced  our  foreign  tonnage  from 
800,716,  in  1816,  to  576,675,  in  1830,  and  from  y^  to  yf^.  It  is 
difficult  to  avoid  the  inference  prompted  by  the  fact  that  this,  the 
lowest  point  in  our  history,  was  reached  under  the  heaviest  duties 
on  iron,  hemp,  cordage,  duck,  copper,  and  other  materials.  Nor 
will  the  singularly  steady  and  regular  decline  be  overlooked,  which 
followed  the  duties  placed  on  iron  in  1818.  The  rate  per  capita 
changed  thus :  67,  65,  64,  62,  61,  60.  The  subsequent  increase 
under  the  tariff  of  1824,  though  not  large,  is,  nevertheless,  note 
worthy,  because  it  was  in  spite  of  duties  still  higher,  and  it  may, 
perhaps,  be  ascribed  to  an  increase  of  the  cotton  crop,  from  560,000 
bales  in  1824  to  957,000  bales  in  1827,  that  the  higher  duties 
did  not  cause  a  further  decline  of  tonnage.  The  actual  increase  was 
less  than  that  of  the  cotton  crop.  The  decrease  in  1830  of  236,000 
tons  since  1828  cannot  be  wholly  explained  by  a  decrease  in  the 
cotton  crop,  from  957,000  bales  in  1827  to  870,415  in  1829,  and  in 
1830  the  crop  was  976,845,  and  in  1831  it  was,  for  the  first  time, 
over  one  million  bales,  which  in  part  explains  the  recovery  of  ton 
nage  in  1831  and  1832.  Taking  the  whole  period  of  sixteen  years 
of  protection,  we  have  an  actual  decrease  of  foreign  tonnage,  from 
854,294  tons  in  1815  to  686,989  tons  in  1832,  and  from  yV^  toyfj^. 
And  this  was  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  our  cotton  crop  had  grown 
from  almost  nothing  to  one  million  bales.  It  certainly  cannot  be 
denied  that  such  a  change  gives  proof  that  our  shipping  and  ship 
building  were  affected  most  unfavorably  then,  as  they  are  now,  by 
high  duties  on  the  materials  used. 


SHIP-BUILDIXG.  65 

In  anticipation  of  reduction  of  duties  and  revival  of  commerce, 
a  large  number  of  ships  were  built  in  the  year  1832,  and  a  still 
larger  number  in  the  year  1833,  and,  under  the  compromise  tariff, 
tonnage  rose  to  885,822  in  1835,  or  from  50  to  60  per  capita.  In 
the  same  time,  the  cotton  crop  had  increased  in  the  same  ratio. 
The  financial  disasters  prevented  further  increase  after  1836,  until 
the  return  to  specie,  but  there  was  then  an  increase,  and  in  1842 
the  tonnage  was  975,359,  or  54  per  capita.  Taking  this  period  as  a 
whole,  therefore,  its  results*  are  an  increase  from  686,989  to  975,359 
tons,  slightly  greater  than  that  of  population — from  1§g0  to  yf-g-^- 
per  capita.  Under  the  protective  tariff  there  was  also  a  very  slight 
increase,  from  54  to  56  per  capita.  But,  with  the  return  to  a  non- 
protective  policy  in  1847,  the  tonnage  gained  in  two  years  more  than 
it  had  in  four  years  under  protection,  and  the  rate  per  capita  gained 
in  one  year  more  than  it  had  in  four.  Thenceforward  an  increase  is 
maintained  with  great  regularity,  until  1855.  In  those  nine  years 
tonnage  increased  from  1,130,286  in  1846  to  2,535,136  in  1855,  or 
more  than  doubled.  Let  us  now  compare  the  fifteen  years  under 
protection,  from  1816  to  1830  inclusive,  with  the  nine  years  under 
non-protection,  from  1847  to  1855  inclusive.  In  the  protective 
period  we  have  a  decrease  from  854,294  in  1815  to  576,675  in  1830. 
In  the  non-protective  period  we  have  an  increase  from  1,130,286  in 
1846  to  2,535,819  in  1855.  And  these  are  the  only  periods  in  our 
history  during  which  long-continued  adherence  to  either  policy, 
without  inflation  of  currency,  fully  tested  its  effect. 

It  will  be  said,  however,  that  the  tonnage  declined  during  the 
remaining  years  of  the  non-protective  period.  It  did,  indeed, 
increase  less  rapidly  than  population,  and  the  cause,  as  has  been 
remarked,  was  the  substitution  of  iron  for  wooden  vessels.  But  the 
commercial  disorders  of  1857  also  had  a  depressing  effect. 

It  will  be  reasoned  that  the  rapid  increase  of  our  cotton  crop  and 
of  exports  of  cotton  caused  the  increase  of  tonnage  from  1847 
onward.  If  this  were  so,  the  reply  would  be  ready  that  it  is  the 
avowed  object  of  protection  to  diminish  the  quantity  of  raw  mate 
rial  sent  abroad  for  manufacture,  and  that,  had  that  policy  been  in 
force,  and  had  it  produced  such  effects  as  its  advocates  desire,  it 
would  have  prevented  this  increase  of  shipping.  But  the  facts  do 
not  fully  sustain  this  plausible  explanation  of  the  increase.  For, 
first,  if  it  were  the  true  one,  our  tonnage  should  have  increased  far 
more  from  1855  to  1860  than  in  the  previous  years,  because  our 
cotton  exports  increased  from  one  thousand  to  seventeen  hundred 


66  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

million  pounds  in  that  period.  But  tonnage  did  not  increase  in  the 
same  time,  and  the  increased  exportation  was  done  in  foreign  vessels. 
And,  again,  if  the  increased  exportation  of  cotton  is  to  account  for 
the  increase  of  tonnage  between  1846  and  1855,  then  there  should 
be  some  proportion  between  them.  But  there  is  not,  for  the  exports 
of  cotton  were  eight  hundred  and  seventy-three  million  pounds  in 
1845,  and  eight  hundred  and  fourteen  million  pounds  in  1848  (the 
crops  were  short  in  the  years  1846  and  1847),  while  they  were  only  one 
thousand  million  pounds  in  1855,  and  only  nine  hundred  and  eighty- 
seven  million  pounds  in  1854.  Increase  of  cotton  exports,  from 
eight  hundred  and  fourteen  to  one  thousand  million  pounds,  or  25 
per  cent. ;  increase  of  tonnage,  from  eleven  hundred  to  twenty-five 
hundred  thousand  tons,  or  225  per  cent. — surely,  these  facts  do  not 
sustain  to  each  other  the  relation  of  cause  to  effect ! 

By  no  such  reasoning  can  the  inference  be  avoided,  that  under  a 
non-protective  policy  our  ship-building  was  stimulated  to  vigorous 
progress  by  profitable  employment  for  our  ships  in  foreign  commerce, 
while  under  a  protective  policy  that  interest  was  retarded,  both  by 
that  decline  of  our  exports  which  we  have  traced  as  an  effect  of 
that  policy,  and  by  the  unnatural  enhancement  of  the  cost  of  mate 
rials  used  in  ship-building. 

The  record  of  ships  built  strongly  confirms  the  same  conclusion. 
We  suppose  that  ships,  barks,  and  brigs,  were  mainly  used  in 
foreign  trade,  and  that  taken  together  they  afford  a  fair  test  of  the 
amount  of  shipping  built  each  year  for  ocean  service.  The  number 
built  under  the  tariff  of  1824  was  931  (1824  to  1827  inclusive),  and 
the  number  built  under  the  higher  protective  tariff  of  1828  (1828 
to  1832)  was  only  533 — a  loss  of  four-ninths.  The  number  built  in 

1832  may,  perhaps,  fairly  be  attributed  in  part  to  the  expectation 
of  a  more  prosperous  trade  from  the  change  of  tariff  then  rendered 
certain  by  the  elections.    And  the  number  in  that  year  and  the  years 

1833  and  1834,  before  inflation  of  currency  had  greatly  increased 
prices,  was  880 — more  by  60  per  cent,  in  three  years  than  had  been 
built  in  four  years  under  protection.     Again,  though  building  had 
revived  after  the  inflation  and  panic,  so  that  628  vessels  were  built 
in  the  three  years  1840, 1841,  and  1842,  it  was  instantly  checked  by 
the  tariff  of  1843,  so  that  only  587  were  built  during  the  four  years 
of  its  operation.     And,  after  the  expiration  of  that  tariff,  in  the  next 
four  years  (1847  to  1850  inclusive)  the  number  built  rose  to  1,457 — 
an  increase  of  more  than  250  per  cent. !     In  the  years  1852  to  1856 
inclusive  there  were  built,  of  ships  and  barks  only,  1,645,  or  nearly 


SHIP-BUILDING.  67 

three  times  the  number  of  ships,  barks,  and  brigs,  built  under  the 
protective  tariff,  and  almost  five  times  that  of  ships  and  barks ! 

No  comments  can  add  to  the  force  of  these  figures.  They  de 
monstrate  that  high  tariffs  are  injurious  to  our  ship-building  interest. 
They  demonstrate  that,  when  we  claim  to  be  protecting  American 
industry,  there  is  at  least  one  branch  of  American  industry,  and  that 
not  the  least  important,  which  we  protect  well-nigh  to  death.  Is 
there  any  reason  why  the  thousands  of  workmen  in  our  forests  and 
ship-yards,  and  the  tens  of  thousands  of  sailors  and  of  people  de 
pendent  upon  their  trade  in  our  maritime  towns,  should  be  selected 
from  all  other  laborers  by  our  government,  and  sentenced  to  starva 
tion  or  a  change  of  employment  ? 

This  great  interest  cannot  longer  be  safely  ignored  or  trampled 
down.  For,  since  the  change  from  wooden  ships  to  iron,  the  effect 
of  the  protective  policy  is  more  injurious  than  ever  before.  The 
wooden  ships  of  twenty  years  ago  required,  for  one  of  five  hundred 
tons,  about  fifty-two  thousand  pounds  of  iron,  twenty  thousand 
pounds  of  cordage,  three  thousand  .five  hundred  pounds  of  copper, 
and  fifty-two  pieces  of  sail-duck ;  and  on  smaller  vessels  the  quan 
tity  required  of  these  articles,  though  less,  was  much  larger  in  pro 
portion  to  tonnage — thus  a  schooner  of  only  one  hundred  tons  re 
quired  fifteen  thousand  pounds  of  iron,  eight  hundred  pounds  of 
copper,  five  thousand  pounds  of  cordage,  and  twenty-four  pieces  of 
sail-duck.  It  was  estimated  that  the  tariff  of  1844  enhanced  the 
prices  of  those  articles  alone  $2,290  for  a  five  hundred  ton  ship,  or 
$4.58  to  the  ton  ;  and,  as  ship-building  had  cost  prior  to  that  tariff 
not  far  from  $35  a  ton,  the  tariff  added  about  one-ninth  to  the  cost 
of  the  ships  by  the  duties  on  those  articles  only.  But  the  burden 
is  still  greater  now.  It  would  cost  to  build  the  same  vessels  now 
about  $70  a  ton  in  gold,*  while  builders  in  New  Brunswick  will  build 
for  any  customer  at  $40  a  ton.  The  iron  needed,  which  before  the  war 
could  be  bought  for  $45  a  ton,  now  commands  $85  ;  the  hemp  then 
costing  4J  cents,  now  costs  12 ;  the  copper,  then  22  cents,  is  now 
34 ;  hackmatack  knees,  then  costing  $1.25  and  $1.50  a-piece,  now 
cost  $2.50  to  $3  ;  oak  timber,  then  28  cents  per  foot,  now  costs  60  ; 
white  pine,  then  22  cents,  is  now  45  ;  and  yellow  pine,  then  23,  is 
now  35  cents  per  foot.  The  present  prices  are  stated  in  currency, 
but  it  will  readily  be  seen  that  they  are  far  higher  now  in  gold  than 
they  were  in  1860.  It  is  noticeable  that  ship-carpenters  do  not  share 
in  the  benefits  of  the  tariff,  for  before  the  w^ar  they  received  $2.25  to 
*  These  and  other  figures  following  give  prices  in  the  fall  of  1869. 


63  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

$2.50  per  day,  and  now  they  get  only  $3.25  to  $3.50  in  currency, 
and  a  great  part  of  them  are  idle  even  at  that. 

But  in  the  building  of  iron  ships  the  disadvantage  is  fatally 
great.  Iron  for  that  use  cost  before  the  war  $45  a  ton,  and  now 
(1869)  it  costs  $85  in  currency,  or  about  $60  in  gold.  This  alone 
would  add  nearly  one-third  to  the  cost  of  the  ship,  while  the  cost  of 
iron  to  other  builders  in  Great  Britain  and  elsewhere  has  been  re 
duced  by  improvements  in  manufacture.  Before  the  war  our  build 
ers  of  iron  vessels  were  beginning  to  compete  vigorously  with  foreign 
builders ;  but  it  needs  no  elaborate  reasoning  to  show  that  they  work 
to-day  under  such  a  load  as  must  crush  all  enterprise. 

The  history  of  England  in  this  matter  is  instructive.  Prior  to 
1848,  through  centuries  of  battle  with  the  world,  England  tried  by 
every  form  of  legislative  aid  to  help  her  shipping  interest,  and  had 
the  mortification  to  see  young  America  fairly  rival  her  in  number  of 
vessels,  and  outstrip  her  in  excellence.  In  1848  England  adopted 
free  trade  in  shipping,  and,  after  freeing  from  import  duty  all  foreign 
timber,  copper,  iron,  hemp,  rope,  and  naval  stores,  took  away  the 
futile  legislative  helps  and  told  her  ship-builders  to  fight  for  them 
selves.  The  consequence  was  that  her  tonnage  quickly  rose  from 
about  3,000,000  tons  entered  in  her  ports  in  1848,  to  5,388,953  in 
1859,  and  to  7,299,417  in  1863  ;  while  in  the  years  1853  to  1862,  in 
clusive,  there  were  built  of  steam  vessels  alone  in  Great  Britain 
1,940,  of  which  1,499  were  of  iron.  To-day  we  have  eight  steamers 
in  all  sailing  from  our  ports  to  Europe,  while  England  alone  has 
sixty-eight  steamers  sailing  to  American  ports,  France  has  six,  and 
North  Germany  has  twenty-four. 

Here,  then,  is  one  great  branch  of  American  industry  which  we 
are  protecting  to  death.  And  it  is  that  upon  which  depend  the 
honor  of  our  flag  in  war,  and,  in  a  large  degree,  the  commercial 
prosperity  of  our  country  in  peace. 


CHAPTER   VI. 

INTERFERENCE   WITH  NATURAL  LAWS. 

THE  inquiry  thus  far  has  not  touched  those  points  upon  which 
advocates  of  the  protective  system  mainly  depend.  Shipping  and 
ship-building  are  important  interests,  but  they  are  so  allied  with  for 
eign  commerce  that  it  is  impossible  to  repress  that  commerce  with- 


INTERFERENCE  WITH  NATURAL  LAWS.  69 

out  unfavorably  affecting  them.  If  it  be  proved  that  high  tariffs  do 
not  prevent  over-trading,  since  they  check  imports  only  at  the  ex 
pense  of  a  greater  reduction  of  exports,  it  will  be  replied  that  they 
may  nevertheless  have  given  needed  aid  to  our  industries.  If  it  be 
proved  that  any  high  tariff  to  check  imports  quickly  spends  its  force, 
the  reply  is  that  it  gives  at  least  a  temporary  advantage,  which,  by 
frequent  additions  to  duties,  can  be  prolonged.  If  it  be  proved 
that  our  manufactures,  tested  by  the  power  to  compete  in  foreign 
markets,  have  progressed  more  rapidly  under  low  than  under  high 
duties,  the  answer  is  that  protection  does  not  look  to  foreign 
markets. 

There  is  something  grand  in  the  attitude  of  a  people  who  delib 
erately  make  voluntary  sacrifices,  resolutely  spurn  the  allurement 
of  goods  offered  at  lower  prices,  and  with  unflinching  fidelity  to 
their  purpose  tax  themselves,  year  after  year,  in  order  to  build  up  a 
nationality  complete  in  every  industry,  armed  at  all  points,  and  suf 
ficient  unto  itself.  Other  nations  have  borne  such  taxes  when  im 
posed  by  rulers,  but  few,  if  any,  themselves  have  imposed  them. 
Whether  the  effort  has  succeeded  or  has  failed,  there  has  been  a  cer 
tain  heroism  in  making  it.  Perhaps  even  the  failure  may  place  in  a 
brighter  light  the  heroism  of  the  endeavor ;  as  the  Spartans  at  Ther 
mopylae,  or  the  six  hundred  at  Balaklava,  were  not  the  less  glorious 
in  their  death.  But,  honorable  as  it  may  be  in  a  people  to  make  vol 
untary  sacrifices  for  the  public  good,  the  time  has  come  when  we 
must  ask  whether  the  endeavor  has  succeeded ;  if  so,  at  what  cost ; 
if  not,  whether  it  has  reasonable  prospect  of  success ;  in  short, 
whether  an-  enlightened  desire  for  the  public  welfare  still  demands 
that  the  effort  shall  be  continued.  We  cannot  always  afford  to 
waste  the  nation's  strength  in  honorable  but  futile  exertions.  If  the 
idea  has  been  a  mistaken  one,  its  patriotic  purpose  is  a  sufficient 
justification  in  the  past ;  but,  when  it  shall  appear  mistaken,  the 
same  patriotism  will  prompt  to  its  abandonment. 

Briefly  stated,  the  idea  of  the  advocate  of  protection  is  that 
high  and  discriminating  duties,  in  spite  of  some  disadvantages, 
greatly  benefit  the  country  by  building  up  within  it  such  diversified 
industry  as  to  render  it  comparatively  independent  of  other  coun 
tries. 

Independence  is  not  always  and  necessarily  a  blessing.  The 
savage  tribes  of  some  Pacific  islands  were  wholly  independent  of 
the  rest  of  the  world,  but  their  condition  has  improved  since  their 
independence  was  destroyed.  China  and  Japan,  by  exclusion  of 


70  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

foreign  trade,  built  up  wonderfully  complete  and  self-sustaining 
civilizations,  but  we  do  not  envy  them.  Already  greater  depend 
ence  upon  the  outside  world  is  giving  to  them  the  benefits  of  a 
civilization  less  isolated  and  stagnant.  Yet,  if  mere  protection  to 
home  industry  could  ever  confer  blessings,  those  nations  should 
have  been  most  blessed.  If  mere  diversification  of  industry,  with 
out  regard  to  its  cost,  is  the  one  thing  needful,  those  nations  gained 
it.  If  the  perfect  condition  is  that  in  which  a  nation  produces  every 
thing  it  wants  and  has  no  foreign  commerce,  deeming  that  a  useless 
waste  of  material  and  effort,  then  China  and  Japan  were  for  cen 
turies  models  of  perfection. 

These  phrases,  by  which  the  system  of  protection  is  defended, 
tempt  the  mind  to  overlook  two  important  considerations :  first, 
whether  the  desired  diversification  and  independence  can  at  this 
time  be  secured  except  at  a  cost  greater  than  their  value ;  and,  sec 
ond,  whether  these  ends  can  be  obtained  more  speedily,  surely,  and 
cheaply,  by  a  system  which  seeks  to  exclude  foreign  competition 
than  by  one  which  permits  that  competition  as  an  additional  stim 
ulus  to  our  industry.  Protection  is  not  a  blessing  in  itself,  for  it 
involves  denial  of  freedom  to  satisfy  all  wants  at  the  least  cost. 
Diversification  of  industry  is  not  a  blessing  in  itself,  for  it  would 
cost  a  great  sacrifice  of  labor  and  capital  to  produce  on  our  own  soil 
all  the  natural  products  of  the  tropics.  Diversification,  attainable 
at  a  future  time  without  cost,  may  now  be  attainable  only  by  a 
wasteful  sacrifice.  He  who  advocates  the  encouragement  of  any  in 
dustry  by  legislation,  ought,  therefore,  to  show  that  it  will  not  grow 
up  as  fast  as  the  country  can  afford  to  sustain  it  without  encourage 
ment.  And,  the  cost  being  considered,  he  is  also  bound  to  show  that 
the  industry  in  question  will  be  more  healthy  and  valuable  to  the 
country  if  sheltered  from  foreign  competition,  than  if  subjected  to 
that  stimulus.  Not  all  plants  can  be  grown  under  glass  to  advan 
tage.  Oaks  do  not  become  tough  and  sturdy  in  a  hot-house. 

These  two  considerations — cost  to  the  country,  and  effect  upon 
industry  of  competition  or  its  absence — must  be  taken  into  account 
when  we  attempt  to  decide  whether  the  protection  of  any  branch  of 
industry  has  been  successful.  In  other  words,  we  must  not  only  as 
certain  whether  the  production  of  wealth  has  on  the  whole  been  in 
creased  under  protective  duties,  but  whether  it  has  been  increased 
more  rapidly  and  surely  under  those  duties  than  under  the  non- 
protective  system. 

It  will  hardly  be  denied  that  every  interference  with  natural 


INTERFERENCE  WITH  NATURAL  LAWS.  71 

laws  involves  some  disadvantage.  If  it  be  only  a  difference  of  a 
cent  in  the  pound  of  an  article  of  food  or  a  material  of  industry,  it 
causes  some  inconvenience  to  somebody.  However  slight  it  may 
be,  that  inconvenience  is  an  element  in  the  cost,  and,  if  there  are 
many,  the  aggregate  may  not  be  slight. 

Every  change  from  one  form  or  degree  of  interference  with  trade 
to  another  also  involves  loss  to  somebody.  If  it  increases  or  lessens 
the  value  of  a  stock  on  hand,  or  the  cost  of  filling  a  contract,  there  is 
loss  to  somebody ;  and,  when  there  is  a  general  change  in  the  rate  of 
duties,  there  are  a  great  many  losses  on  a  great  many  different  articles. 
The  disadvantages  and  losses  which  result  from  the  changes  them 
selves  are  an  important  element  in  the  cost  of  a  protective  system.  If 
by  the  prospect  of  frequent  changes  men  are  discouraged  from  attempt 
ing  the  production  of  wealth,  the  cost  is  still  further  increased. 

The  policy  of  interfering  with  the  laws  of  trade  has  now  been 
tried  for  more  than  eighty  years.  Absolute  free  trade  this  country 
has  never  tried.  The  lowest  ad  valorem  tariffs  have  operated  to 
some  extent  as  a  tax  upon  all  industries  and  as  an  encouragement  to 
many.  Ever  since  our  government  had  being,  it  has  been  making 
artificial  conditions  for  trade  and  industry ;  sometimes  with  equal  or 
level  tariffs,  and  sometimes  with  unequal  or  discriminating ;  some 
times  with  high  duties  and  sometimes  with  low;  sometimes  with 
specific,  and  sometimes  with  ad  valorem  duties;  but  always  in  one 
way  or  another  interfering  with  natural  laws.  Thirty-five  distinct 
tariff  laws  have  been  passed,  each  changing  in  some  way  the  condi 
tions  of  trade  and  production.  It  will  be  admitted  by  all  that  such 
fluctuation  is  in  itself  a  great  evil.  No  one,  who  attentively  consid 
ers  the  effect  upon  commerce,  manufactures,  investments  and  profits 
of  capital,  and  employment  of  labor,  can  fail  to  realize  that  these 
changes  have  been  terribly  injurious.  Thirty-five  alterations  of  the 
very  basis  upon  which  industry  and  capital  must  build — thirty-five 
earthquakes,  each  shattering  some  structures,  destroying  some,  and 
trying  all — thirty-five  changes,  each  involving  to  one  class  or  another 
loss  or  gain,  bankruptcy  or  sudden  wealth — how  can  such  fluctua 
tions  occur  without  imparting  to  all  business  something  of  the  char 
acter  of  gambling  ?  The  sober  and  cautious  method,  the  true  en 
terprise  of  quick  sales  and  small  profits,  must  give  place  to  something 
else.  Large  profits  must  be  realized  to  make  up  for  expected  losses ; 
the  lender  must  charge  twice,  once  for  use  of  money,  and  once  for 
risk ;  timid  capital  must  shrink  from  productive  enterprise ;  the  rate 
of  interest  and  the  charges  for  exchange  of  commodities  must  rise. 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


All  these  consequences  must  result,  in  a  greater  or  less  degree,  from 
a  system  which  changes  the  conditions  of  trade  and  the  very  basis 
of  industry  thirty-five  times  in  eighty  years,  and  introduces  the  ele 
ment  of  chance  into  the  most  legitimate  business. 

But  is  not  this  frequency  of  change  a  natural  effect  of  the  attempt 
to  set  aside  or  modify  natural  laws  ?  Does  not  interference  with 
natural  relations  breed  more  interference  ?  No  tariff  can  please 
everybody,  and,  if  we  interfere  for  the  benefit  of  one,  another  may 
ask  aid  with  equal  justice.  The  favor  to  one  interest  is  a  detriment 
to  some  other.  Men  are  not  omniscient;  not  all  the  consequences  of 
any  measure  can  be  foreseen.  If  in  any  respect  it  works  badly,  the 
result  is  a  new  interference,  this  again  begetting  still  another.  And, 
the  higher  the  duties,  the  more  decided  the  discrimination  between 
some  interests  and  others,  the  stronger  will  naturally  be  the  ten 
dency  to  frequent  changes. 

Since  the  War  of  1812  there  have  been  twenty-four  tariffs 
adopted.  Twenty  of  these  have  been  protective  in  their  object. 
Only  four  were  non-protective,  and  one  of  these  scarcely  went  into 
operation  before  it  was  repealed  by  a  protective  tariff.  But  the 
three  non-protective  tariffs  lasted  over  twenty-three  years.  The 
twenty  protective  tariffs  lasted  less  than  twenty-nine  years.  Begin 
ning  with  the  protective  period  of  1816-'32,  we  find  that  new  tariffs 
were  adopted  in  1816,  1818,  1819,  1824,  1828,  1830,  and  1832— the 
last  a  protective  tariff,  though  succeeded  early  in  the  next  year  by 
the  compromise  act  of  1833.  For  this  period  of  seventeen  years, 
seven  tariffs  were  necessary.  The  protective  tariff  of  1842  lasted 
four  years  without  change,  because  the  elections  in  1844  precluded 
all  hope  of  increase.  The  third  protective  period  began  March  2, 
1861,  and  including  the  act  of  that  date  we  have  had  twelve  changes 
in  eight  years.  Compare  the  proportion  of  duties  to  the  whole 
value  of  imports  and  dutiable  imports,  for  each  period,  with  the  du 
ration  of  each  tariff ! 

NON-PROTECTIVE   TARIFFS. 


PEBCBN' 

PAGE  OP 

Date  of  Tariff. 

Duration. 

Duties  to  dutia 
ble  Imports. 

Duties  to  whole 
Imports. 

1846  —  August  6  

10  years    7  mos. 

24 

20.4 

1857  —  March  3 

4     " 

19 

13  8 

1833  —  March  2  

8     "        6    " 

31.9 

15.4 

1841  —  Sept    11 

11    " 

23  1 

16  6 

Four  tariffs.  

24  years. 

INTERFERENCE  WITH  NATURAL  LAWS. 
PROTECTIVE   TARIFFS. 


73 


Date  of  Tariff. 

Duration. 

PEKCENTAGE  OF 

Duties  to  dutia 
ble  Imports. 

Duties  to  whole 
Imports. 

1816  —  April  27                

2  years. 

34!i 
38.1 
46.5 
41.1 
31.9 

32.4 

26.7 

33.2 

37.2 
43.7 
47.06 

47.34 

47.86 

20. 
23. 
29. 
33.1 
38.5 
32.2 
22.4 

25.2 

17.7 

23.7 
81. 

34.2 
40.2 

42.8 
44. 

1818  —  April  20  

1819  —  March  3               ... 

5     "        2     " 
4     " 
2     " 
2     "        2     " 
.    74-  " 

1824  —  May  22  

18og  —  May  19 

1830  —  May  20  

1832  —  July  14             

First  period  seven  acts         .... 

16  years  104;  mos. 
3  years  11  mos. 
.  .  5     mos    ) 

1842  —  August  30       .           .... 

1861  —  March  2 

1861  —  August  5     

.  .  44-     "      V 

1861  —  Dec.  24  

7       "      ) 

1862  —  July  14                     ... 

.    74-     " 

1863  —  March  3  

1  year   4       " 
8       " 

1864  —  June  30 

1865  —  March  3  

1  year     $     " 
.  .  2       "  ) 

1866  —  March  14 

1866  —  Mavl6   

.  .  24-  •  "  v 

1866  —  July  93 

7       "  ) 

1867  —  March  2  

'           ) 

2  years. 
1  year. 

1869—  Feb.  24  

Third  period,  twelve  acts  

9  years. 

It  appears  that  the  longest  period  without  change  of  laws,  ten 
years  and  seven  months,  and  the  next  in  duration,  eight  years  and 
six  months,  were  under  a  non-protective  policy.  Under  the  act  of 
1833  there  were  changes  of  duty,  but  no  change  of  system,  the  de 
sign  being  to  reach  a  purely  revenue  standard;  and  the  act  of  1841, 
extending  low  duties  to  the  free  list,  effected  no  material  change  in 
industrial  relations.  The  other  non-protective  period,  also,  properly 
extends  from  August  6,  1846,  to  March  2,  1861,  fourteen  years  and 
seven  months,  for  the  change  of  duties  in  1857  was  but  slight,  from 
30  to  24  per  cent.  These  are  the  periods  of  low  duties  and  non-pro 
tection,  and  their  long  duration  without  essential  change  is  evidence 
that  such  tariffs  tend  less  strongly  than  those  of  a  different  character 
to  produce  frequent  fluctuations.  For,  excepting  the  tariff  of  1842, 
which  was  virtually  condemned  to  repeal  by  the  popular  vote  when 
it  had  been  in  operation  hardly  two  years,  other  high  tariffs  have 
invariably  led  to  clamors  for  still  higher  duties,  or  protection  to 
additional  interests.  At  the  same  time,  they  have  roused  an  intense 


74  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

desire  for  their  repeal.  By  these  contending  forces,  legislation  has 
been  constantly  threatened,  and  obtained  with  such  frequency,  that 
the  average  duration  of  protective  tariffs  without  change  is  less  than 
eighteen  months,  while  the  average  duration  of  non-protective  tariffs 
is  six  years. 

The  chief  cause  of  frequency  of  change  under  protection  is  the 
increased  cost  of  production  here,  as  compared  with  a  reduced  cost 
elsewhere,  in  consequence  of  which  the  advantage  of  duties  is  soon 
neutralized.  It  is  important  that  this  statement  should  not  be  mis 
understood.  It  is  not  intended  to  repeat  that  notorious  untruth, 
that  duties  always  enhance  to  their  full  amount  prices  of  domestic 
products.  Nor  is  it  true  that  an  absolute  increase  of  price  follows 
every  duty.  Instances  can  be  and  have  been  given  of  an  actual  re 
duction  of  price  after  protective  duties  had  been  imposed  on  the 
corresponding  foreign  article,  sometimes  because,  as  protectionists 
maintain,  home  competition  has  sufficed  to  reduce  the  price,  and 
sometimes  because  less  costly  raw  material  or  improvements  in  man 
ufacture,  here  and  in  other  countries,  have  caused  a  great  reduction 
of  cost,  a  part  of  which  appears  in  a  lower  price,  while  another  part 
appears  in  larger  profits  of  the  manufacture.  But  it  must  be  re 
membered  that  in  the  latter  case  the  cost  here,  though  not  abso 
lutely,  is  relatively  increased ;  the  margin  between  the  cost  here  and 
the  cost  in  other  countries  is  made  wider.  It  will  not  be  denied  that 
the  general  object  of  protective  duties  is  to  enable  the  manufacturer 
to  receive  more  for  his  products  than  the  cost  of  like  foreign  prod 
ucts,  and  their  general  effect  is  therefore  to  make  prices  higher  here 
than  they  would  have  been  without  the  duties.  Not  all  prices,  but 
some  unquestionably,  are  enhanced;  and  the  cost  of  production  is 
therefore  affected.  If  iron  is  dear,  the  cost  of  machinery  is  affected ; 
if  coal  is  dear,  the  cost  of  power  or  fuel  is  affected ;  if  dye-stuffs  are 
dear,  the  cost  of  cloths  is  affected ;  and  in  like  manner  the  price  of 
lumber  affects  the  cost  of  buildings,  and  the  price  of  clothing  and 
food,  the  cost  of  labor.  These  many  items  make  a  large  aggregate, 
and  each  of  them  is  swelled  by  the  large  profits  which  every  trans 
porter,  merchant,  or  middle-man,  must  charge  to  cover  his  own  in 
creased  risk  from  fluctuations,  or  expense  from  enhancement  of 
prices.  Let  us  now  suppose  that,  with  cotton  at  twenty  cents,  a 
maker  of  cotton  goods,  four  yards  to  the  pound,  could  sell  them'  at 
eight  cents  a  yard  without  loss,  the  manufacture  costing  twelve 
cents  to  the  pound,  or  three  cents  a  yard,  and  that  British  goods  cost 
eight  and  a  half  cents  imported.  The  manufacturer  can  make  a 


INTERFERENCE  WITH  NATURAL  LAWS.  75 

profit  of  one-half  cent  a  yard.  If  we  now  add  a  tariff  of  one  cent  a 
yard  it  simply  enables  him  to  make  three  times  as  large  a  profit,  at 
first.  But  other  articles  are  also  protected,  and  presently  his  ma 
chinery  costs  more,  his  coal  more,  his  dyes  more,  his  buildings  more, 
and  each  item  is  increased  by  higher  charges  of  middle-men,  and  his 
labor  needs  higher  wages  to  meet  increased  cost  of  living.  Let  us 
suppose  that  the  cost  of  working  up  a  pound  of  cotton  rises  to  six 
teen  cents,  or  four  cents  to  the  yard ;  the  benefit  of  the  tariff  is  then 
fully  neutralized.  He  has  to  sell  at  nine  and  a  half  cents  to  get  a 
profit  of  one-half  a  cent  a  yard.  Meanwhile,  the  British  manufac 
turer,  forced  by  competition,  steadily  reduces  his  cost  of  manufac 
ture  by  improvements  or  greater  skilL  If  he  reduces  the  cost  one- 
half  cent,  the  profit  of  the  American  manufacturer  must  vanish, 
competition  from  abroad  overwhelming  him.  Were  there  no  tariff, 
he  would  be  forced  to  keep  pace  with  others  in  skill ;  but,  since  gov 
ernment  has  taught  him  to  look  to  legislation  for  success,  he  flies  to 
Congress,  represents  with  truth  that  the  foreign  competition  is 
crushing  him,  and  obtains  a  duty  of  two  cents  a  yard.  How  many 
such  instances  have  we  seen  !  How  often,,  in  the  record  of  foreign 
trade,  have  we  observed  that  importations  were  at  first  checked  by 
high  duties,  but  presently  rose  higher  than  ever !  Every  such  in 
crease  shows  that  the  duties  have  in  some  way  neutralized  them 
selves,  and  the  method  just  described  is,  perhaps,  the  most  com 
mon. 

To  show  how  this  loss  of  the  effect  of  duties  may  occur  while 
the  price  of  the  product  here  is  not  absolutely,  but  ^nly  relatively 
increased,  let  us  suppose  that  cotton  falls  from  20  to  12  cents  a 
pound  while  the  high  duty  is  in  force.  Both  in  England  and  here 
the  cost  of  the  goods  is  reduced.  Our  manufacturer  now  pays  three 
cents  for  his  material  to  the  yard,  though  he  formerly  paid  five,  and, 
though  the  cost  of  manufacture  has  been  increased  by  the  tariff  to 
four  cents  a  yard,  he  can  now  sell  without  loss  at  seven  cents,  or 
lower  than  he  could  at  first.  But  the  British  manufacturer  has  his 
cotton  cheaper  also,  so  that  the  goods  which  could  be  delivered  here 
for  eight  and  a  half  cents  now  cost  six  and  a  half,  or,  with  the  duty, 
seven  and  a  half.  And  the  natural  progress  in  skill  and  machinery, 
under  pressure  of  competition,  has  enabled  him  to  reduce  the  cost 
of  production  one  half  cent,  so  that  foreign  goods  can  be  sold  here, 
duty  paid,  at  seven  cents.  The  American  can  make  no  profit.  He 
flies  to  Congress,  states  with  truth  that  competition  is  crushing  his 
industry,  and,  by  way  of  proving  that  the  high  tariff  has  not  taxed 


76  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

• 

the  people  at  all,  he  points  to  the  prices  when  cotton  was  twenty 
cents,  and  says  with  truth,  "  The  same  goods  which  I  sold  before  the 
tariff  for  eight  and  a  half  cents,  I  sell  now  at  seven  and  a  half ;  but 
the  pauper  labor  of  Europe  undersells  me,  and  drives  me  from  the 
market."  Then,  Congress,  convinced  that  high  duties  make  low 
prices,  gives  him  a  larger  duty,  and  he  goes  home  again  to  manufac 
ture  until  that  duty  also  has  neutralized  itself.  What  is  the  fact  ? 
The  price  is  absolutely  lower,  but  relatively  higher.  If  the  cost  of 
production  had  not  been  increased  by  a  tariff,  and  if  the  manufac 
turer,  forced  by  competition,  had  kept  pace  with  others,  the  cost  of 
production,  originally  three,  would  have  fallen  to  two  and  a  half 
cents  a  yard,  and,  the  cost  of  material  having  fallen  to  three  cents, 
the  goods  actually  ought  to  be  sold  as  low  as  six  cents,  yielding  to 
the  manufacturer  a  profit  even  then  of  one  half  cent  a  yard.  What, 
then,  is  the  result  in  the  case  supposed  ?  The  goods  sell  at  seven 
cents,  the  people  are  taxed  one  cent  a  yard,  the  manufacturer 
makes  no  profit,  and  British  competition  crushes  him.  Everybody 
is  taxed  ;  nobody  is  benefited  ;  and  our  industry  clamors  for  a  still 
higher  tariff. 

This  is  an  imaginary  case.  But  it  shows  precisely  what  the  effect 
must  be,  when  the  cost  of  production  is  increased  fully  as  much  as 
the  duty  increases  the  cost  of  foreign  goods.  Now,  any  tariff  which 
affects  the  prices  of  thousands  of  articles  must  increase  the  cost  of 
production  in  some  measure.  And  every  such  increase,  whether 
much  or  little,  tends  to  neutralize  the  effect  of  the  duty,  and  to  drive 
the  manufacturer  to  Congress,  seeking  higher  duties.  That  this 
effect  does  follow,  we  may  infer  from  the  frequency  of  changes  under 
the  protective  system,  and  from  the  fact  that  imports,  temporarily 
checked  by  high  duties,  have  always  become  larger  than  ever  after 
those  duties  have  been  in  force  one  or  two  years.  When  the  history 
of  separate  industries  shall  be  examined,  a  multitude  of  facts  will 
illustrate  this  principle. 

Other  causes  contribute  to  bring  about  frequent  changes.  Not 
all  manufacturers  are  enterprising  or  careful  in  management.  Inter 
ference  in  behalf  of  any  interest  invites  all  who  are  not  successful 
in  that  business  to  ask  further  aid.  The  less  enterprising  and 
capable,  finding  themselves  unable  to  realize  large  profits,  repre 
sent  that  the  industry,  as  a  whole,  is  still  depressed  by  foreign 
competition,  and  needs  higher  duties.  The  capable  and  enterprising 
manufacturer,  not  averse  to  still  larger  profits,  joins  the  demand,  or 
rarely  opposes  it.  A  third  cause  of  dissatisfaction  is  that  the  manu- 


INTERFERENCE  WITH  NATURAL  LAWS.  77 

facturers,  in  anticipation  of  higher  duties,  prepare  and  hold  as  large 
stocks  as  possible,  to  be  thrown  upon  the  market  when  the  new 
duties  cause  higher  prices.  But  so  many  take  this  course,  straining 
their  capital  to  carry  large  stocks,  that  the  market  is  depressed  for  a 
time,  and,  indeed,  in  some  cases,  great  losses  have  occurred.  Finally, 
the  expectation  of  large  profits  invites  capital  to  a  favored  industry. 
Men  rush  into  it  without  experience  or  skill,  and  with  insufficient 
capital,  who  cannot  produce  at  a  cost  much  below  the  artificial 
limit  fixed  by  duties,  and  cannot  afford  to  wait  in  an  unfavorable 
condition  of  the  market.  Production  is  suddenly  increased;  the 
market  is  overstocked ;  prices  fall  a  little,  and  that  little  suffices  to 
break  the  new  adventurers,  and,  perhaps,  older  manufacturers  who 
have  been  holding  back  heavy  stocks.  The  broken  firms  cease  pro 
ducing;  the  production  falls  once  more  below  the  demand;  and, 
after  sacrificing  the  entire  capital  of  many  firms,  the  country  is  in 
the  hands  of  a  monopoly,  which  points  to  the  distress  and  ruin  of 
many  as  proof  that  duties  still  higher  are  needed.  He  who  will 
attentively  examine  any  faithful  history  of  either  industry,  however 
strongly  it  may  advocate  protection,  will  find  examples  of  the  work 
ings  of  these  principles.  "  Bishop's  History  of  Manufactures,"  a 
work  which  no  protectionist  will  consider  unfriendly,  says  (vol.  2,  p. 
336)  of  the  year  1829,  immediately  following  the  passage  of  the 
high  tariff  of  1828  with  its  minimum  of  35  per  cent,  on  cotton 
goods : 

"  An  unusual  degree  of  distress  prevailed  at  this  time  among  the  manufacturers 
of  New  England,  particularly  in  the  cotton  branch,  producing  numerous  failures  and 
great  depreciation  of  the  value  of  stocks.  The  cause  was  by  some  ascribed  to 
the  disappearance  of  specie,  and  by  others  to  over-speculation,  which  had  tempted 
great  numbers  into  manufacturing  with  insufficient  capital  and  consequent  over- 
production." 

And  the  same  result  is  noticed  as  the  first  effect  of  the  tariff  of 
1842,  which  caused  such  a  deluge  of  goods  on  the  market  in  1843, 
that  many  manufacturers,  who  had  survived  all  the  pressure  of  foreign 
competition,  were  then  ruined.  Prices  were  then  temporarily  de 
pressed  remarkably ;  but,  when  the  market  had  cleared  itself,  they 
rose  again  higher  than  before,  and  those  manufacturers  who  had 
survived  made  large  profits.  The  history  of  the  past  eight  years  is 
full  of  illustrations  of  the  same  principles — of  demands  for  new 
duties  from  the  less  capable,  when  the  majority  of  manufacturers 
were  already  thriving ;  of  demands  from  all,  caused  by  increased 


78  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

cost  of  production ;  of  stoppage  of  factories  in  consequence  of  over 
production;  of  failures  and  losses  caused  by  fluctuations  of  price. 
And  every  change  has  induced  a  new  appeal  to  Congress  for  aid. 
Accordingly,  the  changes  of  tariff  have  been  more  frequent  than 
ever  before. 

It  needs  no  argument  to  prove  that  these  continual  changes  are 
most  injurious  to  industry.  Said  one  of  the  shrewdest  manufac 
turers  of  New  England,  protesting  against  the  proposed  increase 
of  duties  in  1866 :  "  Your  constant  changes  of  tariff  do  more  harm 
than  any  possible  foreign  competition.  Give  us  any  system,  with 
duties  low  or  high,  but  let  it  only  be  permanent,  and  the  business  of 
the  country  will  adapt  itself  to  the  circumstances  and  will  prosper." 
That  he  did  not  exaggerate  the  benefits  of  a  steady  and  enduring 
policy  may  be  inferred  from  the  fact  that  the  progress  of  the  country 
in  wealth,  production,  and  prosperity,  was  never  as  great  in  any 
decade  in  its  history  as  in  the  decade  1850  to  1860,  the  only  one 
during  which  the  same  tariff  policy  prevailed,  with  only  one  slight 
change  of  duties.  In  like  manner,  speaking  in  behalf  of  the  agri 
cultural  interest,  Henry  S.  Randall,  who  will  be  recognized  by  the 
farmers  as  high  authority,  said  in  1845 : 

"  If  the  same  settled  and  steady  character  could  be  given  to  our  tariff  laws,  our 
prosperity  would  be  greatly  augmented.  The  farmer  wants  to  know  what  to  depend 
upon.  He  asks  that  the  fruits  of  his  labor  shall  not  be  subject  to  constant  varia 
tions  in  value,  by  reason  of  vacillating  legislation ;  he  asks  that  his  government  shall 
not  one  year  enact  laws  to  encourage  him  to  embark  his  capital  hi  one  branch  of 
industry,  and  the  next,  by  adverse  legislation,  destroy  or  depreciate  the  value  of  the 
investment.  In  a  word,  he  asks  that  the  tariff  be  settled  on  a  fixed  and  permanent 
basis — one  admitting  of  no  fluctuations  but  those  rendered  indispensable  by  im 
portant  natural  changes,  or  discoveries  developing  new  interests,  or  modifying 
existing  ones." 

Mr.  Randall's  judicious  words  will  be  most  heartily  indorsed 
by  the  ablest  representatives  of  every  other  producing  interest. 
Constant  fluctuations  can  benefit  only  the  gambler.  The  producer, 
no  matter  of  what  branch,  needs  for  prosperity  a  steady  and  settled 
basis  for  his  calculations.  We  have  seen  that  high  duties,  and 
especially  protective  and  increasing  duties,  tend  to  cause  fluctua 
tions,  and  that  this  is  an  almost  inevitable  result  of  the  nature  of 
that  system.  We  have  seen  that  low  duties  alone  have  endured  for 
more  than  five  years,  and  that  non-protective  tariffs  tend  to  prevent 
frequent  changes.  It  may  fairly  be  asked  at  the  outset,  whether  a 
system  which  involves  frequent  changes,  however  much  it  may 


POPULATION  AND  WEALTH.  79 

momentarily  benefit  particular  interests,  must  not  of  necessity  pro 
duce  by  its  fluctuations  greater  evil  than  can  result  from  duties  lower 
and  more  steady. 


CHAPTER    VII. 

POPULATION     AND     WEALTH. 

"  Ix  spite  of  frequent  changes,  the  production  of  wealth  is  even 
now  increasing,"  it  may  be  said.  It  certainly  is !  During  the  war, 
when  half  a  million  of  men  were  withdrawn  from  useful  labor,  and 
when  heavy  burdens  rested  upon  every  back,  and  a  fearful  uncer 
tainty  filled  the  air — even  then  the  production  of  wealth  increased. 
But  we  do  not  suppose  that  the  war  caused  the  increase. 

There  has  never  been  a  period  in  the  history  of  this  country,  of 
which  any  statistical  evidence  can  be  given,  during  which  the  aggre 
gate  production  of  wealth  has  not  increased.  Single  years  can  be 
found,  in  which  widely  extended  commercial  disaster  or  failure  of 
crops  occurred ;  but  of  no  period,  long  enough  to  test  the  working 
of  any  policy  or  measure,  can  it  be  said  that  it  witnessed  a  decrease 
in  the  aggregate  production  of  wealth.  The  reason  is  obvious.  We 
have  an  inexhaustible  supply  of  natural  resources,  land  both  rich  and 
cheap,  mines  of  wonderful  productiveness,  forests  scarcely  less  than 
continental  in  area.  In  consequence,  the  time  never  has  been  when 
any  large  proportion  of  our  population  were  reduced  to  want,  or  when 
any  considerable  share  of  our  labor  was  more  than  temporarily  un 
employed.  Our  population  is  increasing  at  the  rate  of  three  and  a 
third  per  cent,  yearly,  and,  unless  that  proportion  of  the  laboring 
population  were  deprived  of  employment  for  a  whole  year,  the  ag 
gregate  number  of  laborers  and  the  aggregate  production  of  wealth 
must  have  increased.  But  there  is  no  period,  regarding  which  statis 
tics  are  attainable,  in  which  the  wealth  of  the  country  has  not  in 
creased  faster  than  population.  The  proportion  of  labor  which  has 
at  any  time  been  kept  out  of  employment  has  been  very  small ;  but 
the  increase  in  the  productiveness  of  labor,  by  means  of  inventions, 
facilities  for  transportation,  development  of  resources,  and  settlement 
of  the  country,  has  been  very  rapid.  Disaster  in  one  employment 
has  only  driven  a  small  surplus  of  labor  to  seek  another.  Perhaps  a 
more  considerable  change  of  this  character  was  caused  when  the  war 
broke  out  than  at  any  other  time ;  but  even  then  the  aggregate  pro- 


80  DOES  PROTECTION   PROTECT? 

duction  of  wealth  in  the  Northern  States  was  probably  reduced  not 
more  than  one  year,  and  certainly  not  more  than  two. 

No  period  of  tariff,  whether  high  or  low,  protective  or  "  free 
trade "  in  character,  has  ever  diminished  the  production  of  wealth. 
The  only  changes  effected  have  been  in  the  mode  of  production,  and 
in  the  rapidity  of  increase.  This  fact  it  is  of  essential  importance  to 
keep  in  mind,  for  if  in  every  period  wealth  has  increased  faster  than 
population,  a  mere  increase  of  production  under  any  duty  proves 
nothing  ;  the  test  is  the  rapidity  of  increase  in  one  as  compared  with 
other  periods. 

Tlie  population  of  the  country  has  increased  with  very  great  reg 
ularity.  Immigration  and  the  acquisition  of  a  vast  territory  swelled 
the  increase  during  the  decade  1800-'10 — that  of  the  Louisiana  pur 
chase — to  36|  per  cent.,  and  during  the  decade  1840-'50 — that  of 
the  acquisition  of  Texas,  New  Mexico,  and  California — to  35^-  per 
cent.  Large  immigration  during  the  last  decade,  1850-'60,  made 
the  increase  35  J  per  cent.  Its  lowest  rate  was  in  the  decade  of 
1830-'40,  when  it  was  only  32.67  per  cent. ;  but  no  inference  valuable 
to  our  inquiry  can  be  drawn  from  this  fact,  for  the  loss  in  that  decade 
was  wholly  in  the  slave  population,  the  white  population  having  in 
creased  more  rapidly  than  in  either  of  the  two  decades  preceding. 
The  increase  of  the  white  and  total  population  during  the  seven  de 
cades  since  1790  has  been  as  follows :  ft 

TEAK.  White.  Total. 

1790-1800 35.68  35.02 

1800-1810 36.18  36.45 

1810-1820 34.11  33.13 

1820-1830 34.03  33.49 

1830-1840 34.72  32.62 

1840-1850 37.74  35.87 

1850-1860 37.97  35.46 

The  increase  of  colored  population  has  been  affected  by  causes 
not  pertinent  to  this  inquiry,  and  the  increase  of  white  population 
has  been  mainly  affected  by  other  causes  than  changes  of  tariff.  It 
happens,  however,  that  the  only  decade  during  the  whole  of  which 
the  protective  policy  was  in  force  is  the  one  in  which  the  increase 
was  smaller  than  in  any  other,  1820-'30  ;  and  the  only  decade  dur 
ing  which  no  protective  duties  of  any  kind  were  in  force  is  the  one 
in  which  the  increase  is  greater  than  in  any  other,  1850-'60.  In 
deed,  if  we  remember  that  the  decades  1800-'10  and  1840-'50  were 
marked  by  annexation  of  territory,  the  difference  between  the  last 
decade  of  low  duties  and  any  former  decade  will  be  quite  impressive. 


POPULATION  AXD  WEALTH.  81 

No  accurate  statistics  of  the  aggregate  wealth  of  the  country  in 
earlier  decades  enable  us  to  make  comparisons.  The  property  valued 
for  taxation  in  1789  was  $619,977,247.92,  and  an  increase  at  the  rate 
of  little  more  than  40  per  cent,  in  a  decade  would  give  about  the 
valuation  estimated  from  the  census  of  1830,  or  $2,591,000,000. 
From  1830  to  1840  the  increase  was  53  per  cent.,  and  the  valuation 
of  1840  about  $3,964,322,000.  From  1840  to  1850  the  increase  was 
80  per  cent.,  and  the  valuation  of  1850  was  $7,135,780,228.  But 
from  1850  to  1860  the  increase  was  126  per  cent.,  and  the  valuation 
of  1860  was  $16,159,616,068.  Incomplete  as  these  statistics  must 
necessarily  be,  they  suffice  to  prove,  first,  that  in  every  period  there 
has  been  a  productive  power  in  constant  and  vigorous  activity  ;  and 
second,  that  the  increase  has  been  far  more  rapid  in  that  decade  in 
which  there  were  low  duties  and  no  material  changes  of  tariff,  than  in 
any  other  in  our  history.  Even  if  we  suppose  the  natural  increase 
of  wealth  to  gain  in  a  regular  ratio,  that  gain  was  greater  in  the 
last  than  in  any  former  decade — 50  per  cent,  from  1830-'40  to 
1840-'50,  and  57|  per  cent,  from  1840-'50  to  1850-'60.  But  it 
must  be  remembered  that  the  acquisition  of  a  vast  and  rich  ter 
ritory,  and  the  opening  of  California  mines  in  the  decade  1840-'50, 
account  for  a  portidh  of  the  increase  of  wealth  in  that  decade.  The 
contrast  between  the  last  decade,  of  low  duties  and  no  material 
changes  of  tariff,  and  any  preceding  decade,  then  becomes  still 
stronger.  We  may  fairly  say  that  the  increase  of  wealth  from  1850 
to  1860,  from  causes  other  than  the  acquisition  of  territory,  was 
nearly  double  that  of  any  former  decade.  It  appears,  then,  that  the 
same  period  in  which  our  population  gained  most  rapidly  is  also 
that  in  which  the  production  of  wealth  was  most  largely  increased. 
It  happens  to  be  the  only  decade  of  continuous  low  duties ;  the  only 
one  in  which  nothing  like  protection  was  attempted. 

Of  the  progress  of  the  whole  country  in  wealth  since  1860  no 
complete  and  reh'able  statistics  can  be  given.  The  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  has  recently  made  an  estimate,  which,  however,  was  not 
based  upon  any  ascertainment  of  facts,  but  upon  the  supposition 
that  the  increase  has  been  about  as  great  since  1860  as  it  was  during 
the  preceding  decade.  Mr.  Wells,  the  Special  Commissioner  of  the 
Revenue,  in  the  report  just  published,  gives  an  estimate  confessedly 
based  only  upon  a  supposed  continuation  of  the  increase  at  the  rate 
of  the  increase  during  the  preceding  decade,  with  allowance  for 
property  destroyed  and  productive  industry  diverted  in  consequence 
of  the  war.  But  both  these  estimates  take  for  granted  the  very 


82  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

thing  in  question — whether  the  rate  of  increase  has  been -as  great 
since  1860,  allowance  being  made  for  the  war  and  its  effects,  as  it 
was  before.  Always  faithful  to  facts  when  he  can  ascertain  them, 
however,  Mr.  Wells  has  presented  statistics  which,  if  they  do  not 
suffice  for  a  reliable  estimate  of  the  present  wealth  of  the  country, 
at  least  suffice  to  prove  conclusively  that  the  supposition  above  men 
tioned  is  quite  unwarranted. 

These  statistics  are  records  of  valuations  t)f  property,  real  and 
personal,  in  several  of  the  richest  States,  according  to  assessments 
for  taxation  by  State  authority.  That  these  assessments  never  rep 
resent  the  full  value  of  property  is  true ;  but  it  may  fairly  be  sup 
posed  that  as  to  real  estate,  at  least,  they  are  likely  to  bear  about  the 
same  relation  to  the  actual  value  in  different  years.  As  to  personal 
property,  which  can  more  easily  be  concealed  from  assessment,  the 
disposition  to  conceal  it  has  undoubtedly  been  increased  by  the  in 
crease  of  taxation  since  1861 ;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  the  efforts  to 
discover  property  have  been  stimulated  by  the  same  cause,  and  that 
work  has  been  greatly  aided  by  the  laws  passed  and  the  efforts 
made  by  the  Federal  Government  to  reach  property  for  taxation. 
On  the  whole,  however,  it  is  probable  that  assessments  do  not  now 
reach  quite  as  large  a  share  of  personal  property,  other  than  United 
States  bonds,  as  they  did  in  1861 ;  but  the  difference  in  the  relation 
of  aggregate  assessments  of  real  and  personal  property  to  actual 
value  cannot  be  material.  But  the  property  invested  in  United 
States  bonds  is  important,  and  a  material  difference  in  the  calcu 
lation  must  be  made  for  the  fact  that  so  large  a  value  of  personal 
property  is  now  in  form  not  subject  to  taxation.  Of  a  bonded  debt 
of  about  twenty-one  hundred  millions,  it  is  estimated  by  the  best 
authorities  that  not  less  than  one  thousand  millions  are  now  held  in 
foreign  countries,  and  three  hundred  and  forty-two  millions  held  as 
security  for  bank  circulation  are  represented  in  the  capital  of  the 
banks,  and  the  property  thus  invested  is  therefore  within  reach  of 
taxation.  Deducting  these,  there  remain  about  seven  hundred  and 
fifty  millions  of  United  States  bonds  held  in  this  country,  an  invest 
ment  of  property  not  liable  to  taxation  or  assessment  by  State  au 
thority.  For  this  withdrawal  of  property  from  assessment,  allowance 
must  be  made  in  any  estimate  based  upon  assessments  in  1861  and 
1868.* 

*  Since  this  was  written,  I  have  learned  that  in  at  least  one  of  the  States  named 
the  valuation  includes  United  States  bonds,  though  I  supposed  they  were  not  in 
cluded  in  either. 


POPULATION  AND  WEALTH.  83 

Mr.  "VVells  gives  the  assessments  in  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island, 
Connecticut,  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  New  York,  for  1861  and  1868,  as 
follows : 

Valuation,  Real  and  Personal. 

STATES.                                              1861.  1868. 

Massachusetts $861,485,418  $1,220,498,939 

Rhode  Island 121,118,126  187,697,591 

Connecticut 224,962,514  312,574,408 

Ohio ..'. 892,850,084  1,143,461,386 

Indiana 441,562,339  587,970,549 

New  York 1,441,769,430  1,766,089,140 

Total $3,983,747,911  $5,218,292,013 

In  these  States  the  nominal  increase  has  been  81,234,544,102,  or 
31  per  cent.  But  during  the  year  1868  the  premium  on  gold  was 
39.8  per  cent.,  so  that  the  gold  valuation  of  property  for  assessment 
in  these  six  States  was  actually  less  in  1868  than  in  1861 !  Yet 
these  States  embrace  no  small  share  of  the  wealth  of  the  whole 
country.  In  1860,  according  to  the  census,  their  wealth  was  %&ffo 
per  cent,  of  the  entire  valuation  reported.  They  represent  mainly 
that  very  branch  of  industry  which  it  is  the  object  of  the  protective 
system  to  promote ;  and  in  States  like  these,  if  anywhere,  the  recent 
tariffs  must  have  caused  a  more  rapid  production  of  wealth.  If  the 
country  has  increased  in  wealth  while  these  States  have  declined,  it 
may  be  said  with  certainty  that  the  increase  has  not  been  in  conse 
quence  of  any  development  of  manufactures — that  it  has  been^in 
spite,  and  not  because  of  the  tariff.  But  no  one  will  suppose  that 
the  aggregate  wealth  of  the  country  has  increased  in  ratio  materially 
different  from  that  in  the  six  States  named.  Reducing  the  valuation 
for  1868  to  gold  at  139,  we  have  this  comparison : 

Valuation  six  States,  1861 $3,983,747,911 

Valuation  six  States,  1868 3,757,170,249 


Loss  in  seven  years $226,577,662 

This  shows  a  loss  of  6  per  cent,  in  seven  years.  If  the  wealth  of 
the  whole  country  has  decreased  in  like  proportion,  the  loss  has 
been  $850,000,000,  a  sum  larger  than  the  whole  amount  invested 
in  United  States  bonds  not  reached  by  assessment.  If  this  cal 
culation  were  absolutely  correct,  what  would  follow  ?  This,  simply  ? 
that  the  destruction  of  wealth  by  the  war  has  been  as  great  as  the 
entire  increase  by  the  production  of  wealth  up  to  the  year  1868. 
Mr.  Wells  estimates  the  "  destruction  of  wealth,  or  diversion  of 


84  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

industry  which  would  have  produced  wealth,"  at  nine  thousand 
millions  of  dollars.  But  in  this  estimate  he  counts  all  money  ex 
pended  by  the  Government  in  supporting  men  under  arms,  and,  at 
the  same  time,  counts  the  loss  of  their  industry.  The  men  must 
have  been  fed  and  clothed,  had  there  been  no  war.  He  counts  all 
the  money  applied  by  them  to  the  support  of  families ;  but  those 
families  also  must  have  been  supported,  and  would  probably  have 
consumed  as  much,  had  there  been  no  war.  He  counts  all  that  sol 
diers  saved  from  their  pay,  and  sailors  from  their  prize-money,  and 
all  the  money  paid  in  bounties  or  yet  to  be  paid  in  pensions,  as  so 
much  wealth  absolutely  destroyed,  whereas  it  was  simply  transferred 
from  one  person  to  another.  Much  more  than  half  the  expenses  of 
Government,  in  feeding,  clothing,  and  paying  the  army  and  navy, 
must  be  deducted,  with  all  pensions  and  bounties  paid,  and  all  the 
bonded  debt  now  held  in  this  country,  which  is  simply  property  in 
another  form.  With  these  corrections,  the  cost  of  the  war,  as  a  re 
duction  of  the  wealth  of  the  country,  was  not  more  than  four  thou 
sand  millions,  accepting  the  estimates  of  Mr.  Wells  in  other  respects, 
and  those  estimates  are  certainly  liberal. 

Had  there  been  no  war,  then  the  country  should  have  been  four 
thousand  millions  richer  than  it  is ;  or,  since  it  seems  to  have  gained 
not  more  than  the  war  has  cost,  the  increase  by  production  of  wealth 
has  been  apparently  about  four  thousand  millions,  or  28  per  cent,  in 
eight  years.  This  estimate  would  show  an  increase  during  the  de 
cade  of  not  more  than  35  per  cent.,  against  126  per  cent,  in  the  pre 
vious  decade ;  and,  of  that  35  per  cent.,  28  per  cent,  would  be  cancelled 
by  the  losses  and  the  waste  of  war. 

It  is  not  pretended  that  this  estimate  is  altogether  reliable.  Any 
calculation  based  upon  assessments  for  taxation  must  be  accepted 
only  with  many  reservations.  But  one  thing  it  does  seem  to  prove : 
that,  after  making  full  allowance  for  property  which  is  now  invested 
in  bonds,  and  after  making  full  allowance  for  the  waste  and  destruc 
tion  of  property  and  diversion  of  industry  caused  by  the  war,  the 
increase  of  wealth  during  the  decade  now  drawing  to  a  close  must 
have  been  less  than  the  increase  during  the  decade  1850-'60  under  a 
revenue  tariff.  The  estimate  may  vary  widely  from  the  truth,  but 
it  can  hardly  vary  as  widely  as  the  supposed  increase  differs  from 
the  ascertained  increase  of  that  decade. 


AGRICULTURE. 


85 


POPULATION  OP  THE  UNITED  STATES. 


YEAR. 

Population. 

YEAR. 

Population. 

YEAR. 

Population. 

1791  
1792  

4.067,371 
4.205,404 

1818  
1819  

9.158.513 
q  398  339 

1844... 
1845 

19,034.332 
19  525  749 

1793    

4  343  457 

1820 

9  638  166 

1846 

20  017  155 

1794 

4481  500 

1821 

9  959  965 

1847 

20  508  582 

1795  

4.619  553 

1822 

10  281  765 

1848 

21  413  890 

1796  

4  757  586 

1823 

10  603  565 

1849 

21  956  945 

1797 

4  805  629 

1824 

10  925  365 

1850 

23  191  876 

1798  

5.033  672 

1825    ..  .. 

11  247  165 

1851 

23  887  632 

1799  

5  171  715 

1826 

11  568  965 

1852 

24  604  261 

1800 

5  379  788 

1827 

,  n'890  765 

1853 

25  342  388 

1801  

5.5()2  772 

1828... 

12  212  565 

1854   

26  102.659 

180-2  

5  695  787 

1829 

12,534  365 

1855 

26  885  738 

1803    

5  888  801 

1830 

12  856  165 

1856 

27  692  310 

1804  

6,081,816 

1831  

13  277  415 

1857  

28.523.079 

1805  

6,274,830 

1832  

13  698  665 

1858 

29  378,771 

1806  

6  467  845 

1833  

14  119  915 

1859 

30260134 

1807    

6  660  859 

1834 

14  541  165 

I860 

31  429  891 

1808  

6.853,874 

1835  

14'962'415 

1861 

32  373.388 

1809  

7,047,888 

1836 

15  383  665 

1862 

23  500  000 

1810  

7.239,908 

1837  

15,804,915 

1863  

24.400,000 

1811  

7,479.729 

1838  

16  226  165 

1864  

27,000.000 

1812  

7,719.555 

1839  . 

16  649  415 

1865 

30,000,000 

1813    

7  959  381 

1840 

17  068  665 

1866 

35500000 

1814  

8,199,208 

1841  

17  560,082 

1867 

36.500.000 

1815  

8.439  034 

1842  

18  051  499 

1868 

37,500,000 

1816   .  .  . 

8,678  860 

1843 

18  542  915 

1869 

38640000 

1817  

8,918,687 

The  population  given  for  the  years  1862-'65,  inclusive,  is  the 
Treasury  estimate  of  persons  within  the  military  lines,  and  in  all 
calculations  of  exports  or  imports,  production  or  consumption  per 
capita,  these  figures  are  used,  with  the  estimates  given  for  the  sub 
sequent  years,  as  approximately  correct.  __^ f 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


AGRICULTURE. 


Library 


BY  far  the  greater  part  of  our  production  of  wealth  is  by  means 
of  agriculture.  The  annual  product  of  that  branch  of  industry,  ac 
cording  to  the  census  of  1860,  was  about  $2,598,393,364.  The 
product  of  manufactures,  mining,  and  fisheries,  was  $1,885,861,676; 
but  the  cost  of  raw  material  consumed  was  $1,031,605,092,  so  that 
the  wealth  produced  by  those  industries  was  $854,256,584 — less 
than  one-third  of  the  amount  produced  by  agricultural  labor. 

In  a  scientific  rather  than  a  popular  sense,  trade  and  transpor 
tation  produce  wealth,  it  is  true,  by  adding  to  the  value  of  products 
of  other  industries.  But  these  employments  depend  upon  the  indus- 


86  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

tries  commonly  called  productive ;  and,  since  it  will  not  be  claimed 
that  legislation  injurious  to  agriculture,  mining,  manufactures,  and 
fisheries,  in  the  aggregate  can  have  increased  the  production  of 
wealth,  and  it  is  impossible  to  distinguish  in  statistics  between  the 
increased  value  given  to  foreign  and  the  increased  value  given  to 
domestic  products  by  exchange  or  transportation,  it  will  be  sufficient 
for  the  purpose  of  this  inquiry  to  consider  the  effect  of  tariffs  upon 
those  popularly  known  as  producers.  Thus  agriculture,  mining, 
manufactures,  and  fisheries,  may  be  regarded  as  the  wealth-producing 
industries,  and  of  their  production  more  than  three-fourths  is  by 
means  of  agriculture. 

The  protective  system  is  designed  to  aid  manufactures  and  min 
ing.  Its  theory  is  that  those  operations  in  which  large  capital  and 
costly  machinery  are  needed  must  be  stimulated  by  legislation,  while 
the  abundance  of  cheap  land  renders  it  unnecessary  to  stimulate  or 
shelter  agriculture.  But,  when  the  farmer  began  to  feel  the  burdens 
which  the  protective  system  imposes,  men  sought  to  reconcile  farmers 
to  their  burdens  by  pretending  to  give  them  a  share  of  the  benefits. 
Duties  were  imposed  on  wool  for  the  North,  and  sugar  and  tobacco 
for  the  South ;  and  in  due  time  other  duties,  of  no  effect  whatever 
except  in  localities  close  to  our  northern  border,  were  added.  The 
tariff  under  which  we  now  live  imposes  duties  of  twenty  cents  a 
bushel  on  wheat,  fifteen  cents  on  rye  and  barley,  ten  cents  on  oats 
and  corn,  and  twenty-five  cents  a  bushel  on  potatoes,  the  potato  in 
terest  being  thus  peculiarly  protected  !  It  can  hardly  be  said  that 
we  owe  the  existence  of  the  potato  industry  to  this  beneficent  duty ; 
for  in  1860,  under  a  revenue  tariff,  we  raised  153,000,000  bushels  of 
that  crop,  and  in  1867,  under  protection,  it  yielded  only  97,000,000, 
and,  in  1868,  only  106,000,000  bushels.  Nor  can  it  be  said  that  the 
market  is  flooded  with  foreign  potatoes  grown  by  pauper  labor ;  for 
in  1868  we  imported  only  194,905  bushels,  or  less  than  one  very 
small  potato  to  each  bushel  of  domestic  production.  If  any  farmer 
supposes  that  his  crop  is  increased  in  value  by  this  duty,  he  may  ob 
serve  that  the  average  price  of  potatoes  for  New  York,  the  State 
most  exposed  to  this  flood  of  foreign  potatoes,  according  to  the  Agri 
cultural  Bureau,  is  lower  in  currency  than  the  price  paid  in  gold  in 
1860,  before  this  peculiar  form  of  protection  began.  It  is  amazing, 
too,  that  a  crop  so  important  as  that  of  Indian  corn  receives  no 
better  protection  than  a  duty  of  ten  cents  a  bushel ;  and  yet,  though 
exposed  in  this  manner  it  amounts  to  768,000,000  bushels.  Strange  it 
is  that  our  production  has  not  been  stopped  by  the  flood  of  corn 


AGRICULTURE.  87 

from  Canada,  whence  we  received  in  1868  just  43,042  bushels,  cost 
ing  seventy-one  cents  a  bushel  in  gold  ! 

Of  the  duty  on  wool  we  shall  inquire  in  another  chapter,  and  it 
will  appear  that  in  every  instance  the  protective  duties  have  de 
prived  the  grower  of  a  part  of  the  value  of  his  fleece.  Duties  on 
sugar  and  tobacco  would  be  imposed  for  revenue  rather  than  protec 
tion.  On  every  other  agricultural  product  except  potatoes,  the  du 
ties  are  lower  now,  under  an  extreme  protective  tariff,  than  they  were 
under  the  purely  revenue  tariff  of  1846 — a  fact  which  suffices  to  prove 
that  the  protective  system  is  not  meant  to  protect  the  farmer,  and 
that  the  duties  imposed  on  the  great  products  of  agriculture  are 
merely  legislative  tubs  thrown  to  political  whales.  Under  the  level 
ad  valorem  tariff  those  products  then  paid  30  per  cent.,  while  they 
now  pay  only  20,  15,  or  10  cents,  as  already  stated ;  flax  pays  only 
4  per  cent.,  Russian  hemp  23,  and  Manilla  20  per  cent.  Wheat  then 
paid  30,  and  in  1868  only  12  per  cent.,  and  not  one  of  the  grains 
pays  as  large  a  duty  as  was  imposed  by  the  revenue  system.  Per 
haps  potatoes,  the  duty  on  which  has  been  raised  from  30  to  56  per 
cent.,  are  specially  protected,  because  their  bulk  makes  them  least 
likely  to  be  imported.  No  sensible  man  supposes  that  the  farmers 
of  this  country  get  a  better  price  for  their  crops  because  of  these 
duties.  It  is  an  insult  to  the  farmer,  if  his  intelligence  is  supposed 
to  be  unequal  to  the  task  of  discovering  that  they  do  not  really 
benefit  him.  The  plain  truth  is  that  these  duties  are  put  into  a  bill 
for  the  benefit  of  manufacturers,  in  the  hope  that  some  farmers  may 
be  so  ignorant  as  to  suppose  themselves  blessed  thereby.  Indeed,  in 
1844  it  was  gravely  argued  by  one  of  the  advocates  of  the  tariff 
then  in  force,  that  our  farmers  were  in  need  of  a  protective  duty, 
lest  their  industry  might  be  destroyed  by  the  importation  of  wheat 
from  Russia  !  The  farmers  who  vote  for  such  members  chiefly  need 
protection  against  their  own  ignorance. 

From  the  earliest  times  the  large  majority  of  farmers  in  this 
country  have  looked  upon  the  protective  system  as  injurious  to  their 
interests.  They  could  well  understand  that  a  people,  with  land  as 
cheap  and  as  rich  as  ours,  could  not  be  and  did  not  need  to  be  pro 
tected  in  agriculture  against  any  other  country.  They  could  see  the 
effects  of  the  protective  system  upon  the  prices  of  manufactured 
products  of  which  they  were  consumers,  and  they  held  that  the  sys 
tem  could  in  no  way  benefit,  while,  to  some  extent,  it  manifestly 
taxed  them.  Moreover,  an  opinion  widely  prevailed  that  the  prices 
7 


88  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

of  agricultural  products  were  lower  under  the  operation  of  the  pro 
tective  system  than  under  other  tariffs. 

To  overcome  this  opposition,  it  has  been  argued  that  protection 
will  in  some  way  prevent  the  exhaustion  of  the  soil,  and  facilitate 
the  return  to  it  of  the  elements  withdrawn  in  crops  sent  to  market. 
If  it  were  true  that  under  non-protective  duties  we  exported  ten 
times  more  largely  of  breadstuffs  and  raw  materials  than  under  pro 
tective  duties,  this  reasoning  would  still  be  absurd.  To  the  farmer 
it  makes  no  difference  whether  his  wheat  or  his  cotton  is  sent  to 
New  York,  New  England,  or  to  Liverpool.  The  possibility  of  a  re 
turn  of  its  fertilizing  elements  to  the  soil  is  not  greater  in  one  case 
than  in  the  other.  Farmers  within  short  distances  of  cities  or  towns, 
whether  manufacturing  or  not,  may,  by  some  possibility,  receive 
again  in  the  form  of  manure  the  identical  elements  of  their  crops,  or 
an  equivalent  to  some  extent ;  but  farmers  so  located  would  also  do 
this,  whether  the  tariff  were  protective  or  not,  and  they  are  in  num 
ber  not  to  be  considered  in  comparison  with  the  millions  of  farmers 
who  never  bring  from  any  city  a  single  peck  of  manure,  or  who  use 
only  such  fertilizers  as  guano.  Throughout  the  great  producing  re 
gion  no  fertilizer  is  needed  or  used,  and  the  crop  sent  to  eastern  con 
sumers  might  as  well  be  sent  to  England  or  China.  But  even  at 
the  East  or  nearest  cities  and  towns,  of  the  fertilizers  used,  guano, 
gypsum,  plaster,  lime,  ashes,  bone  or  fish,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
the  supply  of  a  single  one  can  be  affected  by  the  quantity  of  wheat 
exported,  or  by  the  tariff.  No  protective  duty  has  caused  the  birds 
to  visit  particular  islands  of  the  sea,  or  placed  in  the  earth  the  de 
posits  of  stone,  or  caused  the  people  of  towns  to  burn  wood  or  to 
gather  bone  for  grinding.  It  is  hard  to  give  serious  treatment  to 
such  evanescent  will-o'-the-wisps  of  argument.  The  farmer,  be  he 
east  or  west,  will  hardly  raise  good  crops  who  looks  to  Congress  to 
fertilize  his  fields  by  law.  In  practical  effect  on  his  soil,  he  will  find 
one  dead  fish  worth  a  million  tariffs. 

Others  have  reasoned  that  agriculture  will  become  over-crowded, 
and  the  prices  of  its  products  depressed,  by  the  withdrawal  of  labor 
from  other  occupations.  In  reply  to  this  argument,  facts  will  be  pre 
sented  showing  conclusively  that  the  prices  of  agricultural  products 
have  increased  during  the  longest  period  of  low  duties,  and  that  the 
number  of  persons  employed  in  manufactures,  mining,  and  the  fisher 
ies,  and  in  trade  and  transportation,  during  that  same  period,  increased 
more  rapidly  than  the  whole  population.  If,  during  fourteen  years 
of  a  non-protective  policy,  and  of  lower  duties  than  have  been  in 


AGRICULTURE.  89 

force  in  any  other  period  since  1816,  the  proportion  of  persons  at 
tracted  to  other  occupations  increased,  and  the  price  of  agricultural 
products  rose,  it  must  be  conceded  that  the  fear  of  an  overcrowding 
of  agriculture,  as  a  consequence  of  low  duties,  is  groundless.  The 
census  returns  for  1850  and  1860  show  that,  during  that  period,  the 
number  of  persons  engaged  in  manufactures,  mining,  and  fisheries, 
increased  from  956,000  to  1,310,000,  or  more  than  37  per  cent., 
population  meanwhile  increasing  only  35J  per  cent.  In  view  of 
these  facts,  the  apprehension  of  overcrowding  agriculture  may  be 
dismissed  as  chimerical. 

The  most  common  and  plausible  argument  to  prove  that  the  pro 
tective  system  will  benefit  agriculture  is,  that  it  will  build  up  a  local 
home  market  for  agricultural  products.  It  has  this  basis  of  truth, 
that  farmers  in  the  immediate  neighborhood  of  manufacturing  towns 
are  enabled  to  raise  bulky  or  perishable  crops  for  that  market,  which 
they  find  highly  profitable.  Hence,  it  is  somewhat  hastily  inferred 
that  the  protective  system  will  give  to  all  farmers  this  advantage. 
But  it  is  the  proximity  to  a  town,  and  not  the  protection,  from  which 
the  advantage  comes.  Other  towns,  as  well  as  the  manufacturing 
centres,  give  it.  Unless  protection  can  build  up  towns  in  immediate 
proximity  to  every  farm — unless,  in  short,  it  can  bring  one-half  of 
our  population  to  live  packed  together  in  cities,  while  millions  of 
acres  of  rich  and  wild  land  remain  uncultivated — the  argument  is 
deceptive.  But  somebody  must  grow  wheat,  corn,  and  cotton,  and 
those  other  crops  which  will  not  be  produced  on  costly  land  near  a 
large  market.  The  country  cannot  do  without  these  crops  to  have 
every  farmer  raising  garden  vegetables  and  strawberries ;  and  a  na 
tion  composed  two-thirds  of  operatives  and  mechanics  living  entirely 
on  the  costly  vegetables  which  farmers  can  afford  to  raise  for  a  city 
market,  however  beautiful  it  might  seem  to  the  eye  of  the  specu 
lative  philosopher  of  the  protective  school,  would  scarcely  find  any 
body  to  consume  its  wares  and  fabrics.  The  absurdity  of  this, 
which  may  be  called  the  garden-sauce  theory  of  political  economy, 
is  sufficiently  made  manifest  by  the  fact  that  in  1860  the  entire  re 
turned  value  of  market  gardens  and  orchard  products  was  only 
thirty -five  millions ;  only  this  quantity  was  required  to  supply  the 
consumption  of  a  body  of  over  two  millions  of  persons  engaged  in 
manufactures,  mining,  fisheries,  trade,  and  transportation.  If  two 
millions  of  consumers  required  $35,000,000,  more  or  less,  of  garden 
products,  how  many  millions  of  consumers  must  we  have  to  enable  all 
our  farmers  to  raise  vegetables  and  fruits  for  a  city  market  ? 


90  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

Laughably  unimportant  as  this  branch  of  production  is,  compared 
with  the  great  crops  of  agriculture,  it  does  not  appear  that  even  the 
garden-sauce  interest  can  in  any  way  be  promoted  by  protective  du 
ties,  unless  those  duties  will  increase  in  the  aggregate  the  number 
of  persons  engaged  in  manufacturing,  and,  at  the  same  time,  dis 
perse  them  about  the  country  in  such  a  manner  as  to  create  towns 
where  none  existed  before.  Certain  natural  facilities  determine 
the  selection  of  localities  for  manufacturing  establishments.  The 
presence  of  a  natural  water-power,  proximity  to  coal  mines,  or 
mines  of  mineral,  and  lines  of  communication  which  afford  the  cheap 
est  transportation  for  materials  and  products — these  determine  the 
location  of  the  great  manufacturing  centres,  and  in  the  nature  of  the 
case  such  centres  are  few  in  number.  Around  such  natural  centres 
cluster  many  minor  and  dependent  branches  of  manufacture.  But 
by  far  the  greater  number  of  persons  engaged  in  manufacturing 
have  their  locations  fixed  by  the  lines  and  centres  of  trade,  and 
gather  of  necessity  in  those  towns  which  the  lines  of  trade  create. 
From  time  to  time  new  mines  are  opened ;  but  by  far  the  greater 
portion  of  the  increase  in  the  number  of  persons  employed  in  manu 
factures  is  simply  an  increase  in  the  population  of  a  few  large  cities 
or  manufacturing  centres.  That  increase  of  population  benefits,  by 
creating  increased  demand  for  garden  or  orchard  products,  only  the 
farmers  who  already  own  lands  near  such  localities,  and  the  increase 
by  opening  of  iron  mines  affords  a  market  only  to  the  few  farmers  who 
own  lands  adjacent  to  these.  The  great  bulk  of  the  farming  popula 
tion  remains  beyond  the  reach  of  benefit  in  that  way,  whether  the 
increase  of  manufactures  be  rapid  or  tardy.  Manufacturing,  limited 
in  its  choice  of  location  by  natural  facilities  or  lines  of  trade,  tends 
peculiarly  to  a  compact  and  concentrated  growth  around  great  centres 
of  industry  ;  and  the  expectation  of  building  up  a  factory  on  every 
farm,  if  by  anybody  seriously  entertained,  is  doomed  to  disappointment. 

To  all  these  curious  theories  of  the  benefit  to  be  derived  by 
agriculture  from  the  protective  system,  a  few  statistics  conclusively 
reply.  The  census  returns  of  1840,  1850,  and  1860,  if  not  abso 
lutely  correct,  are  sufficiently  accurate  in  regard  to  this  industry  to 
enable  us  to  test  its  progress.  The  decade  1840-'50  embraced  the 
protective  period  of  1843-'46.  The  decade  1850-'60  was  one  of  low 
and  non-protective  duties  throughout.  The  accompanying  tables 
show  whether  this  industry  progressed  more  rapidly  in  the  decade 
which  includes  a  protective  period  than  in  the  decade  of  unbroken 
non-protection. 


AGRICULTURE. 
AGRICULTURAL  PRODUCTS— QUANTITIES. 


91 


CROP. 

1S40. 

1850. 

1860. 

1867. 

1868. 

Corn,  bushels 
Wheat,     " 
Eye, 
Oats,         " 
Barley,     " 
BnekwH,  " 
Potatoes," 
Hay,  tons  
Tobacco,  Ibs  

377,492,388 
84,821.065 
18,640.486 
123,054.992 
4,161,210 
7,291.371 
104,285,435 
10,246,777 
219,607,739 

592,071,104 
100,485,944 
14,188,813 
146,584.179 
5,167,015 
8,956,912 
104,066,044 
13,838.642 
199,752,655 

838,792.740 
173,104.924 
21,101,380 
172.643.185 
15,825,898 
17,571.818 
153,243,893 
19,083.896 
434,209,461 

768,320.000 
212.948.390 
23,184,000 
278.698,000 
25,727,000 
21,359.000 
97,783.000 
26,277,000 
313,724,000 

906.527,000 
224.036,600 
22.504,800 
254.960.800 
22,896,100 
19.863.700 
106.090,000 
26,141,900 
320,982.000 

Cotton,  bales  

1,513,543 

2,445  793 

5,387,052 

2,450,000 

2,500.000 

AGRICULTURAL  PRODUCTS— VALUES. 


CROP. 

1850. 

1860. 

iser. 

1868. 

1868  Ceold). 

Corn 

$296  035  552 

$503  275  644 

$610  948  390 

$569  512  460 

$410  048  971 

Wheat. 

100  485  944 

216  381  155 

421  796  561 

319  195  290 

229  820  609 

Rye  

7,803,847 

12660,828 

32,499,790 

28,683,677 

20,652,247 

Oats  

43  975  253 

57  547  728 

172  472  970 

142,484  910 

102  589.185 

Barley 

3  616  910 

7  912  949 

23  850  130 

29  809  931 

21  463  150 

Buckwheat 

6  969  838 

14  057  454 

23  469  650 

20  814  315 

14  986  307 

Potatoes  

45  453  232 

76621  946 

89,276,830 

84.150040 

60,588^029 

Hay    

96  870  494 

190  838  960 

372  864  670 

351,941  930 

253  398  190 

Total  

$601  211  070 

$1,079  296.664 

$1,746,178,800 

$1,546,592,553 

$1,113,546,638 

Cotton 

98  603  720 

215  480  000 

220  000  000 

325  000  000 

162  000  000 

Tobacco  

13  982  686 

43,420,946 

41,283,431 

40,081,942 

28.858,998 

Total  

$713,797,476 

$1,338,197,610 

$2,007,462,231 

$1,811,674,495 

$1,304,405,636 

The  crop  of  corn  increased  over  two  hundred  millions  in  each  of 
the  periods  under  comparison  ;  that  of  wheat  increased  sixteen  mil 
lions,  or  19  per  cent.,  in  the  period  1S40-'50,  and  seventy-three  mil 
lions,  or  72  per  cent.,  in  the  period  1850-'60 ;  rye  decreased  in  the 
first  period  four  and  a  half,  millions,  and  increased  in  the  second 
seven  millions ;  oats  increased  twenty-three  and  a  half  millions  in 
the  first,  and  twenty-six  millions  in  the  second  period ;  barley  in 
creased  one  million  in  the  first,  and  ten  millions  in  the  second  pe 
riod  ;  buckwheat  increased  less  than  two  millions  in  the  first,  and 
over  eight  millions  in  the  second;  tobacco  decreased  about  twenty 
millions  in  the  first,  and  increased  two  hundred  and  thirty-four  mil 
lions  in  the  second ;  and  cotton  increased  nine  hundred  thousand 
bales,  or  60  per  cent.,  in  the  first,  and  nearly  three  million  bales,  or 
about  125  per  cent.,  in  the  second.  These  crops,  however,  are  pro 
duced  largely  for  exportation ;  let  us  see  how  those  fared  which  de 
pend  wholly  or  mainly  upon  a  home  market.  In  hay,  the  increase 
was  three  and  a  half  million  tons  in  the  first  period,  or  33  per  cent, 
but  in  the  second  period  it  was  5,245,000,  or  38  per  cent.  The  home 


92  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

market  appears  to  have  been  the  better  in  the  non-protective  period. 
Again,  in  potatoes  there  was  an  absolute  decrease  in  the  first  period, 
but  in  the  second  an  increase  of  forty-nine  millions  of  bushels.  Very 
clearly,  this  crop  also  found  an  encouraging  home  market  under  low 
duties.  It  may  be  added,  as  evidence  that  the  production  of  crops 
for  a  home  market  exclusively  was  by  no  means  retarded  during  this 
long  period  of  low  duties,  that  the  quantity  of  butter  produced  in 
creased  from  three  hundred  and  thirteen  millions  to  four  hundred 
and  fifty-nine  million  pounds ;  of  peas  and  beans,  from  nine  to  fif 
teen  million  bushels ;  hops,  from  three  and  a  half  to  eleven  million 
pounds ;  clover  seed,  from  468,973  to  956,188  bushels ;  grass  seed, 
from  416,921  to  900,040  bushels.  The  value  of  orchard  products  in 
creased  five  and  a  quarter  millions  in  the  first,  and  7,190,000  in  the 
second  period,  a  larger  increase,  but  smaller  percentage.  But  the 
value  of  market  gardens  increased  in  the  first  period  about  two  and 
a  half  millions,  or  100  per  cent.,  and  in  the  second  about  ten  mil 
lions,  or  200  per  cent.  This  comparison  must  satisfy  those  who  look 
at  political  economy  from  a  market-garden  point  of  view,  that  protec 
tion  is  a  grave  mistake  ! 

For  comparing  values,  the  census  of  1840  does  not  give  complete 
data ;  but  from  1850  to  1860,  the  value  of  slaughtered  animals  in 
creased  over  one  hundred  millions,  or  90  per  cent. ;  the  value  of  live 
stock  over  five  hundred  millions,  or  about  100  per  cent. ;  the  value 
of  farm  implements  and  machinery  about  ninety-five  millions,  or  60 
per  cent. ;  and  the  value  of  farms  more  than  three  thousand  three 
hundred  and  seventy  millions,  or  over  103  per  cent.  The  entire 
wealth  of  the  country  in  1840  was  nearly  four  thousand  millions. 
The  increase  between  1840  and  1850  in  the  value  of  farms  can  by 
no  computation  be  estimated  higher  than  eleven  hundred  millions, 
or  52  per  cent.  But  the  increase  in  the  decade  of  unbroken  low 
duties  was  about  twice  as  great. 

It  will  not  be  forgotten  that  this  enormous  increase  in  the  pro 
duction  of  wealth  by  agriculture  was  not  caused  by  the  change  of 
laborers  to  that  pursuit  from  others,  or  at  the  expense  of  a  reduced 
price  of  agricultural  products.  We  have  stated  that  during  the  same 
decade  of  low  duties  the  increase  of  laborers  in  manufacturing 
industry  was  more  rapid  than  the  increase  of  population,  proving 
that,  in  spite  of  non-protection,  a  larger  share  of  the  population  was 
drawn  to  manufacturing  for  employment.  Yet  the  quantity  of  agri 
cultural  products  increased,  as  has  been  shown,  with  great  rapidity, 
and  the  value  of  farms,  by  which  their  productive  power  may  be 


AGRICULTURE.  93 

measured,  increased  over  103  per  cent.  The  actual  value  of  the 
leading  crops  above  mentioned  increased  from  seven  hundred  and 
fourteen  millions  to  one  thousand  three  hundred  and  thirty-eight 
millions,  or  over  80  per  cent. 

But  what  has  been  the  effect  of  the  recent  protective  duties  ?  It 
may  be  supposed  that  the  decade  1840-'50  was  an  exceptionally 
unfavorable  one  for  the  agricultural  interest,  or  that,  as  it  comprised 
only  four  years  of  protective  duties,  the  comparison  is  unjust.  Of 
the  progress  since  1860  we  have  no  more  reliable  statistics  than 
those  of  the  Agricultural  Bureau,  and  the  latest  published  report  is 
that  of  1868.  Its  statements,  therefore,  may  be  accepted  as  the  best 
and  latest  evidence  attainable  as  to  the  progress  of  agriculture  under 
the  recent  extreme  protective  duties.  The  figures  are  given  in  com 
parison  with  those  of  1840,  1850,  1860,  and  1867.  In  the  production 
of  corn  there  is  a  decrease  in  1867  of  seventy  millions,  but  in  1868 
an  increase  of  about  sixty-eight  millions  of  bushels,  or  about  8  per 
cent.  The  crops  of  tobacco  and  cotton  have  largely  decreased,  but 
in  part  from  causes  not  connected  with  this  inquiry.  The  increase 
in  wheat,  since  1860,  has  been  forty  millions  in  1867,  and  fifty-one 
millions  in  1868,  a  gain  of  29  per  cent,  in  eight  years ;  while  in  the 
ten  years  preceding  1860  the  gain  was  73  per  cent.  The  crop  for 
the  year  1869,  though  not  accurately  known,  is  estimated  in  the 
papers  at  two  hundred  and  fifty  millions  of  bushels,  a  gain  of  43  per 
cent,  since  1860.  In  rye,  the  increase  has  been  scarcely  7  per  cent, 
against  50  per  cent,  in  the  last  decade.  The  crop  of  oats  has  in 
creased  about  48  per  cent.,  and  is  the  only  one  of  the  principal  crops 
which  has  increased  as  rapidly  as  it  did  in  the  decade  ending  in 
1860.  Barley  has  increased  about  40  per  cent,  in  8  years,  against 
200  per  cent  in  ten  years.  Buckwheat  has  increased  about  13  per 
cent.,  against  nearly  100  per  cent,  in  the  last  decade.  Hay  has  in 
creased  about  36  per  cent,  against  38  per  cent.  Potatoes,  notwith 
standing  "protection,"  have  decreased  about  forty-seven  millions, 
or  nearly  one-third.  It  is  very  plain  that  agriculture  has  not  ad 
vanced  as  rapidly  by  any  means  in  the  present  as  it  did  in  the  last 
decade.  But  it  may  be  said  that  the  increase  in  value  of  crops  may 
have  compensated  for  a  loss  in  quantity.  This  has  been  in  part  the 
case  with  cotton  and  tobacco ;  these  crops  together,  though  much 
reduced  in  quantity,  command  so  much  larger  prices,  that  the  value 
realized  in  currency  is  about  seven  millions  more  than  it  was  in  1860 
in  gold.  But  other  crops  have  fared  quite  otherwise.  In  the  tables 
given  for  values,  the  estimates  of  the  Bureau  are  accepted  for  1867 


94  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

and  1868,  though  the  prices  are  much  higher  than  the  average 
allowed  for  1860  and  1850.  The  figures  for  1850  are  from  De  Bow's 
Compendium  of  the  Census,  and  those  for  1860  are  prepared  on  the 
same  plan,  allowing  for  the  average  value  throughout  the  country 
the  same  proportionate  reduction  from  the  prices  at  New  York  in 
1860.  In  the  last  column,  the  values  for  1868  are  reduced  to  gold 
at  139,  a  little  less  than  the  average  premium  for  the  year.  It  ap 
pears  that  the  crop  of  corn,  though  somewhat  larger,  was  worth 
nearly  one  hundred  millions  less  in  gold  than  the  crop  of  1860,  while 
that  crop  was  worth  over  two  hundred  millions  more  than  the  crop 
of  1850;  that  the  crop  of  wheat  increased  in  value  only  about 
6  per  cent,  in  eight  years,  against  an  increase  of  116  per  cent,  in  the 
last  decade ;  that  the  crop  of  buckwheat  has  increased  less  than  one 
million  in  value,  against  a  gain  of  over  100  per  cent. ;  that  the  crop 
of  potatoes  has  decreased  sixteen  milh'ons  in  value,  against  an  in 
crease  of  over  60  per  cent. ;  and  that  the  crop  of  hay  has  increased 
in  value  only  33  per  cent,  in  the  last  eight  years,  while  the  increase 
during  the  last  decade  was  almost  100  per  cent.  The  aggregate 
value  of  the  principal  crops,  except  cotton  and  tobacco,  increased 
only  $46,250,000,  or  4J-  per  cent,  in  eight  years,  while  the  value 
of  the  same  crops  increased  from  1850  to  1860  over  four  hundred 
and  seventy-eight  millions,  or  about  79  per  cent,  in  ten  years. 

No  possible  correction  of  these  estimates  can  affect  the  conclusion 
to  which  they  irresistibly  lead — that  the  increase  in  the  production 
of  wealth  by  means  of  agriculture  has  been  arrested  in  a  most  re 
markable  manner  during  the  past  eight  years.  Instead  of  the  rapid 
and  healthy  progress  of  the  last  decade,  by  which  the  wealth  of  the 
country  was  more  than  doubled,  though  manufactures  at  the  same 
time  increased  with  about  the  same  rapidity — in  value  of  product 
from  one  thousand  to  nineteen  hundred  millions — there  has  been 
during  the  eight  years  ending  with  1868  scarcely  any  increase  what 
ever  in  the  value  of  Northern  agricultural  products,  with  a  positive 
decrease  in  aggregate  value,  if  cotton  and  tobacco  are  included. 
Two  other  items,  for  which  the  Agricultural  Bureau  furnishes  sta 
tistics,  confirm,  in  the  most  striking  manner,  these  conclusions.  The 
value  of  live  stock  increased  a  little  more  than  100  per  cent,  from 
1850  to  1860.  But  from  1860  to  1867  the  apparent  increase  was 
only  three  hundred  and  seven  millions,  less  than  the  difference 
between  currency  and  gold,  and  the  value  given  by  the  Bureau, 
$1,337,111,822,  for  1868,  reduced  to  gold  at  139,  is  only  $962,720,511, 
against  $1,089,329,915  in  1860.  Again,  the  report  of  1867  contains 


AGRICULTURE.  95 

a  very  elaborate  statement  of  the  value  of  farming  lands  in  that 
year,  as  compared  with  1860,  from  which  it  appears  that  in  only  one 
of  the  old  States  there  has  been  an  increase  equal  to  the  difference 
between  gold  and  currency,  and  in  that  State,  Delaware,  the  im 
provement  was  due  to  new  railroads.  In  Illinois  the  nominal 
increase  was  42  per  cent.,  or  2  per  cent,  actual  increase ;  in  Michigan, 
70  per  cent.,  or  30  per  cent,  actual ;  in  Wisconsin,  50  per  cent.,  or 
10  per  cent,  actual,  and  in  Iowa  75  per  cent.,  or  35  per  cent,  actual. 
But  in  these  States  the  great  increase  of  population  and  railroad 
facilities  has  caused  the  improvement.  The  value  of  farming  lands 
is  determined  by  the  net  value  of  their  annual  products.  The  fact 
that  in  all  the  great  agricultural  States  there  has  been  an  actual 
decrease  in  gold  values,  except  in  the  newer  Western  States  named, 
and  in  Illinois  so  small  an  increase,  conclusively  proves  that  the 
value  of  agricultural  products  has  not  advanced  as  fast  as  the  actual 
cost  of  production,  so  that  the  farms  are  absolutely  less  profitable, 
and  can  produce  less  wealth  now  than  they  could  in  1860. 

It  is  indeed  true  that  the  crops  of  1869  have  been  generally 
larger  than  those  of  1868,  but  the  very  remarkable  fact  appears  that 
this  increase  of  crop  has  caused  a  corresponding  decrease  of  price. 
The  country  is  to-day  not  able  to  consume  as  many  bushels  of  grain 
and  potatoes,  per  capita,  as  it  could  consume  in  1860,  at  higher  prices 
in  gold! 

For  the  aggregate  quantity  of  grain  and  potatoes  produced  in 
1868  was  1,656,879,000  bushels,  or  42  bushels  per  capita,  while  in 
1860  the  aggregate  quantity  was  1,392,283,838  bushels,  or  45  bush 
els  per  capita.  But  in  1868  the  aggregate  value  of  those  crops 
was  $860,148,448  in  gold,  and  in  1860  the  aggregate  value  was 
8888,457,704  in  gold.  And  the  crops  of  1869,  a  little  larger  in 
quantity,  at  once  depressed  prices  materially. 

This  is  the  decisive  fact  in  the  discussion  of  the  tariff  question. 
By  all  parties  the  truth  is  acknowledged  that  any  system  which  in 
volves  injury  to  agriculture,  that  industry  by  which  three-fourths  of 
our  wealth  is  produced,  must  be  injurious  to  the  whole  country. 
Hence  it  is  claimed  that  the  protective  system  will  create  "  a  home 
market "  for  agricultural  products — establish  in  this  country  such  a 
body  of  consumers  that  a  larger  crop  of  agricultural  products  can  be 
consumed  here  at  better  prices.  The  low  tariff  in  force  from  1850  to 
1860  did  so  develop  manufactures,  mechanic  arts,  commerce,  trade, 
and  transportation,  that  crops  from  50  to  100  per  cent,  larger  in  quan 
tity  were  consumed  at  prices  10  to  50  per  cent,  higher,  so  that  the 


96 


DOES  PROTECTION   PROTECT? 


aggregate  value  of  the  principal  crops  increased  from  $713,797,476 
in  1850,  to  $1,338,197,610  in  1860.  But  the  high  protective  tariffs  in 
force  since  1860  have  in  some  way  so  retarded  the  natural  growth 
of  this  home  market  that  crops  not  as  large  per  capita  as  those  of 
1860  were  consumed  in  1868,  at  a  cost  twenty-eight  millions  less 
than  that  of  1860,  and  a  small  additional  increase  of  the  crop  in 
quantity  instantly  forces  down  prices  below  the  cost  of  production 
and  much  below  the  gold  values  of  1860. 

But  the  advocates  of  protection  will  reply  that,  although  the 
growing  of  wheat,  cotton,  and  other  principal  crops  may  be  discour 
aged,  the  farmers  are  enabled  to  grow  garden  produce  and  green 
crops  for  consumption  in  cities  and  manufacturing  villages,  and  to  ob 
tain  better  prices  for  these  than  they  could  for  principal  crops.  No 
statistics  are  obtainable  of  the  product  of  such  crops  in  recent  years ; 
but,  if  the  absurdity  of  this  theory  has  not  been  already  sufficiently 
demonstrated,  the  records  of  the  Agricultural  Bureau  give  it  the 
coup  de  grace.  If  the  farmer  can  produce  a  more  valuable  crop,  his 
farm  becomes  more  valuable.  The  Bureau  gives  statistics  which 
prove  that  the  farms  of  the  chief  manufacturing  States  are  actually 
worth  less  money  to-day  in  gold  than  they  were  in  1860.  The  re 
port  for  1867,  p.  119,  gives  the  following  summary  of  "the  increase 
or  decrease  of  nominal  values  of  farm  lands  in  the  several  States 
since  1860,"  and  it  is  only  necessary  to  remember  that  the  premium 
on  gold  in  1867  was  40  per  cent. : 


STATES. 

Increase  per 
cent. 

Decrease  per 
cent. 

STATES. 

Increase  per 
cent. 

Decrease  per 
cent 

65 
70 
28 
55 
18 

Maine                          .  ... 

19 
17 
17 
17 
18 
20 
28 
30 
25 
66 
20 

27 
50 
60 
55 
55 
60 

Mississippi 

New  Hampshire 

Louisiana 

Vermont    

Texas  

Massachusetts.           ...  . 

Arkansas  

Rhode  Island 

Tennessee 

32 
10 
32 
42 

27 
32 
70 
50 
100 
75 
150 
175 

Connecticut  
New  York      

West  Virginia  

Kentucky  

New  Jersey        .... 

Missouri 

Illinois 

Delaware   

Indiana  

Maryland 

Ohio  

Virginia 

Michigan 

North  Carolina  
South  Carolina  

Wisconsin  

Minnesota  

Georgia 

Iowa 

Florida 

Kansas 

Alabama  

Nebraska  

The  increase  in  the  Western  States  is  due  to  settlement  and  ex 
tended  railroad  facilities.  The  increase  in  States  like  Ohio,  Illinois, 
Indiana,  Michigan,  and  Delaware,  is  fully  accounted  for,  also,  by  the 
increase  of  railroad  facilities.  But  the  remarkable  fact  remains  that 


AGRICULTURE. 


97 


in  every  one  of  the  great  manufacturing  States  the  cash  value  of  farms 
is  absolutely  less  than  it  was  in  1860.  Reducing  the  statement  of 
the  Bureau  to  gold  values,  it  appears  that  the  actual  value,  in  1867, 
of  land  worth  $100,  in  1860,  was  in  the  several  States  as  follows : 


Maine $85  68 

New  Hampshire 84  24 

Vermont  84  24 

Massachusetts 84  24 

Rhode  Island 84  24 

Connecticut 86  40 

New  York 92  16 

New  Jersey 93  60 


Pennsylvania f 90  00 

Maryland 86  40 

West  Virginia 95  04 

Kentucky  79  20 

Missouri 95  04 

Illinois 10080 

Indiana 91  44 

Ohio...  ..  95  04 


From  this  statement,  the  farmers  of  the  manufacturing  States 
can  learn  exactly  how  much  protection  has  cost  them  in  the  value  of 
their  farms.  In  Massachusetts  it  has  cost  them  $15  76  on  every 
$100 ;  in  New  York  $7  84,  and  in  Pennsylvania  just  $10  on  every 
$100.  Can  there  be  a  more  conclusive  demonstration  of  the  fact 
that,  even  in  the  largest  manufacturing  States,  the  cost  of  production 
has  increased  more  largely  than  the  value  of  crops  raised  even  for  a 
market  close  at  hand  ?  For  population  has  unquestionably  increased 
in  these  States,  manufacturing  has  made  progress,  new  towns  and 
villages  have  grown  up,  and  there  must  of  necessity  be  a  larger  de 
mand  for  those  products  which  can  be  raised  only  for  markets  near 
at  hand.  But  the  value  of  a  farm  must  depend  upon  the  profit 
which  can  be  realized  by  working  it,  and  that  depends  upon  the 
value  of  products  raised,  compared  with  cost  of  production.  If  the 
actual  value  of  farms  is  less  than  it  was  in  1860,  the  conclusion  is 
unavoidable  that  the  cost  of  production  has  increased  more  rapidly 
than  the  value  of  products  which  can  be  sold  in  an  enlarged  market. 
There  is  no  reason  to  doubt  the  accuracy  of  the  statement  given  by 
the  Bureau.  But  the  conclusion  to  which  it  leads  is  absolutely  fatal 
to  the  whole  system  of  protective  duties. 

For  to  no  other  cause  can  the  injury  to  agriculture  be  ascribed. 
The  comparison  of  crops  and  values  in  former  years  is  conclusive. 
Similar  comparisons  for  earlier  periods  are  not  possible,  for  want  of 
statistics  of  minor  crops ;  but  the  crop  of  wheat  is  by  all  regarded  as 
a  fairer  test  than  any  other  of  the  general  progress  of  agriculture, 
and  of  that  crop  the  production  at  different  periods  is  thus  stated  : 


Increaie 

Bushel*   i 

Increase 

Bushels 

YEARS. 

Crop. 

percent 

per  capita. 

YEARS. 

Crop. 

per  cent. 

per  capita. 

1790.  .  . 

17,000.000 

4.19 

1840  

84.321.065 

.69 

4.96 

1800... 

22.000.000 

.29 

4.15 

1850  

100,485,944 

.19 

4..  33 

1810  

30.000000 

36 

4  ig 

1860 

173  104  924 

72 

5  51 

18QO  

38.000.000 

.27 

3.95 

1868  

224,036,600 

.29 

5.97 

1830  

50,000,000 

.31 

3.88 

98  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

These  records  show  that  the  production  of  wheat,  as  compared 
with  population,  declined  during  the  forty  years  from  1790  to  1830> 
from  4.19  bushels  per  capita  to  3.88  bushels  per  capita ;  and  that, 
during  nearly  forty  years  since,  it  has  increased  to  5.97  per  capita. 
The  year  1830  was  just  before  the  close  of  the  long  protective  pe 
riod,  and  prior  to  the  beginning  of  that  experiment  were  the  em 
bargo  of  1808  and  the  War  of  1812,  so  that  our  commerce  was  al 
most  unceasingly  interrupted,  by  war,  high  tariffs,  or  other  blessings, 
from  1808  to  1832.  But  from  1810  to  1830  the  production  of  wheat 
declined  from  4.16  bushels  per  capita  to  3. 88  per  capita.  Again,  the 
progress  from  1830  to  1860  is  broken  by  a  marked  decrease  in  the 
decade  1840-'50,  and  it  happens  that  in  that  decade,  and  in  no  other 
after  1832,  until  1861,  there  was  a  protective  tariff  in  force,  from 
1843-'6  inclusive.  Finally,  during  the  eight  years  since  1860,  the 
increase  of  population  having  been  retarded  by  war,  there  is  a  slight 
increase  in  the  production  of  wheat,  from  5.50  to  5.97  per  capita. 
But  the  two  periods  in  which  we  have  increased  most  rapidly  have 
been  the  very  decades  during  which  non-protective  tariffs  were  the 
rule,  namely:  the  decade  of  the  compromise  tariff,  1832  to  1840,  and 
the  decade  of  the  revenue  tariff,  1850  to  1860  ;  and  in  those  decades 
the  increase  was  69  and  72  per  cent.,  and  in  no  other  period  was  the 
increase  more  than  one-half  as  great. 

Did  agriculture  become  overcrowded  in  these  periods,  so  that  its 
products  declined  in  price  ?  Statistics  are  attainable  with  which  to 
answer  that  question  also,  and  as  the  precise  inquiry  before  us  is 
whether  the  protective  or  the  non-protective  system  causes  the 
greater  increase,  not  in  the  production  of  crops,  but  in  the  produc 
tion  of  wealth  by  agriculture,  the  comparison  of  values  is  indeed  the 
more  correct  one.  As  it  is  not  well  with  the  farmer  when  he  raises  a 
great  crop  but  has  no  market  for  it,  so  the  production  of  wealth  by 
agriculture  may  decrease,  though  crops  increase  in  quantity.  We 
may,  indeed,  infer  that  production  will  only  temporarily  increase  be 
yond  the  demand,  and  that  rapid  increase  during  any  period  is  proof 
that  the  labor  so  employed  has  been  well  repaid.  But  statistics  are 
better  than  syllogisms.  The  price  of  wheat  in  all  parts  of  the  coun 
try  is  determined,  first,  by  the  price  in  a  market  for  export ;  second, 
by  the  price  in  chief  markets  for  consumption,  and  third,  by  cost  of 
transportation  to  those  markets.  We  shall  presently  see  that  the 
cost  of  transportation  has  been  very  materially  reduced  by  the  more 
rapid  increase  of  facilities  for  transportation  under  non-protective 
than  under  protective  tariffs.  But,  setting  aside  that  topic  for  the 


AGRICULTURE. 


99 


moment,  let  us  first  take  the  New  York  prices  of  wheat,  and  sup 
pose  that  these  have  borne  the  same  ratio  to  the  actual  value  to  the 
farmer  in  different  years.  The  following  statement  does  not  give 
the  actual  value  of  the  crops,  but  the  value  at  which  they  could  have 
been  sold  in  the  principal  market  for  export,  New  York : 


YEAR. 

Price. 

Value  of  Crop. 

Increase. 

Per  cent. 

1820 

1  00 

38  000000 

1830  

1.06 

53;000.000 

15,000.000 

.36 

1840 

1  10 

93  303  000 

40  303.000 

.76 

1850             

1.25 

125.600.000 

32,297.000 

.35 

I860                        

1.50 

259,656.000 

134,056.000 

1.07 

1869  (currency) 

1.37 

342  000,000 

82.000.000 

.32 

1869  (gold)  

1.06 

265,000,000 

5,344,000 

*x 

The  crop  of  1869,  supposed  to  be  about  two  hundred  and  fifty 
millions  of  bushels,  is  included  at  the  prices  prevailing  in  New  York 
since  it  has  begun  to  be  delivered.  It  will  be  observed  that,  in  every 
period  until  the  present,  the  price  of  wheat  has  risen,  so  that  the 
increase  in  the  production,  not  of  wheat  but  of  wealth  by  wheat- 
growing,  in  the  last  decade,  was  107  per  cent. ;  that  this  was  three 
times  as  great  as  the  increase  in  either  of  the  periods,  1S20-'30, 
wholly  protective,  or  1S40-'50,  partially  protective;  and  that  the 
increase  in  the  other  decade  of  low  duties,  1830  to  1840,  was  also 
very  large.  But  the  contrast  between  these  periods  of  rapid  prog 
ress  and  the  present  period  of  protection  is  very  striking.  In  cur 
rency,  the  increase  in  value  since  1860  has  been  about  32  per  cent., 
but  in  gold  the  increase  has  been  only  2 £  per  cent,  in  nine  years. 
Nor  will  the  result  be  materially  changed  if,  instead  of  the  large 
crop  and  low  price  of  1869,  we  insert  the  higher  price  and  smaller 
crop  of  1868,  for  the  increase  of  value  would  then  be  only  thirty 
millions  in  gold,  or  about  11  per  cent,  in  eight  years,  against  107 
per  cent,  in  the  last  decade. 

The  advocate  of  protection  does  not  wish  to  see  wheat  exported, 
or  sent  to  any  market  for  export ;  let  us  therefore  ascertain  what  its 
price  has  been  in  the  principal  markets  for  home  consumption.  Let 
us  take  the  price  of  flour  in  that  market  where  it  is  bought  and  sold 
not  for  export  but  for  consumption ;  that  market  by  which  the  largest 
number  of  persons  employed  in  manufacturing  is  supplied.  We 
shall  thus  test  the  truth  of  the  theory  that  high  duties,  by  building 
up  a  home  market  for  the  farmer,  have  increased  the  value  of  his 
products.  The  city  of  Philadelphia  is  the  centre  of  the  largest  manu 
facturing  region  in  the  country,  where  almost  all  branches  of  manu 
facture  flourish.  From  that  city  go  the  supplies  of  flour  to  miners 


100  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

and  iron-workers  by  the  thousand,  and  to  a  vast  body  of  workers  in 
other  branches  of  manufacture,  while  in  the  city  itself  almost  every 
branch  is  represented.  At  the  same  time,  Philadelphia  exports  so 
little  flour,  as  compared  with  other  large  cities,  that  we  may  suppose 
that  there,  if  anywhere,  the  price  will  be  governed  rather  by  the 
"  home  market "  of  which  so  much  is  said  than  by  export  demand. 
Fortunately,  an  accurate  record  of  the  price  of  extra  fall  wheat  flour, 
for  every  month  since  1790,  has  been  preserved  by  the  Philadelphia 
Board  of  Trade.  Diagram  No.  V.  presents  to  the  eye,  at  a  glance, 
the  changes  of  price  from  1800  to  1867,  the  average  each  year,  and 
for  different  periods.  The  record  of  the  Board  of  Trade  is  given  in 
currency,  but  for  the  diagram  the  currency  prices  are  reduced  to 
gold  at  the  average  rates  for  each  month. 

It  will  at  once  be  seen  that  the  imaginary  "  home  market "  has 
not  secured  to  the  farmer  high  prices  for  flour  in  times  of  high  tariffs, 
even  in  this  market,  the  centre  of  supply  for  a  vast  manufacturing 
region.  On  the  contrary,  the  ugly  fact  is  very  plainly  presented, 
that  high  tariffs  have  given  low  prices  to  the  farmer  for  his  wheat, 
and  that  low  tariffs  have  given  high  prices. 

The  period  from  1800  to  1815  was  one  of  low  duties  and  of  high 
prices  for  flour — higher  than  have  ever  ruled  since.  But  it  must  be 
remembered  that  the  War  of  1812,  and  the  great  inflation  and  depre 
ciation  of  currency  which  followed,  account  in  part  for  the  high 
prices,  as  the  collapse  of  the  currency  and  the  prostration  which  fol 
lowed  account  in  part  for  the  extreme  low  price  of  1821.  Neverthe 
less,  the  first  great  fall  in  the  price  is  coincident  with  the  adoption 
of  the  iron  protective  tariff  in  1818.  From  that  time  the  price  de 
clined,  and,  though  it  recovered  a  little  after  the  panic  had  passed, 
the  tariff  of  1824  gave  an  average  price  of  $5.09  a  barrel,  and  the 
tariff  of  1828,  with  two  short  crops,  gave  an  average  of  only  $5.63, 
while  from  1820  to  1824  it  was  $5.91.  We  have  here  the  first  test : 
eight  years  of  extreme  protection  did  not  lift  the  price  of  flour  in 
this  manufacturing  centre,  but  simply  reduced  it,  as  compared  with 
the  average  price  of  previous  years.  The  increase  of  price  in  the 
years  1835,  1836,  and  1837,  was  partly  due  to  the  inflation  of  cur 
rency.  In  the  years  of  contraction  and  hard  times,  1839,  1840,  1841, 
and  1842,  the  average  price  was  about  $5.45.  After  the  passage  of 
the  high  tariff  in  August,  1842,  it  fell  from  $5.45  to  $4.12,  and  early 
in  1843  to  $3.75.  During  the  four  years  of  that  tariff,  the  average 
price  was  very  low,  not  more  than  $4.46.  It  has  never  been  as  low 
during  any  period  of  years  in  our  whole  history,  except  during  the 


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AGRICULTURE.  101 

high  tariff  now  in  force.  The  diagram  shows,  at  a  glance^  this  -con 
trast,  and  the  fact  that  under  the  high  protective  tarziF  tliS  average 
price  of  flour  was  lower,  during  the  whole  period,  than  it  wjas  <r/en 
in  the  hard  times  and  extreme  prostration  which  followed  tha  pkiiio 
of  1837.  As  soon  as  the  tariff  was  removed,  we  find  that  the  price 
rose  in  the  next  year  to  $8.25,  but  part  of  this  increase  was  due  to 
the  famine  in  Europe,  and  the  peculiar  demand.  Nevertheless,  it 
never  fell  again,  until  protection  was  revived,  as  low  as  it  had  been 
in  1846,  and  the  average  for  the  first  period  of  low  duties,  1847-'50, 
inclusive,  was  $5.37.  Even  the  panic  of  1857  did  not  cause  the  price 
to  fall  as  low  as  the  average  for  the  whole  protective  period  ending 
in  1846.  But  the  passage  of  the  protective  tariff  of  1861  was  in 
stantly  followed  by  a  fall,  and  the  price  under  the  successive  addi 
tional  tariffs  since  imposed  is  most  conclusive  proof  that  high  tariffs 
do  not  help  the  farmer  to  higher  prices  for  his  produce,  even  in  the 
very  heart  of  the  manufacturing  region. 

The  diagram,  with  its  frequent  fluctuations,  speaks  to  the  eye, 
but  a  brief  statement  of  the  figures  for  certain  periods  may  serve  to 
aid  the  comparison.  The  first  non-protective  period  ended  in  the 
years  of  hard  times,  in  which,  if  ever,  we  should  expect  prices  of 
flour  in  a  great  manufacturing  centre  to  be  depressed.  Yet,  taking 
the  lowest  price  each  month,  the  averages  for  the  first  and  last  half 
of  each  year,  for  each  year,  and  for  the  whole  period,  are  as  follows : 

Year. 

$6.16 
5.04 
5.40 
5.20 

Average  for  the  four  years,  $5.45. 

This,  then,  is  the  measure  of  the  effect  of  extreme  hard  times, 
when  occurring  under  a  non-protective  system.  Compare  these  four 
years,  the  worst  under  that  tariff,  or  under  any  system  of  low  duties, 
with  the  record  of  the  protective  tariff  which  followed : 

Year. 
$4.35 
4.31 
4.64 
4.55 

Average  for  the  four  years,  $4.46. 

As  compared  with  the  extreme  hard  times  which  preceded,  then, 
the  tariff  of  1842-' 46  cost  the  farmer  just  one  dollar  a  barrel  in  re- 
8 


1839   

First  Half. 
$7.46 

Last  Half. 

$5.48 

1840  

5.08 

6.00 

1841  

4.65 

6.15 

1842.. 

5.74 

4.66 

1843 

First  Half. 
$4  16 

Last  Half. 

$4.53 

1844   ... 

4.53 

4.08 

.1845   

4  44 

4.84 

1846.. 

4.68 

4.42 

102  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

duccd  price  of  his  product !  And  this  is  the  effect,  in  the  greatest 
manufacturing  centre  in  the  country,  of  that  system  which  is  to 
*?  build  Up  a  home  market ! " 

Let  us1  compare  two  other  periods.  We  throw  aside  the  earlier 
years  of  the  tariff  of  1846,  because  the  price  was  then  affected,  on 
the  one  hand,  by  the  European  famine,  and  on  the  other  by  the  de 
pressed  condition  of  business  in  1851,  and  take  the  eight  closing 
years  of  that  tariff  to  compare  with  the  six  years  of  protection 
which  followed.  It  must  be  remembered  that  this  period  includes 
the  panic  of  1857,  which  seriously  reduced  the  price  for  six  months. 
The  average  of  monthly  prices  is  as  follows : 

First  Half.  Last  Half.  Tear. 

1854 $8.44  $8.47  $8.45 

]855 9.78  8.68  9.23 

1856 6.87  6.56  6.71 

1857 6.57  5.78  .17 

1858 4.47  5.15  4.81 

1859 6.40  5.28  5.84 

1860 5.48  5.35  5.41 

1861 5.29  6.05  5.17 

Average  for  eight  years,  $6.47. 

We  include  1861,  though  it  reduces  the  average,  because  the 
effects  of  the  tariff  were  not  felt  in  its  earlier  months.  Observe  how 
quickly  the  price  recovered  from  the  depression  in  the  winter  of 
1857-'58,  and  observe  also  that  the  average  is  just  two  dollars  a 
barrel  more  than  the  producer  received  under  the  tariff  of  1842-'46. 

The  quotations  since  the  adoption  of  the  protective  system  in 
1861  have  been  reduced  to  gold,  at  the  rates  current  each  month, 

and  are  as  follows  : 

First  Half.  Last  Half.  Tear. 

1862 $4.89                    $4.52  $4.70 

1863 4.01                       3.86  3.93 

1864 3.91                       4.20  4.05 

1865 4.42                      5.23  4.81 

Average  for  four  years,  $4.37. 

1866 $5.30  $5.72  $5.51 

1867 7.89  5.43  6.66 

Average  for  six  years,  $4.94. 

The  published  table  closes  with  the  year  1867,  but  it  is  well 
known  that  the  price  during  the  year  1869  has  been  so  low  that, 
were  the  monthly  quotations  given,  the  average  for  the  whole  eight 
years  would  be  even  lower  than  the  average  for  the  six  years  given. 


AGRICULTURE.  103 

It  appears  that,  during  four  years  of  protection,  the  average  price,  at 
Philadelphia,  was  lower  than  it  had  ever  been  during  any  preceding 
period.  Moreover,  during  this  period  of  six  years,  as  compared  with 
the  non-protective  period  preceding,  the  loss  to  the  farmer  on  each 
barrel  of  flour  was  $1.53.  The  four  periods  compare  thus : 

Average  price  of  flour  during 

Four  years,  from  1839  to  1842  ("free  trade")  $5.45. 

"      1843    "   1846  ("protection")     4.46. 

Eight  "    "   1854  "  1861  ("free  trade")  6.47. 

Six   "    "   1862  "  1867  ("protection")  4.94. 

Average  price  for  twelve  years,  under  "free  trade,"  $6.13. 

Average  price  for  ten  years,  under  "protection,"  $4.75. 

The  system  of  high  duties,  therefore,  costs  the  agricultural  inter 
est  an  average  yearly  of  one  dollar  and  thirty-eight  cents  on  every 
barrel  of  flour  produced,  which  means,  of  course,  an  average  of  nearly 
thirty  cents  a  bushel  on  every  bushel  of  wheat  grown.  Yet  these 
are  the  prices  in  the  greatest  manufacturing  region  in  the  country, 
and,  if  "  the  home  market "  is  not  a  myth,  there  we  should  see  its 
effects  most  conspicuously  displayed !  If  we  call  the  crop  of  wheat 
two  hundred  and  fifty  millions  of  bushels,  protection  costs  us  this 
year  seventy-five  millions  of  dollars  in  the  value  of  that  product 
alone.  And  this  is  only  one  of  the  many  products  of  the  farmer, 
though  its  price  is  by  all  accepted  as  the  best  test  of  the  general 
prosperity  of  the  agricultural  interest. 

If  agriculture  has  ever  been  overcrowded  to  that  degree  that  its 
products  have  exceeded  the  ability  of  this  country  to  consume,  or  of 
other  countries  to  buy  them  at  remunerative  rates,  that  event  has 
happened  under  the  heaviest  protective  duties  ever  imposed  in  this 
country.  In  periods  of  low  duties,  the  production  by  agriculture  in 
creased  nearly  or  over  70  per  cent,  in  a  decade ;  and  yet  our  ability 
to  consume  at  fair  prices  was  so  much  more  rapidly  increased  that  the 
price  rose,  and  the  production  of  wealth  was  swelled  76  and  107  per 
cent.  But  in  this  latest  and  most  faithful  trial  of  the  protective 
system  an  increase  in  quantity  of  products  of  not  more  than  40  per 
cent,  has  been  met  by  such  an  inability  to  consume  at  fair  rates  that 
the  prices  fall,  and  the  increase  in  the  production  of  wealth  shrinks 
to  a  smaller  proportion  than  ever  before  since  the  War  of  1212  and 
the  protective  system  first  interfered  with  a  prosperous  foreign  com 
merce. 

Startling  and  conclusive  as  these  facts  are,  they  by  no  means 
represent  the  full  injury  done  to  the  agricultural  interest  by  high 


104  DOES  PROTECTION   PROTECT? 

tariffs.  We  have  thus  far  considered  only  the  price  in  the  principal 
markets  for  export  or  consumption,  because  by  these,  it  is  well  known, 
prices  in  all  parts  of  the  country  are  governed.  But  to  every  farmer 
another  consideration  is  of  vital  importance — the  cost  of  transporta 
tion  to  those  markets.  If  transportation  for  wheat  from  Columbus  to 
New  York  costs  18  cents,  and  wheat  is  selling  in  New  York  at  81.28, 
it  is  certain  that  it  cannot  bring  more  than  $1.10  at  Columbus,  and 
the  actual  price  is  still  further  reduced  by  charges  of  shippers  and 
middle-men.  Thus  to  every  farmer  a  saving  of  ten  cents  a  bushel  in 
the  cost  of  transporting  his  grain  to  the  principal  markets  results  in 
an  increase  of  nearly  ten  cents  in  the  price  which  he  receives.  It  is, 
therefore,  of  vital  importance  to  the  farmer  that  facilities  for  transpor 
tation  shall  increase  with  rapidity. 

Increase  there  must  be  in  any  case,  in  a  country  as  new  and  rap 
idly  growing  as  this.  Not  a  year  has  passed,  however  complete  the 
prostration  of  industry,  in  which  no  improvements  have  extended  fa 
cilities  for  transporting  our  products  to  market.  But  that  increase 
has  been  greater  in  some  periods  than  in  others,  and  in  a  very  re 
markable  degree  it  has  been  greater  in  times  of  low  than  in  times  of 
high  duties. 

In  the  earliest  times  of  which  we  have  record,  the  interior  ton 
nage  was  not  distinguished  from  the  foreign,  but  from  1815  we  can 
trace  the  progress  of  ship-building  on  Western  lakes  and  rivers.  In 
1815,  1816,  and  1817,  the  average  was  about  one  thousand  tons 
yearly ;  in  1817  there  were  built  vessels  measuring  1,250  tons. 
Then  the  tariffs  of  1616  and  1818  were  felt,  and  in  1818,  1819, 1820, 
1821,  and  1822,  the  lake  tonnage  was  increased  only  189,  267,  88, 
249,  and  105  tons  respectively,  the  aggregate  for  five  years  being 
less  than  the  tonnage  built  in  the  single  year  1817.  In  1823,  for  the 
first  time,  we  have  record  of  steamers  built  for  the  Western  rivers, 
663  tons,  making  the  aggregate  for  lakes  and  rivers  in  that  year, 
1,066.  It  then  increased  rapidly,  reaching  5,000  in  1827,  falling  to 
3,027  in  1828,  rising  to  6,044  in  1829,  and  falling  to  5,222  in  1831. 
The  average  for  these  eight  years  of  protective  duty,  1824  to  1831, 
inclusive,  was  about  4,300  tons  yearly.  The  tariff  bill  passed  July, 
1832,  greatly  reducing  duties,  though  it  did  not  immediately  take 
effect,  appears  to  have  stimulated  ship-building  enormously,  internal 
as  well  as  foreign,  for  in  that  year  the  foreign  tonnage  built  was 
over  100,000,  more  than  twice  as  great  as  that  of  the  year  before, 
while  the  lake  and  river  tonnage  built  amounted  to  14,475,  more 
than  double  that  of  any  previous  year.  Nor  did  it  recede  in  any 


AGRICULTURE.  105 

year  afterward  as  low  as  the  highest  point  reached  under  protec 
tion.  The  average  under  the  seven  years  of  compromise  duties, 
1833-'39,  inclusive,  in  spite  of  a  decrease  of  nearly  one-half  after  the 
panic  of  1837,  was  14,456  tons.  In  the  hard  times  of  1840  it  fell  to 
8,693,  but  recovered  to  15,318  the  next  year,  and  to  20,782  in  1842, 
so  that  the  average  for  the  whole  period  was  14,598,  an  increase  of 
more  than  200  per  cent,  on  the  average  of  the  eight  years  of  protec 
tion. 

The  rapid  increase  noticed  in  1841  and  1842  continuing,  the  ton 
nage  built  rose  to  38,872  in  1846,  the  average  for  the  four  years  of 
protection  being  31,708,  a  gain  of  100  per  cent,  on  the  average  of 
ten  preceding  years,  and  of  50  per  cent,  on  the  last  year  of  low 
duties.  But  in  1847,  the  first  year  after  the  removal  of  the  protec 
tive  system,  the  tonnage  built  for  the  rivers  and  lakes  jumpe'd  to 
58,240,  an  increase  of  more  than  50  per  cent,  in  a  single  year.  And 
by  1856,  before  it  was  reduced  by  the  panic,  it  rose  to  100,713,  a 
gain  of  200  per  cent,  on  the  average  of  the  protective  period. 
The  panic  of  1857  reduced  the  Western  tonnage  built  to  23,308  in 
1859,  but  it  recovered  to  43,056  in  1860,  and  to  53,427  in  1861. 

Again,  if  we  observe  the  number  of  steamers  built,  we  find 
that  in  1823  there  were  15,  and  in  1824  there  were  $6 ;  that  the 
yearly  average  for  the  four  years  under  the  tariff  of  1829  was  38, 
and  the  yearly  average  under  the  tariff  of  1829-'32  was  53| — in 
cluding  the  year  1832,  in  which  alone  there  were  100  built.  The 
reduction  of  duty  was  then  certain,  and  the  average  without  that 
year  was  only  38 — just  the  same  as  that  of  the  preceding  tariff. 
But  under  the  reduced  duties  the  average  for  the  four  years  1833-'36 
was  72  a  year,  and  for  the  next  four  years,  1837-'40,  it  was  103  a 
year,  in  spite  of  the  panic.  For  the  last  two  years  of  this  tariff,  1841 
and  1842,  the  average  was  107^.  Here  is  an  increase  of  about  150 
per  cent.,  as  compared  with  the  average  of  eight  years  under  pro 
tection.  Again,  from  1842-'46,  inclusive,  the  average  was  157£,  a 
gain  of  less  than  50  per  cent.  But  the  four  years  which  followed 
under  low  duties,  1847-'50,  show  an  average  of  185  yearly,  and 
the  period  1851-'54  shows  an  average  of  261  yearly.  After  the 
panic  the  number  so  decreased  that  the  average  for  1859  and  1860 
is  only  233. 

Let  us  next  consider  the  progress  in  railroad-building.  The  in 
fluence  of  railroads  in  increasing  the  value  of  farming  products  and 
of  farming  land  has  been  most  wonderful,  and  every  farmer  will  un 
derstand  that,  if  the  building  of  railroads  has  been  materially  checked 


106  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

or  retarded  by  any  tariff  system,  that  system  has  cursed  the  farmer 
and  retarded  the  whole  agricultural  interest  of  the  country.  In  the 
years  1829-'32,  under  protection,  we  built  229  miles  of  road,  an 
average  of  76  miles  yearly.  A  table  at  the  close  of  this  chapter 
gives  the  number  of  miles  of  railroad  built  each  year,  and  the  same 
record  is  presented  in  Diagram,  "  Iron,  Coal  and  Railroads"  (p.  206). 
In  the  years  1833-'36,  under  reduced  duties,  we  built  1,044  miles,  an 
average  of  261  miles  yearly;  in  1837-'40,  with  duties  still  lower, 
we  built  1,545  miles,  an  average  of  386  miles  yearly ;  and  in  the  two 
years,  1841  and  1842,  duties  being  at  the  lowest  point,  though  busi 
ness  was  depressed,  we  built  1,208  miles,  or  604  yearly !  But  it 
will  be  said  that  this  increase  was  natural,  the  country  being  new 
and  greatly  in  need  of  railroad  facilities.  True ;  but  observe  how 
suddenly  the  tariff  of  1843  cuts  down  this  progress,  from  717  miles 
built  in  1841,  to  159  miles  in  1843  !  The  whole  number  of  miles 
built  under  that  tariff  was  only  904,  an  average  of  226  miles  yearly — 
less  than  had  been  built  ten  years  before  under  lower  duties  !  Ob 
serve,  again,  how  the  progress  is  resumed  instantly  when  the  load 
of  duties  is  removed !  In  1847  the  number  of  miles  built  was  669, 
more  than  double  the  number  built  in  1846,  and  in  1849  it  had 
doubled  again.  The  whole  number  of  miles  built  in  the  four  years 
after  the  removal  of  the  tariff  was  4,091 — more  than  four  times  as 
many  as  were  built  in  the  four  years  of  protection  just  preceding ! 
The  average  for  1847-'50  was  1,023  miles  yearly,  and  for  the  next 
period,  1851-'54,  it  was  1,925  yearly,  7,699  miles  being  built ;  and 
for  the  next  period,  1855-'5S,  it  was  2,562  miles  yearly,  10,248  miles 
being  built.  The  panic  reduced  the  yearly  average  to  1,833  for  the 
years  1859  and  1860,  but  the  tariff  of  1861  reduced  it  still  more. 
Though  government  needed  and  built  roads  for  military  purposes, 
and  gave  enormous  subsidies  to  others,  the  whole  number  of  miles 
built  during  the  years  1861-'64  was  3,273,  an  average  of  818  yearly. 
But  these  were  years  of  war.  Take,  then,  the  latest  years  of  peace, 
1865-'68,  inclusive,  during  which  the  average  was  2,087 — less  than 
the  average  of  the  period  1855-'58,  ten  years  before !  Nor  is  this  a 
fair  comparison ;  for  within  the  last  four  years  more  than  3,000  miles 
of  road  have  been  built  by  government  land  grants  and  subsidies, 
involving  a  debt  of  over  fifty  millions  of  dollars.  Yet  the  whole 
number  of  miles  built  was  only  8,347,  and  a  portion  of  these  were 
built  by  government  aid.  Deducting  these,  the  yearly  average  for 
these  four  years  under  protection  is  less  than  the  average  twenty 
years  ago,  during  the  first  period  after  the  tariff  of  1842  expired ! 


AGRICULTURE.  107 

In  short,  there  have  been  built  in  fifteen  years  of  protection, 
without  government  subsidies,  9,750  miles,  an  average  of  650  miles 
yearly.  But  in  twenty-four  years  of  revenue  tariff  we  have  built 
29,502  miles,  an  average  of  1,229  miles  yearly.  Does  "  protection  " 
protect  the  agricultural  interest  ? 

The  most  accurate  measure  of  the  benefit  conferred  by  railroad-s 
upon  the  farmers  is  the  increase  in  the  value  of  farm  lands.  A  farm 
is  worth  that  sum  upon  which  its  net  products,  with  allowance  for 
value  of  labor,  will  pay  a  fair  interest;  and  an  improvement  which 
reduces  the  cost  of  transporting  these  products  to  a  market,  thus 
adding  to  the  price  which  the  farmer  can  obtain  for  them,  directly 
increases  the  yearly  value  of  the  farm.  Statistics  of  hundreds  of 
counties,  in  different  parts  of  the  country,  prove  that  the  opening 
of  a  railroad  into  a  county,  not  previously  blessed  with  such  means 
of  transportation,  has  ordinarily  increased  the  average  value  of  lands 
in  the  county  nearly  100  per  cent,  within  a  few  years.  Under  the 
tariff  of  1842  only  904  miles  of  railroad  were  built  in  four  years ;  and, 
if  we  suppose  that  the  value  of  farming  land  for  fifteen  miles  on  each 
side  was  doubled,  27,120  square  miles  of  land  were  thus  raised  in 
value.  But  the  average  number  of  miles  built  every  year  after  that 
tariff  was  repealed  was  greater  than  the  whole  number  built  during 
four  years  of  its  operation,  and  in  the  four  years,  1855-'58,  under  low 
duties,  we  built  2,562  miles  yearly,  and  thus  doubled  the  value  each 
year  of  76,860  square  miles  of  land,  a  territory  one-fourth  larger  than 
the  old  State  of  Virginia.  During  the  decade  1850-'60,  under  low 
duties,  there  were  built  21,613  miles  of  road ;  and,  had  these  nowhere 
conflicted  with  each  other,  about  650,000  square  miles  of  land  would 
have  been  raised  in  value — a  territory  more  than  one-fifth  as  large 
as  the  entire  domain  of  the  United  States.  These  figures  serve  only 
to  give  some  idea  of  the  importance  of  railroad-building  to  the  agri 
cultural  interest,  and  it  may  easily  be  inferred  that  a  protective  sys 
tem  which  makes  the  rails  alone  for  every  mile  of  railroad  cost 
88,000,  when  far  better  rails  could  be  procured,  did  no  tariff  hinder, 
at  a  cost  of  $5,000,  and  enhances  the  cost  of  other  materials  in  like 
proportion,  must  greatly  retard  the  progress  of  railroads,  and  conse 
quently  the  progress  of  agriculture.  Men  who  have  five  millions  of 
money  at  command  can  iron  one  thousand  miles  of  road  if  no  tariff 
interferes ;  but  a  protective  tariff  reduces  them  to  625  miles,  or  com 
pels  them  to  defer  the  undertaking  altogether. 

The  examination  of  the  effect  of  the  protective  system  upon  agri 
culture  has  been  somewhat  lengthy,  but  it  is  repaid  by  the  extreme 


108  DOES  PROTECTION   PROTECT? 

importance  of  the  facts  established.  It  is  proved,  beyond  question, 
that  the  system  of  protective  duties  does  very  materially  retard  the 
production  of  wealth  by  agriculture.  It  reduces  the  export  price  of 
products.  It  reduces  the  prices  of  agricultural  products  in  the  great 
manufacturing  centres.  It  reduces  the  value  of  farming  land  in  the 
chief  manufacturing  States.  It  has  rendered  the  country  unable  to 
consume  crops  scarcely  larger  than  those  of  1860,  at  prices  lower  in 
gold.  It  has  produced  similar  results,  as  to  the  general  progress  of 
that  branch  of  industry,  in  every  period  in  which  it  has  been  tried  since 
1790,  so  that  the  increase  in  non-protective  periods  has  been  fully 
twice  as  great  as  the  increase  in  protective  periods.  It  has  checked 
the  growth  of  facilities  for  transportation,  thus  depriving  the  farmer 
of  a  part  of  even  that  low  price  which  his  products  could  in  protec 
tive  times  have  brought  in  markets  for  export  or  consumption. 
Within  the  last  decade,  the  increase  in  the  production  of  wealth  by 
agriculture  was  fully  100  per  cent.,  but  during  eight  years,  under 
protective  duties,  the  increase  has  been,  measured  by  the  quantity 
of  wheat,  about  40  per  cent.  ;  measured  by  the  value  of  wheat  pro 
duced,  2-£  per  cent. ;  measured  by  the  value  of  all  the  principal  crops, 
nothing ;  measured  by  the  value  of  Northern  crops,  4J-  per  cent. ; 
measured  by  the  value  of  live-stock,  nothing ;  measured  by  the  value 
of  farm  lands,  less  than  nothing. 

But  by  agriculture  three-fourths  of  all  our  wealth  has  been  pro 
duced.  If  the  production  of  wealth  by  that  industry  has  been  re- 
-tarded  by  at  least  one-half  of  its  natural  growth  during  every  protec 
tive  period,  and  if  under  the  present  tariff  the  progress  has  been  yet 
more  seriously  retarded — if  not  arrested  altogether — what  has  the 
country  lost  ?  The  annual  product  in  1860  was  about  twenty-six 
hundred  millions.  If  the  progress  of  the  last  decade  had  been  main 
tained,  the  yearly  product  would  now  be  five  thousand  millions.  If 
there  has  been  no  progress,  we  have  lost  in  yearly  product  by  agri 
culture  alone  a  sum  as  large  as  the  whole  national  debt.  If  the 
progress  of  agriculture  generally  has  been  retarded  no  more  than 
the  crop  of  wheat,  we  have  lost  in  the  product  of  this  year  only  a 
sum  half  as  large  as  that  debt.  And  if,  in  the  year  1870,  it  shall 
appear  that  the  production  of  wealth  by  agriculture  has  increased 
40  per  cent. — a  rate  more  rapid  than  that  of  any  other  protective 
period  in  our  history — we  shall  then  have  lost,  upon  the  product 
of  a  single  year,  not  less  than  $1,500,000,000,  a  sum  nearly  twice 
as  great  as  the  entire  production  of  wealth  by  all  other  forms 
of  industry  in  the  year  1860.  To  compensate  for  that  loss,  the 


AGRICULTURE. 


109 


production  of  wealth  by  manufactures   and  mining  must  have  in 
creased  threefold. 


The  following  tabbs  show,  first,  the  number  of  miles  of  railway  built,  and  the 
number  in  operation  each  year  since  1830  ;  second,  the  price  of  flour  each  month, 
according  to  the  report  of  the  Philadelphia  Corn  Exchange ;  third,  the  averages  for 
different  periods  of  the  lowest  quotations  each  month,  those  since  1861  being  reduced 
to  gold  values ;  fourth,  the  number  of  ships,  barks,  brigs,  schooners,  sloops,  and 
steamers  built,  and  the  total  tonnage  each  year  from  1815  to  1862,  inclusive.  The 
Philadelphia  quotations  are  for  extra  -fall  wheat  flour,  and  the  published  report 
ends  with  1867.  In  the  next  table  the  averages  of  the  lowest  quotations  are  given, 
for  the  first  hah0  of  each  year,  for  the  last  half,  for  the  year,  for  periods  of  several 
years,  and  under  each  taruT.  For  the  years  1868  and  1869  newspaper  quotations  of 
January  1st,  and  July  1st,  reduced. to  gold,  are  averaged  for  the  first  half,  and  quo 
tations  for  July  1st  and  January  1st,  for  the  last  hah0  of  each  year. 

RAILROADS. 

Statement  of  the  Number  of  Miles  of  Railroad  Built  each  Year. — (From  Poor's  Hail- 
way  Manual.) 


YEAR. 

Built. 

Total  in  Oper'n. 

YEAR. 

Built. 

Total  in  Oper'n. 

laso   . 

23 

23 

1850        

1,654 

9,021 

1831 

72 

95 

1851        .   . 

1  961 

10982 

1832  

134 

229 

1R52  

1,926 

12,908 

1833.     . 

151 

380 

1853  

2,452 

15,360 

1834 

253 

633 

1854..., 

1  360 

16  720 

1835 

465 

1  098 

1855        

1654 

18  374 

1836 

175 

1,273 

1856  

3  643 

22,017 

1837 

224 

1,497 

1857 

2491 

24508 

1838  

416 

1,913 

1858  

2,460 

26,968 

1839 

389 

2  302 

1859 

1  821 

28  789 

1840 

516 

2,818 

1860 

1,846 

30,635 

1841 

717 

3  535 

1861 

621 

31  256 

1842  

491 

4,026 

1862  

864 

32.120 

1843          

159 

4.185 

1863  

1.050 

33,170 

1844 

192 

4  377 

1864 

738 

33,908 

1845 

256 

4  633 

1865 

1  177 

35  085 

1846 

297 

4,930 

1866  

1,742 

36,\827 

1847 

669 

5599 

1867        

2449 

39276 

1848 

397 

5  996 

1868 

2979 

42  255 

1849  

1,369 

7,365 

The  number  of  miles  built  in  1869,  after  Poor's  work  was  issued,  waa  very  large 
— it  is  said  nearly  six  thousand  miles.  But  a  large  part  of  this  was  built  by  gov 
ernment  aid,  and  at  heavy  expense  to  the  people,  either  in  subsidies  or  land  grants. 
But  for  the  Pacific  roads,  and  those  constructed  to  give  access  to  or  connection  with 
them,  the  contrast  in  railroad  building  between  the  present  period  and  that  of  low 
duties  which  preceded  would  be  very  striking. 


110 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


Highest  and  Lowest  Price  for  Flour  in  Each  Month  for  Eighty-one  Years— From  1786  to  1867. 


YEARS. 

January. 

February. 

March. 

April. 

May. 

June. 

1786.. 

42s.  Od. 

41s.  6d. 

40s.  6d 

40s.  Od. 

43s.  Od. 

1787.. 
1788 

40s.  Od. 

40s.  Od. 

40s.  Od. 
35s.  Od 

40s.  Od. 
36s.  Od. 

40s.  Od. 
37s  Od 

42s.  6d. 
37s.  Od. 

1789  !! 
1790 

35s.  Od. 
44s.  6d. 

34s.  Od. 

35s.  Od. 

35s.  Od. 

40s!  Od'. 

42s.  6d. 

1791.. 

45s.  Od. 

45s.  Od. 

40s.  Od. 

38s.  Od. 

40s.  Od. 

40s.  Od. 

1792.. 

37s.  6d. 

37s.  6d. 

37s.  6d. 

37s.  6d. 

87e.  Od. 

37s.  6d. 

1793.. 

45s.  Od. 

45s.  Od. 

45s.  Od. 

1794.. 

56s.  Od. 

48s.  2d. 

50s.  Od. 

50s.  Od. 

1795 

75s  Od. 

82s.  6d. 

80s.  3d. 

1796.. 

$12  "66"' 

$13  50 

$15  00 

$14  00 

$14  00 

$12  50 

1797.. 

10  00 

10  00 

10  00®  9  25 

9  00®  8  50 

9  00 

8  50 

1798.. 

8  50 

8  50 

8  50 

8  50®  7  50 

7  00 

6  75 

1799.. 

9  50 

9  50 

9  25 

9  25 

9  50 

9  50 

1800.. 

9  50 

9  75 

10  00 

1801  .  . 

li'so 

li'25 

li'50®  9  50 

11  00 

11  50 

11  50 

1802.. 

7  00 

7  00 

7  00 

7  00 

7  00 

7  00 

1803.. 

6  50 

6  50 

6  50 

6  00 

6  00 

6  00®  6  50 

1804.. 

7  50 

7  50 

7  00 

6  00 

6  50 

6  50®  7  75 

1805.. 

11  00 

12  00@13  00 

17  00 

11  75 

11  00 

1806.. 

7  50 

7'  66 

7  00®  6  75 

6  50®  7  00 

7  00®  8  00 

8  00 

1807.. 

7  50 

7  50 

725 

7  25 

7  25 

7  25®  7  00 

1808.. 

6  00 

5  T5 

5  75 

5  18} 

5  00 

5  00 

1809.. 

5  50 

7  00 

7  00 

6  25 

7  00 

6  50®  7  00 

1810.. 

7  75 

8  00 

8  25 

8  25 

9  00 

9  00 

1811.. 

11  00 

10  50 

10  50 

10  50 

10  25 

10  12 

1812.. 

10  12 

9  75®  9  25 

9  00®  7  00 

7  25®  8  50 

8  50 

1813.  . 

12'  66 

10  50 

9  50 

9  75®10  00 

8  50®  7  25 

8  00®  8  50 

1814.. 

7  50®  7  00 

6  75 

1815.. 

s'66 

8  '66 

,    7'75 

7'75 

850 

8  50®  9  00 

1816.. 

9  00 

9  00 

8  00 

7  75 

7  87 

8  75@10  50 

1817.. 

13  50 

13  75 

14  00®14  75 

14  00®14  25 

14  50@14  00 

11  50®11  00 

1818.. 

9  25®10  00 

10  50@10  75 

10  50 

10  00 

10  00 

10  25 

1819.. 

9  00 

875 

8  00 

7  25 

6  37 

6  00 

1820.  . 

6  00®5  37! 

5  50@5  12! 

5  00®  4  75 

4  75 

4  37®  4  87 

4  50®  4  75 

1821.. 

4  00 

4  00 

3  62®  3  75 

4  00 

4  00 

4  09 

1822.. 

6  25 

6  25 

6  25 

6  50 

7  12 

6  75®  7  00 

1823.. 

6  50®  7  00 

6  50®  7  00 

7  00 

7  25 

7  37 

750 

1824.  . 

6  00 

6  00 

6  00®  6  50 

612 

6  00 

6  00®  5  75 

1825.. 

4  87! 

5  12 

5  12 

5  00 

6  00 

5  50®  5  00 

1826.. 

4  75 

4  62 

4  50 

4  25 

4  25 

4  25®  4  75 

1827.. 

5  25®  6  00 

6  00®  5  75 

5  75®  5  12 

5  12®  5  00 

5  00 

5  00 

1828.. 

5  00®,  4  75 

4  87i®  4  75 

4  75 

475 

4  75 

4  50 

1829.. 

8  25 

•     8  25®  8  00 

8  00®  7  50 

7  50®  6  75 

6  60®  6  75 

6  75®  6  25 

1830.. 

4  62i®  4  50 

4  50 

4  50 

4  50®  5  00 

475 

4  75®  4  50 

1831.. 

6  25©  6  00 

6  00 

6  25®  7  00 

6  37®  7  00 

6  50®  5  50 

5  75®  5  25 

1832.. 

5  50 

5  50 

5  25®  5  00 

5  25®  5  50 

5  50 

5  75®  6  25 

1833.. 

5  75 

5  00®  5  19 

5  25 

5  25 

5  50 

5  50®  5  75 

1834.. 

5  25 

4  87 

4  62 

4  75®  5  25 

5  25®  5  50 

5  50 

1835.. 

4  93} 

5  09 

5  00 

5  18} 

6  00 

6  25 

1836.. 

6  62i 

6  75 

7  00 

6  81} 

6  50 

6  81} 

1837.. 
1838.. 

11  00®11  25 
8  12|®8  62i 

10  50®11  00 
7  50®8  06} 

10  50@10  75 
7  50®  8  00 

9  31} 

7  50®  8  00 

9  00 

7  71®  7  90 

9  00®  9  37 

7  50®  7  75 

1839.. 

8  25®850 

850 

7  50®  8  62 

7  37®  7  50 

7  00®  7  50 

6  12®  6  32 

1840.. 

5  75 

5  50 

5  00 

4  87 

4  62 

4  75 

1841.. 

4  65@5  25 

4  50®5  06} 

4  50®  4  93 

4  62®  5  00 

4  65®  5  00 

5  00 

1842.. 

6  06} 

5  90®6  12 

5  60®  5  81 

5  62®  5  80 

5  75 

5  50®  5  62 

1843.. 

3  98 

3  75®3  92 

3  79®  3  91 

4  22 

4  25®  4  40 

5  00®  5  12 

1844.. 

4  50 

480 

4  75 

4  68 

4  37®  4  57 

4  10®  4  30 

1845.. 

4  15 

4  31} 

4  31} 

5  38 

445 

4  25®  4  40 

1846.. 

5  31} 

4  90 

483 

4  81 

4  31 

3  91 

1847.. 
1848.. 

4  83* 
6  06} 

6  17 

5  87! 

5  93} 

6  06} 

6  87 
5  93} 

7  90 
5  87 

8  25®  8  40 
5  44 

1849.. 

5  21 

5  00 

4  75®  5  13 

4  50 

4  68 

4  55 

1850.. 

5  00 

4  78 

479 

5  00 

6  18 

5  27 

1851.. 

4  66 

4  25@456} 

4  12 

4  50 

426 

4  25 

1852.. 

4  25 

5  55 

4  18} 

4  06} 

4  20 

4  20 

1853.. 

5  37i 

5  20 

4  93* 

4  90 

4  18 

4  62 

1854.. 

7  59 

8  12 

7  45 

8  08 

8  69 

8  72®,  8  90 

1855.. 

9  18} 

8  94 

9  06} 

10  25 

10  75 

10  52 

1856.. 

8  33 

7  31 

7  00 

6  57| 

6  06} 

5  94 

1857.. 

6-32 

6  37! 

6  12| 

6  00 

7  19 

7  45 

1858.. 

4  73 

446 

4  46 

440} 

4  44 

4  31} 

1859.. 

5  75 

5  81 

6  73 

6  25 

7  25 

6  62 

I860.. 

5  44 

5  00 

5  00 

6  00 

5  94 

5  50 

1861.. 

5  31 

5  12 

5  12 

5  37 

5  56 

5  25 

1862.. 

5  31} 

5  31} 

5  00 

5  12! 

4  87} 

4  75 

1863.  . 

6  25 

6  25 

6  12 

6  12 

5  87 

5  75 

1864.. 

6  25 

6  25 

6  00 

7  00 

7  25 

7  50 

1865.. 

9  75 

9  75 

8  25 

7  50 

6  25 

6  25 

1866.. 

7  25 

6  50 

6  75 

7  25 

8  00 

8  50 

1867.. 

11  25@13  50 

10  25@11  25 

10  00@11  00 

12  00®14  00 

11  00@12  50 

10  00®15  25 

AGRICULTURE. 


Ill 


Highest  and  Lowest  Price  for  Flonr  in  Each  Month  for  Eighty-one  Years— From  1786  to  18C7  (Continued). 


YKAKS. 

July. 

August. 

September. 

October. 

November. 

December. 

1786.. 

43s.  Od. 

43s.  Od. 

42s.  6d. 

42s.  6d. 

42s.  Od. 

40s.  Od. 

1787.. 

42s.  6d. 

36s.  6d. 

33s.  Od. 

33s.  Od. 



1788.. 

358.  Od. 

35s.  Od. 

35s.  Od. 

34s.  6d. 

84s'.'  Od. 

35s.  Od. 

1789.. 

38s.  8d. 

41s.  Od. 

42a.  Od. 

42s.  6d. 

40s.  Od. 

42s.  6d. 

1790.. 

53s.  6d.     ' 

45s.  Od. 

43s.  3d. 

46s.  Od. 

46s.  Od. 

1791.. 

'40s.'  Od. 

35s.  Od. 

36s.  Od. 

368.  Od. 

37s.  6d. 

37s.  6d. 

1792.. 

37s.  6d. 

37s.  6d. 

39s.  Od. 

389.  6d. 

38s.  6d. 

38s.  6d. 

1793.. 

48s.  6d. 

47s.  6d. 

47s.  6d. 

47s.  6d. 

47s.  6d. 

1794.. 

54s.'  Od. 

53s.  Od. 

52s.  6d. 

56s.  Od. 

59s.  Od. 

69s.  Od. 

1795.. 
1796.. 

86s.  3d. 
$11  75 

90s.  Od. 
$11  00 

909.  6d. 
$1200 

$13  00 
12  00 

$13  00 
12  00@11  50 

$13  75 
11  50@10  50 

1797.. 

8  50 

8  50 

8  50 

8  50 

8  50 

8  50 

1798.. 

6  75 

8  00®  8  50 

8  50 

8  50 

8  50®  9  50 

9  50@10  00 

1799.. 

10  00®  9  50 

9  50 

9  50 

9  50@10  00 

10  50@11  00 

10  00 

1800.. 

10  25 

10  75 

10  50<|>  9  75 

9  50 

10  50 

11  00 

1801.. 

11  50@11  00 

11  00 

10  00®  9  50 

9  25 

9  00 

8  00®  6  50 

1802.. 

725 

7  25 

7  00®  6  50 

6  50 

6  50 

6  50 

1803.. 

7  00 

7  00®  7  75 

7  75®  7  50 

7  50 

7  50 

7  50 

1804.. 

7  75 

8  00 

9  75@10  00 

9  00 

10  00@10  50 

11  00 

1805.. 

10  75®  9  00 

9  00®  8  00 

8  00 

8  00 

8  00®  8  50 

8  25 

1806.. 

8  00 

7  50®  6  75 

7  00 

6  75 

7  00®  7  50 

7  50 

1807.. 

6  75 

6  75 

7  12®  7  50 

7  25®  6  75 

7  00 

6  75 

1808.. 

5  00®  5  75 

5  25 

5  00®  6  00 

6  00 

6  00®  5  56 

5  50®  6  00 

1809.. 

6  12®  7  00 

6  75 

6  75®  7  25 

7  25 

7  50®  8  00 

7  50 

1810.. 

10  oo^ii  oo 

11  00(^12  00 

11  00@10  75 

10  75@11  50 

10  25 

11  25 

1811.. 
1812.  . 

10  00®11  00 
8  50 

10  75®10  00 
8  25®  9  00 

9  00 
9  00®10  00 

8  50 
10  25@10  00 

9  50 
11  50@10  50 

10  00 
10  25 

1813.. 

7  50 

7  00®  8  00 

8  25®  8  75 

9  25®  8  25 

8  50@10  00 

10  00®  7  50 

1814.. 

7  00®  7  25 

7  25®  8  50 

850 

8  75 

8  75 

8  00 

1815.. 

9  25®  8  75 

8  62 

8  75 

9  00 

9  50 

9  25 

1816.. 

11  00 

10  75®  9  50 

9  75 

10  00@11  00 

11  50@12  50 

12  50®13  50 

1817.. 

10  50®11  50 

11  50@10  00 

9  50 

9  00 

9  50@10  00 

9  75®  9  00 

1818.. 

10  25 

10  50@10  75 

9  75 

9  75 

9  25 

9  00 

1819.. 

6  00 

6  00®  6  25 

6  50 

6  50 

6  12 

6  00®  6  25 

1820.. 

4  50®  4  75 

4  50 

4  50 

4  25 

4  25 

4  50 

1821  .  . 

4  00®  4  50 

4  62®  5  00 

5  25®  5  50 

5  50®  7  50 

7  00®  6  00 

6  00®  6  50 

1822.. 

6  75®  6  25 

6  25®  7  00 

700 

6  62 

6  50 

6  50 

1823.. 

700 

6  50 

6  50 

6  75 

6  62 

6  25®  6  00 

1824.. 

5  25 

5  25 

5  12®  5  50 

5  12 

5  50®  5  00 

4  75®  5  00 

1825.. 

5  50®  4  50 

5  00 

5  00 

5  00®  5  12 

5  12®  5  00 

4  87 

1826.. 

4  37®  4  50 

4  50 

4  50®  5  00 

5  00®  4  25 

5  50 

5  25 

1827.. 

5  00 

5  00 

5  00®  5  25 

5  25 

5  25®  5  50 

5  00 

1828.. 

4  50®  4  75 

5  00®  5  50 

5  50®  7  00 

6  25®  7  00 

7  25®  9  00 

7  75®  8  25 

1829.. 

6  00®  5  00 

5  00®  5  50 

5  50®  5  75 

5  25®  5  00 

5  00®  5  25 

5  25®  4  62 

1830.. 

4  50©  5  25 

5  25®  5  75 

5  50®  5  25 

5  25®  5  00 

5  00 

5  00®  5  62 

1831.. 

5  37®  4  75 

4  75 

5  25®  5  50 

5  50 

5  50®  5  25 

5  25 

1832.. 

6  00 

6  37®  6  25 

6  37®  5  50 

5  50®  6  00 

5  25®  6  12 

5  75®  5  50 

lass.. 

6  00®  6  50 

6  12®  600 

600 

5  87®  5  75 

5  75 

5  50®  5  25 

1834.. 

5  25®  5  50 

5  50 

5  50®  5  25 

5  25 

5  25®  5J2 

5  00®  4  80 

1835.. 

6  81 

6  061 

6  12 

6  061 

6  37 

6  75 

1S36.. 

7  00 

8  37 

9  37 

9  31 

10  62 

11  00 

1837.. 

9  50®  9  95 

9  00®  8  53 

8  00®  8  50 

8  25®  9  00 

9  31®  9  81 

9  50®  9  75 

1838.. 

6  43®  6  12 

6  12®  7  12 

6  90®  8  45 

8  25®  8  40 

8  00®  8  12 

8  31®  8  50 

1839. 

5  59®,  5  12 

5  75®  6  12 

5  87®  6  12 

5  87®  6  00 

625 

5  56®  5  90 

1840.. 

5  25 

5  00 

5  00 

5  00 

5  00 

4  75®  5  25 

1841.. 

5  25®  5  50 

606®  6  34 

6  62®  6  87 

6  12®  6  30 

6  47®  6  96 

6  42 

1842.. 

5  50®  5  37 

5  25®  5  45 

4  561 

4  19 

4  12®  4  37 

4  S7@  4  62 

1843.  . 

1844. 

5  25®  5  37 
4  00®  4  37 

4  75®  5  06 
3  91®  4  19 

1   4J. 

3  89®  4  33 

4  00®  4  50 

4  37 

429 

1845. 

4  22®  4  62 

4  18* 

4  60 

4  061 

5  91 

6  661 

1846. 

3  84 

3  83 

3  82®  4  12 

5  18 

5  10 

4  76 

1847. 

5  91 

6  03 

5  50 

6  45 

6  31 

6  49 

1848. 

5  25 

5  22 

5  67 

5  42 

5  25 

5  14 

1849. 

4  561 

4  87®  5  12 

5  02 

5  10 

5  061 

4  87 

1850. 

5  061 

5  12®  5  37 

5  00 

4  83 

4  85 

4  71 

1851. 

4  25 

3  97 

396 

4  12 

3  97 

4  15 

1852. 

4  12 

4  20 

4  44 

448 

4  90 

5  16 

1853. 

500 

5  33 

5  70 

6  61 

6  90®  7  45 

6  72®  7  00 

1854. 

8  06®  8  29 

8  13®  8  53 

8  50®  8  81 

8  33®  8  58 

8  68®  8  90 

9  12®  9  25 

1855. 

931 

8  81 

7  47 

8  37 

9  31 

8  82®  8  90 

1856. 

6  561 

6  52* 

6  49 

6  50 

6  62* 

6  60 

1857. 

687i 

6  50 

5  62* 

5  25 

5  311 

5  12* 

1858. 

437* 

5  25 

5  59 

5  42 

5  15 

5  12* 

1859. 

587 

5  12 

5  00 

5  12 

5  25 

5  311 

1860. 

5  31 

5  56 

5  69 

5  75 

4  94 

4  87 

1861. 

4  75 

4  42 

5  12 

544 

5  27 

5  31 

1862. 

4  87* 

5  25 

5  00 

6  12* 

6  12* 

6  12* 

1*63. 

5  50 

4  75 

5  06 

5  62 

5  75 

6  00 

1864. 

9  75 

10  25 

10  25 

9  75 

10  00 

10  00 

1865. 

7  00 

7  00 

8  25 

8  25 

8  00 

7  25 

1866. 

7  00 

8  25 

8  50 

9  00 

8  50 

8  75 

1867.. 

8  75@10  00 

8  00®  8  75 

7  25®  9  50 

8  25®  8  75 

7  00®  8  50 

.... 

112 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


PKICE  OF  FLOTJK. 

Average  of  the  Lowest  Quotations  Each  Month  for  Certain  Periods. 


YEAE. 

First  Half. 

Last. 

Year. 

Period. 

Tariff. 

Remarks. 

1817  

$13  54 

$9  96 

$11  75 

Inflation. 

1818  

10  08 

9  75 

9  91 

1819 

7  89 

6  19 

7  04 

Contraction. 

1820  

5  02 

4  42 

4  71 

$8  35 

u 

1821 

3  94 

5  39 

4  66 

u 

1822  

6  56 

6  60 

6  58 

1823 

7  02 

6  60 

6  81 

1824  

6  02 

5  16 

5  59 

5  91 

$7  13 

1825  

5  27 

5  08 

5  17 

1826 

4  43 

4  85 

4  64 

1827  

5  35 

5  08 

5  21 

1828 

4  77 

5  96 

5  36 

5  09 

1829  

7  56 

5  33 

6  45 

1830  

4  60 

5  03 

4  81 

1831  

6  19 

5  27 

5  73 

1832  

5  47 

5  74 

5  60 

6  63 

6  36 

1833      

5  37 

5  87 

5  62 

1834  

5  04 

5  29 

5  16 

1835    .... 

5  39 

6  36 

5  87 

1836  

6  75 

9  28 

8  01 

6  16 

Inflation. 

1837.. 

9  72 

8  93 

9  32 

tt 

1838  

7  64 

7  33 

7  48 

8  40 

{< 

1839 

7  46 

5  48 

6  16 

Contraction 

1840  

5  08 

5  00 

5  04 

u 

1841 

5  65 

6  15 

5  40 

u 

1842  

5  74 

4  66 

5  20 

5  45 

6  32 

(( 

1843 

4  16 

4  53 

4  35 

1844      

4  53 

4  08 

4  31 

1845  

4  44 

4  84 

4  64 

1846  

4  68 

4  42 

4  55 

4  46 

4  46 

1847  

6  66 

6  11 

6  38 

Irish  Famine. 

1848  

5  87 

5  32 

5  59 

1849  

4  78 

4  91 

4  85 

1850  

6  17 

4  93 

5  05 

6  37 

1851  

4  51 

4  07 

4  29 

1852  

4  56 

4  55 

4  55 

1853  

4  87- 

6  04 

5  45 

1854.. 

8  44 

8  47 

8  45 

5  69 

1855  

9  78 

8  68 

9  23 

1856.. 

6  87 

6  56 

6  71 

.  i 

1857  

6  57 

5  78 

6  17 

1858  

4  47 

5  15 

4  81 

6  70 

Panic 

1859  

6  40 

5  28 

5  84 

1860 

5  48 

5  35 

5  41 

5  62 

5  86 

1861  

5  29 

5  05 

5  17 

War. 

1862 

4  89 

4  52 

4  70 

u 

1863  

4  01 

3  86 

3  93 

u 

1864 

3  91 

4  20 

4  05 

(( 

1865  

4  42 

5  23 

4  81 

4  53 

Short  Crop 

1866 

5  30 

5  72 

5  51 

(i 

1867  

7  89 

5  43 

6  66 

« 

1868  

5  10 

4  17 

4  63 

1869  

3  44 

3  42 

3  43 

5-05 

4  79 



AGRICULTURE. 


113 


SHIP-BUILDING. 
TheNumber  and  Class  of  Vessels  built,  and  the  Tonnage  thereof,  from  1815  to  1862. 


YEAB. 

CLASS  OP  VESSELS. 

Total  No 
of  Vessels 
built. 

Total  Ton 
nage. 

Ships  anc 
Barks. 

Brigs. 

Schooners 

Sloops  and 
Canal  B'ts 

Steamers. 

1815  

136 

224 

681 

274 

1,315 

Tons.  95ths. 

154,624.39 

1816  

76 

122 

781 

424 

. 

1,403 

131,668.04 

1817.... 

34 

86 

559 

394 

1,073 

86,393.37 

1818  

53 

85 

428 

332 

.  . 

898 

82,421.20 

1819  

53 

82 

473 

243 

851 

79,817.86 

1820  

21 

60 

301 

152 

.  . 

534 

47,784.01 

1821.... 

43 

89 

247 

127 

.  . 

506 

65,856.01 

1822  

64 

131 

260 

168 

.  . 

623 

75,346.93 

1823.... 

55 

127 

260 

165 

15 

622 

75,007.57 

1824  

56 

156 

377 

166 

26 

781 

90,939.00 

1825  

56 

197 

538 

168 

35 

994 

114,997.25 

1826  

71 

187 

482 

227 

45 

1,012 

126,438.35 

1827.... 

55 

153 

464 

241 

38 

951 

104,342.67 

1828  

73 

108 

474 

196 

33 

884 

93,375.58 

1829.... 

44 

68 

485 

145 

43 

785 

77,098.65 

1830'... 

25 

56 

403 

116 

37 

637 

58,094.24 

1831.... 

72 

95 

416 

94 

34 

711 

85,962.68 

1832  

132 

143 

568 

122 

100 

1,065 

144,539.16 

1833.... 

144 

169 

625 

185 

65 

1,188 

161,626,36 

1834  

98 

94 

497 

180 

68 

937 

118,330.37 

1835  

25 

50 

301 

100 

30 

506 

46,238.52 

1836  

93 

65 

444 

164 

124 

890 

113,627.49 

1837.... 

67 

72 

507 

168 

135 

949 

122,987.22 

1838  

66 

79 

501 

153 

90 

889 

113,135.44 

1839  

83 

89 

439 

122 

125 

858 

120,989.34 

1840  

97 

109 

378 

224 

64 

872 

118,309.23 

1841  

114 

101 

310 

157 

78 

760 

118,893.71 

1842  

116 

91 

273 

404 

137 

1,02k 

129,083.64 

1843.  .  .  . 

58 

34 

138 

173 

79 

452 

43,617,77 

1844  

73 

47 

204 

279 

163 

766 

103,537.29 

1845.  .  .  . 

124 

87 

322 

342 

163 

,038 

146,018.02 

1846  

100 

164 

576 

355 

225 

,420 

188,203.93 

lfrL7.  .  .  . 

151 

168 

689 

392 

198 

598 

^243,732.67 

184877.. 

254 

174 

701 

647 

175 

'1,851 

318,075.54 

1849  

198 

148 

623 

370 

208 

,547 

256,577.47 

1850  

247 

117 

647 

290 

159 

,360 

272,218.54 

1851  

211 

65 

522 

326 

233 

,367 

298,203.60 

1852  

255 

79 

584 

267 

269 

1,444 

351,493.41 

1853  

269 

95 

681 

394 

271 

1,710 

425,571.49 

1854.... 

334 

112 

661 

386 

281 

1,774 

535,616.01 

1855  

381 

126 

605 

669 

253 

2,037 

583,450.04 

1856  

306 

103 

594 

479 

221 

1,703 

469,393.73 

1857  

251 

58 

504 

258 

263 

1,334 

378,804.70 

1858  

222 

46 

431 

400 

226 

1,225 

242,286.69 

1859.... 

89 

28 

297 

284 

172 

870 

156,601.33 

1860  

110 

36 

372 

289 

264 

1,071 

212,892.45 

1861.... 

110 

38 

360 

371 

264 

1,143 

233,194.35 

1862  ... 

60 

17 

207 

397 

183     864 

175,075.84 

114  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

CHAPTER    IX. 

MECHANICS  AND  NATURAL  MANUFACTURES. 

HAS  the  production  of  wealth  by  manufactures  increased  more 
largely  under  protective  than  under  non-protective  duties  ?  And,  if 
so,  has  that  increase  been  so  great  as  to  compensate  for  an  ascer 
tained  loss  in  a  branch  of  industry  to  this  country  three  times  as  im 
portant  ? 

We  approach  questions  which  have  not  usually  been  considered, 
in  discussions  of  the  tariff,  with  that  attention  which  their  impor 
tance  invites.  Some  have  argued  with  force  that  this  country  ought 
to  build  up  a  diversified  industry.  Others,  with  equal  force,  have 
argued  that  the  effort  costs  heavily.  But  the  question,  "  Does  pro 
tection  protect  ?  "  may  not  have  received  as  much  attention  as  it 
deserves.  By  many,  at  least,  it  has  been  taken  for  granted  that  the 
system  of  protective  duties  must  at  least  stimulate  manufactures. 

If  protection  does  protect  anybody,  then  it  confers  some  benefit, 
even  though  it  may  injure  others  more.  But  if,  with  all  its  dis 
advantages  to  other  interests,  the  protective  system  results  in  no 
healthy  and  permanent  development  of  manufactures,  greater  than 
would  be  attained  without  it;  if,  with  reference  to  that  interest 
alone,  protection  is  a  failure  and  a  mistake ;  if  the  supposed  protec 
tion  has  proved  unreal,  and  the  supposed  stimulus  only  a  hinderance, 
then  all  the  arguments  in  favor  of  a  diversified  industry  become 
arguments  for  a  non-protective  policy. 

What  production  of  wealth  actually  results  from  manufacturing 
industry,  and  to  what  extent  is  that  industry  supposed  to  be  within 
reach  of  protection?  The  census  report  of  1860,  volume  "Manu 
factures,"  includes  the  statistics  of  mining  and  fisheries.  The  mining 
of  iron,  coal,  and  other  metals  than  gold  and  silver,  may  the  more 
properly  be  classed  with  manufactures,  as  the  mining  and  the  manu 
facture  are  frequently  combined.  But  the  mining  of  gold  and  silver 
is  not  supposed  to  be  protected.  Fisheries  are  included,  no  doubt, 
only  because  they  are  too  unimportant  for  a  separate  schedule.  De 
ducting  the  products  and  materials  reported  for  these  industries 
from  the  aggregates  given  in  the  census  return,  we  have  as  the 
product  of  manufactures,  or  mining  other  than  of  gold  and  silver, 
$1,822,234,031,  while  the  raw  material  used  cost  $1,009,972,896, 
and  the  production  of  wealth,  therefore,  amounted  to  $812,261,135. 


MECHANICS  AND  NATURAL  MANUFACTURES.  115 

But  there  are  also  included  as  manufactures  many  branches  of 
industry  which  may,  perhaps,  properly  be  termed  mechanic  arts. 
Masons,  carpenters,  and  painters,  if  manufacturers  at  all,  do  not  be 
long  to  that  class  whose  relations  to  the  tariff  we  are  especially 
investigating.  Some  classification  of  the  branches  of  industry  in 
cluded  by  the  census  under  the  head  of  manufactures  is  necessary. 
Yet  the  vagueness  of  the  entries  in  the  census  returns  renders  any 
rigorous  classification  impossible.  Thus  under  the  single  head  of 
"  Lumber  sawed  "  are  entered  over  19,000  establishments,  employing 
over  71,000  hands,  and  yielding  a  product  of  over  ninety-three  millions 
yearly.  Evidently,  every  variety  of  establishment,  from  the  smallest 
and  most  primitive  saw-mill  to  the  largest  works  of  our  chief  lumber- 
markets,  is  here  included.  Whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  wis 
dom  of  duties  on  timber  and  lumber,  it  will  not  by  any  one  be 
seriously  supposed  that  the  existence  of  this  industry  depends  upon 
duties,  the  less  as  we  export  largely  of  lumber  and  its  manufactures. 
Under  the  heads  of  "  Boots  and  shoes  "  are  included  12,486  establish 
ments,  and  123,026  hands,  whose  product  was  about  ninety-two  mill 
ions.  Every  village  has  its  shoemaker,  and  in  this  entry  are  evi 
dently  included  all  those  who  make  boots  and  shoes  to  order,  as 
well  as  the  larger  establishments  more  properly  called  manufacturing. 
Under  the  head  "  Clothing  "  are  included  over  4,000  establishments, 
employing  over  120,000  persons,  whose  product  was  nearly  ninety 
millions.  The  wholesale  maker  and  the  village  tailor  are  indistin 
guishable  here.  But,  while  accurate  classification  is  not  possible,  a 
few  general  principles  may  enable  us  to  reach  a  fair  approximation. 

A  country  mainly  agricultural  in  its  industry  needs  no  duty  to 
protect  its  flour-mills  and  provision-packers.  The  product  of  our 
flour-mills  was  $248,580,365,  and  the  material  cost  $208,497,309. 
The  product  of  provision-packing  was  $31,986,433,  and  the  material 
cost  $24,894,624.  No  one  will  apprehend  that  we  may  import  our 
bakers'  bread,  and  the  bakers  produced  $16,980,012,  and  their  ma 
terial  cost  $10,634,199.  Mill-wrights  will  also  find  employment  as 
long  as  we  raise  our  own  wheat,  and  the  ice  dealer  will  scarcely 
need  protection  until  there  is  an  increased  supply  of  pauper  labor 
about  the  North  Pole. 

Whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  duty  upon  lumber,  it  will  by 
no  one  be  seriously  supposed  that  this  country  is  in  danger  of  de 
pending  upon  foreign  forests  for  its  main  supply  of  wood.  But  in 
some  parts  of  the  country,  at  least,  the  duty  does  increase  the  cost 
of  lumber,  and  in  consequence  a  manufacture  is  retarded  which  is  as 


116  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

necessary  as  any  other  to  every  country,  which  could  be  subjected 
to  no  serious  competition  if  all  duties  were  repealed,  and  which  em 
ploys  a  large  share  of  our  industry — the  manufacture  of  wood.  We 
cannot  import  the  hundredth  part  of  our  lumber;  and  saw-mills 
must  exist  in  which  to  cut  our  own  forest-trees.  The  simple  fact 
that  they  did  exist,  in  number  quite  as  great  as  ever  before  or  since, 
during  the  time  when  lumber  from  Canada  was  admitted  free  of 
duty  under  the  reciprocity  treaty,  must  end  all  dispute  as  to  the 
necessity  of  protecting  this  manufacture.  But  if  the  sawing  of  trees 
into  lumber  is  beyond  the  reach  of  protection,  the  manufacture  of 
lumber  into  houses,  furniture,  and  household  articles,  is  still  more 
independent.  We  cannot  import  our  own  houses,  or  the  repairs  on 
them,  our  barns,  or  our  fences.  Except  in  a  few  of  the  most  costly 
articles,  this  country  is  beyond  the  possibility  of  competition  in  the 
matter  of  furniture ;  indeed,  we  have  for  many  years  sent  to  other 
countries  large  quantities  of  furniture  for  sale,  and,  with  lumber  in 
creased  in  cost,  are  still  exporting  not  less  than  ten  millions'  worth 
of  wood  and  its  manufactures.  But  the  manufacture  is  incomparably 
more  important  than  that  small  fraction  of  the  lumber  interest  which 
can  be  benefited  by  duties  on  Canadian  products.  If  those  duties  en 
hance  the  cost  of  lumber  in  the  least  degree,  they  benefit  only  a  few 
owners  of  forests  near  the  Canada  border,  while  they  injure  a  manu 
facture  employing  a  quarter  of  a  million  of  skilled  mechanics,  and 
yielding  a  product  quite  incalculable  in  value,  since  no  census  return 
attempts  to  ascertain  the  cost  of  houses  or  barns  built,  or  the  value 
of  additions  and  repairs.  Still  less  does  any  census  give  the  value 
of  fences,  yet  farmers  on  western  prairies  know  to  their  sorrow  how 
large  a  share  of  the  expense  of  farming  is  caused  by  the  cost  of 
lumber.  And  the  cost  of  all  furniture  made  of  Northern  lumber  is  in 
like  manner  affected.  Whatever  makes  a  product  more  costly,  other 
things  being  equal,  diminishes  consumption  of  that  product  and  in 
jures  the  manufacture.  But  statistics  prove  beyond  question  that 
the  duty  on  Canada  lumber  does  affect  the  price  in  our  largest  and- 
most  important  markets.  The  price  of  lumber  at  Albany  and  at 
Chicago  has  largely  increased  since  the  expiration  of  the  reciprocity 
treaty  in  the  spring  of  1866.*  The  owners  of  certain  timber-lands 
have  thus  been  benefited.  But  one  of  our  most  important  manu- 

*  Commissioner  Wells,  in  the  report  published  since  this  volume  was  mainly 
completed,  gives  tables  showing  that  the  increase  at  Chicago  was  from  $14.80  per 
M.  to  $17.70  per  M.,  and  at  Albany  from  $22,12  per  M.  to  $29.83  per  M.  The 
general  fact  that  there  has  been  an  increase,  however,  is  undenied  and  undeniable. 


MECHANICS  AND  NATURAL  MANUFACTURES.  H7 

factures  has  been  retarded,  and  consumers  in  all  parts  of  the  country 
dependent  upon  those  markets  have  been  taxed,  while  the  cost  of 
furniture  has  necessarily  been  somewhat  affected.  This  manufacture, 
since  it  cannot  be  aided  by  duties  on  foreign  houses  or  barns,  fences 
or  furniture,  and  has  been  to  some  extent  injured  by  increased  cost 
of  its  material,  must  be  classed  with  the  non-protected  industries. 
In  the  table  of  manufactures  of  1860,  it  includes  139,000  persons ; 
raw  materials,  $74,100,000  ;  products,  $167,600,000. 

We  are  as  likely  to  import  foreign  houses,  as  the  bricks  or  the 
dressed  stone  of  which  they  are  built.  Nor  can  masons,  joiners, 
plasterers,  carpenters,  painters,  plumbers,  roofers,  whitewashes, 
paper-hangers,  upholsterers,  or  locksmiths,  be  protected  in  their  in 
dustry,  because  no  foreign  competition  is  possible.  Unless  we  can 
import  foreign  gas,  the  makers  and  gas-fitters  must  also  be  classed 
as  unprotected.  But  each  of  these  is  to  some  extent  retarded  in  his 
industry  by  duties  on  lime,  lead,  paints,  lumber,  tools,  or  paper,  and 
the  gas-manufacturers,  especially  in  Eastern  cities,  having  to  pay 
heavy  duties  on  foreign  gas-coal,  find  the  consumption  of  their  prod 
uct  in  some  degree  restricted  by  its  increased  cost.  To  these,  which 
may  be  classed  as  house-building  employments,  may  be  added  the 
dressing  of  marble,  not  separable  from  stone-cutting  in  census  returns, 
for  we  are  not  likely  to  import  our  tombstones  engraved  to  order. 
These  branches,  in  1860,  employed  59,188  persons,  used  material  cost 
ing  $15,300,000,  and  produced  to  the  value  of  $56,200,000. 

Of  necessity,  the  manufacture  of  clothing  must  be  injured  by  a 
system  which  undeniably  increases  the  cost  of  some  of  its  materials. 
Without  entering  at  present  upon  the  question  whether  woollen, 
cotton,  silk,  or  linen  goods  are  generally  rendered  more  costly  by 
high  duties,  it  is  not  denied  that  they  are  in  many  cases.  But,  when 
ever  the  materials  are  rendered  more  costly,  the  increased  cost  of 
clothing  must  to  some  extent  affect  its  use,  and  limit  the  consump 
tion.  It  is  perfectly  true  that  this  injury  does  not  follow  all  duties, 
but  certain  that  it  does  result  from  some ;  perfectly  true  that  it  is 
not  always  apparent,  since  other  circumstances,  such  as  an  inflated 
currency,  may  prompt  people  to  consume  more  largely  in  spite  of  the 
cost,  but  the  fact  remains  that  even  then  they  would  have  consumed 
still  more  largely,  had  the  clothing  cost  less.  Any  increase  in  the 
cost  of  materials  also  increases  the  capital  necessary  to  transact  the 
same  business,  and  thus  reduces  its  profits,  causing  a  smaller  pro 
duction  of  wealth  in  proportion  to .  the  capital  and  labor  invested. 
A  single  fact  proves  that  it  is  not  even  intended  by  the  protective 
9 


118  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

system  to  confer  any  benefit  upon  the  tailor,  and  the  manufacturer 
of  clothing :  the  duty  on  clothing  is  only  54  per  cent,  if  of  wool, 
and  35  per  cent,  if  of  cotton,  while  the  duty  on  woollen  cloths  ranges 
from  56  per  cent.,  upward,  and  the  duty  on  cotton  cloths,  of  qualities 
inported,  is  from  40  per  cent,  upward.  In  fact,  so  much  does  the 
clothing  manufacture  depend  upon  taste,  style,  changes  of  the  fash 
ion,  and  the  form  or  habit  of  the  wearer,  that  Congress  has  very 
correctly  inferred  that  it  could  not  be  exposed  to  any  serious  compe 
tition,  and,  in  spite  of  the  duty  on  the  uncut  cloth  larger  than  the 
duty  on  the  finished  article,  we  imported  in  1868  less  than  $200,000 
worth  of  woollen  clothing  of  all  kinds.  Adding  ladies'  dress-making, 
dying,  and  bleaching,  the  returns  for  1860  include,  under  manufactures 
of  clothing,  128,488  persons  employed,  $51,400,000  of  materials,  and 
$98,000,000  of  product. 

The  manufacture  of  leather  needs  no  protection,  because  this 
country  possesses  materials  superior  to  those  of  any  European  coun 
try,  and  has  so  perfected  the  manufacture,  that  in  1845  it  was  testi 
fied,  by  men  in  that  business,  that  leather  could  be  made  here  cheaper 
than  in  Europe.     It  may  be  considered  certain  that  an  agricultural 
country,  amply  supplied  with  the  best  materials  for  dressing  leather, 
will  not  throw  away  its  hides,  or  send  them  abroad  to  be  dressed. 
But  this  important  manufacture  is  also  impeded  by  the  duty  on  for 
eign  hides  and  materials  used.     The  hides  produced  in  this  country 
supply  less  than  three-fourths  of  the  consumption,  and  the  hides  from 
South   America    and    elsewhere,   thus  required   for    our   own  use, 
are  rendered  more  costly ;  currying  oil  is  increased  in  cost,  and  in 
some  localities  hemlock-bark  is  also  made  more  expensive.     The  re 
sulting  injury  to  the  whole  leather  manufacture  may  be  slight,  but  it 
affects  an  industry  of  vast  importance,  and  the  increased  cost  of 
leather  in  turn  injures  another  manufacture  of  the  very  first  rank — 
the  making  of  boots  and  shoes.     In  1868,  according  to  estimates  by 
the  trade,  given  by  Commissioner  Wells,  there  were  made  51,500,000 
pairs  of  boots  and  shoes  for  males,  and  47,000,000  pairs  for  females, 
the  aggregate  value  being  about  $228,250,000,  and   statistics  are 
published  by  him,  to  show  that  the  cost  of  these  products  is  increased 
by  more  than  fifteen  million  dollars  by  the  duties  on  hides,  bark, 
oils,  lasting,  serge,  and  rubber  webbing,  so  that  men's  boots  cost 
842.38  a  dozen,  and  would  cost  only  $39.37  without  the  duties ;  and 
cheap  gaiters  for  women,  sold  before  the  war  for  60  cents,  now  cost 
$1.05.     The  result  is,  that  an  export  trade  in  boots  and  shoes,  which 
has  existed  for  many  years  under  all  changes  of  style,  and  which, 


MECHANICS  AND  NATURAL   MANUFACTURES.  119 

after  the  removal  of  the  protection  tariff  of  1842,  increased  from 
$93,140,  in  1847,  to  more  than  two  millions  in  1865,  is  now  reduced 
to  $475,053,  the  trade  with  South  and  Central  America,  Mexico,  and 
the  West  Indies,  being  almost  entirely  lost.  It  need  not  be  added 
that  workmen  in  New  England  are  suffering  from  lack  of  employ 
ment  and  low  wages,  and  the  organ  of  that  industry  states  that  they 
are  now  employed  on  an  average  only  ten  months  in  the  year. 
Since  leather  and  boots  and  shoes  can  be  made  here  cheaper  than 
anywhere  else,  and  could  therefore  be  profitably  exported,  while  no 
duty  can  aid  the  workmen  in  this  industry,  duties  which  enhance 
the  cost  of  its  materials  must  inevitably  injure  it,  rendering  it  less 
able  to  compete  in  foreign  markets.  Only  a  part  of  the  shoemakers 
are  included  under  manufacturers  in  the  census  tables  of  1860,  but, 
of  persons  so  included  in  all  branches  of  leather  manufacture,  there 
were  161,563 ;  raw  material,  $99,000,000 ;  product,  $182,000,000. 

Enough  has  been  said  to  show  that  ship-building  has  been  seri 
ously  injured  by  the  system  of  protection.  It  employed  9,560  per 
sons,  materials  worth  $10,500,000 ;  and  its  products  are  valued  at 
$21,000,000.  Carriages,  cars,  omnibuses  and  wagons,  from  their  bulk, 
are  not  readily  imported,  and  so  superior  is  our  manufacture  that,  in 
spite  of  the  cost  of  transportation  and  materials,  we  have  shipped 
American  vehicles  of  many  kinds  to  foreign  countries,  and  even  to 
Europe.  But  no  other  interest  is  more  directly  injured  by  high 
duties,  which  affect  the  cost  of  the  iron  and  steel,  the  paint  and  the 
varnish,  the  woollen  cloth  and  silk  trimmings,  and  some  varieties  of 
leather,  the  cost  of  which  forms  a  large  part  of  the  cost  of  the  finished 
carriage.'  In  this  industry  40,638  persons  used  materials  costing 
$13,800,000,  and  produced  to  the  value  of  $40,200,000.  To  these 
may  be  added,  as  manufactures,  natural  and  necessary  to  the  country, 
which  cannot  be  helped  by  duties  on  foreign  products,  the  production 
and  refining  of  coal-oil,  kerosene,  and  turpentine,  the  manufacture 
of  soap  and  candles,  and  the  taking  of  photographic  likenesses, 
which  we  are  not  likely  to  import.  These  branches  in  1860  employed 
13,689  persons ;  used  $20,100,000  of  materials,  and  produced  to  the 
value  of  $32,300,000. 

But  there  still  remain  important  branches  of  industry  which 
must  be  set  aside  in  any  inquiry  as  to  the  effect  of  protective  duties. 
For  revenue  purposes  only,  duties  are  imposed  in  nearly  all  coun 
tries,  and  with  assent  of  all  parties  in  this  country,  upon  a  class  of 
articles  which  may  be  termed  natural  objects  of  taxation — liquors, 
tobacco,  jewelry,  silks,  sugar,  and  coffee.  Extreme  protectionists 


120  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

and  extreme  free-traders  agree  that  a  part  of  the  revenue  needed  by 
government  may  advantageously  be  raised  by  duties  on  such  arti 
cles  ;  and  those  duties,  whether  they  affect  favorably  or  unfavorably 
the  manufacture  in  this  country,  are  not  properly  classed  with  those 
of  a  protective  character,  and  need  not  be  considered  in  an  examina 
tion  of  the  protective  system.  In  these  branches  of  manufacture 
63,164  persons  were  employed,  and  the  raw  material  used  cost 
$105,000,000,  and  the  product  was  $171,000,000. 

It  will  not  be  seriously  argued  that  we  are  in  danger  of  import 
ing  our  daily  and  weekly  newspapers,  or  our  handbills,  posters,  and 
advertising  cards.  The  great  majority  of  our  printers  are  employed 
in  newspaper  or  in  job  offices — not  depending  upon  the  publication 
of  books  or  magazines  for  success.  Of  books  originating  here,  not 
one  in  twenty  would,  under  any  circumstances,  be  published  in  for 
eign  countries,  and  by  far  the  greater  part  of  that  business  also  is 
beyond  the  reach  of  any  foreign  competition.  But,  in  the  publica 
tion  of  foreign  books,  the  American  has  an  advantage  in  the  fact 
that  the  foreign  publisher  has  to  pay  the  authors.  The  proportion 
of  the  publishing  business  which  depends  upon  protective  duties  is 
therefore  small.  But,  while  the  publication  of  books  is  but  a  small 
part  of  the  printing  business,  and  but  a  small  part  of  that  can  be 
helped  by  protective  duties,  all  publishers  in  all  their  business  are 
injured  by  duties  w^hich  increase  the  cost  of  paper,  ink,  machinery, 
types,  and  labor.  Even  those  few  publishers  who  print  works  of 
foreign  origin  are  probably  injured  more  than  they  are  benefited  by 
the  duties,  while  the  much  larger  proportion,  including  the  whole 
force  of  job  and  newspaper  publishers,  are  injured  materially  and 
are  not  benefited  at  all.  It  is  reasonable,  therefore,  to  class  the 
printing  business,  as  a  whole,  with  those  branches  of  industry  which 
are  in  no  degree  protected  by  duties  on  corresponding  foreign  prod 
ucts.  It  employed,  in  1860,  among  those  returned  in  the  table  of 
manufactures,  28,150  persons,  using  material  costing  $15,000,000, 
and  its  product  was  $38,000,000. 

The  industries  already  specified  yielded,  in  1860,  a  product  of 
$1,104,000,000,  and  the  raw  material  cost  $648,000,000.  Nearly 
two-thirds  of  the  entire  product  of  manufactures,  therefore,  is  de 
rived  from  branches  not  benefited  by  duties  upon  corresponding 
importations,  protective  in  design.  But,  besides  those  enumerated, 
there  are  others  in  great  number,  each  yielding  a  small  product, 
though  the  aggregate  is  over  one  hundred  and  fifty  millions,  which 
are  indeed  protected  by  duties  on  foreign  products,  but  are  injured 


MECHANICS  AND  NATURAL  MANUFACTURES.  121 

to  a  much  greater  extent  by  the  duties  designed  to  aid  the  great 
branches  of  manufacture,  and  by  the  consequent  increase  in  cost  of 
materials.  Thus  the  manufacture  of  looking-glass  frames  is  in  no 
considerable  degree  aided  by  duties,  because  the  glass  is  almost  of 
necessity  framed  near  the  place  of  use,  but  it  is  retarded  by  duties 
ranging  from  20  to  90  per  cent,  on  the  silvered  glass  which  is  im 
ported,  and  manufacturers  of  the  silvered  glass  are  in  turn  impeded 
by  duties  ranging  from  20  to  90  per  cent,  on  glass,  added  to  a  duty 
of  15  per  cent,  on  quicksilver.  In  the  time  of  low  duties,  American 
oil-cloth  gained  a  deserved  reputation  for  its  excellence,  and  our 
workmen  are  so  superior  that  we  could  manufacture  largely  for  ex 
port  if  the  cloth  and  the  paints  were  not  rendered  costly,  especially 
by  duties  ranging  from  50  to  200  per  cent,  on  the  most  important 
paints.  The  preparation  of  medicines  has  been  peculiarly  successful 
in  this  country  as  a  branch  of  manufacturing,  but  it  has  to  meet 
most  extraordinary  duties  on  drugs  and  barks,  in  addition  to  revenue 
duties  or  excises  upon  alcohol  in  all  forms.  The  manufacture  of 
rubber  goods,  by  patents  of  American  invention,  has  grown  up  in 
spite  of  duties  on  the  imported  raw  material,  and  still  is  so  flourish 
ing  that  notwithstanding  those  duties  we  export  largely  of  rubber 
goods.  American  pianos  are  by  our  makers  so  skilfully  adapted  to 
our  climate  that  they  are  in  no  danger  of  foreign  competition,  the 
less  as  our  makers  have  won  premiums,  at  European  expositions,  for 
their  excellent  workmanship ;  but  the  cost  of  materials  is  somewhat 
enhanced  by  duties.  American  invention  has  distanced  competition 
in  the  manufacture  of  buttons,  and  in  producing  silk  hats  our  work 
men  are  only  retarded  by  the  duties  on  materials,  while  the  manu 
facture  of  wool  hats,  even  in  colonial  times,  had  progressed  so 
rapidly  that  the  British  Parliament,  at  the  appeal  of  London  work 
men,  prohibited  the  exportation  of  felt  goods  from  these  colonies  in 
order  to  protect  the  British  manufacturer  from  competition,  and  ever 
since  our  independence  we  have  exported  of  such  goods.  American 
clocks  may  be  found  in  every  part  of  the  world ;  brooms,  baskets, 
boxes,  lamps,  matches,  and  other  such  articles,  no  one  imagines  that 
we  shall  ever  cease  to  make  for  ourselves ;  billiard-tables  are  made 
better  here  than  anywhere  else ;  tinware  is  too  bulky  for  importa 
tion,  nor  is  there  any  danger  that  we  shall  import  our  coffins,  send 
our  soiled  clothes  to  European  laundries,  or  our  wood  and  coal  to 
Europe  to  be  made  into  charcoal  and  coke. 

Space  does  not  serve  even  to  enumerate  the  many  minor  branches 
of  manufactures,  but  enough  has  been  said  to  show  the  relative  im- 


122  DOES  PROTECTION   PROTECT? 

portance  of  those  which  are  recognized  as  especial  objects  of  legis 
lative  aid.  These  are  the  manufactures  of  iron,  and  of  articles 
of  which  iron  is  the  material  of  chief  cost,  the  manufactures  of  cot 
ton,  of  wool,  of  paper,  of  glass,  of  salt,  copper,  brass,  linen,  flax, 
lead,  and  hemp.  The  unprotected  branches  of  manufacture — those 
which  cannot  be  aided  by  duties,  or  are  necessarily  injured  more  than 
they  are  aided — employ  not  less  than  two-thirds  of  the  hands,  and 
yield  not  less  than  two-thirds  of  the  annual  product,  of  all  manufac 
turing  industry.  Before  passing  to  an  examination  of  separate 
branches  of  industry,  it  is  well  to  fix  attention  upon  the  inquiry, 
"  Does  the  system  of  protection  increase  the  production  of  wealth  ?  " 
Three-fourths  of  our  production  is  by  agriculture,  and  is  not  increased 
but  retarded  by  this  system.  Of  the  remaining  fourth,  it  now  ap 
pears  that  a  large  share  is  derived  from  industries  not  protected,  or 
seriously  injured  by  high  duties.  Not  more  than  six  hundred  mill 
ions  in  the  aggregate,  or,  deducting  cost  of  material,  not  more  than 
two  hundred  and  sixty  millions  of  annual  product,  is  derived  from  all 
these  branches  of  industry  which  are  supposed  to  be  sustained  or 
aided  by  the  tariff.  It  is  therefore  necessary  to  inquire,  not  merely 
whether  these  have  been  aided,  but  whether  the  production  of  wealth 
by  these  industries  has  been  so  enormously  increased  as  to  compen 
sate,  first,  for  the  injury  to  agriculture,  producing  nearly  ten  times 
as  much ;  and  second,  for  the  injury  to  other  manufactures  producing 
more  than  twice  as  much.  About  seven  per  cent,  of  our  annual 
production  was  derived,  in  1860,  from  industries  supposed  to  depend 
upon  protection.  How  vastly  must  their  product  be  increased,  to 
balance  any  injury  to  industries  yielding  93  per  cent,  of  that  annual 
protection ! 


CHAPTER    X. 

THE    COTTON   MANUFACTURE. 

FOUR  hundred  years  before  Christ,  Herodotus,  the  father  of  his 
tory,  learned  of  India  that  its  trees  bore  fleeces,  which  the  Indians 
made  into  cloth.  But  Herodotus  does  not  tell  us  that  the  manufac 
ture  owed  its  existence  to  any  protective  tariff.  The  cultivation  and 
manufacture  of  cotton  in  Persia  are  spoken  of  by  Strabo,  and  Pliny 
recorded  that  cotton  clothes  had  been  made  in  Egypt.  Nor  is  it 
doubted  that  calico-printing  by  blocks,  and  the  use  of  mineral  dyes, 


THE   COTTON   MANUFACTURE.  123 

were  known  to  the  Egyptians.  Early  in  the  Christian  era,  cotton 
stuffs  from  India  were  transported  to  Europe  for  sale ;  indeed,  long 
before  that  time,  the  vestal  virgin  had  preserved  the  last  sparks  of 
sacred  fire  on  the  altar,  by  casting  upon  it  her  head-dress  of  "  carba- 
sus."  When  civilized  travellers  first  penetrated  to  the  interior  of 
Africa,  they  found  broad  fields  cultivated  in  cotton,  by  dusky  na 
tives  dressed  in  its  soft  fabrics.  When  Columbus  first  gazed  upon 
the  wonders  of  a  new  world,  he  saw  women  clothed  in  coats  of  cot 
ton  ;  the  earliest  discoverers  found  the  plant  growing  wild  as  far  in 
land  as  the  Mississippi ;  and  Cortez  sent  back,  among  his  earliest 
spoils  from  Mexico,  cotton  cloths  woven  into  beautiful  figures, 
"  mantles,  some  all  white,  others  mixed  with  white  and  black  or  red, 
green  and  yellow,  and  blue;  waistcoats,  handkerchiefs,  counter 
panes,  tapestries,  and  carpets  of  cotton."  Those  who  suppose  that 
the  working  of  cotton  into  fabrics  is  due  in  this  country  to  protective 
duties,  or  that  it  would  not  now  survive  without  them,  must  suppose 
that  the  ingenious  and  skilful  American  has  less  of  that  wonder 
working  power  on  which  civilization  is  based  than  the  natives  of 
Hindostan,  less  than  the  Persians,  less  than  the  negroes  of  the  wilds 
of  Africa,  less  than  the  copper-colored  savages,  and  far  less  than  the 
ancient  Aztecs. 

Long  before  any  legislative  aid  had  been  'given  to  it,  this  in 
dustry  existed  in  this  country.  Early  in  the  history  of  the  colonies, 
women  and  children  carded  and  spun  the  raw  cotton,  while  the  father 
of  the  family  plied  the  loom ;  and  in  1645  the  General  Court  of  Mas 
sachusetts,  with  a  patriotic  desire  to  direct  the  industries  of  the 
people,  which  may  be  called  the  very  germ  of  American  protection, 
declared  in  a  general  order  that  the  towns  should  take  measures 
for  the  importation  of  sheep,  because  "  those  who  had  provided 
their  families  with  cotton  cloth  (not  being  able  to  get  the  other) 
have  by  that  means  had  some  of  their  children  much  scorched  by 
fire,  yea,  divers  burned  to  death."  So  little  did  this  industry  then 
need  aid,  that  it  was  thought  necessary  to  discourage  it,  and,  by  this 
and  many  other  acts,  to  compel  the  making  of  woollen  goods.  In 
New  Amsterdam  and  in  Virginia,  the  utmost  efforts  were  also  made 
to  stimulate  the  making  of  other  cloth,  but  in  the  acts  of  that  period 
the  cotton  industry  is  treated  as  not  in  need  of  similar  care.  In  all 
parts  of  the  country,  the  manufacture  of  cotton  had  grown  up  with 
the  colonies,  and  existed  prior  to  the  Revolution.  The  cloth  used  by 
the  people  was  mainly  of  their  own  manufacture,  and  after  the  Revo 
lution  the  domestic  supply  continued  to  increase  so  greatly  that  the 


124  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

importations  of  goods  were  largely  reduced.  Indeed,  Bishop,  in  his 
"  History  of  American  Manufactures,"  notices  this  fact,  and  adds,  "  It 
may  be  questioned  if  the  people  of  that  day  were  not  as  really  inde 
pendent  of  other  countries  for  such  necessaries  as  are  their  descend 
ants  at  present."  Yet  the  same  writer  ascribes  the  subsequent  prog 
ress  of  the  manufacture  to  the  stimulus  afforded  by  legislation ! 
Until  that  time  (1790)  the  Arkwright  machinery  had  not  been  intro 
duced,  while  it  was  largely  used  and  had  materially  reduced  the  cost 
of  the  cloth  in  England ;  and  yet,  in  spite  of  that  advantage,  the  in 
crease  of  the  domestic  manufacture  was  rapidly  driving  out  the  for 
eign  goods.  Is  it  reasonable  to  suppose  that,  with  the  machinery 
then'  introduced,  we  should  not  have  sustained  this  industry  had  no 
legislative  aid  been  given  it  ? 

In  1790,  Samuel  Slater  set  up  in  this  country  two  Arkwright 
frames  of  thirty-two  spindles ;  and,  in  1791,  a  duty  of  7-J-  per  cent, 
was  laid  on  all  imported  manufactures  of  cotton.  This  would  hardly 
be  called  a  protective  duty  now,  and,  in  his  report  of  that  year, 
Hamilton  explains  that  the  duty  previously  imposed  of  three  cents 
a  pound  on  the  raw  cotton,  then  largely  brought  from  the  West 
Indies,  "  was  a  serious  obstacle  "  to  the  manufacture.  The  duty  on 
goods  was,  perhaps,  designed  to  counterbalance  this  disadvantage ; 
but  in  1794  it  was  raised  to  12J  per  cent.  At  that  time  Slater  was 
selling  American  yarn,  No.  20,  at  $1.21.  After  six  years  of  pro 
tection,  we  find  that  the  price  of  Slater's  yarn,  No.  20,  had  in 
creased  in  1800  to  $1.36,  although,  during  the  same  period,  the 
price  of  yarn  in  England  had  been  reduced — No.  100,  from  15s. 
Id.  to  8s.  9d.  per  pound.  Accordingly,  in  1802,  there  were  petitions 
from  calico-printers  for  legislative  aid.  And,  until  our  commerce 
was  interrupted  by  embargo  in  1808,  the  price  of  yarn  and  goods 
continued  about  the  same — yarn,  No.  20,  being  131  cents,  sheeting, 
in  1805,  50  cents  a  yard,  and  gingham  70  cents,  although  the  price 
of  United  States  upland  cotton  had  fallen  in  Liverpool  from  38d.,  in 
1799,  to  14d.  in  1804,  and  the  price  of  yarn,  No.  100,  in  England, 
had  fallen  to  7s.  lOd.  In  consequence,  the  imports  of  British  goods 
increased  largely — to  about  nineteen  millions  in  1807.  Under  no 
duties  at  all,  and  without  machinery,  the  domestic  manufacture  had 
reduced  imports.  With  machinery  of  the  same  style  as  the  English, 
and  with  duties  to  aid  the  manufacture,  the  imports  of  cotton  in 
creased.  For,  under  the  operation  of  duties,  the  price  of  yarn  here 
actually  increased  from  121  cents  to  131,  although  the  cotton  had 
fallen  in  price,  and  the  yarn  in  England  had  been  reduced  in  cost 


THE  COTTON   MANUFACTURE.  125 

from  15s.  to  7s.  lOd.  Is  there  not,  in  this  brief  history  of  the 
manufacture  prior  to  the  embargo,  a  complete  illustration  of  the 
failure  of  duties  on  imports  to  build  up  a  manufacture  or  to  exclude 
foreign  goods  ? 

During  the  embargo  and  the  war  with  England,  the  manufacture 
of  cotton  grew  rapidly  on  both  sides  of  the  ocean.  In  England  and 
in  this  country  the  power-loom  was  invented  and  successfully  ap 
plied,  but  with  this  difference  :  in  England,  sharp  competition  forced 
every  manufacturer  to  adopt  the  best  methods ;  in  this  country,  the 
manufacture  was  shut  out  from  all  competition,  and  adhered,  gen 
erally,  to  the  old  hand-loom.  The  power-loom,  invented  by  Mr. 
Lowell,  was  applied  with  success,  in  the  first  large  establishment  for 
spinning  and  weaving  combined,  by  the  Waltham  Company,  and  the 
price  of  yarn  was  reduced  to  less  than  one  dollar  before  the  war 
closed,  but  very  few  establishments  had  made  similar  improvements. 
When  the  peace  brought  our  manufacturers  to  the  test  of  competi 
tion  with  those  of  England,  and  cargoes  of  goods  were  sent  to  our 
markets  for  sale,  what  was  the  effect  ? 

The  power-loom  of  Mr.  Lowell  held  its  ground  so  well  that  in 
1816  its  proprietors  stated  to  Congress  that  they  were  making  a 
profit  of  25  per  cent.,  and  stood  in  no  need  of  further  protection. 
Other  enterprising  manufacturers  either  had  adopted  improved  ma 
chines  or  quickly  did  so.  Mr.  Bemis,  of  Boston,  who  had  begun  the 
manufacture  of  sail-duck  in  1809,  was  still  using  the  hand-loom  and 
selling  his  duck  at  a  dollar  a  yard  in  1815.  But,  under  the  pressure 
of  competition,  he  introduced  the  power-loom  in  1816,  and,  not  long 
after,  we  find  that  he  was  selling  the  same  quality  of  duck  at  35 
cents  a  yard.  Other  mills  did  likewise,  and  new  mills  were  put  up 
in  the  years  1815  and  1816,  in  spite  of  the  utmost  efforts  of  the 
British  manufacturers  to  break  down  this  industry. 

But,  while  men  of  enterprise  were  only  stimulated  by  competition 
to  new  effort  and  progress,  a  large  majority  of  the  manufacturers 
were  still  using  the  hand-loom,  and,  instead  of  seizing  upon  improve 
ments,  they  appealed  loudly  to  government  for  aid.  Seven  years  of 
great  prosperity,  entire  freedom  from  competition,  and  consequent 
large  profits,  had  indeed  enormously  increased  the  number  of  mills, 
but  had  led  the  majority  to  no  such  improvements  as  had  been  made 
in  England,  or  in  this  country  by  a  few  men  of  enterprise.  To  help 
them,  they  asked  and  obtained  the  first  tariff  in  which  the  minimum 
principle  was  applied  :  all  cotton  goods  were  deemed  by  the  law  to 
have  cost  at  least  25  cents  a  yard,  and  were  subjected  to  a  duty  of 


120  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

25  per  cent,  on  this  assumed  cost.     It  was  intended  to  be,  and  in 
effect  it  was,  absolutely  prohibitory  as  to  low-priced  goods. 

It  is  important  to  observe  the  real  difficulty  which  led  to  the 
adoption  of  this  tariff.  It  was  not  that  the  raw  material  had  risen 
in  price,  or  that  the  currency  had  greatly  depreciated — those  disad 
vantages,  serious  as  they  were,  affected  the  Waltham  Company  as 
well  as  others,  and  did  not  prevent  it  from  making  a  profit  of  25  per 
cent.  It  was  simply  the  failure  to  adopt  new  and  improved  machin 
ery,  either  during  the  war,  when  the  manufacture  yielded  great 
profits,  or  after  its  close,  when  foreign  competition  rendered  weaving 
by  hand-looms  unprofitable.  The  minimum  tariff  was  devised  to 
protect  these  old  methods,  to  sustain  men  in  their  adherence  to  old 
machines,  to  help  men  who  had  refused  to  help  themselves.  The 
first  heavy  shirtings,  unbleached,  made  by  the  Waltham  Company 
during  the  war,  sold  for  30  cents  a  yard,  but,  in  1816,  shirtings,  from 
yarn,  No.  12,  sold  in  New  York  for  23  cents,  and,  at  that  price,  the 
Waltham  spinners  were  making  a  profit  of  25  per  cent.,  while  goods 
made  on  the  hand-loom  could  not  be  sold  at  a  profit.  Their  testi 
mony  to  Congress  proves  that  the  duty  was  not  needed  to  protect 
them  or  others  who  had  adopted  new  looms.  Was  not  the  tariff  a 
premium  for  laziness  and  want  of  enterprise  ?  Have  we  not  the 
right  to  infer  that,  if  all  manufacturers  had  then  been  forced  to  adopt 
the  best  machines,  and  to  win  success  as  the  Waltham  Company  did, 
by  keeping  pace  with  the  progress  in  other  countries,  this  industry 
would  not  then  have  needed  any  protection,  and  its  growth  would 
have  been  more  sure,  more  healthy,  and  thenceforward  independent 
of  artificial  aid  ? 

The  effect  of  this  tariff  was  not  such  as  to  encourage  other  ef 
forts  in  the  same  direction.  British  mills  quite  generally  changed 
from  United  States  to  the  cheaper  Bengal  and  Surat  cotton,  and 
the  price  of  cotton  here  declined  from  over  20d.  to  about  lid.  in 
1819,  and  9Jd.  in  1820.  The  losses  of  shippers  and  planters  were 
severe,  and  a  similar  decline  in  breadstuffs  of  fully  50  per  cent, 
combined  to  reduce  the  agricultural  interest,  then  even  more  than 
now  the  basis  of  all  prosperity,  to  great  distress,  and  affected  ship 
pers  and  merchants  not  less.  When  farmers  stop  buying,  mills 
must  stop  producing.  "  A  general  paralysis  fell  upon  all  branches 
of  industry,"  writes  Bishop  ;  "  the  distress  became  more  general  and 
severe  than  had  ever  before  been  known;  farms  were  mortgaged 
and  sold  at  one-half  and  one-third  their  cost,"  and  factories  and 
workshops  were  everywhere  closed."  In  the  Pennsylvania  courts, 


THE  COTTON  MANUFACTURE.  127 

there  were  14,537  actions  for  debt  in  1819,  and  1,800  imprisonments 
for  debt  in  the  county  of  Philadelphia  alone.  These  disasters 
were  not  caused  by  the  excess  of  foreign  importations,  for  those  had 
greatly  declined.  The  manufacturing  interest  was  not  the  basis  ;  it 
employed  but  a  small  part  of  the  people.  Neither  is  it  claimed  that 
the  tariff  was  the  principal  cause ;  the  condition  of  the  currency, 
already  explained,  was  undoubtedly  the  main  trouble.  But,  in  view 
of  the  peculiar  prostration  of  agriculture,  it  is  not  easy  to  avoid  the 
conclusion  that  this  disaster  was  immediately  brought  on  and  great 
ly  aggravated  by  the  decline  in  our  great  exported  staples,  cotton 
and  breadstuff's. 

In  the  midst  of  the  prostration  then  prevailing,  when  mills  had 
generally  suspended,  and  prices  had  fallen  50  percent.,  the  Waltham 
Company  went  forth  cash  in  hand  to  seek  a  site  for  a  much  larger 
establishment,  and  in  1820  bought  the  site  now  occupied  by  the  city 
of  Lowell.  These  gentlemen  had  not  suspended.  Others  were  call 
ing  on  government  to  help  them.  But  these  had  helped  themselves 
by  enterprise.  They  had  testified  that  they  did  not  need  the  tariff 
of  1816  with  its  minimum,  nor  would  others  had  they  relied  upon 
themselves  and  not  upon  government.  Others,  in  the  midst  of  the 
prostration,  were  begging  for  higher  duties.  But  the  Waltham 
makers,  understanding  that  their  only  sure  reliance  was  in  the  inven 
tion  and  enterprise  of  American  industry,  "  were  supposed  to  be  un 
favorable  to  an  increase  of  duties,"  say  records  of  that  time.  Ac 
cordingly,  while  others  were  begging  for  aid,  they  were  putting  up 
at  great  cost  the  largest  establishment  in  the  United  States,  which 
went  into  operation  in  1823,  and  in  1825  "  made  its  first  dividend 
of  $160  per  share,  and  the  company  had  also  built  three  new 
mills !  "  As  early  as  1823,  the  "  domestics  "  of  this  company  had 
become  so  popular  that  they  were  counterfeited  by  foreign  manufac 
turers,  and  as  early  as  1827  it  is  recorded  that  "  the  demand  for 
American  cottons  in  Brazil  was  considerably  affected  by  imitations 
of  them  made  in  Manchester,  and  offered  there  "  (in  Brazil)  "  at  lower 
prices,  although  they  could  be  made  as  cheaply  in  the  United  States 
as  the  same  quality  could  be  produced  in  that  city." — (Bishop, 
ii.,  317.)  In  view  of  the  progress  of  this  company,  is  it  not  plain  that 
the  act  of  1816  was  unnecessary  to  protect  the  enterprising  manufac 
turer  ?  If  to  protect  him  it  was  unnecessary,  it  was  simply  a  pro 
tection  to  others  against  the  consequences  of  their  own  lack  of  en 
terprise,  and  a  discouragement  to  those  who  might  by  peculiar  ener 
gy  and  skill  have  commanded  a  larger  share  of  the  home  market. 


128  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

If  the  act  of  1818  was  not  necessary,  what  shall  we  say  of 
the  act  of  1824,  with  its  increased  duties?  By  that  act  the 
minimum  was  raised  from  26  to  35  cents,  in  face  of  the  fact  that 
the  Lowell  mills  were  then  making  that  profit  of  $160  per  share 
in  two  years !  What  shall  be  said  of  it  in  view  of  the  fact  that, 
after  the  prostration,  the  great  prosperity  of  the  cotton  manufacture 
was  acknowledged,  and  new  mills  had  been  established  in  every  di 
rection  prior  to  1824 — thirty-six  in  New  York  alone  in  the  years 
1821-1824  ?  Although  American  cottons  were  largely  exported, 
and  were  counterfeited  by  foreigners  both  for  pur  own  and  for  other 
markets,  although  the  manufacture  was  already  increasing  faster 
than  the  demand  for  its  products,  this  increased  duty  was  by  some 
demanded,  and  by  Congress  granted. 

The  effect  was  such  as  to  instruct  those  not  wilfully  blind. 
Within  less  than  five  years  (in  1829)  we  find  it  recorded  that  great 
distress  prevailed  "  among  the  manufacturers  of  New  England,  par 
ticularly  in  the  cotton  branch,"  and  that  "  at  a  meeting  of  the  man 
ufacturers  of  Philadelphia  on  3d  February  (1829)  resolutions  were 
adopted  to  establish  one  or  more  private  houses  for  the  sale  of 
their  goods,  and  to  discontinue  sales  at  public  auction,  as  having  a 
tendency  to  reduce  prices  below  value."  Here  we  have  the  first 
recorded  instance  of  combination  to  keep  up  the  price  of  goods,  in 
spite  of  competition  and  over-production.  The  tariff,  therefore,  had 
worked  thus  :  first,  profits  to  the  manufacturer,  "  $160  per  share  in 
two  years ;  "  second,  great  numbers  of  new  mills  started ;  third,  great 
distress  among  the  manufacturers  because  of  over-production ;  fourth, 
combinations  of  the  manufacturers  to  prevent  reduction  of  the  price. 

It  is  the  constant  argument  of  those  who  favor  the  protective 
policy,  that  it  cannot  increase  the  price  of  manufactured  products, 
because  competition  will  invariably  keep  down  that  price.  But  at 
every  step  will  be  found  proof  that  manufacturers  can  combine  in 
this  country  as  well  as  in  England,  and  that,  when  they  are  pro 
tected  against  foreign  rivalry,  they  constantly  do  combine  to  keep 
up  the  price,  the  rate  being  fixed  not  by  the  progress  of  the  most 
skilful,  but  by  the  negligence  of  the  most  unenterprising.  Thus  the 
least  deserving  and  useful  are  kept  alive  to  "  cumber  the  ground  ;" 
and,  though  the  quantity  of  goods  made  is  increased  often  beyond 
the  demand,  the  method  of  manufacture  is  not  improved  and  the 
cost  reduced,  by  weeding  out  the  incompetent  and  yielding  returns 
only  to  those  who  advance  toward  perfection.  Those  whose  unskil 
ful  manufacture  is  a  sheer  loss  to  the  country  continue  to  share  the 


THE  COTTON  MANUFACTURE. 

The  quantity  of  Cotton  produced,  and  the  quantity  consumed,  in  this  country,  in  pounds, 
per  capita,  with  the  average  export  price,  from  1827  to  1861,  inclusive. 


1827  '28  '29  '30  '31  '32  '33  '34  '35  '36  '37  '38  '39  '40  '41  '42  '43  '44  '45  '46  '47  '48  '49  '50  '51  '52  '53  '54  '55  '56  '57  '58  '59  'CO  '61 


NOTE— T.  The  extreme  low  price  during  the  tariff  of  1842-'46. 

II.  That  the  manufacture  has  been  governed,  in  almost  every  increase  or  decrease 
of  consumption,  by  the  quantity  of  crop  and  the  price. 

III.  That  the  short  crops  and  high  prices  of  1850  and  1851  fully  account  for  the  re 

duced  consumption. 

IV.  That  the  short  crops  of  1841  and  1842,  rather  than  any  state  of  tariff,  explain  the 

small  consumption. 

V.  That  in  1847,  under  low  duties,  it  happened  for  the  first  and  only  time,  that  two 
short  crops  did  not  reduce  the  manufacture. 


THE  COTTON  MANUFACTURE.  129 

profits  and  divide  the  market ;  and  the  more  enterprising,  unable  to 
extend  their  sales  freely  to  foreign  markets  because  of  a  cost  of  pro 
duction  artificially  increased,  are  themselves  subjected  to  frequent 
losses  and  prostration  by  the  overcrowding  of  the  home  market. 
Thus  repeated  disasters,  shared  by  all,  have  to  do  the  work  which 
natural  competition  would  do  more  surely,  confining  its  effect  to 
those  who  fail  to  keep  pace  with  the  times ;  they  are  crushed  from 
time  to  time,  but  by  prostrations  which  affect  others  as  well.  Mean 
while,  all  classes  are  trained  to  rely,  not  upon  ceaseless  improve 
ment,  but  upon  frequent  interpositions  of  government. 

The  consumption  of  cotton,  which,  according  to  Bishop,  had 
reached  150,000  bales  in  1826,  and  according  to  the  statistics  of  the 
Cotton  Association  was  149,516  bales  in  1827,  declined  in  1828  to 
120,593,  and  in  1829  to  118,853  bales,  a  loss  of  nearly  one-fifth. 
This  was  not  caused  by  a  failure  of  crops,  or  by  an  increase  of  price. 
The  crop  of  1827  was  the  largest  then  ever  produced  by  more  than 
200,000  bales,  and  except  in  that  year  none  had  ever  been  produced 
larger  than  those  of  1828  and  1829.  The  price  of  cotton  was  6Jd. 
in  Liverpool  in  1827,  and  fell  to  5fd.  in  1829.  The  duties  on  im 
ported  goods  were  higher  than  ever  before ;  on  sheetings  about 
145  per  cent.,  checks  109,  shirtings  and  chintzes  43,  and  calicoes 
about  72  per  cent.  Yet  this  prostration  was  more  severe  in  effect 
upon  the  cotton  interest  than  that  produced  by  the  terrible  currency 
explosion  of  1837.  But  it  evidently  had  a  good  result.  It  forced 
into  bankruptcy  a  great  many  concerns  which  had  been  kept  alive 
by  protection,  and  were  a  constant  impediment  to  the  progress  of 
the  manufacture ;  though  it  inflicted  heavy  losses  upon  the  more  en 
terprising  as  well,  it  left  this  branch  of  industry  in  a  more  healthy 
condition.  For  thenceforward,  during  many  changes  of  duty,  it  con 
tinued  a  steady  and  rapid  progress. 

From  this  time  onward  we  are  able  to  trace  with  accuracy  the 
progress  of  this  manufacture  by  the  aid  of  statistics.  The  following 
table  presents  the  crop  of  each  year  since  1827,  the  quantity  ex 
ported,  the  quantity  consumed  each  year  in  this  country,  the  pro 
portion  of  the  crop  consumed  here,  the  number  of  pounds  con 
sumed  per  capita,  the  price  of  uplands  in  Liverpool  in  pence,  and 
the  average  price  of  all  cotton  exported  in  our  own  ports  in  cents. 
To  render  this  table  more  intelligible,  the  accompanying  diagram 
has  been  drawn,  showing  the  crop,  consumption,  and  price.  By 
comparing  these  lines,  the  cause  of  every  considerable  change  in  the 
production  of  cotton  goods  may  at  once  be  traced : 


130 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 
THE  COTTON  MANUFACTURE. 


TAKEN  FOR  CONSUMP 

t 

TION. 

EXPORTED. 

TOTAL  CROP. 

PRICE. 

0 

t 

CONSUMED 

YEAR. 

1  ™ 

i 

-M 

1 

2 

I 

'   1 

I 

i 

! 

t! 

_g 

5 

1 
I 

0< 

5| 

1  ~ 

1820 

127,800  000  Ibs 

16  c. 

9>£d 

1821 

124,900.000  Ibs 

i80.ddd.bob  ibs 

16 

83^ 

1822 

144,700,000  Ibs  210.000.000  Ibs 

16.6 

8J/ 

1823 

173,700  000  Ibs 

11.8 

8% 

1824 

142,400,000  Ibs 

15.4 

8J€ 

1825. 

176,500,000  Ibs  255,000,000  Ibs 

20.9 

UX 

1826.... 

150,000 

.. 



204,500,000  Ibs 

720,000  bales. 

12.2 

6^ 

Bales. 

Balei. 

1827.. 

149.516 

331 

49,489,796 

854,000 

957,281 

10 

6^ 

26 

15 

4.22 

1828.. 

120.593 

335 

40,398,655 

600,000 

720,593 

10.7 

6% 

19 

16 

3.30 

1829.. 

118,853 

341 

40,528,873 

740,000 

870,415 

10 

5X 

23 

13# 

3.31 

1830.  . 

126,512 

339 

53,887,508 

839,000 

976,845 

9.9 

6% 

26 

13* 

4.19 

1831.. 

182,142 

341 

62,110,422 

773,000 

1,068,847 

9.1 

6 

26^ 

17 

4.67 

1832.. 

173,800 

360 

62,568,000 

892.000 

987,477 

9.8 

6& 

26 

17 

4.56 

1833.. 

194.412 

350 

68,044,200 

867,000 

1,070,438 

11.1 

8^ 

26^ 

18 

4.81 

1834.. 

196.413 

363 

71,297,919 

1,028.000 

1,205.394 

12.8 

8% 

30 

16 

4.90 

1835.. 

216,888 

367 

79,597,896 

1,023,500 

1,254,328 

16.8 

105^ 

31 

17 

5.31 

1836.  . 

236.733 

373 

88,301,409 

1.116,000 

1,360,725 

16.8 

&A 

33 

17 

5.73 

1837.. 

222.540 

379 

84,342.660 

1.169.000 

1,423,930 

14.2 

7 

34 

15 

5.33 

1838.. 

246.063 

379 

93,262,877 

1,575,000 

1,801,497 

10.2 

7 

42 

14 

5.74 

1839.. 

276,018 

384 

105,990,912 

1,074,000 

1,360,532 

14.8 

7% 

31# 

20 

6.36 

1840.. 

295.193 

383    113,058,919 

1,876,000 

2,177,835 

8.5 

6 

49 

13 

6.68 

1841.. 

297,288 

394 

107,131,472 

1,313.500 

1,634.954 

10.3 

6^ 

3«# 

18 

6.08 

1842.. 

2(57,850 

397 

106,336,450 

1,465,500 

1,683,574 

8.1 

5X 

37 

16 

5.85 

1843.  . 

325,129 

409 

132,977,761 

2,010,000 

2,378,875 

6.2 

4% 

52}<r 

13 

7.11 

1844.. 

346,750 

412 

142,861,000 

1,629,500 

2,030,409 

8.1 

4% 

44 

17 

7.42 

1845.. 

3S9.000 

415 

161,435,000 

2,083.700 

2,394.503 

5.9 

4% 

51 

16 

8  15 

1846.. 

422,600 

411 

173,688,600 

1,666,700 

2,100,537 

7.8 

4% 

43 

20 

8.54 

1847.. 
1848.. 

428,000 
616,044 

431 
417 

184,468,000 
256,890.348 

1,241,200 
1,858,000 

1,778,651 
2.439,786 

10.3 
7.6 

6% 

±K 

37 
47 

24 
25 

8.87 
11.99 

1849.. 

642,485 

436    280.123.460 

2,228,000 

2,866,983 

6.4 

5>£ 

56^ 

MX 

12.75 

1850.. 

613,498 

429    263,190,642 

1,590.200 

2,233,718 

11.3 

7X 

41 

27 

11.34 

1851.. 

485,614 

416    162,015,424 

1,988,710 

2.454,442 

12.1 

5X 

43 

19j£ 

6.78 

1852.. 

699,603 

428   299,430,084 

2  443,646 

3,126,310 

8 

5% 

54 

22 

12.16 

1853.. 

803,725 

428    343,994,300 

2,528,400 

3,416,214 

9.8 

5% 

57# 

28# 

13.57 

1854.. 

737,236 

430 

317,011,480 

2,319,148 

3.074,979 

9.5 

5% 

50^ 

24 

12.16 

1855.. 

706,412 

434 

306.582,808 

2,244,209 

2,982,631 

8.74 

5X 

48 

24 

11.40 

1856.. 

770,739 

420 

323,710.380 

2,954,606 

3,665,557 

9.49 

6 

55X 

21 

11.70 

1857.  . 

819,936 

444 

364.162.584 

2.252,657 

3,093,737 

12.55 

7& 

48 

26X 

12.76 

1858.. 

595,562 

442 

263,238,404 

2.590,455 

3,257,239 

11.70 

6X 

49 

18 

8.95 

1859.: 

927,651 

447 

414.659.997 

3,021,403 

4,018.914 

11.64 

6^ 

59 

23 

13.70 

i860.. 

978.043 

461 

450,877,823 

3,774,173 

4,861,292 

10.89 

5X 

71 

20 

14.32 

1861.. 

843,740 

477 

401,263.980 

3,127,568 

3,849.469 

11.07 

8V 

57 

22 

12.39 

1862 

370  000 

170,200,000 

1,600,000 

23.18  17% 

7.24 

1863  '.  '. 

28s!oOO 

•  * 

120,'960'000 

450,000 

42*57  23^ 

*  * 

4^99 

1864!! 

22o!oOO 

" 

92,400.000 

300,000 

52.72  -21% 

3*42 

1865  ! 

345^000 

423 

145  935,000 

2  130  000 

38  05,19 

"  " 

*  " 

5!21 

1866!! 

731  J25 

441 

322^690,725 

1,554,664 

2,342,116 

30!6715^ 

29' 

si" 

9!09 

1867.. 

940,039 

444 

417,377,316 

1,557,054 

2.318,660 

21.5911 

28 

40 

11.49 

1868.. 

968,165 

445 

425,992,600 

1,655,816 

2,599,241 

....      9% 

34 

39 

11.36 

1869.. 

968,000 

447,216,000 

1,447,643 

2,439,039 

....  hag 

39 

11.57 

The  crop  of  1819-'20  is  entered  as  1820,  and  so  for  each  year.  The  estimate  of  consump 
tion  in  1826  is  Bishop's. 

The  figures  for  1869-'70  are  from  the  Financial  Chronicle  ;  another  statement  gives  the 
quantity  consumed  as  995,127  bales,  or  11.94  pounds  per  capita,  and  the  total  crop  aa 
2,260,557  bales. 


THE  COTTOX  MANUFACTURE.  131 

Since  1829,  until  the  recent  war,  the  progress  of  the  cotton  man 
ufacture  has  been  rapid  and  generally  steady,  without  regard  to  any 
changes  of  duty  whatever.  The  compromise  tariff  of  1832,  with  its 
great  reduction  of  duties,  did  not  prevent  the  consumption  advancing 
from  173,800  bales  in  1832,  to  297,288  bales  in  1841,  or  from  4.67 
Ibs.  per  capita  to  6.68  Ibs.  in  1840,  and  6.08  in  1841.  Nor  was  this 
advance  caused  or  accompanied  by  any  sacrifice  of  the  producer  of 
cotton,  for  the  price  was  9.8  cents  in  1832  and  10.2  cents  in  1841. 
The  severe  shock  given  to  all  industry,  by  the  currency  explosion 
of  1837,  only  reduced  consumption  14,000  bales — less  than  one- 
fifteenth  ;  and,  in  the  extreme  depression  of  the  return  to  specie  pay 
ments,  the  consumption  was  reduced  less  than  30,000  bales,  or  about 
one-tenth.  This  progress,  therefore — steady,  rapid,  and  sure-footed 
enough  to  be  little  shaken  by  the  greatest  industrial  prostration — 
was  not  gained  at  the  expense  of  the  producer. 

Neither  was  it  gained  at  the  expense  of  the  consumer.  Tables 
of  prices,  which  will  be  found  in  Chapter  XXI.,  show  that  there  was 
a  very  considerable  reduction  in  the  prices  of  all  kinds  of  cotton 
goods,  from  1835  to  1841,  amounting,  in  the  average,  to  about  one- 
third  of  the  price  in  1835,  and  a  further  reduction  in  1842,  so 
that  nearly  40  per  cent,  of  the  cost  to  the  consumer  was  removed 
during  these  eight  years  of  non-protection.  The  cost  of  manufacture 
to  the  pound  of  cotton  was  reduced,  it  was  stated  by  manufacturers 
in  1845,  from  33  cents  in  1828,  to  14£  in  1841 ;  and,  as  the  price  of 
cotton  was  more  than  60  per  cent,  higher  in  1835  than  in  1841,  it  is 
plain  that  the  reduction  of  price  was  not  disastrous  to  the  manufac 
turer,  but  that  his  profits  at  the  prices  of  1841  were  probably  about 
as  large  as  they  were  at  the  prices  of  1835.  It  is  easy  to  understand, 
also,  why  the  extreme  depression  of  business  after  the  resumption 
of  specie  payments  did  not  more  seriously  prostrate  this  manufac 
ture,  for  it  found  a  ready  outlet  in  exports  for  its  surplus  product 
whenever  domestic  consumption  was  checked.  Grower,  consumer, 
and  manufacturer,  were  all  benefited  during  this  period. 

In  the  next  period  it  was  otherwise.  In  1843  the  price  in  Liver 
pool  fell  below  5d.,  and  so  remained  until  the  tariff  of  1842  expired. 
The  price  here  dropped  to  six  cents,  and  during  those  four  years 
averaged  only  seven  cents.  With  a  reduction  of  price  from  15  cents 
in  1839,  to  6  cents  in  1845,  and  less  than  8  cents  in  1846,  it  is  not 
strange  that  the  consumption  here  advanced  from  276,000  bales  to 
422,000  bales,  an  increase  of  just  one-sixth  in  seven  years.  Indeed, 
this  increase  of  the  manufactures  was  not  more  rapid  than  the  in- 
10 


132  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

crease  of  the  crop,  for  in  1839  we  consumed  20  per  cent,  of  the 
entire  crop,  and  in  1846  exactly  the  same  propdrtion.  The  con 
sumption  per  capita  increased  under  this  tariff  from  6.68  in  1840  to 
8.54  in  1846,  or  about  two  pounds  per  capita,  and  this  was  at  an 
expense  of  two  cents  a  pound  on  the  value  of  the  whole  crop,  or 
sixteen  million  dollars.  Whether  the  tariff  of  1842  caused  the 
low  price  or  not,  the  diagram  shows  that,  in  every  period  of  protec 
tion  until  the  war,  the  price  has  been  low.  The  essential  point  is, 
that  the  consumption  increased  only  in  proportion  to  the  crop,  and 
in  connection  with  prices  extremely  favorable  to  the  manufacture, 
and  extremely  unfavorable  to  the  grower. 

It  is  also  necessary  to  observe  that  this  progress  was  made  at 
the  expense  of  the  consumer  of  cotton  goods.  The  tables  of  prices 
in  Chapter  XXI.  show  that  the  progressive  reduction  of  price,  which 
had  been  quite  rapid  from  1836  to  1842,  was  suddenly  arrested  dur 
ing  this  tariff;  that  the  low  price  of  cotton  was  not  permitted  to 
inure  to  the  benefit  of  the  consumers  of  cotton  goods,  and  that  the 
prices  of  a  large  majority  of  the  qualities  there  named  were  higher 
in  1846,  at  the  close  of  the  protective  tariff,  than  they  had  been  in 
1842,  before  its  adoption,  or  in  1843,  its  first  year.  Buying  cotton 
at  10T2Q-  cents  in  1841,  the  manufacturer  made  Chicopee  brown  sheet 
ings,  three  yards  to  the  pound,  so  that  they  were  sold  in  1842  at 
T'TST  cents  a  yard,  and  the  cost  of  manufacture  and  profits  were 
then  not  greater  than  eleven  cents  to  the  pound  of  cotton  worked. 
But  the  same  establishment,  buying  cotton  at  5^  cents,  in  1845, 
sold  the  same  quality  of  sheeting  in  1846  for  eight  cents  a  yard ;  so 
that  the  cost  of  manufacture  and  profits  were  then  18T*g-  cents  to  the 
pound  of  cotton  manufactured.  It  will  elsewhere  appear  that  wages 
were  not  higher  in  1845  than  in  1841  or  1842,  but  the  cost  of  manu 
facture  may  in  many  other  ways  have  been  increased  in  conse 
quence  of  the  tariff.  Yet  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  the  great 
part  of  the  increased  tax  then  borne  by  consumers — amounting  to 
7-^0  cents  to  the  pound  of  cotton  used — went  in  the  form  of  increased 
profits  to  the  manufacturer.  The  grower,  therefore,  was  injured, 
the  consumer  was  taxed,  and  the  manufacture  increased  at  the  ex 
pense  of  both  classes.  If  profits  were  very  large,  they  went  not  to 
the  benefit  of  labor,  but  to  the  capitalist.  May  it  not  fairly  be 
doubted  whether  progress  so  gained  was  wisely  gained  ? 

Under  the  "  free-trade  tariff "  which  followed,  the  manufacture 
progressed  far  more  rapidly,  while  the  cotton-grower  received  better 
prices,  and  the  consumer  obtained  his  cloths  at  a  great  reduction  of 


THE  COTTON  MANUFACTURE.  133 

cost.  By  reference  to  the  table  of  prices  it  will  be  found  that  the 
cost  of  every  quality  of  cotton  goods  was  reduced  from  1846  to 
1849,  the  average  reduction  being  about  one-sixth.  The  same  qual 
ity  of  sheetings  already  mentioned  was  sold  in  1849  for  6T%-  cents, 
a  reduction  of  ly1^  cents,  but  the  grower  in  that  year  received  614i5- 
cents,  and  in  1848  he  received  7TV  cents  a  pound,  while  in  1845  the 
price  was  5T9Q-  cents,  and  in  1846  it  was  7fV  cents.  Two  enormous 
crops  pushed  down  the  price  in  1849  ;  but  in  no  other  year  thence 
forward  was  the  price  as  low  as  the  average  for  the  whole  tariff  of 
1842.  Stimulated  by  the  reduced  price  of  goods,  the  consumption 
advanced  from  422,600  bales  in  1846,  the  last  year  of  protection,  to 
642,485  in  1849,  a  gain  of  more  than  one-half  in  three  years,  and  the 
consumption  per  capita  from  8.54  Ibs.  to  12.75  Ibs.,  about  one- 
half.  Moreover,  this  increase  was  not  caused  by  an  increase  of  crop 
alone,  for  in  1846  we  consumed  20,  and  in  1850  we  consumed  27 
per  cent,  of  the  whole  crop.  The  short  crops  of  that  year  and  the 
next,  however,  causing  the  price  to  rise  to  twelve  cents,  temporarily 
reduced  consumption,  and  imports  of  cotton  goods  were  increased, 
England  having  the  advantage  of  other  and  cheaper  supplies  of  cot 
ton.  But,  the  instant  that  advantage  was  removed,  by  recovery  of 
our  crop,  the  manufacture  rose  in  1852  to  699,603  bales,  and  in 
1853  to  803,725  bales,  13.57  pounds  per  capita.  Thus,  in  seven 
years,  the  quantity  manufactured  in  this  country  had  increased  un 
der  low  duties  nearly  100  per  cent.,  and  the  proportion  of  the  crop 
consumed  here  had  increased  from  20  to  23|-  per  cent.,  while  the 
price  of  cotton  to  the  producer  had  risen  from  7.8  cents  to  9.8  cents 
a  pound — just  two  cents.  With  many  millions  gained  to  the  grower, 
the  manufacture  doubled,  and  cotton  goods  cheapened,  this  tariff 
cannot  be  said  to  have  injured  the  country. 

Thenceforward,  until  the  war,  the  cotton  manufacture  varied  al 
most  precisely  in  proportion  to  the  crop,  rising  from  803,725  bales 
in  1853,  to  978,043  bales  in  1860,  or  from  13.57  Ibs.  per  capita  to 
14.34  Ibs.,  the  price  meanwhile  also  rising  to  about  eleven  cents. 
The  main  variation  caused  by  the  panic  of  1857  was  a  loss  in  con 
sumption  of  about  one-quarter  in  1858,  which  was  more  than  recov 
ered  in  the  next  year.  Taking  this  tariff  period  as  a  whole,  the  gain 
from  1846  to  1860  was  in  consumption  from  422,600  bales  to  978,043 
bales,  or  130  per  cent.,  and  to  the  grower  from  7.8  cents  a  pound  to 
10.8  cents  a  pound,  or  over  fifty  million  dollars  on  the  crop  of  1860. 

The  war  cut  off  the  supply  of  cotton  and  reduced  the  manufacture 
greatly,  but  since  peace  was  restored  it  is  again  vigorously  advan- 


134  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

cing.  The  consumption  per  capita,  however,  has  not  yet  reached 
the  quantity  consumed  before  the  war,  and  the  great  increase  in  the 
growth  of  cotton  elsewhere  has  made  England  comparatively  less 
dependent  upon  our  crop  for  supply.  In  consequence  of  this  fact, 
and  of  the  reduced  crop,  we  consume  a  larger  proportion  of  the  crop 
than  we  did  before  the  war,  though  the  manufacture  does  not  as  yet 
supply  to  consumers  as  large  a  quantity  of  goods  per  capita  as  it 
then  did.  As  the  crop  is  less  than  one-half  as  large  as  it  was  in 
1860,  the  grower  gets  much  higher  prices,  so  that  the  production  of 
wealth  by  the  growth  of  cotton  has  not  been  materially  diminished. 
Nor,  if  we  consider  the  manufacture  as  productive  of  wealth  in  pro 
portion  to  the  quantity  of  cotton  which  it  transforms  into  fabrics, 
can  we  say  that  the  production  of  wealth  by  this  branch  of  industry 
has  increased.  But  the  effect  of  the  present  tariff  cannot  be  deci 
sively  distinguished  from  the  effects  of  other  causes  upon  both 
growth  and  manufacture.  To  the  periods  prior  to  the  war  we 
must  look  for  proof  whether  the  cotton  manufacture  has  been  aided 
by  the  protective  system.  The  review  of  facts,  we  think,  has  fully 
demonstrated — 

I.  That  the  manufacture,  like  the  growth  of  cotton,  is  indigenous 
to  this  country,  and  has  never  owed  its  existence  to  protection. 

II.  That  protective  duties,  even  in  the  earlier  years,  were  desired 
only  by  the  less  enterprising,  to  shield  them  from  the  effects  of  lack 
of  enterprise. 

III.  That  those  duties  were  a  premium  to  bad  management,  and 
kept  alive  the  less  useful  establishments,  a  hinderance  to  progress. 

IV.  That  severe  prostration,  the  disasters  of  which  were  shared 
by  the  best  and  the  worst,  were  needed  to  weed  out  these  con 
cerns,  and  prepare  the  manufacture  for  healthy  growth — a  work 
which  natural  competition  would  have  done  with  less  detriment  to 
others. 

V.  That  since  1829,  under  all  changes  of  duty,  the  growth  in 
this  manufacture  has  been  such  as  to  demonstrate  its  independence 
of  legislative  aid. 

VI.  That  the  manufacture  has  progressed,  since  that  time,  in 
proportion  to  the  growth  of  the  crop,  but  a  little  more  rapidly  in 
times  of  non-protective  than  in  times  of  protective  duties. 

VLL  That  progress  in  the  manufacture  has  been  accompanied 
with  loss  to  the  grower  of  cotton  and  to  the  consumer  of  goods  under 
protective  duties,  but  under  non-protection  a  more  rapid  progress 
has  been  made,  with  gain  to  the  grower  and  to  the  consumer. 


THE  WOOLLEN  MANUFACTURE.  135 

VIII.  That  the  production  of  wealth  by  cotton  manufacture  pro 
gressed  more  rapidly  under  the  low  revenue  tariff  of  1846-' 60  than 
at  any  other  time  in  our  history. 


CHAPTER    XI. 

THE   WOOLLEX    MANUFACTUKE. 

THE  condition  of  the  woollen  interest  in  this  country  is  very  re 
markable.  During  the  past  year  many  large  mills  have  stopped,  and 
very  few  of  the  manufacturers  have  worked  full  time.  The  business, 
it  is  generally  acknowledged,  was  never  in  a  more  unsatisfactory 
condition,  and  fine  factories  are  for  sale  at  great  sacrifice.  Some  of 
the  largest  and  most  intelligent  manufacturers  openly  appeal  to 
Congress  to  repeal  the  protective  duties,  and  give  them  a  moderate 
revenue  tariff.  Yet  this  disastrous  condition  of  the  manufacture  is 
not  caused  by  high  prices  of  the  raw  material,  and  is  not  accom 
panied  with  any  benefit  to  the  wool-grower,  for  the  prices  of  almost 
all  varieties  of  American  wool  are  lower  than  they  were  in  1860, 
and  of  the  most  important  grades  lower  in  currency  than  they  were 
in  1860  in  gold.  In  consequence,  the  wool-growers  are  slaughtering 
their  sheep  by  thousands,  and  the  clip  of  wool  for  the  year  1869  is 
said  to  be  fully  forty  millions  less  than  that  of  1868.  While  the 
manufacturer  is  ruined  and  the  wool-grower  slaughters  his  sheep, 
the  consumer  is  taxed  from  fifty  to  one  hundred  and  fifty  per  cent, 
for  his  clothing,  blankets,  and  carpets.  Surely  this  cannot  be  con 
sidered  a  successful  policy,  which  ruins  manufacturers,  slaughters 
sheep,  and  fleeces  consumers  ! 

"  How  can  these  results  possibly  occur  under  the  same  tariff?" 
Yet  they  actually  do  occur ;  here  they  are,  to  be  witnessed  by  any 
man :  mills,  silent  or  bankrupt ;  growers  feeding  hogs ;  consumers 
paying  nine  dollars  a  pair  for  blankets  which  cost  not  more  than  five 
in  1860.  Nor  is  this  the  worst  phase  of  the  matter.  We  imported 
in  1869  of  wool  and  woollens  about  as  much  in  value,  and  of  woollens 
far  more  in  quantity,  than  we  did  in  1860,  under  lower  duties.  Yet 
many  important  kinds  of  woollen  goods  are  absolutely  excluded,  and 
the  manufacturer  here  has  absolute  control  of  the  market.  No  ad 
vocate  of  protection  can  be  persuaded  that  a  system  which  entirely 
excludes  a  foreign  article  can  benefit  nobody,  yet  who  is  benefited 


136  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

here  ?  No  advocate  of  that  system  will  admit  that  duties  which 
ruin  the  manufacturer  and  the  grower  can  at  the  same  time  tax  the 
consumer,  yet  here  are  duties  which  unquestionably  injure  grower, 
consumer,  and  manufacturer.  It  is  for  no  lack  of  protection  that 
these  disasters  occur.  The  tariff  under  which  we  live  was  shaped  by 
a  convention  of  wool-growers  and  wool-manufacturers,  and  unani 
mously  demanded  by  both,  as  absolutely  necessary  to  keep  those  in 
terests  from  destruction.  Congress,  as  if  legislating  for  them  alone, 
and  for  the  millions  of  consumers  not  at  all,  granted  what  they  asked. 
How  can  the  results  be  explained  ? 

Three  causes  have  combined  to  that  end :  There  has  been  a  large 
increase  here  in  the  manufacture  of  those  goods  of  which,  prior  to 
protection,  consumption  was  mainly  or  wholly  supplied  by  our  own 
mills,  rather  than  of  those  of  which  consumption  was  not  so  supplied. 
The  cost  of  production  here  has  been  increased,  while  the  cost  of  the 
raw  material  elsewhere,  partly  because  of  our  tariff,  has  been  greatly 
reduced.  The  cotton  manufacture  has  recovered  from  its  extreme 
depression  during  the  war. 

To  a  considerable  extent,  the  woollen  and  the  cotton  manufacture 
compete  to  supply  the  same  consumption.  When  the  supply  of  cot 
ton  failed  during  the  war,  the  woollen  manufacture  was  very  largely 
increased.  A  similar  increase,  less  in  degree,  occurred  in  other 
countries,  where  the  consumption  of  cotton  was  checked.  In  this 
and  in  other  countries  an  enormous  demand  for  wool  was  created, 
and  production  rapidly  increased.  But  the  revival  of  the  cotton 
supply  and  manufacture,  after  the  war,  diminished  the  consumption 
of  woollen  goods,  and  the  supply  exceeded  the  demand.  Conse 
quently,  in  other  countries  as  well  as  in  this,  the  woollen  manufac 
ture  has  been  reduced  or  compelled  to  accept  lower  prices,  and  the 
wool-grower  has  also  been  compelled  to  reduce  production,  or  sell  at 
lower  rates. 

When  this  cause  began  in  all  countries  to  affect  both  the  growth 
and  manufacture  of  wool,  people  in  other  countries  adjusted  their 
industry  to  the  facts.  If  they  could  sell  at  lower  prices  or  manufac 
ture  more  cheaply,  they  did  so.  But  in  this  country  they  went  to 
government  for  aid.  Already  both  grower  and  manufacturer  had 
been  aided,  first  by  the  Morrill  protective  tariff  of  1861 — as  perfect 
a  piece  of  work  of  its  kind  as  ever  was  devised — and,  that  having 
failed,  by  the  higher  tariff  of  1864.  Instructed  thus  to  rely  upon 
legislation  to  cure  all  industrial  ills,  they  asked  and  obtained  a  still 
higher  duty  in  1866,  and  finally  the  wool  tariff,  framed  by  wool- 


THE  WOOLLEN  MANUFACTURE.  137 

growers  and  manufacturers,  the  blessings  of  which  we  and  they  now 
experience.  How  higher  duties  could  be  expected  to  increase  con 
sumption,  or  relieve  a  market  already  overstocked  with  the  wools 
and  goods  mainly  produced  here,  we  do  not  see.  But,  in  some  such 
strange  hope,  Congress  granted  the  extreme  duties  desired,  and 
grower  and  manufacturer  were  permitted  to  ruin  themselves  at  the 
public  expense. 

When  the  cotton  supply  fell  short  and  prices  of  woollen  goods 
went  extravagantly  high,  many  people  were  attracted  to  the  growth 
and  manufacture  of  wool.  Quite  naturally,  they  preferred  to  grow 
that  class  of  wool  which  had  been  found  most  profitable  here,  instead 
of  other  qualities  more  really  needed,  but  less  profitable.  The  manu 
facturer,  also,  having  promise  of  control  of  the  home  market,  preferred 
to  make  goods  for  which  our  wool  was  suitable,  rather  than  those 
which  required  the  use  of  foreign  wools  bearing  high  duties.  Thus 
both  growth  and  manufacture  progressed  rapidly  in  one  direction, 
without  extending  greatly  in  others.  Of  wools  which  we  naturally 
produce  because  they  are  supposed  to  be  the  most  profitable,  we 
produced  more.  Of  goods  which  we  naturally  make  because  they 
can  be  made  of  American  wools,  we  produced  more.  And,  of  these 
wools  and  woollens,  the  supply  quickly  equalled  or  exceeded  the  de 
mand.  But,  for  other  wools  and  other  qualities  of  woollen  goods, 
we  remained  as  dependent  as  ever  upon  foreign  supply.  This  did 
not  please  legislators,  nor  yet  gentlemen  who  wanted  to  exclude 
foreign  products  entirely,  and,  therefore,  duties  were  raised  still 
higher.  This  promised  larger  profits,  and  accordingly  more  people 
rushed  into  the  growing  of  the  same  wools  and  the  manufacture  of 
the  same  goods.  Then  the  markets  were  overstocked,  and  losses 
followed,  while  we  continued  as  dependent  as  before,  for  other 
goods  and  wools,  upon  foreign  supply.  Now,  protection  makes  it 
the  business  of  government  to  apply  a  remedy  whenever  any  pro 
tected  interest  is  losing.  Wherefore,  the  remedy  was  applied — 
higher  duties.  With  special  determination  to  shut  out  foreign 
wools,  on  mestiza,  then  selling  at  13  cents  in  gold,  a  duty  of  11^- 
cents  was  imposed.  To  help  the  manufacturer,  duties  of  fifty  cents 
a  pound  and  thirty-five  per  cent,  ad  valorem  were  imposed  on  the 
goods.  These  promised  great  profits,  and  more  people  still  began 
to  grow  the  same  wools  and  to  manufacture  the  same  goods.  And 
now  we  have  factories  idle  or  for  sale,  and  sheep  slaughtered  by 
the  million.  Yet  we  are  still  importing  wool  and  woollens  to  the 
value  of  over  forty  millions ;  for  the  manufacture,  extended  mainly  in 


138  DOES  PROTECTION   PROTECT? 

those  directions  in  which  we  do  not  compete  with  foreign  products, 
has  but  slightly  diminished  our  importations. 

"  But  how  can  it  be  that  an  overcrowded  manufacture  of  certain 
goods  does  not  reduce  the  prices  of  those  goods  ?  "  It  does  reduce 
the  prices  of  some  below  the  cost  of  manufacture,  but  not  below  the 
cost  in  1860,  when  wool  was  dearer,  but  the  manufacture  cost  much 
less,  and  not  at  all  to  compare  with  the  reduction  of  cost  in  other 
countries.  The  attempt  to  exclude  mestiza  wool  from  our  ports  has 
thrown  it  upon  the  markets  of  Europe  at  a  greatly  reduced  price. 
The  English  manufacturer,  getting  his  wool  cheaper  than  before, 
can  produce  cloths  cheaper.  Thus  our  tariff  has  operated  to  protect 
the  foreign  manufacturer,  and  so  great  has  been  the  reduction  of 
cost  that  he  can  now  pay  the  duty  of  "  fifty  cents  a  pound,  and 
35  per  cent,  ad  valorem,"  amounting,  in  some  cases,  to  nearly  150 
per  cent.,  and  still  sell  some  goods  in  our  market  at  prices  little 
above  those  of  1860.  But  our  manufacturer,  with  his  increased  cost 
of  manufacture,  and  with  no  cheap  foreign  wool  to  mix  profitably 
with  our  own,  cannot  sell  lower  than  he  did  in  1860  without  a  ruin 
ous  sacrifice.  Of  the  qualities  which  are  sold  at  the  prices  of  1860 
in  gold,  some  are  sold  at  a  sacrifice,  and  even  then  the  consumer  is 
heavily  taxed  because  foreign  goods  cost  much  less.  But  the  goods 
sold  at  or  near  the  prices  of  1860  in  gold  are  few.  At  the  sale  after 
the  exhibition  at  Cincinnati  in  August,  the  prices  paid  to  the  manu 
facturers  direct,  in  large  quantities  and  not  by  the  piece,  were  for 
flannels  plain,  50  to  65  cents ;  red,  52^ ;  plaid,  from  40  to  52^ ;  cas- 
simeres,  81.12-J-,  $1.25,  and  $1.35;  blankets,  from  $9  to  $11  a  pair; 
shawls  (long),  $7.25 ;  jeans,  from  50  to  82^-  cents.  Similar  goods 
sold  in  1860 — flannels,  26  to  36  cents;  cassimeres,  66  to  90  cents; 
blankets,  $3  to  $6  a  pair ;  shawls,  $7.* 

*  In  the  report  for  1870,  received  after  this  chapter  was  prepared,  Mr.  Wells 
gives  tables  of  prices  (quoted  p.  153),  which  more  fully  illustrate  the  principles  above 
stated  than  any  statistics  which  I  had  been  able  to  obtain.  He  gives,  first,  the 
selling  prices  at  Stewart's,  New  York,  of  the  most  important  articles  of  domestic 
manufacture,  in  1860  and  in  1869  ;  and,  second,  the  importing  prices  of  certain 
French  goods.  These  tables  show  that  the  prices  of  American  goods  have  been 
increased  from  10  to  80  per  cent,  since  1860,  though  many  of  them  now  sell  for  less 
in  gold  than  they  then  did,  but  at  the  same  time  the  cost  of  goods  has  been  reduced 
in  other  countries  very  greatly.  I  add,  at  the  close  of  this  chapter,  another  table, 
prepared  by  Mr.  Greeley  to  prove  that  many  qualities  of  domestic-made  goods  actu 
ally  sell  for  less  or  little  more  in  gold  than  they  cost  in  1860 — which  is  true  of  some 
goods  which  can  be  advantageously  made  of  American  wool  only,  because  the  price 
of  American  wool  is  much  lower  in  gold  than  it  was  in  1860.  But  of  other  goods 


THE  WOOLLEN  MANUFACTURE.  139 

But  these  are  the  goods  which  we  most  successfully  manufac 
ture,  sold  at  auction  in  large  quantities  by  the  manufacturers  direct. 
Of  others  the  price  has  been  much  more  increased — so  much  that 
the  foreign  manufacturers  supply  quite  as  large  a  share  of  the  con 
sumption  as  they  have  ever  done.  The  reason  is,  that  the  wool  of 
this  country  is  not  suited  to  the  production  of  such  goods,  and  for 
eign  wool  of  that  quality  has  not  been  admitted  at  such  terms  that 
our  manufacturers  could  compete  with  others  who  have  their  wool 
free  of  duty. 

Nearly  all  the  wool  produced  in  this  country  is  of  the  merino  of 
medium  grades,  suitable  for  the  manufacture  of  card-wool  tissues — 
flannels,  blankets,  shawls,  cloakings,  satinets,  and  cassimeres.  But 
of  the  fine  clothing  wools  from  which  broadcloths  and  doeskins  can 
be  made,  this  country  produces  no  supply.  Of  combing  wool,  that 
quality  by  which  the  vast  manufacture  of  England  is  mainly  sus 
tained,  a  long  wool  necessary  to  the  worsted  manufacture,  we  pro 
duce  no  supply.  So  small  is  the  quantity  produced  of  either  of 
these  qualities,  that  we  might  as  well  not  produce  them  at  all. 
Neither  have  we  the  Cheviot  wool,  a  mixture  of  which  gives  their 
peculiar  character  to  the  Scotch  tweeds,  cassimeres,  and  coarser 
shawls  and  blankets.  Nor  have  we  those  finest  qualities  of  merino 
wool  such  as  enable  the  French  to  excel  all  nations  in  dress-goods 
for  women. 

The  American  wool  is  costly,  and,  though  superior  in  quality  for 
many  purposes,  can  even  for  those  be  often  most  economically  used 
in  mixture  with  foreign  wools.  A  free  supply  of  cheap  wool  from 
other  countries,  therefore,  enables  the  manufacturer  to  consume  a 
larger  quantity  of  American  wool,  and  retain  command  of  the 
market.  Manufacturers  in  other  countries  have  this  opportunity  to 
choose  from  many  qualities  of  wool  the  best  and  most  economical 

it  is  not  true.  And  while  Mr.  Greeley  introduces  this  table  to  prove  that  consumers 
in  this  country  are  not  taxed  by  the  tariff  on  woollen  goods,  he  carefully  conceals 
the  fact  that  prices  of  goods  in  other  countries  have  been  so  much  reduced  that 
duties  of  80  per  cent,  do  not  shut  out  importations  nearly  as  large  as  those  of  1860 ; 
and  he  also  conceals  the  fact  that  the  cost  of  American  wool  here  has  been  so  de 
pressed  that  the  material  for  a  yard  of  cloth,  which  cost  in  1860  just  $1.08 J  (wool 
50  cents  21  Ibs.)  now  costs  only  84|  cents  (wool  39  cents  2£  Ibs.),  a  difference  of  24  cts. 
in  gold  in  a  yard  of  cloth.  It  is  plain,  then,  that  if  the  cost  of  manufacture  has  not 
been  increased,  the  cloth  costing  one  dollar  and  a  half  a  yard  in  1860  ought  now  to 
be  sold  for  one  dollar  and  a  quarter  in  gold.  It  is  not  worthy  of  Mr.  Greeley's  rep 
utation  to  suppress  these  essential  facts,  which  prove  that  the  people  are  taxed,  and 
that  heavily. 


140  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

mixture.  The  policy  of  our  government  has  always  denied  to  our 
manufacturers  that  opportunity.  The  "protection" — the  advantage 
thus  given  to  the  foreign  manufacturer — is  so  great  as  to  be  abso 
lutely  decisive  of  itself  in  a  contest  between  national  industries. 
But  another  advantage,  not  less  great,  is  the  power  of  changing 
from  one  class  of  goods  to  another,  as  the  state  of  the  market  may 
require.  With  free  and  amply  supply  of  wools  of  all  kinds,  the 
foreign  manufacturer,  if  he  finds  the  market  overstocked  with  goods 
of  any  kind,  can  change  to  others  for  a  time.  But  the  manufac 
turer  here,  when  foreign  wools  are  either  excluded  or  by  duties 
made  too  costly  for  profitable  use,  is  forced  to  confine  himself  to  the 
production  of  such  goods  as  can  be  made  wholly  or  mainly  of  Ameri 
can  wool ;  and,  whenever  the  market  for  these  few  qualities  is  sup 
plied,  he  must  close  his  mills  or  work  at  a  sacrifice. 

These  few  facts  are  the  key  to  the  whole  history  of  the  woollen 
interest.  It  was  impossible  for  the  manufacturer  to  compete  on 
even  terms  with  those  of  other  countries,  without  free  supply  of  all 
kinds  of  wool.  But  that  supply  has  not  been  given  a  single  year 
since  1824.  Consequently  the  manufacture  has  always  been  at  a 
disadvantage,  and,  in  the  attempt  to  produce  goods  other  than  those 
for  which  American  wool  alone  can  be  profitably  used,  that  disad 
vantage  has  been  fatal.  Even  in  the  i\se  of  American  wool,  free 
dom  to  mix  with  others  being  denied,  our  manufacturer  has  been 
unable  to  produce  as  cheaply  as  that  of  other  countries,  except  in  a 
few  articles ;  and  thus,  while  the  manufacture  of  some  fabrics  has 
been  repeatedly  prostrated  by  an  excess  of  production  over  demand, 
the  industry  as  a  whole  has  been  narrowed,  weakened,  and  rendered 
unable  to  consume  as  largely  of  American  wool  as  it  otherwise 
might  have  done. 

When  to  these  disadvantages  is  added  the  increased  cost  of 
machinery,  of  buildings,  of  power,  and  of  dyes,  under  a  protective 
tariff,  it  will  be  realized  that  the  cost  of  production  here  has  been 
artificially  raised  above  the  cost  in  other  countries.  Hence,  this 
great  industry  is  the  weakest  of  all  leading  branches  of  manufac 
ture,  and  demands  the  heaviest  duties  to  shelter  it  against  compe 
tition;  and,  having  those  duties,  finds  itself  worse  off  than  ever 
before.  In  plain  terms,  it  has  been  "  protected  "  almost  to  death. 

Instead  of  leaving  it  free  to  enjoy  such  success  as  it  could 
honestly  win  and  surely  hold,  unimpeded  by  legislative  interference 
with  the  cost  of  materials  and  of  production,  we  have  been  trying 
almost  without  cessation  for  forty-five  years  to  compensate  the 


THE  WOOLLEN  MANUFACTURE.  141 

manufacture  for  protection  to  the  wool-grower  and  others,  and  have 
shut  it  out  from  supplies  of  wool  absolutely  necessary  to  make  it 
permanently  successful. 

"  But  this  has  been  done  to  benefit  the  wool-grower,"  it  will  be 
said.  The  only  market  for  American  wool  must  come  from  Ameri 
can  manufacture,  and  that  manufacture  will  be  able  to  consume 
American  wool  at  fair  prices  only  when  it  has  attained  a  healthy 
condition,  a  solid  and  enduring  success.  We  shall  presently  inquire 
what  protection  has  done  for  the  grower.  Let  us  first  ascertain  how 
it  has  affected  the  manufacture.  A  review  of  statistics  will  prove, 
first,  that  the  woollen  manufacture,  never  needing  protection  as  to 
such  goods  as  can  be  best  produced  from  American  wool,  has  never 
by  protection  been  so  extended  as  to  materially  diminish  our  de 
pendence  upon  foreign  countries  for  other  goods;  and  second,  that 
the  manufacture  has  been  retarded  and  crushed  by  repeated  and 
mistaken  efforts  to  protect  wool-growers. 

Under  all  tariffs  prior  to  1824,  wool  was  free.  Light  revenue 
duties  were  imposed  on  carpets,  of  7-J-  per  cent,  in  1791,  of  10  per 
cent,  in  1792,  of  15  per  cent,  in  1794,  and  in  1800  of  12£  per  cent., 
and  in  1804  of  15  per  cent,  on  other  manufactured  goods.  Under 
these  trifling  duties  the  manufacture  grew  up.  Arthur  Schofield 
established  the  mill  at  Pittsfield  from  which  goods  were  soon  sent  to 
New  York,  sold  for  British  broadcloths,  and  brought  back  for  sale 
by  a  dealer  of  that  same  town  in  which  they  were  manufactured. 
He  was  soon  followed  by  others,  and  in  many  quarters,  before  the 
embargo  of  1808,  woollen  goods  were  made  for  $1.06  which  were 
declared  to  be  equal  in  fineness  and  superior  in  wear  to  British 
goods  of  double  width  costing  $3.50  a  yard.  Thus  British  goods,  if 
free  of  duty  then,  would  have  cost  $1.50  for  the  same  quantity  and 
an  inferior  quality,  compared  with  goods  manufactured  here  at  $1.06. 
But  this  was  before  we  began  to  protect  wool-growers.  During  the 
war,  the  woollen  manufacture  greatly  increased,  but  wool  was  so 
scarce  as  to  be  sold  for  $4  a  pound,  and  broadcloths  sold  as  high  as 
$18  a  yard.  When  the  war  closed,  and  these  fictitious  prices  in 
the  then  inflated  currency  were  brought  in  contact  with  those  of 
other  countries,  the  manufacturer,  having  wool  free,  adjusted  himself 
accordingly ;  and  it  is  recorded  that  new  and  large  woollen  mills 
were  built  after  the  close  of  the  war,  until  the  prostration  produced 
in  1819  by  the  great  disorder  and  contraction  of  the  currency,  already 
described.  In  that  disaster  the  woollen  manufacture  shared,  yet  not 
more  largely  than  that  of  cotton,  and  it  recovered  quite  as  vigor- 


142  DOES  PKOTECTION  PROTECT? 

ously.  Under  the  tariff  of  1816,  imported  woollen  goods  bore  a 
duty  of  25  per  cent.,  blankets,  worsteds,  and  stuffs,  bearing  15  per 
cent. ;  but  these  duties  did  not  prevent  the  subsequent  prostration. 

A  table  of  the  importations  of  woollen  goods,  from  1821  to  1845 
inclusive,  classified,  is  taken  from  the  Treasury  report  of  1845  (Table 
No.  5  at  the  close  of  this  chapter),  and  preceding  (Table  No.  4) 
is  also  a  table  of  wool,  woollens,  and  carpets,  imported  since  1845. 
From  these  records  it  appears  that  in  1821,  when  the  country  was 
just  beginning  to  recover  from  depression,  the  value  of  woollen  goods 
imported  was  nearly  seven  and  a  half  millions,  of  which  five  mill 
ions  were  of  cloths,  shawls,  etc.,  and  a  million  and  three-quarters 
of  worsted  goods.  But,  of  blankets,  the  importation  was  less  than 
half  a  million,  and  of  hosiery,  gloves,  etc.,  less  than  $200,000.  It  is 
evident  that  the  importation  of  worsteds  and  of  fine  woollen  cloths 
supplied  a  large  part  of  the  consumption,  while  of  blankets,  hose, 
and  the  coarser  cloths,  very  much  the  greater  part  consumed  was  then 
produced  here.  The  importations  of  1822  were  much  heavier,  but 
those  of  1823  and  1824  were  about  eight  and  a  quarter  millions,  and 
the  proportions  of  different  articles  were  about  the  same.  At  that 
time  the  whole  consumption  of  woollens  was  about  $43,000,000,  of 
which  $8,386,597  was  imported  in  1824,  the  last  fiscal  year  preced 
ing  a  change  of  duty,  or  less  than  one-fifth. 

In  1824  the  first  attempt  was  made  to  protect  the  grower,  and 
the  manufacturers,  to  balance  the  duty  on  the  raw  material,  received 
largely  increased  protection,  the  minimum  principle  being  then  ap 
plied  to  woollen  goods.  All  goods  costing  less  than  33J  cents  a 
yard  bore  a  duty  of  25  cents  a  yard,  and  goods  costing  more  a  duty 
of  33^  per  cent.  This  system,  to  the  astonishment  of  its  advocates, 
greatly  prostrated  the  woollen  manufacturer,  and  reduced  the  price 
of  wool  to  the  grower  from  32 \  to  25  cents !  The  reason  is  plain : 
the  manufacturer  was  prostrated  by  denial  of  his  choice  of  wools. 
That  effect  alone  was  so  injurious,  that,  in  spite  of  a  reduced  cost 
of  nearly  one-quarter  in  American  wool,  and  an  increased  duty  on 
foreign  goods,  the  importations  increased  in  the  very  next  year, 
1825,  to  over  $11,000,000,  and  were  $8,679,505  in  1828,  the  last 
(fiscal)  year  of  this  tariff.  Demonstration  cannot  be  clearer;  the 
prostration  of  the  manufacturer  cannot  possibly  be  ascribed  to  any 
other  cause  except  the  inability  to  compete  without  free  choice  of 
wool.  It  cannot  be  ascribed  to  increased  cost  of  American  wool. 
It  cannot  be  ascribed  to  importations  merely,  for  those  only  reached 
in  1828  about  one-fifth  of  the  total  consumption.  But  the  manufac- 


THE  WOOLLEN  MANUFACTURE.  143 

turers  themselves  testified  before  a  congressional  committee  to  their 
losses.  Thirteen  of  those  who  were  examined  in  1828  declared  that 
they  had  been  losing  money  since  1825-?' some  largely,' and  only  one, 
a  maker  of  flannels,  reported  success.  And  they  stated  the  real 
difficulty :  they  were  dependent  upon  imported  wools,  which  cost, 
Saxony,  61  cents  to  $1.60 ;  Spanish,  35  to  85  cents ;  merino,  30  cents 
to  $1.25 ;  Italian,  32J  cents ;  German  coarse,  16  to  20  cents ;  Rus 
sian,  13  cents ;  Smyrna,  16  to  22  cents  per  pound,  wrhile  the  com 
mon  American  was  selling  for  20  to  25  cents.  Its  value  had  depre 
ciated,  they  truly  testified,  because  of  "  the  depressed  state  of  the 
manufacture." 

Here  are  to  be  observed,  as  consequences  of  the  first  protective 
tariff  on  wool,  nearly  the  same  results  as  are  now  witnessed ;  manu 
facturers  ruined,  wool  depreciated  in  price,  consumers  taxed,  and 
importations  increased.  But  Congress,  failing  to  see  that  protection 
itself  was  the  cause  of  these  disasters,  or  believing  in  the  maxim 
"Similia  similibus  curantur"  prescribed  another  dose  of  protection. 
On  wool  the  duty  was  4  cents  a  pound,  and  40  per  cent,  for  one 
year ;  then  45  per  cent,  for  one  year,  and  then  50  per  cent.  On 
woollens  minimums  were  established  of  50  cents,  $1,  $2.50,  and 
$4,  with  a  duty  of  40  per  cent,  for  one  year  on  such  arbitrary  valua 
tion,  and  after  that  of  45  per  cent.  If  it  is  possible  to  exclude 
foreign  goods,  and  give  to  domestic  manufacturers  an  absolute  mo 
nopoly,  by  any  form  of  tariff,  it  would  be  supposed  that  this  tariff 
would  have  that  effect.  The  practical  object  of  it  was  to  impose 
upon  the  four  classes  of  goods  such  duties  as  to  establish  in  this 
country  a  fixed  price,  so  that  no  reduction  in  the  cost  of  the  goods 
abroad  could  affect  the  price  here.  For  if  goods  costing  four  dollars 
a  yard  should  be  reduced  by  improvements  in  manufacture  to  $2.51, 
they  would  still  be  valued  at  the  custom-house  at  four  dollars,  and  a 
duty  of  $1.80  a  yard  would  be  exacted.  No  improvement  in  manu 
facture  abroad,  it  was  intended,  should  ever  inure  to  the  benefit  of  any 
American  consumer  by  affecting  the  duty.  At  the  time  this  extraor 
dinary  tariff  was  passed  we  were  importing  of  woollens  $8,679,505. 
Three  years  after,  in  1831,  we  imported  $12,627,229.  This  increase, 
it  is  important  to  observe,  was  mainly  in  those  qualities  of  goods 
which  are  not  well  manufactured  from  American  wool,  namely, 
fine  cloths  and  worsteds.  The  importation  of  cloths  increased  from 
$4,315,714  to  $6,121,442,  and  the  importation  of  worsteds  from 
$1,446,146  to  $3,392,037.  Instead  of  supplying  any  larger  part  of 
the  consumption  of  these  articles,  the  domestic  manufacturer  actually 


144  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

lost  ground  as  to  these,  and  supplied  a  smaller  proportion,  the  im 
portation  of  such  goods  being  much  larger  in  proportion  to  popula 
tion,  when  this  tariff  closed,  than  when  it  was  adopted.  Here  is 
illustrated  the  futility  of  attempting  to  force  the  manufacture  into 
other  channels  than  those  to  which  the  supply  of  American  wool 
directs  it.  But  it  is  equally  important  to  observe  that  the  importa 
tion  of  blankets  increased  from  $624,239  in  1828  to  $1,180,478  in 
1831.  "  Blankets  can  be  made  wholly  of  American  wool,  but  its 
cost  has  always  been  too  high,"  said  a  manufacturer  before  the  com 
mittee  in  1824.  Hence  some  mixture  of  cheap  or  foreign  wool  was 
useful,  but  the  tariff  tried  to  exclude  that  wool.  Accordingly,  the 
foreign  wool  came  in  the  form  of  blankets  ! 

During  these  four  years  it  does  not  appear  from  the  most  minute 
records  of  the  manufacture  that  a  single  new  woollen-mill  was 
established,  or  that  it  was  extended  or  improved  in  any  noteworthy 
respect.  If  individuals  made  money,  they  made  it  in  spite  of  dis 
advantages  which  all  felt,  not  the  least  of'  these  being  the  increased 
cost  of  woollen  goods  to  the  consumer,  which  tended  to  check  con 
sumption,  the  increased  cost  of  iron  and  its  products,  and  of  manu 
facture  as  compared  with  the  cost  in  other  countries  where  it  was 
being  constantly  reduced.  Once  more,  the  consumer  was  taxed, 
and  the  manufacture  not  developed  or  extended,  and  yet  the  grower 
was  worse  off  than  ever.  The  price  of  wool  during  the  years  1829 
and  1830  was  very  low ;  in  1830  common  sold  for  18  cents  in  July ; 
and  in  1831  for  22-J-  cents  in  May.  If  the  grower  was  not  benefited ; 
if  the  manufacture  was  not  developed  in  any  healthy  sense ;  if  the 
consumer  was  heavily  taxed,  and  if  foreign  importations  increased 
from  eight  to  twelve  millions,  in  what  sense  can  this  tariff  be  called 
successful  ? 

In  1832  a  tariff  was  passed  reducing  duties  on  nearly  all  articles 
materially,  abandoning  the  minimum  principle  on  woollens,  and  put-> 
ting  very  low  duties  on  cheap  woollen  cloths,  worsteds,  flannels,  and 
on  ordinary  carpets  and  hosiery  only  25  per  cent.  Meanwhile  wool 
costing  less  than  8  cents  was  admitted  free,  and  other  wool  reduced 
to  4  cents  and  40  per  cent,  duty ;  dye-stuffs  were  also  made  free.  In 
the  next  year  Mr.  Clay's  compromise  tariff  was  adopted,  which  pro 
vided  for  a  gradual  reduction  of  all  duties,  by  abating  every  second 
year  one-tenth  of  the  excess  above  20  per  cent.,  until  1841,  when 
one-half  of  the  residue  of  such  excess  should  be  abated. 

It  is  impossible  to  distinguish  the  effects  of  this  tariff  from  those 
of  the  great  ebb  and  flow  of  currency  induced  by  the  land  specula- 


THE  WOOLLEN  MANUFACTURE.  145 

tion  already  described.  It  would  be  unfair  to  ascribe  the  general 
prosperity  of  the  manufacturer  until  1841  altogether  to  the  large  re 
duction  of  duties,  and  equally  unfair  to  ascribe  the  subsequent  depres- 
soin  altogether  to  the  continued  reduction.  The  extreme  contraction 
of  the  currency  and  the  general  distress  fully  account  for  the  prostra 
tion  of  the  manufacture  in  1842,  while  foreign  importations  do  not, 
for  those  were  less  in  either  of  the  years  1840-'42  inclusive,  than  in 
the  years  1831-'33  inclusive.  The  aggregate  value  of  woollens  im 
ported  for  the  three  years  1831-'33  was  nearly  thirty-six  millions, 
and  the  aggregate  value  imported  for  the  three  years  1840-'42  in 
clusive,  when  the  duties  were  lowest,  was  twenty-eight  and  a  third 
millions.  The  prostration  of  this  interest  at  that  time  cannot,  there 
fore,  be  ascribed  to  the  effect  of  foreign  competition.  It  is  worthy 
of  note,  also,  that  the  imports  continued  to  be  almost  wholly  of 
qualities  of  goods  not  manufactured  here  with  success,  namely, 
worsteds  and  fine  cloths.  The  importation  of  blankets,  notwith 
standing  the  low  duty,  had  fallen  to  $500,000,  and  of  carpets  to  about 
$250,000,  and  of  flannels  to  $90,289.  The  manufacture  of  these 
articles,  especially  of  carpets  and  flannels,  was  so  established  that 
only  the  more  costly  kinds  were  imported  under  any  rate  of  duty, 
and  while  the  domestic  manufacture  supplied  of  carpets  as  early  as 
1834  fully  1,147,500  yards,  of  the  qualities  for  ordinary  use,  besides 
great  quantities  which  were  made  in  families,  the  quantity  imported 
under  the  reduced  duty  in  1833  was  only  344,173  yards.  The 
average  price  of  all  carpets  made  in  this  country,  in  factories,  was 
then  about  a  dollar  a  yard.  The  proportion  of  carpets  imported  was 
less  in  1842,  when  this  tariff  closed,  and  under  the  lowest  duties, 
than  in  1833,  when  it  began,  and  when  duties  were  highest,  and  the 
same  was  true  of  flannels  and  blankets.  But  the  importation  of 
woollen  cloths  and  worsteds  varied  with  the  general  prosperity  of 
the  country,  and  was  largest  in  the  years  1835  and  1836,  when  the 
domestic  manufacture  of  woollens  was  also  most  prosperous.  These 
facts  confirm  the  view  already  taken,  that  the  importation  was  mainly 
of  such  articles  as  are  not  produced  here ;  that  the  manufacture  was 
aided  by  the  admission  of  cheap  wool  free,  and  the  reduction  of  duty 
on  all  wool,  and  that  its  subsequent  depression  was  due  not  to  im 
portations  or  reduction  of  duties,  but  to  changes  of  currency  and  of 
the  general  condition  of  the  country. 

Tables  given  in  Chapter  XXI.  show  that  the  prices  of  woollen 
goods  made  with  success  in  this  country  were  greatly  reduced  under 
the  operation  of  this  tariff.  The  price  of  Salisbury  38-inch  flannels  was 


146  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

reduced  from  44  cents  in  1835  to  40  cents  in  1838,  and  33  cents  in 
1840 ;  Lowell  carpets  were  reduced  in  price  from  $1.10  in  1835  to  90 
cents  in  1841 ;  linseys  were  reduced  from  28  to  22  cents ;  cassimeres 
from  $2  to  $1.70  per  yard;  broadcloths  from  $4.25  to  $4  per  yard; 
and  blankets  from  $5.25  to  $4.25  a  pair.  A  further  reduction  of 
price  followed  the  return  to  specie  in  1841,  caused  not  only  by  the 
depression  of  business,  but  by  the  low  price  of  wool.  But,  prior  to 
this  change,  the  consumer  had  been  greatly  benefited  by  the  reduc 
tion  in  the  cost  of  goods ;  the  wool-grower,  in  spite  of  the  admission 
of  cheap  foreign  wool  free  of  duty,  had  received  very  high  prices  for 
his  wool,  and  the  manufacture  had  advanced  with  very  great  rapidity. 
In  Massachusetts  the  value  of  woollen  goods  produced  increased 
60  per  cent,  in  the  five  years  from  1832  to  1837. 

The  restoration  of  the  currency  was  followed  by  a  revival  of  all 
industry,  and,  because  the  protective  tariff  of  1842  was  adopted  soon 
after  that  event,  the  tariff  has  been  credited  by  its  advocates  with 
the  revival  of  industry  and  the  restoration  of  currency  itself.  For 
the  present  purpose,  it  is  essential  only  to  observe  that  under  this 
tariff,  as  before,  the  importation  of  woollens  increased  with  the  in 
crease  of  the  manufacture  here,  so  that  the  progress  of  our  industry 
cannot  be  ascribed  to  the  exclusion  of  foreign  goods.  The  increase 
of  importations  was  frdm  $8,375,725  in  1842,  to  $10,083,819  in  1846, 
the  last  year  of  this  tariff,  and  it  was  in  every  quality  of  goods,  as 
follows : 

YEAB.  Cloths.  Worsted.  Blankets.  Hosiery. 

1842 $4,180,875  $2,366,132  $566,233  $375,297 

1846 4,488,434  2,658,023  633,745  838,866 

YEAB.  Yarn.  Carpets.  Flannels.  All  other. 

1842 $217,611  $242,309  $90,289  $336989 

1846 266,330  253,543  156,851  788,027 

The  importations,  in  1845,  of  cloths,  blankets,  and  carpets,  were 
much  higher  than  in  1846.  No  statistics  are  attainable  of  the  quan 
tity  of  woollen  goods  manufactured  in  these  years,  but  it  is  known 
that  it  increased  rapidly  after  the  revival  of  industry,  and  that  the 
manufacture  of  broadcloths  was  quite  generally  attempted.  The 
duty  on  such  cloths  was  40  per  cent.,  and  the  duty  on  wool,  costing 
less  than  seven  cents,  was  but  5  per  cent.,  while  on  other  wool  it 
was  three  cents  a  pound,  and  30  per  cent.  Under  these  circum 
stances,  the  growth  of  fine  wool  and  the  manufacture  of  fine  cloth  were 
undertaken,  and  in  1844  the  finest  wools  commanded  a  high  price. 


THE  WOOLLEN  MANUFACTURE.  147 

But  these  and  all  other  wools  thenceforward  fell  rapidly  in  price, 
while  the  importations  of  woollen  cloths  slightly  increased. 

It  appears  that  the  American  supply  of  the  fine  wools  was  en 
tirely  insufficient,  and  that  the  manufacturers  depended  very  largely 
upon  foreign  supplies ;  and  Mr.  Randall,  in  a  statement  in  1845,  said : 
"  Numerous  specimens  of  wool,  equalling  our  choicest  Saxon,  are  in 
the  hands  of  various  individuals  throughout  the  country,  which  men 
of  well-known  standing  and  veracity  allege  they  obtained  of  import 
ers  and  manufacturers — such  importers  stating  that  they  were  from 
bales  of  South  American  wool  admitted  under  the  5  per  cent,  ad 
valorem  duty,  and  conceding  that  large  quantities  of  a  similar  qual 
ity  were  received  by  them  from  the  same  source.  It  is  alleged  that 
some  of  the  smaller  manufactories  of  good  cloths  receive  their  princi 
pal  supply  in  this  way."  In  that  same  year  we  imported,  of  wool, 
no  less  than  23,833,050  pounds,  and  in  the  next  year  16,558,247. 
Whether  this  wool  was  or  was  not  fraudulently  admitted,  does  not 
affect  the  inference  that  its  admission  under  merely  nominal  duty 
was  the  advantage  which  enabled  the  manufacturer  to  extend  his  ef 
forts  to  the  finer  cloths  for  which  the  American  wool  did  not  suffice. 

Convincing  evidence  that  this  was  in  fact  the  cause  of  the  tem 
porary  success  of  that  branch  of  the  manufacture  is  afforded  by  its 
immediate  abandonment  in  1847,  when  the  duty  on  all  foreign  wools 
was  changed  to  30  per  cent.  Thus  this  tariff,  though  called  a 
"  free-trade  "  tariff,  was  in  this  particular  eminently  a  protective  tariff 
— it  excluded  the  foreign  wool  upon  which  the  manufacture  of  fine 
cloths  had  depended,  and  stopped  that  manufacture  so  that  the  com 
mittee  of  wool  manufacturers  and  growers  say  in  their  memorial  to 
Congress  of  1866 :  "  The  manufacturers  of  fine  cloths  found  it  in  vain 
to  struggle  against  foreign  wools,  who,  in  addition  to  cheap  interest 
and  cheap  labor,  had  the  crowning  advantage  of  free  wool.  The 
higher  branches  of  the  manufacture  were  abandoned ;  soon  every 
one  of  the  eighteen  hundred  broadcloth  houses  in  the  country  ceased 
work.  The  branches  of  the  manufacture  continued  with  activity 
were  those  like  flannels,  which  were  supplied  by  the  common  wool 
of  this  country — so  superior  in  its  spinning  qualities  as  in  itself  to 
afford  an  advantage  over  the  foreign  manufacturer.  There  was  no 
longer  a  demand  for  any  but  common  wools.  The  Saxon  wool-hus 
bandry  ceased  with  the  manufacture  of  fine  cloths  which  had  called 
it  into  existence."  It  seems  to  be  very  satisfactorily  established  by 
this  concurrent  testimony  of  both  parties  interested,  the  growers 
and  manufacturers,  that  the  increased  duty  on  foreign  wools  at  this 
11 


148  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

point  destroyed  the  manufacture  of  fine  cloths,  and  with  it  the  de 
mand  for  and  culture  of  the  Saxon  wools. 

Returning  to  the  tariff  of  1842,  it  appears  that  in  other  branches 
the  manufacture  made  no  such  progress  as  to  supply  a  better  market 
for  American  wool  at  its  close  than  had  existed  in  the  year  of  pros 
tration  with  which  it  commenced,  and  that  the  price  of  goods  was 
not  reduced  in  proportion  to  the  reduction  in  the  cost  of  wool. 
Northampton  broadcloth  sold  for  $3  a  yard  without  change  for  four 
years,  and  some  other  qualities  of  broadcloth  were  increased  in  price ; 
satinet  was  increased  in  price  from  50  to  65  cents ;  Lowell  carpets 
were  raised  a  little ;  flannels  were  slightly  higher  in  1846  than  in 
1843,  and  blankets  were  raised  50  cents  a  pair ;  yet  all  grades  of 
wool  were  cheaper  in  the  last  year  of  this  tariff  than  in  its  first. 
The  tables  already  mentioned  (Chapter  XXI.)  show  that  the  consumer 
and  the  wool-grower  were  taxed  to  support  the  manufacturer,  and 
that  after  the  repeal  of  this  tariff  the  price  of  wool  materially  im 
proved,  while  the  cost  of  goods  to  the  consumer  was  lessened. 

Notwithstanding  the  lamentable  effect  of  the  tariff  of  1846  upon 
the  broadcloth  manufacture — an  effect  due,  as  has  been  stated,  to  a 
protective  feature  in  a  tariff  generally  non-protective  in  character — 
the  manufacture  of  those  qualities  of  woollen  goods  for  which  the 
American  wool  suffices  so  increased  that  a  larger  quantity  of  that 
wool  was  used  at  higher  prices  than  it  had  obtained  since  the  infla 
tion  in  1837. 

The  tariff  of  1857  was  marked  by  an  entirely  different  policy. 
The  duties  on  manufactured  goods  were  reduced  to  24  per  cent.,  and 
all  wool  costing  18  cents  or  less  was  admitted  free,  other  wool  bear 
ing  only  a  24  per  cent.  duty.  Under  the  first  provision  was  admitted 
nearly  every  kind  of  wool  upon  which  our  manufacture  had  depended. 
The  tariff  went  into  effect,  however,  at  a  time  when  industry  was 
much  disordered,  and  the  panic  which  occurred  in  that  year  deferred 
for  some  months  the  improvement,  but  the  subsequent  progress  was 
very  rapid.  So  great,  indeed,  was  the  demand  for  wools  of  all  kinds, 
that  the  prices  of  all  grades  of  American  rose  higher  than  ever  be 
fore  since  the  War  of  1812,  although  it  was  believed  that  fully 
95,000,000  Ibs.  of  foreign  wool  were  imported  within  the  three  years ; 
and  the  census  of  1869  shows  that  about  98,379,785  Ibs.  of  wool 
were  consumed  in  the  manufactures,  of  which  about  $51,516,959 
were  of  domestic  growth. 

In  that  year  the  product  of  this  manufacture  was  in  value 
about  eighty  millions,  and  consisted  of  124,897,862  yards  of  cloth, 


THE  WOOLLEN  MANUFACTURE.  149 

6,401,206  Ibs.  of  yarn,  296,874  pairs  of  blankets,  616,400  shawls.  In 
value  the  product  had  increased  42  per  cent,  since  1850,  and  a  large 
part  of  that  increase  had  been  effected  within  the  years  1858-'60, 
under  the  lowest  duties  on  both  wool  and  woollens.  The  product  in 
cloth  was  nearly  four  yards  to  each  inhabitant,  and  in  value  $1.97 
per  capita, ;  but  the  quantity  of  cloth  exceeded  the  quantity  manu 
factured  in  1850  by  42,691,210  yards,  or  52  per  cent.,  showing  that 
while  quantity  and  value  had  both  increased  faster  than  population, 
the  cost  of  a  given  quantity  had  been  reduced.  Under  this  tariff, 
therefore,  the  manufacture  grew  with  great  rapidity,  the  wool- 
grower  received  the  highest  prices  for  his  wool,  and  the  consumer 
had  cheaper  cloth.  But  this  was  during  the  period  of  the  lowest 
duties,  both  on  wool  and  woollens,  ever  imposed  since  1824.  And, 
though  no  official  records  show  the  quantity  of  goods  manufactured 
in  the  whole  country,  except  in  years  of  census,  the  State  census  of 
Massachusetts  discloses  the  following  facts,  as  to  the  value  of  the 
product  of  woollen  manufacture  in  that  State,  at  different  periods : 

1832 $6,500,000                          

1837 10,399,807  Increase,  60  per  cent. 

1845 8,877,478  Decrease, 

1850 1 2,781,514  Increase,  44  per  cent. 

1855 12,105,514  Decrease, 

1860 19,655,787  Increase,  62  per  cent. 

As  Massachusetts  is  by  far  the  larger  producer  of  woollens,  the 
value  of  the  goods  produced  made  in  that  State  being  nearly  one- 
third  of  the  value  made  in  the  whole  country,  and  as  there  is  no 
reason  to  suppose  that,  in  either  of  these  periods,  the  manufacture 
increased  or  decreased  except  under  the  influence  of  causes  affecting 
in  like  manner  other  wool-manufacturing  States,  these  figures  give 
quite  conclusive  proof,  first,  of  the  large  increase  in  the  manufac 
ture  after  the  abandonment  of  the  protective  system  in  1832 — the 
increase  having  been  60  per  cent,  in  five  years  ;  second,  of  the  great 
depression  caused  by  the  disorders  of  currency ;  third,  of  the  great 
increase  in  the  manufacture  as  a  whole,  after  the  abandonment  of 
the  protective  system  in  1846,  notwithstanding  the  defeat  of  the 
broadcloth  experiment  already  described ;  fourth,  of  a  decrease  in 
the  manufacture  from  1850  to  1855,  caused,  apparently,  by  the  press 
ure  of  competition  from  foreign  mills  enjoying  cheap  wool,  while  our 
mills  were  forced  to  pay  30  per  cent,  duty  on  their  foreign  wool — a 
competition  the  extent  of  which  will*  be  seen  from  the  table  of  im 
ports  of  woollens,  which  shows  that  over  eighty-five  millions  in  value 


150  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

were  imported  in  the  three  years  ending1  1855 — and  finally,  of  the 
very  rapid  increase  from  1855  to  1860,  which  was  more  than  62  per 
cent.  Of  this  increase  nearly  the  whole  occurred  after  the  removal 
of  duty  from  wool  of  18  cents  a  pound  or  less,  in  1857.  In  view  of 
these  facts,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  greatest  increase  ever  at 
tained  in  the  woollen  manufacture  was  during  the  two  periods  when 
a  large  share  of  foreign  wool  was  admitted  free,  while  duties  on 
woollen  goods  were  low  or  rapidly  reduced.  Of  the  two  periods, 
that  increase  was  largest  in  the  period  when  duties  were  lowest. 

These  are  the  conclusions  compelled  by  a  review  of  the  history 
of  this  manufacture  prior  to  the  war.  Since  1860  its  growth  has 
been  greatly  affected,  first  favorably  and  then  unfavorably,  by  the 
changes  in  the  production  of  cotton  goods.  The  enormous  increase 
prior  to  1865  was  by  no  means  due  entirely  to  the  admission  of 
foreign  wool  at  low  rates,  on  the  one  hand ;  nor  on  the  other  to  the 
high  duties  on  imports.  Its  great  depression  since  1865  has  been 
in  part  caused  by  the  revival  of  the  cotton  manufacture,  but  still 
more  by  the  duties  imposed  on  foreign  wool.  Very  potent  in  its 
influence  was  the  repeal  of  the  reciprocity  treaty.  By  that  change, 
the  worsted  manufacture  was  remarkably  affected,  and  the  cost  of 
making  carpets  greatly  increased. 

It  has  been  stated  that  in  this  country  no  wool  is  grown  from 
which  worsteds  are  made.  In  1866  the  wool-manufacturers  reported 
that  "  the  American  production  of  worsted  combing  wool  is  not  suf 
ficient  to  supply  one  mill" — say  three  hundred  thousand  pounds. 
At  that  time  it  was  estimated  that  the  quantity  of  combing  wool 
consumed  in  the  worsted-mills  was  four  million  pounds.  This  wool, 
grown  in  Canada  far  more  largely  than  it  has  there  been  consumed, 
when  admitted  free,  enabled  us  to  build  up  a  branch  of  manufacture 
not  only  important  in  itself,  but  exceedingly  beneficial  to  the  Ameri 
can  wool-grower,  because  it  increased  the  consumption  of  our  own 
qualities  of  wool.  But  the  tariff  of  1864  subjected  this  wool,  after 
the  reciprocity  ceased,  to  a  duty  of  37  to  40  per  cent.  The  effect 
upon  our  manufacture  may  easily  be  imagined — it  was  entirely  pros 
trated.  The  manufacturers  were  not  wrong  in  saying,  in  January, 
1866,  "  A  duty  on  Canada  wools  would  crush  an  industry  which  has 
already  assumed  a  truly  national  importance,"  as  the  importation  of 
worsteds  worth  about  fourteen  millions  in  that  year  indicated.  In 
the  manufacture  of  Brussels  carpets,  also,  it  was  then  made  clear  that 
the  duty  was  a  serious  disadvantage. 

But  Congress,  instead  of  giving  to  the  manufacturer  free  wool,  at- 


THE   WOOLLEN   MANUFACTURE.  151 

tempted  to  compensate  for  the  higher  cost  of  the  material  by  higher 
duties  on  the  product,  and  the  result  is  before  us  in  the  depression 
now  existing.  Of  the  effect  of  the  tariff  of  1867,  two  witnesses  may 
testify.  The  Providence  Journal,  edited  by  Senator  Anthony,  of 
Rhode  Island,  an  advocate  of  the  protective  system,  speaks  of  some 
mestiza  wool  thus : 

No  American  wool  has  ever  been  found  which  will  make  so  nice  a  finish,  or  felt 
so  well.  The  tariff  at  the  time  this  wool  was  purchased  was  six  cents  a  pound. 
At  the  revision  of  the  tariff  a  duty  was  placed  upon  it  of  10  cents  per  pound  in  gold, 
and  13  per  cent,  on  the  valuation.  This  makes  from  11  to  12  cents  per  pound  duty 
on  the  wool  in  the  grease,  and  is  absolutely  prohibitive.  In  consequence  of  this 
duty,  the  price  of  wool  has  been  so  brought  down  in  Europe,  that  the  manufactur 
ers  in  Germany,  England,  and  France,  can  obtain  it  at  a  much  less  rate  than  before 
we  were  deprived  of  it.  In  fact,  much  of  it  can  be  bought  by  them  for  the  same 
price  per  pound  that  would  be  paid  by  us  in  duties.  This  enables  them  to  send 
into  the  United  States  their  fine  goods,  which  only  pay  a  duty  to  our  government  of 
60  per  cent.,  whereas  the  duty  paid  to  this  government  on  much  of  the  same  kind 
of  wool  amounts  to  from  100  to  120  per  cent.,  leaving  our  manufacturers  from  40  to 
50  per  cent,  worse  off  than  they  would  be  under  a  free-trade  system. 

To  the  same  purport,  but  more  explicitly,  writes  Mr.  Edward 
Harris,  one  of  the  largest  woollen  manufacturers  in  New  England : 

This  (the  duty)  has  put  down  the  price  of  fine  wool  in  Europe  so  low,  that  it 
enables  their  manufacturers  to  produce  their  fine  goods  so  low  that  they  can  and 
will  eventually  drive  us  out  of  the  market.  It  is  worse  to  the  American  manufac 
turers  than  free  trade,  by  50  to  60  per  cent.,  while  the  poor  wool-grower  is  killing 
off  his  fine-wool  sheep.  ...  I  venture  to  suggest  that  we  have  a  tariff  simply  for  rev 
enue,  that  the  reciprocity  treaty  be  renewed,  and  that  all  duties  on  the  raw  mate 
rial  be  repealed. 

If  manufacturers  themselves  are  driven  to  such  conclusions  and 
confessions,  must  it  not  be  admitted  that  the  system  which  has  taxed 
the  consumer  heavily  has  rendered  no  permanent  service  to  this 
branch  of  industry  ?  But  it  will  be  said  that  these  admitted  evils 
spring  only  from  ill-adjustment  of  the  protective  tariff,  and  can  be 
remedied  by  further  legislation.  So  it  was  reasoned  in  1866,  when 
the  wool-growers  and  manufacturers  met  in  convention,  and  selected 
committees  of  their  ablest  men  to  frame  a  tariff.  So  faithfully  did 
Congress  echo  their  demands  in  legislation,  that  it  might,  without 
exaggeration,  be  said  that  in  this  instance  the  wool  interest  itself 
was  permitted  to  make  laws  for  the  rest  of  the  country,  Congress 
having  abdicated  in  its  favor.  If  the  very  men  who  most  thoroughly 
understand  the  wants  and  circumstances  of  this  interest  have  found 
it  impossible  to  frame  a  law  with  better  results  to  themselves  than 


152  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

those  now  witnessed,  may  we  not  begin  to  doubt  the  possibility  of 
improving  upon  natural  laws  by  finite. wisdom?  Is  there  not,  in 
short,  something  in  protection  —  interference  with  those  natural 
laws — which  defeats  itself? 

As  to  the  wool  manufacture,  it  is  plain  that  duties  for  its  benefit 
prompt  the  grower  to  demand  like  favors.  Say  the  committees,  in 
their  joint  memorial  of  1866 :  "  The  obvious  disadvantage  to  the 
manufacturer  of  the  policy  of  the  tariff  of  1857  was  its  inherent  in 
stability.  The  manufacturer,  investing  large  capital  in  structures 
and  machinery  which  cannot  be  diverted  to  other  purposes,  and 
which  may  not  give  returns  until  years  of  operation,  demands  above 
all  things  stability  of  legislation.  This  he  could  never  expect  under 
a  system  which  made  the  agricultural  interest  secondary  to  his."  Is 
not  that  the  inevitable  result  of  any  and  every  policy  which  taxes 
the  agricultural  interest  for  the  benefit  of  the  manufacturing  ?  Is 
there  not  in  every  protective  tariff  this  obvious  and  fatal  disadvan 
tage — "inherent  instability?"  The  more  thoroughly  it  discrimi 
nates  in  favor  of  an  interest,  the  greater  the  probability  of  speedy 
change.  Whoever  will  glance  at  the  record  of  changes  of  the  tariff, 
already  given,  will  see  reason  to  believe  that  tariffs  are  short-lived 
in  proportion  as  they  are  "  protective."  The  tariff  of  1857,  though 
the  lowest  revenue  tariff  ever  adopted  since  1816,  was  regarded  by 
the  wool-grower  as  a  discriminating  or  protective  tariff  in  favor  of 
the  manufacturer.  Statistics  have  shown  that  under  it  the  manufac 
ture  did  increase  more  rapidly  than  under  any  other  form  of  duty. 
But  its  "  inherent  instability  "  was  obvious  because  it  was  supposed 
to  discriminate  in  favor  of  the  manufacture,  although  in  fact  it  gave 
the  wool-grower  higher  prices  for  his  wool  than  he  had  ever  received 
since  "  protection  "  began.  It  must  at  least  be  admitted  that  the 
system 'which  succeeded  it  did  not  display  any  inherent  stability,  for 
we  have  had  twelve  changes  in  eight  years.  Is  it  not  time  for  the 
manufacturer  to  seriously  consider  whether  low  duties  for  revenue, 
raw  materials  free,  and  stability,  will  not  confer  greater  benefits  upon 
him  in  the  end  than  high  duties  for  protection,  with  producers  of 
raw  materials  also  demanding  protection,  and  twelve  tariffs  in  eight 
years  ? 


THE  WOOLLEX  MANUFACTURE. 


153 


NO.  1.— MR.  GREELEY'S  TABLE. 

The  prices  of  the  most  important  woollen  fabrics  ten  years  ago,  when  we  had  comparative 
free  trade  in  wool  and  in  woollens,  and  now,  are  as  follows : 


FABRICS. 

Price  in  1859. 

Price  in  1869.* 

Currency  price,  1869. 

Flannels,  per  yard— 
A.  &  T.  white        

$0  18 

$0  16 

$0  21 

H.  A  F  scarlet 

26 

23 

30 

J  R  F  twilled  scarlet 

30 

29 

3~3£ 

B.  twilled  scarlet  

26 

25 

32# 

Double  weight  scarlet  twilled 

27  X 

30% 

40 

F.  &  C 

36 

34>£ 

44^ 

Talbot  R%  plain  scarlet  

26 

25 

3-2^ 

G.  M  &  Co  twilled  scarlet    

23 

20% 

27 

E.  S 

25 

23 

30 

NAM 

25 

23 

30 

Ballam  bale  4-4  white  No  1 

75 

65^ 

85 

Ballam  bale  4-4  white,  No.  2  

60 

53X 

70 

Ballam  bale  4-4  white  No.  3  

45 

403^ 

52j£ 

Ballam  bale  4-4  white  No  4 

40 

34/£ 

45 

Ballam  bale  4-4  white  No  5 

35 

323£ 

42^ 

Blankets,  per  pair  — 
Holland  10-4  all  wool       

3  50 

4  23 

5  50 

Holland  11-4  all  wool 

5  00 

5  38 

7  00 

Cocheco  11-4,  ex  super  

6  00 

6  15 

8  00 

Cocheco  12-4  ex  super 

7  50 

7  30 

9  50 

Cumberland  10-4 

3  00 

3  46 

4  50 

Cumberland                

4  00 

4  23 

5  50 

Rochdale  10-4  super  extra  super        .... 

3  50 

3  27 

4  25 

Rochdale  11-4  super  extra  super 

4  50 

4  03 

5  25 

Rochdale  12-4,  super,  extra  super  

5  50 

4  80 

6  25 

Rochdale  10-4  premium 

4  50 

4  23 

5  50 

Rochdale  11-4,  premium  

5  50 

5  00 

6  50 

Rochdale  12-4,  premium  

6  50 

5  77 

7  50 

Cassimeres,  per  yard  — 
Broadbrook  Co.'s  fancy  Cassimeres,  14  oz  — 
Hamilton  Woollen  Co.'s  (1860)  per  yard  
Shawls  —  Middlesex  Co  's 

1  62^©!  75 
66T9& 
7  00 

1  34@1  44 
52% 
5  38 

1  75®  1  87^ 
68^% 
7  00 

De  Laines—  Hamilton  Woollen  Co.1s  (1860)  
Salisbury  Mills  Boys'  Checks,  per  vard  (1860).  .  . 
Salisbury  Mills  Eugenie  Cloths  (1860) 

16T9<?o 
58% 
94 

13 

45# 
69 

lT$b 
B9X 

903£ 

Salisbury  Mills  Silk  Codrington  (I860)  
Crossly  Co.'s,  Conn.,  Tapestry  Carpet  
The  imported  article  sold  in  1859  for  95c. 

1  52% 

'S* 

1  54% 
1  25 

NO.  2. -WOOLLEN  GOODS. 

The  following  table,  prepared  at  the  request  of  Commissioner  D.  A.  Wells,  by  the  house  of 
A.  T.  Stewart  &  Co.,  of  New  York,  shows  the  selling  price  of  certain  leading  varieties 
of  woollen  goods  in  1860  and  1869,  respectively : 


FABRICS. 

1860. 

1869. 

Cadet  Cloths,  Government  standard,  per  yard  
Harris  Cassimeres,  14  oz.  per  yard 

$2  75 
1  37^(3)1  50 

$3  25 

1  75(^2  00 

Cotton  Warp  Cloths,  14  oz.,  per  yard  

1  00    @,l  25 

1  75 

All-wool  Cloths.  14  oz.,  per  yard  

1  50 

2  75 

Middlesex  Sackings,  per  yard  ....                   .  . 

1  10 

1  25 

Middlesex  Doeskins,  per  yard.  .  . 

1  05 

1  15 

Middlesex  Shawls,  each  

7  00 

7  00 

Middlesex  Beavers,  per  yard                   .... 

3  75 

4  25 

Middlesex  Opera  Flannels,  per  yard  

47)£ 

50 

Broadbrook  Cassimeres,  per  yard  

1  62V@1  75 

1  75 

Broadbrook  Beavers,  per  yard        .  .     . 

2  75 

3  00 

Spring  Cassimeres,  8  to  9  oz.,  per  yard  

12V@1  25 

1  25@1  37* 

Glenham  Repellants,  per  yard  

10    ©1  15 

1  20 

Glenliam  Sackings,  per  yard  

05 

1  15 

Swift  River  Fancies,  11  to  12  oz.,  per  yard 

90 

1  00@1  10 

Rovalston  Cassimeres,  per  yard,  average  

073£ 

1  25 

Fitchburg  Cassimeres,  per  yard,      "       

07* 

1  25 

*  Equivalent  in  gold  (gold  at  130).    October  average. 


154 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


NO.  3.— FRENCH  GOODS. 
Importing  Prices.     Report  1869,  p.  104. 


FABRICS. 

1859. 

1866. 

1869. 

French  Merinos  all  worsted              .        •< 

Francs. 
2  62 
3  03 

Francs. 
2  40 
3  00 

Francs. 
1  90 
2  00 

Dyed  Mousseline  de  Laines,  all  worsted,  j 
French  dyed  Poplins,  all  worsted  •] 

3  22 
1  13 
1  22 

3  15 
98 
1  06 
1  75 

240 
79 
85 
1  19 

2  15 

1  69 

IMPORTS  OF  WOOL  AND  WOOLLENS. 


YEAR. 

UNMANUFACTURED. 

Carpets. 

Other  ManuPs. 

Value  ManuPs. 

Quantity. 

Value. 

1841 

15,006,410 
11,420,958 
3,517,100 
14,008,000 
2,3,833,040 
16.558,247 
8^60,109 
11,341,429 
17,869.022 
18,669,794 
32,548,461 
18,341,298 
21.599.079 
20,200,110 
18,534,415 
14,737,393 
16,502,060 

j   Estimated 
•j  95,000,000 

36,000,000 
43,571,026 
73,897,807 
90.396,104 
43,858,154 
67,917,031 
33,482,155 
24,474,307 

$11.001.939 
8,375,725 
2,472,154 
9,475,702 
10,666,176 
10,083,850 
10,998,933 
15,240,883 
13,704.606 
17,151,509 
19,507.309 
17,573.694 
27,621,911 
32,382,594 
24,404.149 
31,961,793 
31,286.118 
26,486,091   - 
33,521,956 
37,936,945 
28,261,039 
14,884.394 
20,411,625 
32,139,336 
20,347,563 
57,115,901 
45,776,475 
32,460,884 

1842 

1843 

1844 

1845 

1846  

$1,134,226 
555,822 
857,034 
1,177.347 
1,681,691 
3,833.157 
1,930,711 
2,669,718 
2,822,185 
2,072,139 
1,665,064 
2,125.744 
4,022,6135 
4,444,954 
4,842,152 

$253,543 
289,881  • 
643,187 
493,058 
790,604 
996,781 
730,967 
1,217,279 
2,268,815 
1,506,577 
2,212,318 
2,181,290 
1,542,600 
2,200,164 
2,542,523 

$9,830,307 
10,709.052 
14,597,696 
13.211,548 
16.360,905 
18,510,528 
16,842,727 
26,404,632 
30,113,779 
22,897,572 
29,749,475 
29.104.828 
24,943,491 
31,321,792 
35,394,422 

1847        

1848 

1849 

1850 

1851 

1852                      

1853 

1854  

1855 

1856  

1857  

1858 

1859 

I860  

1861        

1862 

1863 

1864  

1865. 

1866  .            

10,068,533 
5,565,279 
3,868,137 

2,854,097 
2,766',29i 

54,261,804 
29,694,593 

1867  

1868  

'f  r  • 

&&&• 


THE  WOOLLEN   MANUFACTURE. 


155 


156  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

A  letter  from  Mr.  Edward  Harris,  the  "  veteran,  eminent,  and 
successful  manufacturer,"  as  Mr.  Greeley  publicly  states,  has  recent 
ly  appeared  in  the  Tribune^  and  deserves  notice.  He  says : 

I  ain  a  woollen  and  cotton  manufacturer,  and  use  annually  a  large  amount  of 
coal  for  producing  motive-power,  and  am  otherwise  employing  quite  a  large  number 
of  persons  in  skilled  labor.  I  have,  and  can  now  use,  bituminous  coal  from  the 
British  possessions ;  but  I  am  met  with  a  duty  of  $1.25  in  gold  per  ton,  which  is 
equal  in  currency  to  $1.50  per  ton.  There  is  no  escaping  this  tax ;  and,  it  being  so 
high,  I  can  use  but  very  little  of  this  coal ;  consequently,  I  am  obliged  to  purchase 
my  coal  from  the  Pennsylvania  mines,  and  pay  not  only  such  a  price  as  the  miners 
may  charge,  but  also,  in  addition,  such  a  price  as  those  who  transport  the  coal  to 
me  may  charge  ;  which  sums,  added  together,  make  it  very  high. 

Thus  you  can  see  that,  so  far  as  the  item  of  coal  is  concerned — which  is  a  very 
heavy  one — I  cannot  compete  with  those  establishments  situated  near  the  coal 
fields. 

Thus  a  very  heavy  burden  is  legislated  not  only  upon  me,  but  upon  a  vast  and 
varied  interest,  comprising  a  large  section  of  our  country,  and  giving  employment 
to  hundreds  of  thousands  of  our  citizens. 

And  for  whose  benefit  is  this  duty  imposed  ?  Not  for  the  poor  men  who  work 
in  the  mines ;  for  demand  and  supply  fix  their  wages,  and  those  who  work  the 
mines  are  importing  laborers  daily  at  a  small  expense,  and  without  paying  a  duty 
on  the  hands  so  imported.  And  even,  for  argument,  if  it  did  give  these  poor  labor 
ers  a  little  more  pay — it  is  nothing  in  comparison  to  the  detriment  of  the  many  who 
are  benefited  by  the  use  of  the  coal. 

I  have  only  alluded  to  the  use  of  coal  for  producing  motive-power.  Think  of 
the  thousands  of  poor  families  which  suffer  for  the  want  of  fuel  to  keep  soul  and 
body  together.  The  reasons  for  a  repeal  of  this  duty  are  numerous,  and  the  benefits 
of  continuing  the  duty  are  not  apparent. 

Now  for  the  duty  on  fine  wool.  I  will  here  state,  without  fear  of  contradiction, 
that  fine  nap  goods  cannot  be  made  to  advantage  in  this  country  without  the  use  of 
foreign  fine  wools,  which  can  be  mixed  to  advantage  with  our  American  wools,  and 
produce  an  article  which  will  favorably  compare  with  foreign  goods.  But  here  I  am 
met  with  a  duty  of  over  100  per  cent,  on  this  article,  as  I  can  prove  to  you  by  the 
Liverpool  prices  current.  I  quote  from  one  published  by  John  L.  Bowes  &  Brother 
for  the  month  of  November,  1869 :  Buenos  Ayres  No.  1  wool,  average  shrinkage  70 
to  72  per  cent. ;  5£d.  per  pound.  Call  this,  reduced  to  gold,  1 1  cents  per  pound. 
The  duty  on  this  wool  is  specific,  10  cents  per  pound,  and  11  per  cent.,  making  a 
little  over  100  per  cent,  duty;  whereas  the  duty  on  fine  woollen  goods  will  not  ex 
ceed  45  or  50  per  cent,  at  most.  This  leaves  a  net  balance  of  at  least  50  per  cent, 
against  the  American  manufacturer,  so  far  as  the  wool  is  concerned,  which  is  much 
the  heaviest  item  hi  the  cost  of  the  goods. 

To  simplify  the  matter,  it  is  50  per  cent,  worse  than  free  trade  to  the  manufac 
turer. 

Now,  I  ask,  how  can  any  American  grower  of  fine  wools  receive  any  advantage 
whatever  from  such  a  tariff,  when,  instead  of  the  fine  wools  being  brought  to  this 
country,  we  receive  the  fine  goods  smuggled  and  brought  into  this  country  in  every 
direction  ? 


THE  WOOL-GROWER.  157 

This  tariff  has  shut  us  out  of  the  foreign  markets  for  fine  wool,  and  consequently 
reduced  the  price  so  low  to  the  foreign  manufacturers,  and  has  given  increased  ac 
tivity  to  their  business,  and  enabled  them  to  raise  the  price  of  their  labor.  In  fact, 
it  has  acted  as  a  bounty  on  smuggling ;  and,  if  continued,  will  ere  long  transfer  the 
manufacture  of  fine  goods  from  this  country  to  foreign  countries  entirely.  As  an 
instance  of  the  bad  effects  of  this  tariff  upon  the  fine  wool-growers  of  this  country, 
we  see  their  sheep  disappearing  in  every  direction. 

I  believe,  if  the  duty  was  taken  off  from  fine  wool,  that  the  price  of  that  article 
would  advance  in  Europe  to  such  an  extent  that  the  manufacturers  there  would  not 
be  able  to  produce  fine  goods  at  such  extreme  low  prices  as  to  enable  them  to  send 
the  same  into  this  country,  and  destroy  our  business  in  spite  of  any  tariff  which  can 
be  enforced. 

If  our  wool-growers,  by  this  unjust  tariff  on  scoured  wool  of  32  cents  per  pound 
and  11  per  centum  in  gold,  succeed  in  keeping  the  fine  foreign  wool  out  of  this 
country,  they  cannot  keep  out  the  fine  goods  of  foreign  manufacture ;  and  no  American 
manufacturer  can  afford  to  pay  them  any  higher  price  for  their  wool  than  these  fine 
foreign  goods  will  warrant,  as  they  will  govern  the  price  of  American  goods. 

I  will  only  add,  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  the  best  minds  of  New  England  are 
coming  to  these  conclusions. 

With  great  respect,  I  remain  your  friend, 

EDWARD  HARRIS, 

Woonsocket,  R.  Z,  January  19,  1870. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

THE     WOOL-GROWER. 

Do  protective  tariffs  benefit  the  wool-grower  ?  The  question  is 
one  of  fact,  easily  answered  by  statistics  of  the  most  reliable  charac 
ter.  At  the  close  of  this  chapter  will  be  found  tables  giving  the  price 
of  wool  of  different  qualities  at  New  York,  according  to  the  offi 
cial  report  of  the  Treasury  Department  of  1863,  and  at  Boston,  ac 
cording  to  Mr.  Livermore.  The  diagram  indicates  by  two  lines  the 
prices  of  merino  and  common  fleece  in  the  New  York  market,  with 
every  monthly  variation  since  1824  until  the  close  of  1861,  when 
variations  of  currency  began  to  affect  the  price. 

In  1824  the  first  duty  on  wool  was  imposed — 15  per  cent,  on 
wool  worth  10  cents  or  less,  and  on  other  wool  20  per  cent,  until  1826, 
and  afterward  30  per  cent.  As  a  consequence,  in  1825  and  the  ear 
lier  half  of  1826  the  price  was  slightly  reduced  and  afterward  fell  rap 
idly.  The  loss  under  that  tariff  was  in  New  York  10  cents  for  com 
mon,  15  to  20  for  full-blood  merino,  and  5  to  10  cents  for  pulled. 


158  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

According  to  Mr.  Livermore's  tables,  the  prices  at  Boston  declined 
1  cent  for  long,  4  cents  for  middle,  and  14  cents  for  fine  wool. 
What  is  the  explanation  ?  The  manufacture,  shut  out  for  the  first 
time  from  cheap  supply  of  foreign  wool,  was  depressed  and  unable  to 
consume  as  largely  as  before. 

The  first  attempt  to  benefit  the  grower  having  resulted  thus  un 
favorably,  on  the  19th  of  May,  1828,  duties  were  imposed  of  4  cents 
a  pound  and  40  per  cent,  until  June  30,  1829,  45  per  cent,  until  June 
30, 1830,  afterward  4  cents  and  50  per  cent.  At  once  the  manufacture 
was  prostrated,  and  the  prices  of  all  grades  fell  still  lower.  The  pro 
duction  of  wool  very  readily  adapts  itself  to  the  demand,  and  with 
production  reduced,  the  reviving  manufacture  gave  higher  prices  in 
1831  and  1832.  But  in  1832,  after  eight  years  of  protection,  the  prices 
were  still  lower  than  they  were  when  it  began,  thus  : 

Common.  Merino.  Pulled. 

1825 30-38  50-62  25-44 

1832 25-30  40-45  37-40  (No.  1.) 

We  have  seen  that  the  consumer  was  taxed.  We  have  seen  that 
the  manufacturer  was  worse  off  at  the  end  than  at  the  beginning  of 
this  period  of  eight  years.  We  now  see  that  protection  deprived  the 
grower  of  a  part  of  the  value  of  his  wool.  In  1832  wool  worth  8 
cents  a  pound  was  admitted  free,  and  the  duty  on  more  costly  wool 
was  reduced  to  4  cents  and  40  per  cent.,  with  gradual  reduction  af 
terward.  It  is  interesting  to  note  how  the  prices  of  American  wool 
rose  under  this  relaxation  of  duties.  We  have  seen  that  the  manufac 
ture  in  Massachusetts  increased  60  per  cent  in  five  years.  The  ta 
bles  show  that  the  prices  of  all  grades  increased  both  in  Boston  and 
New  York,  according  to  the  official  record,  thus  : 

Common.  Merino.  Pulled. 

1832 25-30  40-45  37-40 

1836 40-50  50-68  52-58 

Thus  the  increase  of  price  kept  pace  with  the  increase  of  the  manu 
facture.  And  in  like  manner,  when  the  manufacture  was  prostrated 
during  the  disorder  of  currency,  the  price  of  wool  fell  very  low.  Yet 
the  average  for  this  period  is  higher  than  that  of  the  protective  pe 
riod  which  preceded  it. 

In  1842  another  protective  period  commenced,  with  duties  of  5 
per  cent,  on  wool  costing  7  cents  or  less,  and  on  other  wool  3  cents  and 
30  per  cent.  It  is  curious  to  observe  how  the  momentary  improve 
ment  in  prices  in  1844  was  followed  by  a  decrease  to  as  low  a  point 
as  had  ever  been  reached.  Growers  expected  great  profits,  evidently, 


THE  WOOL-GROWER.  159 

and  held  their  wool  for  a  few  months,  hoping  to  realize  them.  They 
realized  the  loss  which  awaits  everybody  who  tries  to  mend  natural 
laws  by  human  legislation.  The  American  wool  was  rejected  while 
the  manufacturer  obtained  from  South  America  wool — as  fine  "  as  our 
choicest  Saxon,"  says  Mr.  Randall ;  "  no  American  wool  has  ever  been 
found  which  will  make  so  fine  a  finish,"  says  the  Providence  Journal 
— necessary  for  the  success  of  the  broadcloth  experiment.  The  result 
of  this  tariff  to  the  grower  was : 

NEW  YORK.  BOSTON. 

Common.        Merino.          Pulled.        Fine.  Middle.  Long. 

1842.... 19  29  27  42  37  30 

1846.... 20$  27$  22*          40  33  27 

Thus  the  closing  year  of  the  great  protective  tariff  of  1842  gave 
to  the  wool-grower  lower  prices  than  he  received  in  the  extreme 
"  hard  times "  in  1842,  and  the  average  for  the  whole  period  was 
lower  than  that  of  any  other,  protective  or  non-protective,  in  our  his 
tory. 

With  1847  went  into  operation  the  "  destructive  British  free- 
trade  tariff,"  as  Mr.  Carey  calls  it — a  level,  30  per  cent,  ad-valorem 
tariff,  which  remained  unchanged  until  1857.  This  raided  the  duty 
on  wools  costing  less  than  7  cents,  but  removed  from  those  costing 
more  than  7  cents  a  duty  of  3  cents  a  pound.  The  broadcloth  manu 
facture  stopped,  but  people  began  to  work  up  American  wool  with 
profit  to  the  grower.  The  statistics  have  exhibited  the  increase  of 
the  manufacture  from  1845  to  1850.  The  following  figures  show 

how  the  grower  fared : 

NEW  YORK.  BOSTON. 


Common.     Merino.       Pnlled.        Fine.       Middle.      Long. 

1846 20$  27$  22$  40  33  27 

1850 33$  40$  34$  45  38  32 

Nor  was  this  an  increase  for  a  single  year  only ;  for,  though  the 
manufacture  did  not  greatly  increase  after  this  time  until  1857,  it 
continued  to  consume  American  wool  at  these  rates  or  higher.  Thus 
the  prices  of  1850  and  of  1856  were : 

NEW  YORK.  BOSTON. 

Common.     Merino.        Pulled.          Fine.       Middle.       Long. 

1850 33$  40$  34$      .        45  38  32 

1856 32  42$  32$  57  48  41 

It  is  not  improbable  that  the  high  price  of  the  material*  as  com 
pared  with  reduced  prices  in  other  countries,  did  much  to  cause  that 


160 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


slight  decrease  of  the  manufacture  which  has  been  observed,  and  the 
rapid  growth  of  the  cotton  manufacture  contributed  to  the  same  result. 
The  only  true  remedy  for  this  evil  was  to  give  a  free  supply  of  cheap 
foreign  wool  to  mix  with  the  American  in  use,  and  that  remedy  Con 
gress  applied  in  1857,  by  a  tariff  admitting  free  all  wool  costing  18 
cents  a  pound  or  less,  which  Mr.  Stanton,  of  Ohio,  denounced  as  "  a 
blow  at  the  wool-grower."  How  severe  a  blow,  let  the  prices  prove ! 
The  record  shows  that  the  prices  of  common  and  merino  were  higher 
during  the  whole  of  that  period,  1857-'60,  inclusive,  except  during 
the  panic,  than  they  were  before  the  change  of  duty.  Taking  the 
New  York  record,  because  monthly  prices  are  given,  the  average 
price  of  common  wool  was : 


1853. 
1854. 
1855. 
1856. 


Average. 


41 


29* 


34* 


1857. 
1858. 
1859. 
1860. 


37 
30 
38 
36| 


Average 35* 


In  spite  of  the  reduced  price  during  the  panic  in  1858,  the  aver 
age  under  this  tariff  was  higher  than  before.  Nor  was  this  true  at 
New  York  only,  but  in  Western  markets.  The  Chicago  record,  in 
spite  of  the  very  high  price  of  1853,  gives  the  following  average  of 
prices  for  August: 


1853. 
1854. 
1855. 
1856. 


Average. 


40 
25 
31* 

28* 

31 


1857. 
1858. 
1859. 
1860. 


29* 
33* 
36 


Average 34 


Returning  to  the  New  York  table,  it  is  interesting  to  compare 
the  average  prices  for  different  periods. 

Common.  Merino.  Pulled. 

1825-'28 28*  42|  27 

1829-'32 26  44f  38£ 

1833-'41 34  49  42 

1842-'46 23£  82  27 

1847-'56 32  89£  31 

1857-'60 35*  44*  28* 

It  must  now  be  conce'ded,  since  facts  indisputably  prove,  that 
under  the  system  of  protective  duties  the  price  of  wool  has  been 
lower  th'an  under  non-protective  tariffs ;  that  the  American  wool  has 
risen  in  price  when  the  manufacture  has  been  encouraged  by  the  free 


THE  WOOL-GROWER.  161 

admission  of  foreign  wools,  or  by  low  duties  on  them,  coupled  with 
a  revenue  duty  only  on  the  woollen  goods ;  and  that  it  has  been  de 
pressed  in  price  whenever  the  manufacture  has  been  retarded  by 
high  duties  on  foreign  wool,  or  pushed  by  protection  to  attempt 
branches  of  the  manufacture  not  naturally  sustained  by  our  own 
quality  of  wool.  But  to  the  wool-grower  there  is  another  considera 
tion  of  especial  importance.  The  essential  thing  is  not  that  he  shall 
get  high  prices  in  a  single  year;  still  less  that  he  shall  see  high 
quotations  for  a  single  month ;  he  needs,  and  must  have,  to  make  the 
culture  of  sheep  profitable,  a  price  remaining  steadily  at  or  above  a 
certain  limit,  and  never  falling  below  it  in  any  year  so  continuously 
that  he  cannot  dispose  of  his  clip  of  wool  for  that  year  at  fair  rates. 
The  diagram  will  show  at  a  glance  when  such  periods  of  sustained 
prices  have  occurred.  The  first  was  from  January,  1833,  to  Febru 
ary,  1840,  eight  years,  during  which  common  fleece  never  fell  below 
32  cents,  except  for  a  month  in  1833,  the  winter  of  1834,  and  a  part 
of  1835.  In  any  one  of  these  eight  consecutive  years,  the  grower 
could  obtain  at  least  32  cents  for  his  common  fleece,  and  in  the  same 
years  he  could  obtain  49  cents  for  merino,  though  only  in  the  last 
month  of  1838.  But  this  was  a  period  of  "  free  trade,"  during  which 
cheap  foreign  wool  was  admitted  free,  and  all  duties  were  reduced. 
The  next  period  of  sustained  high  prices  was  from  1849  to  1861,  thir 
teen  years ;  and  in  any  one  of  these  years  the  grower  could  have  sold 
common  fleece  for  30  cents,  and  the  price  fell  below  that  mark  only 
in  parts  of  four  years.  Merino,  also,  never  fell  below  36  cents  dur 
ing  that  period,  and  in  every  year  after  1849  the  grower  could  have 
obtained  at  least  40  cents.  But  this  was  also  a  period  of  "  free 
trade,"  and  during  the  closing  years  wool  worth  less  than  18  cents 
was  admitted  free.  During  the  thirty-six  years  which  these  tables 
cover,  no  other  periods  of  sustained  prices  occurred ;  and  these  facts, 
with  the  averages  already  given,  prove  that  low  duties  on  foreign 
wool,  and  free  admission  of  cheap  foreign  wool,  have  secured  higher 
and  more  steady  prices  to  the  American  grower  than  any  other  form 
of  tariff  tried  during  that  period. 

But  wool  is  consumed  by  manufacturing,  and  the  manufacturer 
can  pay  more  when  prosperous  than  when  embarrassed.  Do  not 
these  facts  prove  that  the  wool  manufacture  possessed  greater  abil 
ity  to  consume  wool  at  fair  prices,  under  low  and  non-protective 
duties,  than  under  protection  ?  The  domestic  supply  of  wool  has 
not  controlled  the  price,  for  this  country  has  never  produced  as  much 
as  it  has  consumed ;  the  tendency  has  therefore  been  at  all  times  to 


162  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

secure  to  the  grower  as  high  prices  as  the  manufacturer  could  afford 
to  pay.  When  he  is  able  to  pay  30  cents  for  common,  as  he  was 
in  the  periods  1833-'40,  and  1849-'61,  then  the  farmer  asks  and  ob 
tains  it ;  but  when  he  is  hot  able  to  consume  wool  profitably  at  that 
price,  as  he  was  not  in  the  protective  periods,  1824-'32  and  1843-'46, 
then  the  farmer  has  to  accept  less.  The  facts  prove,  then,  that  the 
manufacturers  of  wool  in  this  country  have  been  able  to  consume 
wool  at  the  best  prices  when  they  have  been  least  protected ! 

To  those  who  still  believe  that  protection  must  protect,  the  propo 
sition  will  be  somewhat  startling.  But  it  accords  precisely  with  the 
incidents  already  observed  in  the  history  of  the  manufacture,  and 
especially  with  the  records  of  foreign  importations.  When  high 
duties  deprive  the  manufacturer  of  a  variety  of  cheap  foreign  wools, 
he  is  placed  at  a  fatal  disadvantage  as  compared  with  manufacturers 
of  other  countries.  Forced  to  use  American  wool  exclusively,  he 
must  abandon  the  making  of  articles  which  can  be  most  profitably 
made  by  mixture  of  wools,  or  must  see  himself  undersold  by  foreign 
goods.  When  high  tariffs  prompt  manufacturers  to  attempt  work 
in  which  countries  with  free  wool  have  the  greatest  advantage,  they 
tempt  them  with  delusive  hopes.  The  foreign  competition  is  shut 
out  only  for  a  short  time.  Soon  the  flood  of  foreign  goods  rushes  in 
again,  and  the  capitalist,  who  has  been  tempted  to  build  on  a  quick 
sand,  sinks. 

It  remains  to  consider  the  effect  of  recent  tariffs.  Protective 
duties  were  imposed  in  1861  of  5  per  cent,  on  wool  worth  18  cents 
a  pound  or  less,  3  cents  a  pound  on  wool  worth  24  cents  to  18  cents, 
and  9  cents  a  pound  on  wool  worth  over  24  cents.  Under  the  act  of 
1865,  wool  worth  12J  cents  a  pound  or  less  bore  a  duty  of  3  cents 
a  pound.  Under  the  act  of  1866,  the  same  wool  was,  by  additional 
charges,  held  to  have  cost  over  12  cents  a  pound.  Under  the  act  of 
1867,  the  duties  imposed  were,  on  clothing  or  combing  wools,  value 
32  cents  per  pound  or  less,  10  cents  a  pound  and  11  per  cent,  ad 
valorem ;  on  such  wools  of  higher  price,  12  cents  a  pound  and  10 
per  cent. ;  on  carpet  wools,  costing  12  cents  a  pound  or  less,  3  cents 
a  pound,  and  costing  over  12  cents,  a  duty  of  6  cents  a  pound. 

What  effect  have  these  extraordinary  duties  had  upon  the  prices 
of  American  and  foreign  wool  ?  It  is  admitted  by  all  that  the  price 
of  American  wool  is  lower  than  it  was  in  1860.  Mr.  Greeley  states 
the  fact  as  a  proof  "  that  protection  inevitably  tends,  by  stimulating 
home  production,  to  a  reduction  of  price,"  but  neglects  to  state  that 
this  same  protection,  within  the  very  year  in  which  his  essays  were 


THE  WOOL-GROWER. 


163 


written,  instead  of  "  stimulating  home  production,"  actually  caused 
a  reduction  of  forty  millions  of  pounds  in  the  clip  ;  caused  no  less 
than  four  million  sheep  to  be  slaughtered,  according  to  one  state 
ment  of  the  Agricultural  Bureau,*  and  the  number  actually  killed 
must  have  been  still  greater ;  and,  in  spite  of  this  greatly-reduced 
production,  also  caused  prices  of  wool  to  fall  even  lower  than  the 
ruinous  rates  of  1868.  These  facts,  which  would,  indeed,  have 
sadly  marred  the  beauty  of  his  theory,  Mr.  Greeley  remembered  to 
forget  In  a  table,  at  the  close  of  this  chapter,  will  be  found  prices 
of  different  grades  of  wool  at  New  York,  October  31st,  in  1860,  and 
since;  but  the  price  of  wool  and  the  rate  of  gold  have  quite 
recently  changed. 

The  prices,  October  31,  1860,  and  December  25,  1869,  gold  then 
selling  at  120,  compare  thus  • 


1860. 

1869. 

1869. 

Gold. 

Currency. 

Gold. 

Saxony  Fleece.  
Full-blood  Merino  

54-58 

48-52 

65-60 

47-53 

46  -50 
39  -44 

lr  and  £ 

40-46 

46-50 

38  -42 

Extra  Pulled 

42-46 

39-45 

324-37* 

Superfine  Pulled 

37-40 

42-46 

35  -38 

No.  1  Pulled  

28-30 

30-33 

25  -27^ 

California,  unwashed.  .  .  . 

24-32 

26-30 

22  -25 

Every  grade  of  American  wool  is  selling  at  a  price  considerably 
lower  in  gold,  and  scarcely  higher  in  currency,  than  it  commanded  at 
the  close  of  the  long  free-trade  period.  The  loss  has  been  eight 
cents  a  pound  on  Saxony,  eight  and  a  half  cents  on  blood  merino, 
ten  cents  a  pound  on  extra  pulled,  and  about  five  cents  on  California 
wool.  Inspection  of  the  table  referred  to  will  show  that  meanwhile 
foreign  goods  have  been  somewhat  increased  in  price  in  this  country, 
in  spite  of  the  very  great  decrease  in  price  elsewhere.  African  un 
washed  sold  in  New  York  for  9-18  cents,  and  washed  from  16-28 
cents,  in  1860.  African  unwashed  now  sells  for  16-19,  and  Cape  of 
Good  Hope  unwashed  for  33-34  cents.  But  the  price  at  the  place 
of  export  has  decreased  from  18  to  11  cents,  and  the  foreign  manu 
facturers  have  the  benefit  of  that  advantage,  while  ours  do  not.  Mes- 
tiza  then  sold  for  16-25  cents  in  New  York,  and  it  now  sells  for  20-30 

*  In  another  statement  (March  and  April  report,  1869)  the  decrease  since  1866  is 
declared  to  be  "  not  less  than  20  per  cent.,"  which  would  imply  a  slaughter  of  at 
least  eight  millions. 
12 


164  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

cents,  but  the  cost  to  the  foreign  manufacturer  has  declined  so 
greatly  that  good  qualities  are  bought  in  England  for  sixpence  a 
pound — just  about  the  sum  which  our  manufacturer  would  have  to 
pay  in  duties  alone.  Smyrna  unwashed  sold,  in  1860,  in  New  York, 
for  11-18  cents,  and  washed  for  22-28,  but  the  same  qualities  now 
cost  20-23  cents  and  33-35  cents.  These  facts  show — 

I.  That,  in  the  manufacture  of  any  goods  requiring  foreign  or 
a  mixture  of  foreign  wool,  the  foreign  manufacturer  has  an  advan 
tage  absolutely  fatal  to  our  industry. 

II.  That,  in  the  manufacture  of  goods  from  American  wool  alone, 
the  manufacturer  lives  only  by  depressing  the  price  of  American 
wool  lower  than  was  paid  in  1860,  under  "  free  trade." 

Paying  eight  to  ten  cents  a  pound  less  for  wool  than  in  1860,  the 
manufacturer  ought  to  be  able  to  make  a  yard  of  cloth  eighteen  to 
twenty-two  cents  cheaper ;  but  he  does  not  and  cannot.  The 
foreign  manufacturer,  with  wool  still  lower,  can  and  does  make 
cheaper  cloth.  Hence,  our  mills  meet  a  competition  almost  as  great 
as  they  did  in  1860 ;  the  people  have  to  pay  twice  as  much  for  their 
clothes  as  they  should;  and  the  unhappy,  much-protected  wool- 
grower  slaughters  his  sheep.  He  has  been  plundered  doubly :  ten 
cents  a  pound  has  been  taken  from  the  price  of  his  wool,  and  twenty 
cents  a  yard  has  not  been  taken  from  the  price  of  his  cloth.  Yet 
there  are  farmers  who  meet  in  convention  and  resolve  that  the  duty 
on  wool  ought  not  to  be  removed !  Do  not  these  men  show  less 
good  sense  than  the  sheep  whose  wool  they  clip  ?  For  the  sheep 
never  insist  upon  being  shorn,  and  never  solemnly  resolve  that  they 
like  it. 

In  this  country  we  have  never  yet  produced  either  the  quantity  or 
the  variety  of  wool  needed  to  sustain  a  vigorous  manufacture,  and 
the  ability  of  the  manufacturer  to  consume  American  wool  at  fair 
prices  depends  upon  a  free  choice  and  ample  supply  of  cheap  foreign 
wool.  Those  who  advocate  protection  to  the  wool-grower  maintain 
that  it  will  cause  the  growth  of  other  needed  qualities.  But  it  is 
well  known  that  the  effort  has  been  entirely  unsuccessful ;  that  the 
increase  in  production  has  been  almost  exclusively  in  those  qualities 
which  we  already  produce  quite  as  largely  as  they  can  be  consumed. 
The  reason  is  plain :  the  farmer,  rightly  or  wrongly,  believes  that 
the  growth  of  those  qualities  is  the  most  profitable,  and  he  persists, 
and  will  persist,  as  long  as  duties  encourage  him  to  do  so,  in  growing 
sheep  for  the  wool  alone,  and  in  striving  for  weight  instead  of  quality 
of  fleece.  If  a  removal  of  all  duties  would  make  it  no  longer  profit- 


THE  WOOL-GROWER.  165 

able  in  Eastern  States  to  grow  sheep,  except  for  wool  and  mutton, 
the  culture  of  breeds  such  as  those  which  sustain  the  manufactures 
of  England,  France,  and  Germany,  might  soon  be  generally  under 
taken  in  the  States  where  land  is  costly,  and  where  proximity  to 
markets  secures  a  fair  price  for  flesh  and  lambs.  But  high  duties 
and  hopes  of  profit  only  encourage  the  farmer  to  multiply  his  flocks 
of  the  American  merino.  Tariffs  do  not  induce  men  to  grow  rye  on 
land  which  will  produce  wheat  in  equal  quantity.  Neither  tariffs  on 
wool  nor  appeals  from  manufacturers  will  persuade  the  farmer  to 
grow  fleeces  weighing  three  pounds  as  long  as  the  duties  promise 
him  a  profit  on  fleece  and  yolk  weighing  from  seven  ,to  twenty 
pounds. 

Why  should  we  encourage,  at  public  expense,  the  growing  of 
sheep  in  Eastern  States  for  the  wool  alone  ?  Can  it  be  that  this 
culture  is  the  most  useful  employment  of  land  as  costly  and  labor 
as  dear  as  ours  ?  We  have  in  Texas,  New  Mexico,  and  California, 
lands  less  valuable,  and  peculiarly  adapted  to  the  sheep-culture,  and 
thither,  if  no  artificial  system  prevented,  the  growing  of  sheep,  for 
wool  only,  would  naturally  be  transferred,  while  the  English  breeds 
of  sheep  would  be  found  in  well-settled  States,  and  the  manufacture 
would  have  a  solid  footing.  Is  it  indeed  desirable  for  a  great  and 
well-settled  country  to  go  back  as  far  as  possible  toward  a  patriar 
chal  &>rm  of  industry  ?  Ought  the  country  to  pay  men  for  employ 
ing  costly  land  and  costly  labor  in  such  a  fashion  ?  To  "  protect 
American  industry,"  must  we  employ  it  as  nearly  as  possible  after 
the  methods  of  the  South  American  or  African  pampas  ?  We  are 
simply  trying  to  prevent  a  natural  progress  from  semi-barbarism  to 
the  highest  civilization ;  trying  to  prevent  the  growing  of  sheep  in 
Texas  and  New  Mexico,  where  it  will  always  be  profitable,  and  to 
force  in  New  England,  New  York,  and  Ohio,  a  growth  of  sheep 
for  wool  only.  Whatever  the  purpose,  eight  years  of  protection  has 
only  induced  an  excessive  development  of  a  culture  which,  in  many 
localities,  is  a  sheer  waste  of  land  and  labor.  Nature  frowns  upon 
all  attempts  to  arrest  the  progress  of  mankind.-  Disaster  after  dis 
aster  has  driven  the  farmer  to  Congress  for  more  aid,  which,  when 
granted,  has  only  proved  a  new  Pandora's  box  of  evils.  .  Meanwhile, 
he  has  been  taught  to  rely  much  upon  Congress,  and  little  upon 
common-sense.  Such  lessons  have  to  be  unlearned,  and  experience 
is  a  severe  teacher. 

In  brief,  the  protection  of  wool  and  woollen  manufactures  has 
never  enabled  us  to  shut  out  any  important  part  of  foreign  importa- 


166 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


tions,  but  has  retarded  natural  growth  in  the  working  of  American 
and  foreign  wools.  It  has  never  caused  the  growth  of  new  and 
needed  varieties  of  wool,  but  has  only  hindered  a  natural  adaptation 
of  sheep-culture  to  the  condition  and  needs  of  the  country.  More 
than  once  it  has  tempted  the  capitalist  into  ruinous  undertakings, 
and  the  grower  into  a  waste  of  land  and  labor.  It  has  taxed  the 
people  many  millions,  has  taken  money  from  the  farmer's  pocket,  and 
has  deprived  both  grower  and  manufacturer  of  that  measure  of  solid 
prosperity  which,  under  low  duties  and  with  free  wool,  both  had 
attained. 

PRICE  OF  WOOL. 

Common  Fleece,  New  York,  Highest  and  Lowest  Each  Month,  with  Average 
for  Year,  and  Duty. 


1825  20  p.c. 

1826 

1887 

1828 

18294-45 
18304-50 


25©30  ;>:><-'  :;u  Mi)-,/  3D  30@35 


88| 

43 
184 
801 

40|  38J- 
30  28 
20@24  27 


30@34|  29 
31@37'31@37 
3530@35i  37 
30@32l  30 
'-,40!  38 


27@32i27@32  27@32!27@32  27@32  27@32  27@32'27@32  27 


30@34|30@34  80@34!88@84:88®84  83@34  28@80'2a®85 

47         47         40(T/4:24(yrM240@4240@4242@4445@51 
62@65  65@70  75@80I75@80  70@73  65@,67|65@67j 


1835  4-36 

183614-34 

1837,4-32 

18384-30 

1839,4-28 

1840*4-26 

1841,4-24 

1842 '4-22 

18433-30 

1844  3-30 

1845|3-30 

1846 '3-30 

1847  30  p.C. 

1848 

1849 

1850 

1851 

1852 

1853 

1854 

1855 

1856 

1857 

1858  24  p.C. 

1859 

1860 


1861 
1862 
1863 


9cts. 


PRICE  OF  WOOL  AT  NEW  YORK,  EACH  MONTH.-TREASURY  REPORT,  1863. 

P 


Highest  price,  merino,  for  two  years,  1836-'37,  56  cents ;  five  years.  1832-'37,  48  cents ; 
twelve  years,  1849-'61,  36  cents  ;  common,  two  years.  1836-'37,  37  cents  ;  five  years,  1835-'39, 
thirty  cents;  six  years,  1855-'61,  twenty-nine  and  a  half  cents;  six  years,  1849-'54,  twenty, 
six  cents ;  seven  and  a  half  years,  1833-'39,  twenty-eight  cents. 


THE  WOOL-GROWER. 
WOOL— NEW- YORK  QUOTATIONS  REDUCED  TO  GOLD. 


icr 


1860.   1861.       1869.  1868.          1864.  1865.          1866.  186U. 


x'y 
l'd 


full-bl'd  nieri'0  48@52  4 
Nat'e,  %  &  %  bl.|34©46  3 

pulled  ....  42©  1«  3S©40  44 


£4846 
t>4846 

,.,..       ..  _          14448 
Extra  pi 

Superfine  "  37©40  36@40  43 

No.  1          "  ....  '28©30  32©34  37 
California,uuw'd  24©32  27©32  29 

"  common,  "  :10@20  12        |15>^( 
S.  A.  Mestiza,  "  |l6@25  16@20  19 
"  common,  "  1 10®  13  14@17  14 

Cordova 81 

Valparaiso 1 

African,  washed.  " 
African,  unw'd.. 
Mexican,       " 
Smyrna,        " 
"       washed . 


14H9    ©27 

18  163tf@21«|14X 

"'31    ©35     126^ 


The  quotation  for  1869  is  that  of  September  llth ;  for  the  other  years  the  prices  of  Octo 
ber  31st  are  given,  taken  from  the  Chronicle,  New  York. 


PRICE  OF  WOOL. 


YEAR. 


NEW  YORK.— AVEBAGE  or  MONTHLY 
RATES. 


Merino. 


Pulled. 


BOSTON.— G.  LIVERHOBE'S 
TABLE. 


Fine 


Middle. 


Long. 


1825 

1826 

1827 

1828 

1829 

1830 

1831 

1832 

1833 

1834 

1835 

1836 .. 

1837 

1838 

1839 

1840 

1841 

1842 

1843 

1844... 

18 15 

1846... 

1847 

1848 

1849 

1850... 

1851 , 

1852 

1833 

1854 

1855 

1856 

1857 

1858 

1859... 
1860... 


25*130 


37<T/  40 


86 

:U 
5S 

50 
4:i 
57 

:>i 
58 
59 
47 
44 
49 
40 
4-2 

87 


81 
89 
96 
80 
96 
41 
49 
88 
45 
40 
15 
4!) 

89 
88 
40 
88 
84 


;n 


80 
96 
80 
89 
88 
37 
47 
84 
84 
U 
u 


'  Pulled  No.  1  from  this  point  forward. 


168  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

IKON-HISTORY  OF  THE  IRON  MANUFACTURE  PRIOR  TO  1833. 

WHAT  is  "  the  iron  interest  ?  "  Is  it  confined  to  the  taking  of  ore 
from  the  mountains ;  to  the  reduction  of  ore,  by  smelting,  to  raw 
iron,  called  pig-metal ;  or  to  the  preparation  of  that  metal,  by  further 
processes,  for  use  as  bar-iron,  wrought-iron,  or  steel  ?  Does  it  not 
include  far  more  ?  Does  not  the  whole  business  of  casting  iron  into 
forms  for  use,  and  of  manufacture  of  hardware,  tools,  cutlery,  and 
wire,  deserve  consideration  as  part  of  "the  iron  interest?"  Do 
not  the  making  of  nails  and  bolts,  horseshoes,  safes  and  locks,  the 
shaping  of  sheet-iron  into  pipe,  or  the  working  of  iron  at  the  black 
smith's  forge ;  the  manufacture  of  agricultural  implements,  and  of 
all  forms  of  machinery,  steam-engines  especially  included — do  not 
all  these  deserve  to  be  remembered  whenever  "  the  iron  interest " 
is  mentioned  ?  Are  not  these,  indeed,  the  very  branches  of  that  in 
terest  which  most  affect  the  welfare  of  the  country  ? 

To  certain  persons  it  seems  otherwise,  if  we  may  judge  by  their 
words  or  acts.  Whenever  "  the  iron  interest "  is  named,  they  seem 
to  think  only  of  pig-iron.  To  them,  a  large  production  and  a  high 
price  of  pig-iron  seem  to  represent  an  approach  to  the  millennium. 
Whenever  protection  is  abroad  in  the  land,  it  seizes  upon  the  pro 
duction  of  pig-iron  as  the  tender  infant  which  stands  in  greatest 
need  of  careful  nursing.  By  these  persons,  the  idea  that  an  extrav 
agant  and  unnatural  price  of  pig  may  do  injury  to  the  iron  interest 
as  a  whole  is  treated  as  the  most  absurd  of  all  notions,  and  a  sug 
gestion  that  lower  duties  on  pig-iron  may  benefit  the  iron  interest 
as  a  whole  is  regarded  as  conclusive  proof  that  its  author  has  been 
"  bought  with  British  gold  !  " 

If  some  gardener,  anxious  to  make  his  tree  bear  fine  fruit,  should 
dig  up  its  roots  and  wrap  them  all  closely  in  bandages  to  "  protect " 
them  from  the  soil  and  moisture,  he  would  do  a  thing  not  more  un 
reasonable  than  those  are  doing  who  make  pig-iron  costly,  and  call 
that  "  protecting  the  iron  interest ! " 

In  1860,  there  were  employed  in  all  branches  of  iron  manufacture 
198,532  persons,  and  its  aggregate  product  was  valued  at $£56,1 3 7,73 6. 
In  the  mining  and  smelting  of  iron — the  production  of- pig-metal — 
there  were  employed  19,133  persons,  and  their  product  was  valued 
at  $23,275,412.  Less  than  one-tenth  of  the  hands  employed,  less 
than  one-eleventh  of  the  product,  belong  to  the  making  of  pig.  In 


HISTORY  OF  THE  IRON  MANUFACTURE  PRIOR  TO   1833.     169 

forging  and  rolling  iron,  and  making  steel — in  the  preparation  of 
iron — were  then  employed  22,903  persons,  and  the  value  of  products 
was  $38,417,099.  As  the  production  of  pig  employs  9£  per  cent,  of 
the  hands,  and  yields  9  per  cent,  of  the  product  of  the  whole  iron 
interest,  the  preparation  of  iron  employs  12  per  cent,  of  the  hands, 
and  yields  15  per  cent,  of  the  product.  Looking  next  to  the  branches 
which  may  more  properly  be  termed  manufactures  of  iron,  we  find 
that  these  are  of  two  classes :  those  which  are  supposed  to  be  sus 
tained  by  protective  duties  ;  and  those  which  in  the  nature  of  things 
cannot  be  thus  sustained  because  exposed  to  no  competition,  or 
which  have  been  so  developed  in  this  country  that  they  need  no  aid. 
In  a  classification  of  the  iron  interest  (page  187)  will  be  found 
the  entries  in  the  census-tables  of  1860,  arranged  in  four  divisions: 
"Production,"  "Preparation,"  "Protected,"  and  "Non-protected 
Branches."  It  will  at  once  be  granted  that,  if  the  non-protected 
branches  cannot  be  aided  by  duties,  they  must  be  retarded  or  injured 
by  any  increase  in  the  cost  of  iron.  To  these,  therefore,  if  the  classi 
fication  is  correct,  the  protective  system  can  only  do  harm,  if  it  in 
creases  the  cost  of  the  material.  And  these  embrace  more  than  half 
of  the  hands  employed,  and  yield  more  than  half  of  the  product,  of 
the  whole  iron  interest. 

Concerning  the  correctness  of  the  classification,  it  may  be  re 
marked  that  in  the  making  of  all  machinery  our  artisans  are  exposed 
to  no  competition;  that  when,  iron  has  been  of  moderate  price, 
American  locomotives  have  been  shipped  to  Europe  for  use  in  Eng 
land  and  Prussia ;  that,  sewing  and  other  machines  are  even  now 
largely  exported  to  Europe ;  that  American  fire-arms  are  not  only 
of  known  excellence,  but  are  made  by  machinery  not  equalled  any 
where  else  for  ingenuity  and  effectiveness  ;  that  our  agricultural  im 
plements  have  proved  their  superiority  in  European  expositions, 
and  the  history  presently  to  be  reviewed  will  show  that  dependence 
upon  foreign  manufactures  of  this  class  was  long  ago  prevented  by 
the  superiority  of  our  products.  The  same  fact  will  appear  in  regard 
to  all  cut  nails — indeed,  we  export  of  them  largely  even  when  the 
raw  iron  is  costly.  The  workers  in  sheet-iron  are  not  separated  in 
the  census-tables,  and  in  fact  cannot  be,  from  the  workers  in  tin ;  and 
while  the  making  of  sheet-iron  can  be  protected,  the  shaping  of  it 
into  pipe  or  other  forms  evidently  cannot  be  exposed  to  any  com 
petition.  Nor  can  the  blacksmith  be  affected  by  duties  except  when 
they  increase  the  cost  of  his  tools  and  materials. 

In  general  terms,  then,  it  may  be  said  that  one-half  of  the  iron\ 


170  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

interest  cannot  be  aided  by  any  form  of  protective  duties  on  similar 
products,  but  must  be  injured  if  the  cost  of  its  material  is  increased. 
/"~ Again,  one-quarter  of  that  interest,  comprising  those  branches 
/classed  as  "  protected,"  must  be  injured  if  raw  iron,  bar  or  wrought 
/  iron,  or  steel,  is  rendered  more  costly.     Whether  this  injury  can  be 
I    compensated  by  duties  on  foreign  manufactured  products,  must  be 
\ascertained. 

Again,  one-eighth  of  the  iron  interest,  engaged  in  the  rolling  and 
forging  of  iron,  an<J  the  making  of  steel,  must  be  injured  if  raw  iron 
is  rendered  more  costly,  but  its  products  may  be  correspondingly  en 
hanced  in  price. 

Finally,  less  than  one-tenth  of  the  iron  interest — the  production 
of  pig-metal — if  benefited  at  all  in  the  increased  price  of  its  prod 
uct — must  be  so  benefited  at  the  expense  of  injury  to  more  than 
nine-tenths  of  the  iron  interest,  and  to  a  whole  nation  of  consumers 
of  iron  and  its  products ;  or,  stating  it  more  exactly,  the  relation  of 
the  different  classes,  measured  by  number  of  hands  and  by  value  of 
aggregate  product,  is  as  follows  : 

Hands.  Product. 

Production  (pig) 9^  per  cent.  9  per  cent. 

Preparation  (bar,  etc.) 12          "  15         " 

Manufacture  (protected) 24          "  25        " 

Manufacture  (not  protected) 54£        "  51         " 

100          "  100        " 

This  is  "  the  iron  interest,"  with  pig  for  its  roots,  bar  for  its 
trunk,  castings,  etc.,  for  its  boughs,  and  the  non-protected  manufac 
tures  for  its  richest  fruit,  and  our  protecting  gardeners  have  band 
aged  roots,  trunk,  and  boughs,  to  make  it  bear  more  largely.  Has 
the  experiment  succeeded  ?  In  reviewing  the  history  of  this  interest, 
it  is  important  to  keep  in  mind  the  relation  of  these  classes  to  each 
other,  and  to  inquire  not  only  whether  the  production  of  pig  alone, 
or  of  pig  and  bar  iron,  has  been  increased,  but  whether  the  produc 
tion  of  wealth  by  the  manufacture  of  iron  in  all  forms  has  been  in 
creased  by  protective  duties. 

The  fashioning  of  iron  into  shapes  for  use  began  in  this  country 
as  early  as  1646,  when  Joseph  Jenks  made  the  first  castings  in  New 
England  of  which  we  find  record.  In  1652  there  were  established  in 
Massachusetts  blast-furnaces,  a  bloomery,  and  forge-hammer;  in  1655 
there  was  granted  to  Jenks  a  patent  for  "  an  improved  scythe," 
which,  in  every  essential  feature,  was  like  the  implement  now  in 
use  ;  in  1666  people  skilled  in  wire-drawing  were  found,  and  in  1731 
there  were  six  furnaces  for  hollow  ware  in  New  England,  nineteen 


HISTORY  OF  THE  IRON   MANUFACTURE  PRIOR  TO  1833.     171 

forges,  or  bloomeries,  one  slitting-mill,  and  a  nail-factory.  Before 
the  Revolutionary  War,  in  Massachusetts,  as  in  other  colonies,  there 
were  made  edge  tools,  augers,  scythes,  shovels,  "  better  and  cheaper 
than  the  English,"  nails,  muskets,  cannon,  and  almost  every  kind  of 
domestic  casting. 

During  all  this  time  this  industry,  then  really  in  its  infancy,  was 
exposed  to  the  full  force  of  a  foreign  competition,  not  only  unchecked 
by  any  duties  whatever,  but  even  favored  by  British  officials  and 
British  laws.  If  it  grew  so  rapidly  and  vigorously,  even  then,  can 
it  be  supposed  that  it  would  not  now  survive  the  removal  of  artificial 
aid  ?  So  rapid  was  its  growth  that  the  manufacturers  of  England 
became  alarmed,  and  besought  Parliament  to  protect  them,  against 
the  infant.  By  the  act  of  1750,  England  absolutely  prohibited  the 
erection  of  any  slitting  or  rolling  mills,  plating-forges,  or  steel-fur 
naces,  in  the  colonies,  and  prohibited  the  exportation  from  them  of 
any  manufactured  products,  but,  with  a  greater  wisdom  than  we  have 
since  shown,  encouraged  the  exporting  of  pig  and  bar  iron  to  Eng 
land,  that  the  British  manufacturer  might  have  his  raw  material 
both  cheap  and  abundant.  In  fact,  as  early  as  1718,  raw  iron  had 
been  exported  to  England  from  Maryland,  and  by  1730  the  quantity 
exported  from  that  colony,  Virginia,  and  Pennsylvania,  to  England, 
was  over  2,250  tons.  In  1732-'33  we  began  to  export  bar-iron  to 
England,  and  from  that  time  until  the  Revolution  a  quantity  of  pig 
and  bar  was  thus  exported  every  year.  Prior  to  1750  the  iron  thus 
exported  paid  a  duty  of  3s.  9d.  a  ton,  and,  when  it  was  proposed  to 
repeal  this  impost,  and  admit  American  iron  free,  the  iron-masters 
protested  that  their  works  at  Sheffield  and  elsewhere,  erected  at 
great  expense,  would  be  ruined,  the  laborers  be  rendered  destitute, 
or  forced  to  emigrate,  and  "  the  plenty  and  cheapness  of  wood  would 
enable  American  iron  to  undersell  the  British,  and  thus  ruin  the 
trade,  while  the  iron  manufacture,  rendered  wholly  dependent  on 
so  distant  and  precarious  a  source  for  material,  would  probably  de 
cay,  and  reduce  thousands  of  workmen  to  want  and  misery ! " 
How  often  have  we  since  heard  from  American  lips  the  same  dismal 
prophecies !  It  is  the  old  cry  of  a  threatened  monopoly,  pleading 
anxious  regard  for  the  welfare  of  labor.  Were  these  men  honest  ? 
Every  bit  as  honest  as  the  men  who  say  that  American  furnaces 
would  now  be  closed  by  the  repeal  of  duties  on  pig-iron  ! 

The  act  of  1750  encouraged  the  importation  of  American  bar, 
but  prohibited  the  taking  it  ten  miles  from  London.  In  1756  the 
manufacturers  petitioned  for  repeal  of  this  prohibition,  and,  again, 


172  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

the  owners  of  109  forges  in  England  and  Wales  represented  that  the 
American  would  compete  with  British  iron,  the  making  of  which 
would  be  stopped,  "and  a  great  number  of  families,  dependent 
thereon,  be  reduced  to  beggary."  It  was  answered  that  a  manufac 
ture  is  much  more  valuable  than  the  raw  materials,  and  that,  as  these 
could  not  be  produced  at  home  in  such  quantity  and  at  such  a  price 
as  to  sustain  the  manufacture,  it  was  the  duty  of  the  legislature  to 
encourage  their  free  importation  if  it  should  arrest  their  production 
on  the  island ;  that  progress  of  other  nations  made  it  more  than  ever 
necessary  to  obtain  materials  at  a  lower  price,  or  lose  the  manufac 
ture  of  fine  articles  of  steel  and  iron  ;  the  only  way  to  do  this  was 
to  reduce  the  duty  on  foreign  iron,  "  or  make  it  necessary  for  the 
iron-masters  to  reduce  their  price  by  raising  up  a  rival  in  Amer 
ica"  Is  there  not  matter  here  which  an  American  Congress  to-day 
may  well  study  ? 

The  prohibition  was  repealed,  and  the  importation  of  American 
iron  to  England  increased  from  3,441  tons  in  1755  to  5,303  tons  in 
1771,  and  then  began  to  decrease.  It  is  not  necessary  to  add  that 
this  flood  of  foreign  iron  did  not  put  out  British  furnace-fires ;  but, 
forcing  British  monopolists  to  put  down  the  price  of  the  material,  it 
did  build  up  in  England  a  most  powerful  manufacture. 

Not  only  before  the  war,  but  after  the  Revolution,  and  before  the 
adoption  of  the  Constitution  or  of  any  national  tariff,  our  manufac 
ture  was  exposed  to  the  full  force  of  British  competition.  The  most 
abundant  evidence  exists  that  our  industry  was  not  only  not  crushed 
by  this  competition,  but  made  very  great  and  rapid  progress.  In 
the  making  of  machinery  our  independence  was  thus  early  estab 
lished  ;  even  then,  before  the  invention  of  nail-machines,  the  making 
of  nails  was  so  extensively  carried  on,  that  there  was  a  large  surplus 
exported,  both  from  Pennsylvania  and  New  England ;  and,  in  making 
fire-arms  and  all  forms  of  farming  implements,  American  superiority 
was  quickly  demonstrated.  Nor  was  the  country  prevented  from 
commencing  the  higher  branches  of  the  manufacture.  Before  the 
adoption  of  the  Constitution,  the  importations  of  steel  had  been  ma 
terially  reduced  by  the  progress  of  our  own  industry,  in  spite  of  open 
competition  with  other  countries.  A  single  furnace  in  Pennsylvania 
was  making  230  tons  of  steel  in  a  year;  and  at  that  time  we  find  it 
recorded  that  "a  dangerous  rivalry  to  British  iron  interests  was 
apprehended  in  the  American  States — not  only  in  the  production  of 
rough  iron,  from  the  cheapness  of  fuel  and  the  quality  of  the  iron, 
but  also  in  articles  of  steel  cutlery  and  other  finished  products, 


HISTORY  OF  THE  IRON  MANUFACTURE  PRIOR  TO   1833.     173 

from  the  dexterity  of  the  Americans  in  the  manufacture  of  scythes, 
axes,  nails,  etc.  In  these  they  exceeded  the  French  and  most  Euro 
pean  nations,  as  well  in  the  style  and  finish  as  in  the  quality  of  their 
articles,  being  made  from  the  best  iron."  That  the  manufacture  was 
not  prostrated  after  the  peace,  Secretary  Hamilton  shows  in  his 
elaborate  report  of  1791,  saying  that  iron-works  were  carried  on 
more  numerously  and  more  advantageously  than  formerly,  and  the 
price  of  iron  had  risen  because  of  the  increase  of  the  demand  for  the 
manufacture,  from  about  $64,  the  average  before  the  Revolution,  to 
about  $80.  He  particularly  mentions  that,  in  the  manufacture  of 
steel,  several  new  enterprises  on  an  extensive  scale  "  had  been  lately 
set  on  foot."  If  this  manufacture  had  here  such  natural  advantages 
that  in  its  very  infancy  it  alarmed  English  manufacturers  of  the 
higher  grades,  and,  though  exposed  to  wholly  unchecked  competition 
with  foreign  industry,  actually  advanced  with  such  vigor  and  rapid 
ity,  before  the  adoption  of  any  tariff  laws  whatever,  as  to  produce 
nails  for  exportation,  machines  unmatched  in  excellence,  implements 
of  acknowledged  superiority,  and  scythes  and  axes  equal  to  the  best 
of  European  make,  is  it  not  the  height  of  folly  to  say  that  it  would 
never  have  existed,  or  could  not  now  be  sustained,  without  protec 
tive  duties? 

The  first  tariff  framed  by  the  founders  of  the  government,  though 
intended  to  give  protection  in  some  sense,  imposed  no  higher  duties 
than  those  upon  iron,  namely,  7J  per  cent,  on  bar,  bolt,  and  pig  iron, 
one  cent  a  pound  on  nails,  and  one-half  cent  a  pound  on  steel.  In  1792 
the  duty  on  steel  was  raised  to  $20  a  ton,  and  on  iron  cables  to  $30  a 
ton ;  and  in  1794  the  tariff  on  rolled  iron  and  steel  was  fixed  at  15  per 
cent.,  on  hardware  10  per  cent.,  and  on  all  other  manufactures  of  iron 
at  15  per  cent.  These  low  rates  were  maintained  until  1816,  when 
protection  of  a  very  different  character  was  demanded  and  granted. 

From  1790  to  1800  the  manufacture  of  iron  steadily  increased, 
though  no  accurate  information  of  its  progress  is  obtainable.  Nor 
are  there  any  records  of  the  importations  of  iron  at  that  time.  But 
we  find  recorded  the  opening  of  twenty-one  furnaces  in  Pennsylva 
nia  alone  within  that  time,  one  of  them  yielding  2,800  tons  per 
annum.  It  appears  that  in  1798  Lancaster  County  had  3  furnaces, 
11  forges,  and  produced  1,200  tons  of  pig,  and  as  much  of  bar;  that 
Berks  had  6  furnaces,  and  as  many  forges;  that  Chester  had  6 
forges,  and  produced  1,000  tons  of  bar-iron;  and  that,  patents  for 
nail-machines  having  been  granted  in  1794,  there  were  three  facto 
ries  in  operation  in  Philadelphia  by  1797.  In  New  Jersey  also,  in 


174  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

1794,  there  were  produced  1,200  tons  of  bar-iron,  "besides  hollow- 
ware  and  castings,  and  iron  in  pigs  and  bars  was  exported  to  a  large 
amount.  Only  eight  years  later,  the  manufacture  in  that  State  had 
more  than  doubled.  There  were  then  produced  3,000  tons  of  bar- 
iron  and  3,500  tons  of  pig,  and  four  rolling  and  slitting  mills  were  in 
operation.  But  in  that  same  year,  1802,  the  citizens  concerned  in 
the  manufacture  petitioned  Congress  for  increased  duties  on  foreign 
products.  We  are  not  forced  to  look  far  for  the  explanation.  It 
happens  to  be  recorded  that  in  1789,  before  any  duties  had  been  im 
posed,  the  price  of  pig-iron  was  £6  lOs.^  Pennsylvania  money,  equiv 
alent  to  $17.33^,  while  in  1800  pig-metal  was  worth  £10  a  ton,  or 
$26.67f .  This  enhanced  price,  whether  caused  in  part  by  the  duties, 
or  altogether  by  increased  demand  for  iron  to  be  used  in  manu 
factures,  had  a  double  effect.  First,  it  stimulated  the  building  of 
those  furnaces  which  we  have  seen  starting  up  in  every  direction, 
and  thus  caused  New  Jersey  to  more  than  double  its  product  of  pig 
and  bar  iron  in  eight  years.  But,  second,  it  rendered  all  manufac 
turers  of  iron  less  able  to  cope  with  foreign  competition,  for,  the  ma 
terial  costing  more,  they  could  no  longer  produce  castings,  nails,  and 
other  articles,  as  cheaply.  Hence,  a  cry  to  the  government  for  aid. 
Nor  was  it  without  excuse;  for  we  find  that  in  1801  there  were  im 
ported  of  nails  3,120,691  pounds,  of  spikes  280,237  pounds,  and  of  steel 
14,844  cwt.  In  1790,  as  Secretary  Hamilton  stated  in  his  report,  there 
were  imported  only  1,800,000  pounds  of  nails,  and  he  recommended 
a  duty,  "to  put  an  end  to  this  importation."  It  will  be  remembered, 
moreover,  that  a  duty  was  granted,  on  nails  one  cent  a  pound,  higher 
than  on  any  other  form  of  iron.  And  it  will  also  be  remembered 
that  within  the  same  decade  the  manufacture  had  been  greatly  im 
proved  by  the  invention  of  better  machinery  in  this  country  than 
any  other  possessed.  Yet,  the  importation  had  increased  from 
1,800,000  pounds  to  3,120,691  pounds !  Such  was  the  effect  of  the  first 
effort  to  "  put  an  end  to  an  importation "  by  duties !  The  iron  had 
risen  in  price  from  $17  to  $26  a  ton,  and  bar-iron,  protected  now  by 
duties  of  15  per  cent.,  had  also  risen  in  like  proportion,  and  therefore 
the  cost  of  domestic  nails  had  risen  more  than  the  one  cent  a  pound 
of  protective  duty,  and  the  importation  had  increased.  No  better 
illustration  can  be  desired  of  the  workings  of  the  tariff.  Nor  can  it 
be  supposed  that  other  manufactures  had  fared  better,  for  that  of 
nails  was  justly  regarded  as  most  firmly  established  before  the  war. 
Although  the  New  Jersey  men  complained,  and  the  manufacture 
was,  no  doubt,  relatively  retarded,  it  still  continued  to  increase. 


HISTORY  OF  THE  IRON  MANUFACTURE  PRIOR  TO   1833.      175 

New  works  were  opened;  in  1805  there  were  16  furnaces  and  37 
forges  in  Pennsylvania,  and  on  the  west  side  of  the  Alleghanies  11 
forges  and  about  the  same  number  of  furnaces;  and  10  more  fur 
naces,  three  forges,  and  a  bloomery,  were  in  that  year  erected  in  the 
State.  In  1807  there  were  in  Pittsburg  four  nail-factories,  one  mak 
ing  100  tons  of  nails  a  year.  And  yet  in  that  year  the  importation 
of  nails  was  about  as  large  as  in  1801,  being  3,072,238  pounds,  and 
of  spikes  284,742  pounds,  and  of  steel  10,604  cwt.  The  impor 
tation  of  steel  had  decreased  about  one-third.  In  the  next  year, 
1808,  foreign  trade  was  interrupted  by  the  embargo,  but  in  1810 
the  foreign  importations  were  about  the  same,  except  of  nails, 
2,112,223  pounds.  At  this  point,  Mr.  Gallatin,  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  in  a  report  on  manufactures,  classed  that  of  iron  as  "  firmly 
established,"  and  estimated  the  quantity  of  bar-iron  produced  to  be 
40,000  tons,  against  about  9,000  imported.  But  he  observes  that  a 
reduction  of  the  duty  on  Russia  iron  was  asked  for  by  the  rolling 
and  slitting  mills.  The  same  difficulty  of  which  the  nail-makers  had 
complained  in  1802,  namely,  the  cost  of  the  raw  material,  had 
now,  in  1810,  extended  to  the  rolling-mills.  As  to  the  nail  business, 
he  said  that  the  use  of  machinery  had  extended  throughout  the 
country,  and  about  280  tons  were  already  exported  annually,  but  we 
still  imported  about  1,500  tons  of  wrought  nails  and  spikes.  The 
manufactures  of  iron  were  principally  agricultural  implements,  black- 
smith's-work,  anchors,  shovels,  spades,  axes,  scythes,  and  other  edge 
tools,  saws,  bits,  and  stirrups,  and  every  sort  of  machine  and  other 
castings,  and  a  great  variety  of  coarser  products,  but  cutlery  and  the 
finer  hardware,  and  steel- work,  were  almost  entirelyiimported.  The 
value  of  iron  imported  was  nearly  four  millions,  and  the  value  of  iron 
produced  and  manufactured  was  from  twelve  to  fifteen  millions.  To 
the  important  information  of  this  report  we  have  also  added  the  cen 
sus  of  that  year,  which  stated  the  number  of  furnaces  as  153,  pro 
ducing  53,908  tons  of  iron,  and  4  steel-furnaces  producing  917  tons 
of  steel,  whereas  we  imported  only  550.  In  the  same  year,  notwith 
standing  the  duty,  we  imported  852,949  pounds  of  "  anchors  and 
sheet-iron,"  and  759,337  pounds  of  "  sheet  or  hoop  iron." 

These  statistics  give  a  very  fair  idea  of  the  condition  of  the  iron\ 
manufacture  before  the  war  which  soon  followed.  Until  after  the 
close  of  the  war,  neither  duties  nor  importations  affected  our  indus 
try,  but  the  great  inflation  and  depreciation  of  our  paper-money  cur 
rency  caused  enormous  prices,  and  prepared  the  way  for  inevitable 
disaster  when  the  war  ended. 


176  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

*  High  prices  invite  the  seller,  we  reasoned  in  speaking  of  imports. 
This  was  forcibly  illustrated  after  the  War  of  1812,  when  our  indus 
tries,  which  had  prospered  before  the  war  with  little  protection,  were 
suddenly  checked  by  importations  of  foreign  products.  Our  people 
imagined  that  the  whole  world  had  conspired  to  ruin  our  industry  by 
selling  goods  below  cost.  The  truth  was,  that  it  cost  less  to  pro 
duce  in  other  countries,  where  lower  prices  prevailed.  But,  in  the 
vain  effort  to  arrest  this  influx  of  foreign  products,  the  tariff  of  1816 
was  adopted,  with  increased  duties  in  1818.  The  attempt  failed. 
Nothing  could  stop  the  flood  except  a  return  to  the  natural  level  of 
prices,  and  that  was  precisely  what  people  dreaded.  _  In  spite  of 
the  tariff,  it  came,  and  with  it  the  prostration  of  manufactures  in 
1819  and  1820. 

It  is  to  be  regretted  that  complete  and  reliable  statistics  do  not 
exist  of  the  immediate  effect  of  foreign  importations  upon  the  iron 
business  after  the  war,  and  prior  to  the  tariff  of  1816.  It  is  said  that 
21,000  tons  of  British  iron  were  imported  in  1815,  and  a  like  amount 
in  1816,  of  which  only  7,600  tons  were  bar-iron.  It  is  not  strange, 
for  in  1816  Congress  authorized  a  contract  for  500  tons  of  iron  for  use 
in  the  navy,  at  a  cost  of  $52,558,  or  $105  a  ton.  In  1818  iron  had 
fallen  at  the  seaports  to  about  $100,  but  was  still  worth  at  Pittsburg 
$190  to  200,  and  at  Cincinnati  $200  to  220.  In  the  latter  city  and  at 
Zanesville  castings  and  hollow-ware  were  worth  $120  to  130.  These 
facts  show  how  the  great  depreciation  of  the  currency  affected  our 
business.  "Where  our  industries  were  brought  at  once  face  to  face 
with  foreign  prices,  the  evil  was  more  quickly  corrected,  and  it  may 
be  questioned  whether,  if  that  natural  corrective  had  been  left  un 
interrupted  by  legislation,  the  disasters  which  followed  would  not 
have  been  less  severe  and  prolonged.  It  was  inevitable  that  prices 
should  fall  before  a  healthy  business  could  be  done,  and  the  great 
reduction  which  did  follow — flour  from  $1§  a  barrel  in  1817  to  $5  in 
1819 ;  bar-iron  from  $140  to  $80 ;  pig-iron  to  $30,  and  castings  to 
$75  a  ton — was  neither  caused  nor  averted  by  any  tariff.  It  appears, 
however,  that  the  iron  manufacture  was  by  no  means  stopped  by 
importations.  New  establishments,  including  some  of  great  im 
portance,  went  into  operation  in  this  very  time  of  greatest  depres 
sion.  The  census  returns  showed  that  thirty  iron-works — fourteen 
blast-furnaces  and  sixteen  bloomeries — had  been  built  in  Pennsyl 
vania  within  ten  years ;  new  and  important  branches  of  the  industry 
had  been  commenced,  and  the  reduction  of  the  price  of  pig  and  bar 
iron,  and  consequently  of  the  profits  of  these  branches,  though  de- 


HISTORY  OF  THE  IRON  MANUFACTURE  PRIOR  TO    1833.      177 

pressing  to  them,  was  an  encouragement  to  the  manufacture  of  all 
finished  products. 

The  imports,  in  these  years,  were  comparatively  small.  They 
included,  in  all,  less  than  8,200  tons  of  iron,  against  21,634  in  1816. 
Of  pig-iron  there  was  imported  only  329  tons — surely  not  enough  to 
control  the  price  !  Of  bar  there  was  imported  rolled  59,385  cwt.  and 
hammered  389,797  cwt. ;  of  castings  only  6,202  cwt. ;  of  anchors 
only  79,252  pounds — and  yet  it  was  said  that  excessive  importations 
at  this  time  stopped  the  manufacture  of  anchors  at  Baltimore — of 
sheet-iron  only  12,520  cwt.,  of  wire  127,866  pounds,  of  tacks  and 
brads  23,506,  of  steel  7,802  cwt,  and  of  nails  only  220,682  pounds, 
and  spikes  38,625  pounds.  These  figures  do  not  indicate  that  the 
importation  was  heavy  enough,  or  of  such  a  character  as,  to  prostrate 
the  manufacture,  and  its  depression  must  be  referred  to  the  general 
prostration  of  business,  attending  the  contraction  of  currency  and 
the  return  to  a  specie  basis. 

With  reference  to  this  period  Mr.  Henry  C.  Carey  says : 

In  1810,  prior  to  our  second  war  with  England,  our  furnaces  numbered  153, 
with  an  average  yield  of  36  tons,  giving  a  total  produce  of  54,000  tons.  Protection 
afforded  by  the  war  caused  a  considerable  increase,  but  there  exist  no  reliable  sta 
tistics  in  regard  thereto.  Peace  in  1815  was  followed  by  the  so-called  revenue 
tariff  of  1817,  and  that  in  turn,  as  is  so  well  known,  by  the  closing  of  factories  and 
furnaces ;  by  the  ruin  of  manufacturers  and  merchants ;  by  the  discharge  of  work 
men  everywhere ;  by  the  stoppage  of  banks  ;  by  the  bankruptcy  of  States  ;  by  the 
transfer  under  the  sheriff's  hammer  of  a  large  portion  of  the  real  estate  of  the  Union ; 
and  by  an  impoverishment  of  our  whole  people  general  beyond  all  former  precedent. 
The  demand  for  iron  had  so  far  ceased  that  the  manufacture  was  in  a  state  of  ruin 
so  complete,  that  not  only  had  it  lost  all  that  had  it  gained  in  time  of  war,  but  had, 
as  was  then  believed,  greatly  retrograded.  In  placing  it,  as  I  now  shall  do,  near  the 
point  to  which,  by  aid  of  non-intercourse  and  embargo  acts,  it  had  been  brought  in 
1810,  I  am,  as  I  feel  assured,  doing  it  entire  justice.  Such  with  little  change  con 
tinued  to  be  the  state  of  things  until  the  passage  of  the  semi-protective  tariff  of  1824. 

It  is  for  readers  to  judge  whether  such  a  statement,  wholly  sup 
pressing  the  vital  fact  of  currency  inflation  and  depreciation,  and 
the  destruction  of  paper-issuing  banks,  is  a  fan-  account  of  the  events 
of  this  period.  Mr.  Carey  surely  was  not  ignorant  of  the  fact  that 
the  enormous  issues  of  paper  during  the  war,  and  the  creation  of 
new  banks,  many  of  them  financially  worthless,  had  disordered  the  cur 
rency  and  increased  prices  most  unnaturally ;  nor  was  he  ignorant  of 
the  fact  that  the  failure  of  such  banks,  the  depreciation  and  ultimate 
abandonment  of  such  a  currency,  its  shrinkage  from  $110,000,000 
13 


178  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

in  1816  to  $45,000,000  in  1819,  and  the  return  from  fictitious 
to  legitimate  prices,  must  in  any  case  have  produced  severe  revul 
sion,  prostration  of  business,  and  embarrassment  to  all  productive 
industry.  If  he  knew  these  facts,  it  would  surely  have  been  more 
candid,  not  to  say  honest,  had  he  mentioned  them  as  causes,  in  part 
if  not  altogether,  of  the  disaster  described.  Nor  are  there  known  to 
the  writer  any  statistics  which  justify  the  statement  that  the  manu 
facture  "  lost  all  that  it  had  gained  in  time  of  war."  On  tjie  con 
trary,  it  appears  that  many  new  iron-works  were  established  after 
the  war,  and  prior  to  the  general  failure  of  banks  in  1819-'20, 
among  which  may  be  mentioned  a  factory  of  steam  and  fire  engines, 
mill  machinery  and  steamboat  engines,  in  Cincinnati  in  1817,  and 
another  machine-factory  in  1818,  while  another  in  operation  at  the 
same  time  employed  eighty  hands.  The  manufacture  of  chain  cables, 
by  Cotton  &  Hill,  was  commenced  at  the  same  time  at  Boston ; 
and  the  Hunt  Brothers,  in  Litchfield  County,  Conn.,  made  anchors 
of  8,000  and  9,000  pounds,  and  screws  for  the  largest  machinery, 
while  anchors  were  made  at  Baltimore  for  8  and  9  cents  a  pound. 
That  there  was  great  depression  in  the  production  of  iron,  caused  by 
decrease  of  prices,  is  stated,  but  the  fact  that  new  establishments 
were  started  for  the  manufacture  of  iron  accords  with  the  reasonable 
supposition  that  cheaper  raw  material  would  naturally  stimulate 
both  manufacture  and  use. 

Nor  is  it  possible  to  reconcile  the  last-quoted  statement  of  Mr. 
Carey  with  recorded  facts.  The  iron  production  and  manufacture 
had  both  begun  to  revive  before  the  year  1824.  This  was  in  part 
due,  no  doubt,  to  the  opening  of  mines  of  anthracite  'coal,  already 
used  in  the  working  of  iron  to  some  extent,  and  the  completion  of 
the  Lehigh  Canal,  which  forwarded  to  Philadelphia  its  first  supply 
of  365  tons  in  1820,  and  in  the  year  1822  the  canal  brought  its  first 
supply  from  the  Schuylkill  region,  of  1,480  tons.  By  the  year  1824, 
when  the  tariff  was  passed  to  which  Mr.  Carey  ascribes  all  the  sub 
sequent  progress,  the  quantity  of  coal  forwarded  from  the  Lehigh 
region  was  9,541  tons,  and  the  whole  amount  was  11,108  tons. 
This  increase  is  a  proof  as  it  was  a  cause  of  rapid  growth  of  the 
manufacture  of  iron,  which  revived  as  soon  as  the  currency  had 
reached  a  solid  basis.  (Numerous  inventions  in  the  production  and 
manufacture  of  iron  were  at  that  time  made,  as  the  patent  records 
show,  prior  to  the  change  of  tariff,  and  these  contributed  to  the  in 
creased  growth  of  that  interest.  In  1822  Bishop  records  the  first 
extensive  use  of  iron  pipes  for  the  water-works  of  Philadelphia,  and 


HISTORY  OF  THE  IRON   MANUFACTURE  PRIOR  TO  1833.      179 

states  that  the  iron-works  in  Brandon,  Vermont,  in  that  year  pro 
duced  a  very  superior  quality  of  shovels,  "  said  to  be  better  and 
tougher  than  those  imported,"  while  "  Mr.  Conant's  works,  recently 
put  in  operation,"  made  castings  to  the  amount  of  100  tons  annu 
ally,  including  stoves  so  popular  that  the  demand  exceeded  the 
supply.  Incidents  like  these  do  not  indicate  that  the  manufacture 
waited  for  the  tariff  before  it  revived.  Again,  of  1823,  Bishop  says : 
"  With  the  general  revival  of  business  about  this  time,  the  building 
of  steamboats  was  resumed  at  Marietta,"  and  "  the  business  received 
a  new  impulse  in  the  other  river-towns."  In  the  same  year  the  first 
railway  act  was  passed,  to  give  communication  from  Philadelphia 
to  Lancaster  County,  of  whose  iron-works  we  have  seen  statistics. 
This  does  not  indicate  that  all  the  furnaces  there  were  idle,  and 
waiting  for  the  tariff!  In  New  Hampshire,  in  the  same  year,  "  fifty- 
four  trip-hammers  were  at  work,  and  a  rolling  and  slitting  mill  and 
nail-works  and  machine-shops  were  in  course  of  erection,"  not  waiting 
for  the  tariff !  The  first  steam  printing-press  was  put  in  operation 
in  the  same  year ;  a  pin-machine  was  in  operation  in  New  York  which 
would  make  thirty  pins  a  minute,  the  best  machines  in  London  then 
making  only  fourteen,  less  perfectly ;  and  a  cutler  in  New  York  used 
New  Brunswick  steel  for  penknife-blades,  which  he  made  superior 
to  any  of  English  blistered  steel.  In  the  same  year  surveys  were 
made  for  the  Delaware  and  Raritan  and  Morris  Canals,  the  latter 
giving  access  to  the  anthracite  mines  of  Pennsylvania,  and  a  cheap 
outlet  for  the  iron  of  that  region,  which  at  that  time  had  three  fur 
naces  and  fifty-one  forges,  though  many  "  had  gone  to  decay  in  part 
from  the  scarcity  of  fuel  and  the  increasing  cost  of  transportation." 
And,  in  1825,  only  a  year  after  the  tariff  had  passed,  Pittsburg  con 
tained  seven  steam  rolling-mills,  eight  air-furnaces,  and  a  cupola 
furnace,  a  foundery,  and  six  steam-engine  factories,  while  there  were 
five  blast-furnaces  north  of  the  river  supplying  metal,  besides  sev 
eral  in  Fayette,  Westmoreland,  Beaver,  and  Armstrong  Counties. 
And  Huntington  County  contained  the  next  year  eight  furnaces 
and  ten  forges,  one  slitting-mill,  and  a  nail-factory.  Not  even  Mr. 
Carey  will  claim  that  all  these  works  were  erected  in  a  single  year, 
or  in  two.  I  These  incidents,  among  many  which  might  be  gathered 
from  the  records  of  that  time,  seem  to  prove  conclusively  that  in  all 
parts  of  the  country  the  production  and  manufacture  of  iron  had 
greatly  revived,  with  the  revival  of  other  business,  before  the  adop 
tion  of  the  tariff  of  1824,  to  which  Mr.  Carey  ascribes  all  the  prog 
ress  then  made.  If  this  is  true,  it  is  not  a  candid  statement  to  say 


180  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

that  the  prostration  continued  "  until  the  passage  of  the  semi-pro 
tective  tariff  of  1824."  For  the  facts  prove  that  it  did  not.  It  is 
of  no  small  importance  to  ascertain  whether  Mr.  Carey  is  right  or 
wrong  in  this  instance,  for  upon  his  authority  rest  many  statements 
vital  in  the  history  of  the  iron  interest.  If  it  appears  that  in  the 
statement  quoted  he  has  distorted  or  twisted,  suppressed  or  misrep 
resented  facts,  we  may  be  prepared  to  receive,  not  with  absolute 
confidence,  other  statements  by  him  in  the  same  interest.  More 
over,  if  the  iron  manufacture  had  actually  revived,  and  begun  to 
grow  with  vigor  before  the  change  of  tariff,  it  is  reasonable  to  con 
clude  that  its  growth  would  have  continued  had  there  been  no  such 
change. 

Some  evidence  of  the  real  condition  of  the  country  in  the  years 
1820-'24  may  be  drawn  from  the  record  of  imports  of  iron.  The 
duty  being  unchanged  in  those  years,  the  great  decrease  of  imports 
in  1821  marks  the  general  prostration  in  business  in  that  year,  and 
the  revival  of  imports  in  the  years  1822  and  1823  marks  a  revival 
of  business,  and  a  renewed  demand  for  iron,  which  benefited  the 
domestic  manufacturer  more  than  the  importer,  for  the  quantity 
made  here  was  several  times  as  large  as  the  quantity  imported. 
From  the  Treasury  reports  we  take  the  statistics  of  imports  of  iron 
from  1818  to  1844,  which  will  be  found  at  the  close  of  chapter  XIV. 

It  appears  that  the  quantity  of  pig  imported,  less  than  1,000 
tons  in  1821,  increased  to  about  2,500  tons  in  1823.  This  proves 
that  an  increased  demand  existed,  while  the  quantity  imported  is 
still  so  small  as  to  prove  that  domestic  production  was  not  percepti 
bly  impeded  by  it.  In  like  manner,  the  importation  of  hammered 
bar-iron  increased  from  17,000  tons  in  1821,  to  29,000  tons  in  1823 ; 
and  the  importation  of  rolled  bar  from  2,000  tons  in  1821,  to  5,300 
in  1823,  and  5,790  in  1824.  The  whole  amount  of  raw  iron  im 
ported  for  manufacture  was  therefore  20,000  tons  in  1821,  and 
36,800  tons  in  1823.  Now,  Mr.  Carey  himself  admits  that  there 
was  produced  as  much  as  53,000  tons,  and  it  is  known  that  furnaces 
existed  for  the  production  of  at  least  100,000  tons.  The  rapid  in 
crease  of  manufactories  shows  that  a  demand  existed  for  the  iron ;  is 
it  likely  that  these  furnaces  remained  idle  ?  j  Is  it  not  more  probable 
that  they  shared  with  foreign  producers  the  benefit  of  increased  de 
mand,  and  that  the  production  grew  as  well  as  the  manufacture)? 
For,  in  the  same  time,  the  importation  of  nails  and  spikes  decreased, 
from  1,072,000  Ibs.  in  1822,  to  658,000  in  1823 ;  and  we  remember 
that  over  4,000,000  pounds  had  been  imported  in  1804,  when  the  great 


HISTORY  OF  THE   IRON   MANUFACTURE  PRIOR  TO   1833.      181 

part  of  the  consumption  was  even  then  supplied  by  home  products. 
The  importation  of  manufactured  wares  paying  ad-valorem  du 
ties,  which  was  $2,767,757  in  1822,  was  $2,568,842  in  1823.  In 
creasing  imports  of  the  material,  and  decreasing  imports  of  finished 
products,  with  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  in  such  quantity  as  to 
overwhelm  domestic  production — these  conditions  surely  indicate  a 
growing  demand  and  a  growing  manufacture.  At  all  events,  the 
statistics  prove  that  the  imports  were  not  large  enough  to  break 
down  nor  prevent  the  growth  of  the  manufacture.  Only  $5,083,351 
in  value  of  iron  of  all  kinds  was  imported  in  1823,  and  $5,210,056 
in  1822.  But  it  will  be  remembered  that,  ten  years  before,  the  do 
mestic  product  was  over  fourteen  millions  in  value,  and  the  importa 
tions  four  millions,  the  manufacture  rapidly  growing,  and  that  the 
production  had  fully  doubled  before  and  during  the  war.  It  would 
be  absurd  to  suppose  that,  after  thirteen  years  of  growth,  an  importa 
tion  of  five  millions  was  enough  to  depress  or  check  a  manufacture 
which  in  half  that  time  had  doubled  its  productive  power ! 

This  is  surely  conclusive.  We  must  dismiss  Mr.  Carey's  special 
pleading  at  this  point,  with  the  conviction  that,  had  he  recognized 
two  truths — first,  that  the  iron  interest  had  revived  and  begun  to 
grow  again  before  1824 ;  and  second,  that  importations  were  not  so 
great  as  to  prevent  a  healthy  progress — he  would  not,  perhaps,  have 
made  out  so  great  an  apparent  need  for  the  tariff  of  1824,  but 
would  have  been  more  true  to  the  recorded  facts. 

From  1824  onward,  records  bearing  upon  the  iron  interest  are 
more  complete.  The  tariff  of  that  year  did  not  increase  the  duty 
upon  pig  or  rolled  bar,  and  only  raised  the  duty  on  hammered  bar 
from  75  to  90  cents  per  cwt. ;  showing  that  the  production  of  iron 
was  not  then  thought  to  need  much  greater  aid.  Products  before 
admitted  under  an  ad-valorem  duty  of  20  per  cent,  now  paid  25  per 
cent. ;  on  castings  the  duty  was  raised  from  75  cents  per  cwt.  to  1 
and  1  £  cent  per  pound ;  the  duty  on  anchors,  tacks,  and  brads,  and  on 
steel,  was  not  changed ;  the  duty  on  nails  was  raised  from  4  to  5 
cents  per  pound,  but  anvils,  blacksmiths'  hammers,  cables  and  chains, 
muskets  and  rifles,  braziers'  rods,  mill  saws,  cranks  and  irons,  were 
taken  from  the  ad-valorem  list  and  placed  under  specific  duties. 
This  tariff  lasted  four  years.  In  its  first  year  it  reduced  the  impor 
tations  of  iron  to  $4,518,134;  in  its  second  year  they  were  higher 
than  ever  before,  and  in  its  last  year,  1828,  the  importations  of  iron 
were  $7,286,543.  This  attempt  to  protect  does  not  seem  to  have 
protected. 


182  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

Beginning  with  the  raw  material,  we  find  that  the  imports  in 
creased  as  follows : 

1824.  1828. 

Pig-iron  (cwt.) 15,856  69,937 

Rolled  Bar,  "     ' 115,809  205,897 

Hammered  Bar  (cwt.) 425,906  667,849 

Total 557,571  943,683 

Thus  the  imports  of  the  material  increased  from  about  27,000 
tons  to  about  47,000  tons.  Mr.  Carey  asserts  that  the  production 
of  iron  in  the  same  time  increased  to  130,000  tons,  "  giving  a  dupli 
cation  in  the  short  period  of  four  years."  This  is  plainly  an  erro 
neous  statement,  for  it  has  been  shown  that  the  product  of  1824  was 
undoubtedly  more  than  100,000  tons,  and  the  increase  of  production, 
not  more  than  30  per  cent,  in  four  years,  was  less  than  the  increase 
of  importations — which  did  nearly  "  duplicate  in  the  short  period  of 
four  years." 

Notwithstanding  a  large  share  of  articles  had  been  taken  from 
the  ad-valorem  list,  the  value  of  imports  under  that  head  was 
$2,486,164  in  1824,  and  $3,225,907  in  1828.  Of  the  articles  taken 
from  that  list  for  specific  duties  the  imports  increased  as  follows : 

1824.  1828. 

Anvils  (Ibs.) 116,387  972,129 

Blacksmiths'  Hammers  (Ibs.)  10,144  58,855 

Cables  and  Chains,             "       210,550*  847,655 

Muskets  and  Rifles, 2,14^  7,097 

Braziers'  Rods  (Ibs.) 2,128  730,031 

Wood  Screws $5,206  $87,100 

MiU  Saws $1,073  $2,758 

Cranks . .  none. 


We  certainly  need  not  say  that  these  attempts  to  protect  singu 
larly  failed  !  Other  qualities  of  iron  were  also  much  more  largely 

imported,  thus : 

1824.  1828. 

Steel  (cwt.) 21,954  35,660 

Sheet-iron  (Ibs.) 1,088,858  6,551,642 

Nail-rods,     "     2,307  985,909 

Band-iron,    "     6,832  97,909 

Enough  of  these  details  !  How  this  tariff  was  ever  called  pro 
tective,  or  "  semi-protective,"  unless  on  the  principle  "  lucus  a  non 
lucendo"  passes  comprehension. 

A-  There  is  proof  that  during  this  period  the  production  and  manu- 
i  facture  increased,  but  the  evidences  of  its  progress  are  less  numerous 


HISTORY  OF  THE  IRON  MANUFACTURE  PRIOR  TO    1833.     183 

or  conclusive  than  are  those  of  progress  in  former  periods.  The  fact 
is  noted  that  American  hammered  bar-iron  had  been  enhanced  in 
price,  to  $105  per  ton,  since  the  increased  duty  on  foreign  hammered 
bar,  but  pig  and  rolled  bar,  after  a  sudden  and  unnatural  rise  to  enor 
mous  prices  during  the  financial  trouble  in  1825  which  affected 
England  seriously,  receded  at  once,  and  for  the  whole  period  slightly 
declined.  The  increase  of  facilities  for  transporting  iron  was  an  im 
portant  advantage  gained  at  this  time,  which  contributed  more  than 
all  tariffs  to  the  future  growth  of  the  iron  interest,  and  this,  as  we 
have  seen,  began  before  the  tariff  of  1824.  The  anthracite  coal  sent 
to  market  had  increased  to  77,516  tons,  and  the  Delaware  and  Hud 
son  Company  had  by  this  time  completed  its  works,  and  began  to 
deliver  in  1829. 

It  was  not  the  iron  but  the  wool  interest  that  demanded  and  ob 
tained  the  tariff  of  1828,  but,  to  secure  strength  enough  to  carry  the 
enormous  duties  desired  by  that  interest,  larger  duties  were  also 
given  to  others.  The  duty  on  pig-iron  was  raised  to  $12.50  per  ton ; 
on  hammered  bar  to  $22.44,  or  67  per  cent.,  and  on  rolled  bar  to  $37 
per  ton,  or  121  per  cent.  Did  this  effort  protect  ?  The  importation 
of  pig  at  first  fell  to  22,771  cwt.,  but  then  in  two  years  rose  to 
203,025  cwt.,  far  higher  than  ever  before.  Rolled  bar  at  first  fell  to 
66,408  cwt.,  but  after  two  years  rose  higher  than  ever  before,  reach 
ing,  in  1832,  427,745  cwt.  Hammered  bar,  in  like  manner,  falling  off 
to  sixty-six  million  pounds,  rose  again  to  eighty-five  million  pounds. 
In  1828  we  imported  47,000  tons  of  iron  unmanufactured.  In  1832  we 
imported  74,000  tons,  an  increase  of  57  per  cent,  in  four  years. 
Meanwhile,  taking  Mr.  Carey's  own  statements,  the  domestic  pro 
duction  of  iron  had  increased  from  130,000  to  200,000  tons,  or  in  a 
ratio  of  53  per  cent.  Under  this,  the  last  effort  of  protection  to  shut 
jout  foreign  products  by  extreme  duties — by  duties  higher  than  ever 
before  or  since  until  recently — the  imports  of  foreign  iron  had  in 
creased  faster  than  the  domestic  production,  so  that  actually  a  larger 
share  of  our  consumption  was  supplied  by  imports  in  1832,  when 
this  tariff  was  abandoned,  than  in  1828,  when  it  was  adopted.  No 
wonder  it  was  abandoned !  No  wonder  men  began  to  doubt  whether 
protection  really  did  protect !  Nor  were  the  manufactures  of  iron 
more  successfully  shut  out  from  foreign  competition.  The  duties 
imposed  by  the  act  of  1828  were  very  heavy,  but  the  importations, 
though  diminished  in  the  first  year  or  two,  afterward  became 
larger  than  ever : 


184 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


1838. 

1832. 

Nails    cwt                   

653  655 

746  544 

35,660 

54  929 

Tacks  Ibs               

21  859 

32  885 

Anchors   cwt        . 

55  640 

78  921 

1  133  140 

2  999  039 

Anvils  Ibs                                           .        .  . 

972  129 

1  393  295 

Chains,  Ibs  

847  655 

2  454  360 

Wood  Screws 

$87  100 

$133  698 

Scythes,  Spades,  etc  

119,849 

133  677 

Axes  and  Adzes  

6,392 

62  774 

Bridle-Bits  

7,445 

99  977 

Steelyards  .  . 

3.804 

67.613 

In  spite  of  the  removal  of  many  of  these  articles  from  the  ad-va 
lorem  list  by  the  tariff  of  1828,  the  aggregate  of  those  remaining  was 
still  larger  in  1832  than  the  aggregate  of  the  whole  in  1828 ;  the  in 
crease  was  from  $3,225,907  to  $3,894,298.  In  face  of  these  facts,  it 
would  be  folly  to  expect  that  the  manufacture  had  grown  more  rap 
idly  than  the  production  of  iron.  In  some  branches  it  had  made 
progress,  but  in  all  its  real  strength  was  undermined  by  teaching  it 
to  rely  not  upon  skill  but  upon  duties,  and  by  enhancing  the  cost  of 
the  raw  material,  as  compared  with  the  cost  in  other  countries.  This 
last  expression  needs  especial  consideration. 

By  reference  to  tables  given  at  the  close  of  chapter  XY,  it  will 
be  seen  that  the  price  of  pig-iron  here  had  slightly  declined,  from 
$38  in  1828,  to  $35  in  1832,  and  that  the  price  of  bar  had  also  fallen 
from  about  $100  to  $80  a  ton.  Hence,  it  is  said,  the  tariff  did  not 
enhance  the  cost  of  the  raw  material,  and  did  not,  therefore,  retard 
the  manufacture.  It  is  enough  to  point  to  the  enormously  increased 
importations  of  raw  material.  These  prove  that  the  prices  were  rel 
atively  much  higher  here  in  1832,  as  compared  with  other  countries, 
than  in  1828,  otherwise  this  increased  importation  could  not  have 
taken  place  in  the  teeth  of  duties  ranging  from  60  to  120  per  cent ! 
But  we  are  not  left  to  inference.  The  facts  are  known.  The  price 
of  pig-iron  in  England  in  1828  was  from  $31  to  $39  a  ton ;  in  1832 
it  was  from  $23  to  $26  a  ton.  The  price  of  bar  in  Great  Britain  was 
in  1828  from  $33  to  $38,  and  in  1832  from  $27  to  $29.  The  use  of 
coke  in  smelting  iron  had  for  some  time  been  rapidly  increasing  in 
England,  while  in  this  country  our  furnaces,  carefully  "  protected  " 
from  any  very  serious  competition,  were  content  to  get  along  in  the 
old  way,  and  even  our  vast  supplies  of  anthracite  were  not  used  to 
smelt  iron  until  sharp  competition  after  1837  forced  new  methods. 


HISTORY  OF  THE  IRON   MANUFACTURE  PRIOR  TO  1833.     185 

Hence  the  production  in  Great  Britain  had  been  so  rapidly  perfected 
that  the  cost  of  pig  had  been  reduced  from  25  to  30  per  cent.,  while 
in  this  country  it  had  scarcely  been  reduced  at  all.  The  natural 
tendency  of  the  simpler  manufactured  products  is  to  lower  prices,  as 
new  inventions,  and  methods,  and  increased  skill,  are  applied. 
^Protection  "  arrested  that  steady  improvement  here,  by  paying  our 
iron-makers  well  for  sticking  to  the  old  methods.  It  held  up  the 
price  of  iron,  while  in  other  countries  it  was  being  rapidly  reduced. 
Hence  the  increased  importations  in  spite  of  the  increased  duty. 
But  other  countries,  having  cheaper  material,  could  sell  manufac 
tured  products  cheaper.  Hence,  in  spite  of  increased  duties,  the  fin 
ished  products  of  iron  came  in  from  abroad  more  largely  under  the 
tariff  of  1828  than  before,  and  more  largely  in  its  last  year  than  in 
its  first. 

At  the  time,  this  was  well  understood.  The  tariff  which  Mr. 
Carey  and  other  gentlemen,  who  do  not  allow  facts  to  bother  them, 
so  greatly  admire,  seemed  to  some  of  the  iron-workers  of  that  day 
a  nuisance.  Upward  of  three  hundred  mechanics  of  Philadelphia, 
employed  in  the  various  branches  of  the  iron  manufacture,  petitioned 
Congress  in  1831,  representing  that  the  high  duties  on  bar-iron, 
imposed  by  the  act  of  1828,  were  extremely  unfavorable  to  the 
manufacturing  of  hardware,  blacksmiths'- work,  and  chain  cables, 
"  which  last  could  now  be  imported  cheaper  than  the  rods  out  of 
which  they  were  made,"  and  a  committee  reported  that  relief  could 
be  afforded  only  by  a  reduction  of  the  duties  on  raw  iron.  This 
little  incident  tells  us  the  same  story  that  the  statistics  have  told — 
how  the  producers  quietly  went  on  in  their  old  methods,  and 
pocketed  high  prices,  while  the  manufacturer,  for  want  of  raw 
material  at  reasonable  rates,  was  forced  to  face  a  greatly-increased 
importation  of  foreign  wares.  And  this  was  the  glorious  protective 
tariff  of  1828  !— the  "thoroughly  protective  tariff,"  with  its  "mar 
vellous  prosperity,"  as  Mr.  Carey  calls  it !  Truly,  one  must  have  a 
brilliant  imagination  to  apply  these  phrases  to  such  facts  as  we  have 
reviewed. 

Before  we  leave  this  brilliant  period,  one  more  fact  must  be  fixed 
in  mind.  The  building  of  railroads  had  now  begun  in  earnest,  and 
a  demand  was  thus  created  for  a  large  supply  of  iron  in  manufactured 
form.  We  had  the  iron,  the  coal,  and  the  labor,  and  rolling-mills, 
but  our  glorious  tariff  had  "protected"  our  industry  against  the 
stimulus  of  competition.  Our  furnaces  were  happy  in  the  good  old 
charcoal  process,  and  while  England  was  coking  bituminous  coal 


186  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

with  which  to  master  the  world,  and  while  our  beds  of  anthracite 
were  already  yielding  363,871  tons  a  year,  not  a  ton  had  been  used 
in  smelting  iron.  Consequently,  England  could  supply  rails  cheaper, 
and  when  the  Columbia  and  Pennsylvania  road  advertised  for  pro 
posals  to  furnish  iron  in  1831,  there  were  none  for  American  iron, 
and  the  contracts  were  made  in  England  for  the  whole  quantity  at 
£6  17s.  6d.  per  ton.  Just  here  began  England's  mastery  over  us  in 
the  iron  manufacture.  Had  our  industry  been  in  condition  to  meet 
this  new  demand,  the  future  magnitude  of  which  was  not  then  fore 
seen,  more  than  three  million  tons  of  manufactured  iron,  which 
we  have  since  imported  at  a  cost  of  one  hundred  and  fifty  million 
dollars,  would  have  been  made  here.  No  one  can  estimate  the 
power  which  this  would  have  given  to  the  iron  manufacture  thence 
forward.  But  it  was  not  in  condition.  It  was  indulging  in  the 
comfortable  dream  of  protection  against  competition.  When  we 
were  colonies,  this  unprotected  manufacture  had  frightened  England 
with  its  products.  When  we  had  learned  to  protect  ourselves, 
England  mastered  our  strongest  and  most  natural  industry.  In  its 
infancy,  rugged  and  self-reliant,  this  industry  exported  pig  and  bar 
to  England.  After  seventeen  years  of  careful  nursing  and  wrapping 
by  the  fireside  of  protection,  this  same  industry  looked  helplessly  on 
while  England  began  to  make  rails  for  all  our  railroads.  And  this, 
the  final  and  crushing  blow,  was  the  latest  gift  of  the  protective 
system  to  the  infant  manufacture  !  Ah,  if,  instead  of  so  much  shel 
ter,  we  had  given  a  little  more  stimulus ;  if,  instead  of  so  much 
coddling,  we  had  subjected  it  to  a  few  severe  lessons  in  the  rough 
practical  world,  how  many  millions  we  should  have  saved !  Not  a 
solitary  American  would  to-day  dream  that  a  duty  on  any  form  of 
iron  was  needed,  if  in  1832  our  industry  had  never  been  protected 
at  all,  and  had  preserved  the  rugged  vigor  and  tireless  invention  of 
its  colonial  times. 


-. 


HISTORY  OF  THE  IRON   MANUFACTURE  PRIOR  TO   1833.      187 
THE  IRON  INTEREST. 


Entries  Included. 

Material. 

Product. 

Hands. 

Net  Product. 

Iron  minin^ 

439.562 
12,293,030 

21,961.437 
858,274 
15,524.01!! 
4,402,958 

226,035 

1.263,010 
3,671,247 

642.668 
19.587.928 
2,411,954 

700,776 
1,059,622 
376.913 
820,810 

7.004,162 
6,069,095 
1,325,159 

157,263 
7,699,047 
3,421,410 

2,405,292 
20,870,120 

36,537,259 
1,879.840 
36.678.073 
10,903,106 

429,884 

2,135.118 
9,151,893 

1.689.148 
52,550.668 
4,866,900 

4.403.206 
4.040,692 
2,362.681 
2,144,150 

20.944.004 
9,857,223 
3,468,115 

'  446,133 

16,718,388 
11,655,843 

3,206 
15,927 

22,014 

m 

26,961 
10,721 

278 

860 

7,284 

812 

41,688 
4,174 

2,452 
2,937 
2.056 
1,314 

17.094 
6.878 
2,229 

317 
11.226 
15,733 

Iron,  pig.  ... 

10,542,820 

Iron,  forced,  rolled, 
and  wrought  

Steel  

15,597,138 

Castings  (^eneral) 

Hardware..  . 

Forged  

Anchors,  chains,    anvils, 
vices,  axles 

Wire.    Cloth,     and 
Rope 

Cutlery  and  Tools  * 
Furnaces,  etc 

Furnace?,  grates,  japan'd- 
ware,  tinned  ironware, 
and  sad-irons  

35,316,685 

Machinery 

Includes  machinist's  tools 

Locomotives 



Sewing-Machines..  . 
Other  Machines  t.. 

Needles,     shuttles,     and 
cases 

Fire-arms  

Safes  and  Locks  .  . 

Agricultural  Imple 
ments  
Nails  and  Spikes 

Shovels,  cotton-gins,  ma 
chine-knives  

Bolts,  Nuts,  Scales. 
Horseshoes  

Lightning-rods  and  fish- 

Sheet-Iron  Workers 
Blacksmith... 

82,823.864 

Tools  and  c'riage-smiths' 

Total  

111,856,979     256,137,736     198,532 

144,280,757 

THE  COTTON  MANUFACTURE. 


Cotton  Goods,  etc  £ 
Calico  Printing. 

57,309.387 

115,785,931 

7.748.644 
3,522,152 

122.202 
3,894 
1,766 

3,789.783 
2,420,124 

Bags,  etc  §  



Total  

63,519,294 

127,056,727     127,862      63,537,433 

Woollen  Goods  — 
Carpets  

THE  WOOLLEN 

Goods,     yarn,     worsted, 
fulling,  carding  

MANTJFACa 

41,975,917 
4.419.561 
3,202,317 

336,487 

'URE. 

69.739.469 

7.860,351 
7,280,606 

667,960 

45,357 
6.683 
9,103 

427 



Hosiery 

Shoddy,  etc  

Satinet  printing,  helting, 
dressing  

Total  

35,614,104 

49,934,282 

85,548,386 

61,570 

Glass  

OTHER  Us 

[TERESTS. 

2,914,303 
1,054,780 

12,786,662 
242,066,300 

8.775.155 
2,289,504 

23,449,702 
503,257,210 

9,016 
2,213 

12,281 

5.860.852 
1,234,724 

10,663,040 
261,190,910 

Salt 

Paper,  etc  

Bags,     hanging,      ruling, 
shades,  and  staining.  .  . 

Total,  six  pr 

*  Includes  cutlery,  carpenters',  coopers',  curriers',  shoemakers',  and  stonecutters'  tools,  edge  tools,  and  axes,  saws, 
springs,  and  wired  steel. 

f  Includes  fire-engines,  hoisting-machines,  printing-presses,  instruments,  pumps,  tinners'  machines,  jack-screws,  and 
steam-heaters. 

J  Includes  cotton-bags,  batting,  braid,  cordage,  coverlets,  flannel  goods,  lamp-wick,  mosquito-netting,  and  table 
cloths. 

§  Includes  bags,  bagging,  flags,  coach  lace,  etc. 


188 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


CHAPTER    XIV. 

IRON. THE    COMPROMISE   TARIFF. 

THE  history  of  the  iron  manufacture  under  the  tariff  of  1833  is 
full  of  interest.  Passed  with  the  avowed  object  of  removing  protec 
tion,  and  bringing  back  our  industry  to  a  self-supporting  indepen 
dence  without  sudden  or  violent  changes,  that  act  has  been  called  the 
Carolina  Compromise,  and  by  Mr.  Carey  the  free-trade  tariff.  As 
names  do  not  fix  facts,  it  is  important  to  ascertain  what  changes  of 
duty  affecting  the  iron  interest  this  tariff  involved.  The  tariff  ap 
proved  July  14,  1832,  added  about  two  hundred  articles  to  the  free 
list,  and  largely  reduced  the  duties  on  iron  and  most  of  its  manu 
factured  products,  bringing  them  back  substantially  to  the  basis  of 
the  act  of  1824.  Thus  the  duty  on  pig  was  reduced  from  62 J-  to  50 
cents  per  cwt. ;  on  bar  hammered  from  $1.12  to  90  cents ;  on  bar  rolled 
from  $1.85  to  $1.50;  on  sheet  from  3|-  to  3  cents  a  pound;  on  nail- 
rods  and  band  or  slit,  the  same ;  on  screws  from  40  to  30  per  cent., 
and  the  same  on  implements  (scythes,  sickles,  spades,  and  shovels). 
But  the  compromise  tariff,  passed  March  2,  1833,  made  still  further 
reductions.  It  provided  that  after  December  31,  1833,  there  should 
be  deducted  one-tenth  of  all  excess  above  20  per  cent,  duty,  and  that 
a  like  reduction  of  one-tenth  should  be  made  every  second  year  there 
after,  namely,  December  31,  1835,  1837,  1839 ;  and  after  December 
31,  1841,  one-half  of  the  remaining  excess  should  be  deducted,  and 
June  30,  1842,  all  duties  should  be  reduced  to  20  per  cent.  This 
progressive  decrease  caused  the  duties  to  vary  thus : 


1832. 

1833. 

1834. 

1836. 

1838. 

1840. 

1842. 

Pig-iron  .  . 

$12  50 

$10  00 

$9  47 

$9  34 

$8  59 

$7  CO 

$5  31 

Hammered  Bar.  .  . 
Rolled  Bar  

2240 
87  00 

1800 
80  00 

1722 
27  77 

17  00 
26  00 

16  00 
24  00 

1500 
21  00 

13  00 
14  50 

On  manufactured  articles  the  reduction  of  duty  was  in  like  pro 
portion.  It  will  be  admitted  that  this  tariff  was  very  far  from  pro 
tective  in  its  purposes.  The  manifest  object  was,  to  get  rid  of  the 
whole  protective  system,  without  a  violent  shock  to  industries  accus 
tomed  to  unnatural  conditions.  What  was  the  effect  ? 

Under  the  "  first  completely  protective  tariff,"  as  Mr.  Carey  styles 
that  of  1828,  imports  of  iron  increased  faster  than  domestic  produc 
tion.  Under  this  system  of  rapid  reduction  of  duties,  smelting  by 


IROX.— THE  COMPROMISE  TARIFF.  189 

the  aid  of  anthracite  was  commenced,  new  iron- works  sprang  into 
existence  in  every  year,  the  domestic  production  was  increased  73| 
per  cent.,  and  the  imports  of  foreign  iron  were  diminished. 

In  1832,  the  last  fiscal  year  of  the  protective  tariff,  74,000  tons 
of  pig  and  bar  were  imported.  At  the  same  time,  according  to  the 
statistics  upon  which  Mr.  Carey  relies,  we  were  producing  200,000 
tons  of  iron.  Twenty-seven  per  cent,  of  the  unmanufactured  iron  used 
therefore  came  from  Europe.  But  in  1840,  the  last  year  under  this 
tariff  in  which  the  production  of  iron  is  known,  we  produced  347,000 
tons,  an  increase  of  73-J  per  cent,  in  eight  years.  In  the  same  year 
there  were  imported  of  pig  110,314  cwt.,  of  bar  rolled  656,574  cwt., 
and  of  bar  hammered  576,381  cwt. ;  total  1,343,269  cwt.,  or  67,163 
tons,  a  decrease  in  eight  years  of  6,603  tons,  or  9£  per  cent.  In 
1832,  under  protection,  the  entire  consumption  was  274,000  tons, 
c>f  which  27  per  cent,  was  imported.  In  1840,  under  non-protection, 
we  consumed  414,163  tons,  of  which  only  16  per  cent,  was  imported. 
These  facts  may  astonish,  as  they  will  probably  annoy,  those  who 
have  maintained  that  the  reduced  duties  of  that  period  were  fatal  to 
the  iron  interest  in  this  country ;  but  they  rest  on  no  guess  by  any 
theorist — on  no  doubtful  authority.  The  Treasury  reports  state  the 
importations  of  iron,  and  the  quantity  produced  in  the  two  years  is 
stated  by  all  authorities,  and  by  Mr.  Carey  himself,  as  just  given. 
Eight  years  of  reduced  duties,  then,  increased  domestic  produc 
tion  73^  per  cent.,  and  decreased  importations  9|-  per  cent.  Eight 
years  of  "British  free  trade,"  so  called,  reduced  the  proportion 
of  foreign  iron  consumed  by  this  country  from  27  per  cent,  to  16 
per  cent. 

It  is  true,  the  domestic  production  was  less  in  1841,  if  statements 
generally  accepted  are  true.  Concerning  the  production  of  that  year 
and  1842  there  is  dispute.  But  no  one  questions  the  fact  that  the 
product  of  1840  was  347,000  tons.  Each  year  of  census  is  a  stum 
bling-block  in  the  way  of  those  who  seek  to  shape  facts  to  theories. 
Since  the  production  of  that  year  is  undisputed,  it  affords  the  only 
sure  and  satisfactory  test  of  the  effect  of  this  tariff.  In  spite  of  the 
panic  of  1837,  the  disorder  and  contraction  of  the  currency,  the  gen 
eral  disaster  and  bankruptcy  which  followed  the  suspension  of  the 
banks,  the  production  of  iron  in  1840  was  73-J  per  cent,  greater  than 
in  1832,  while  the  importations  were  9£  per  cent.  less.  The  non- 
protective  tariff,  tested  by  statistics,  proves  to  have  given  more  real 
protection  than  the  protective  tariff. 

Nor  was  this  decreased  importation  of  raw  iron  caused  or  bal- 


190  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

anced  by  an  increased  importation  of  manufactured  iron.  In  1832, 
there  were  imported  of  iron  manufactures,  covered  by  specific  du 
ties  by  weight,  an  aggregate  of  11,124  tons,  and  in  1840  there 
were  imported  of  the  same  articles  only  9,581  tons — a  decrease  of 
1,543,  or  14  per  cent.  The  tables  following  this  chapter  give  the 
quantities  of  the  leading  articles.  It  thus  appears  that  the  manu 
factured  product  was  more  thoroughly  excluded  by  domestic  pro 
duction  than  the  raw  material.  According  to  the  census  of  1840, 
the  value  of  the  products  of  iron  was  $50,820,907,  but,  according  to 
the  Treasury  records,  the  value  of  all  iron  imported  was  $7,241,407 ; 
the  total  consumption  was,  therefore,  $58,062,314,  and  the  imports 
were  less  than  13  per  cent.  But  in  1832,  though  the  value  of  prod 
ucts  of  iron  is  not  accurately  known,  it  cannot  reasonably  be 
estimated  at  more  than  twenty-five  millions,  and  the  proportion  of 
imports  to  consumption  was  about  27  per  cent.  In  eight  years,  we 
had  progressed  about  half-way  to  absolute  independence  of  all 
foreign  nations,  as  to  iron  and  its  manufactures. 

It  does  not  shake  this  reasoning  to  observe  that  the  importations 
of  iron  were  much  larger  in  the  time  of  inflation.  The  effect  of  an 
inflated  currency  is  to  increase  importations,  nor  will  it  be  forgotten 
that  the  duties  in  1836  were  higher  than  in  1840.  If  high  duties 
protect,  why  did  not  the  higher  duties  of  1836  prevent  an  importa 
tion  larger  than  that  of  1840  ?  The  truth  is  again  illustrated,  that 
importations  depend  not  upon  duties  so  much  as  upon  prices.  In 
1832,  as  has  been  shown,  high  duties  had  caused  prices  to  stand 
still  for  years,  while  in  other  countries  the  price  of  iron  was  being 
reduced  by  great  improvements.  Following  this  cause  of  high 
prices  came  another,  the  expansion  of  the  currency.  The  bank  cir 
culation  rose  from  $61,323,898  in  1830,  to  $149,135,190  in  1837 ; 
and  in  that  wild  hour  of  speculation,  when  all  things  bore  fictitious- 
values,  pig-iron  sold  for  $52  a  ton,  and  bar  for  $115  a  ton.  It  is  not 
strange  that  sellers  sought  such  a  market  for  their  wares.  Yet  the 
excessive  importations  in  1836  and  1837  did  not  check  domestic 
production.  To  this  fact,  strangely  enough,  Mr.  Carey  testifies 
when  he  says,  "  The  production  of  iron  continued  to  increase  in  the 
three  years  which  followed,"  "  smelting  by  the  aid  of  anthracite 
was  first  introduced  here  in  1837 ;"  "  by  the  close  of  1841,  six  such 
furnaces  had  been  put  in  blast."  Facts  which  Mr.  Carey  does  not 
accidentally  state  may  be  added.  It  was  in  1836  that  the  first 
wrought-iron  was  used  for  gas  and  water  pipes ;  in  that  year  sixty- 
one  steamers  were  built  in  Pittsburg,  and,  in  the  year  1837,  wire 


IRON.— THE  COMPROMISE  TARIFF.  191 

factories  in  that  town  were  supplying  the  whole  Mississippi  Valley, 
one  using  600  tons  of  iron  yearly.  In  1838,  Howe's  solid-headed 
pin,  and  the  Collins  axes  with  punched  eyes,  were  patented,  as  well 
as  cast-iron  car- wheels  and  improved  ploughs  ;  and,  in  1839,  Baldwin 
received  from  England  application  to  build  locomotives  for  English 

^railways.  In  1840,  Griffiths  was  excluding  foreign  saws  with  his 
own;  Sanford  had  pushed  his  skate-manufacture  to  success.  At 
the  same  time  other  manufactures  throve ;  the  pin-machines  at 
Derby  amazed  an  English  traveller,  for  each  did  the  work  of  fifty- 
nine  workmen  ;  and  our  clocks  began  to  travel  over  all  Europe.  In 
the  same  year  an  establishment  in  New  York  turned  out  fifty  tons 
of  horseshoes  daily,  and  sold  them  ready  for  use  at  five  cents  a 
pound.  The  hardware  manufactures,  also,  were  noted  as  extending 
their  enterprises  rapidly,  and,  having  sold  their  goods  direct  to  the 
trade  since  1837,  were  doing  an  increasing  and  paying  business. 
Best  proof  of  all — surest  proof  that  the  iron  manufacture  was  vigor 
ously  growing — there  were  built,  in  1837,  224  miles  of  railroad,  and 
416  in  1838,  and  389  in  1839,  and  516  in  1840,  and  717  in  1841 ;  so 
that,  in  the  years  1840  and  1841,  not  less  than  98,000  tons  of  iron 
were  laid  down  in  track  and  repairs,  or  used  in  engines  and  cars. 
Of  this  amount  52,000  tons  were  imported ;  the  rest  was  of  domestic 

^manufacture.  In  the  same  years  141  new  steamers  were  built, 
each  requiring  many  tons  of  iron.  These  incidents  prove  that  the 
production  and  manufacture  of  iron  had  not  been  checked  by  the 
large  foreign  importations,  but  that,  when  prostration  of  business 
and  reduction  of  prices  stopped  importations,  the  domestic  manu 
facture,  still  advancing,  supplied  the  demand,  and,  as  we  have  seen, 
excluded  yearly  a  larger  share  of  the  foreign  products.  Such  is  the 
true  history  of  the  iron  interest  from  1832  to  1840,  under  the 
reduced  duties.  And,  so  inconvenient  was  it  to  explain,  and  so 
impossible  was  it  to  deny  the  increased  production  of  iron  until 
1840,  that  Mr.  Carey,  in  discussing  the  history  of  this  period,  ab 
solutely  ignores  the  crisis  of  1837 !  It  seems  amazing  that  any 
writer  addressing  intelligent  readers  should  venture  upon  such  a 
step,  but  in  his  reply  to  Mr.  Wells,  in  the  second  letter  devoted  to 
this  period,  there  occurs  not  one  word  to  indicate  that  the  writer 
had  ever  heard  of  any  disaster  or  disorder  in  that  period  prior  to 
1841 !  For,  the  quantity  produced  in  1840  being  known,  it  was  not 
possible  to  refer  to  the  currency  crisis  preceding,  without  supplying 
to  every  reader  a  more  reasonable  explanation  than  Mr.  Carey 
chooses  to  give  of  the  reduction  of  prices  in  1841  and  1842.  Such 


192  DOES  PROTECTION   PROTECT? 

treatment  may  be  adroit  and  shrewd,  but  it  is  for  candid  readers  to 
say  whether  it  is  worthy  of  any  good  cause. 

The  "  Iron  Manufacturer's  Guide,"  a  work  prepared  by  the  Iron 
Association  with  great  labor,  gives  a  record  of  furnaces,  with  the 
date  of  their  erection.  By  examination  of  this  list,  it  appears  that 
one  hundred  and  eighteen  furnaces  are  recorded  as  having  been  built 
in  the  years  1833-'42,  inclusive,  as  follows : 


FUKNACES  BUILT. 


Pennsylvania.  Other  States. 

ia33 ..    3  7 

1834 2  7 

1835 7  8 


fi 


1837 5  13 

1838 7  5 


Pennsylvania.    Other  States. 


1839 5  5 

1840 4  7 

1841 6  3 

1842 8  2 

53  65 


Other  furnaces  are  mentioned,  which  appear  to  have  been  built 
during  the  same  period,  but  the  precise  date  is  not  stated.  From 
this  record  it  will  be  seen  that  the  excessive  importations  of  1836  and 
1837  did  not  prevent  a  rapid  increase  of  domestic  production  in 
those  years,  and  that  the  production  continued  to  increase,  in  spite 
of  the  rapid  removal  of  duties,  and  in  spite  of  the  panic  and  disorder 
of  currency.  Nor  does  this  record  show  the  whole  number  of  fur 
naces  then  built,  as  we  have  stated ;  the  number,  indeed,  does  not 
match  the  known  increase  of  production. 

The  tariff  of  reduced  duties,  during  eight  years  to  1841,  did  not 
break  down  the  iron  manufacture,  but  so  stimulated  and  strengthened 
it,  that  foreign  iron  had  become  less  than  13  per  cent,  of  the  con 
sumption.  It  remains  to  ascertain  the  cause  of  depression  in  1841 
and  1842. 

The  movement  from  a  depreciated  and  worthless  paper  currency 

(fto  specie  values  involves  inevitable  distress,  and  temporary  disorder 
of  business.  In  the  year  1841,  the  banks  moved  toward  specie 
payments,  and  resumption  was  reached  in  1842.  .In  the  process,  a 
large  quantity  of  discredited  paper,  then  in  circulation,  was  thrown 
out,  and  the  currency  was  severely  contracted ;  prices  fell,  people 
stopped  buying,  specie  was  scarce,  and  for  the  time  no  sound  cur 
rency  sufficiently  supplied  its  place.  Distress  was  the  unavoidable 
consequence,  yet  it  was  the  sure  sign  of  better  days.  A  represent 
ative  from  Indiana,  in  the  year  1844,  described  the  change  thus : 
"  A  return  to  a  rigid  system  of  economy  was  apparent  everywhere  ; 
all  men  were  trying  to  live  within  their  means ;  there  were  fewer 
debts  contracted  in  1841  and  1842  than  there  had  been  during  any 


IRON.— THE  COMPROMISE  TARIFF.  193 

twenty-four  months  for  more  than  fifteen  years  past ;  the  evils  of  the 
credit  system  were  felt  and  acknowledged  by  every  man,  people 
everywhere  were  struggling  to  get  out  of  debt,  and  limiting  their 
expenditures  to  the  least  possible  amount."  Is  this  condition,  so 
clearly  described,  one  of  disease  and  paralysis,  or  of  returning  health  ? 
Trade  was  greatly  retarded  for  the  time,  but  were  the  productive 
energies  of  the  country  destroyed  or  paralyzed  by  severe  economy  ? 
Was  this  prostration  of  business  caused  by  the  tariff  of  1833,  or  by 
the  abandonment  of  a  depreciated  currency,  and  the  return  to  specie 
payments  ?  Mr.  Carey  says  it  was  caused  by  the  tariff.  That  his 
language  may  not  be  misunderstood,  we  quote  :  "  With  1841  there 
came,  however,  as  already  shown,  the  fifth  reduction  of  duty,  un 
der  the  Carolina  nullification  tariff  of  1833." "  With  each 

succeeding  day,  therefore,  the  societary  movement  became  more 
completely  paralyzed,  until  there  was  produced  a  state  of  things 
wholly  without  parallel  in  the  country's  history." 

It  is  not  directly  asserted,  but  it  is  implied,  that  this  fifth  reduc* 
tion  of  duty  was  the  cause  of  all  distress.  Is  it  possible  that  Mr. 
Carey  was  so  careless  as  not  to  observe  that  this  same  fifth  reduction 
came,  not  "  with  1841,"  but  after  December  31, 1841,  and  that  the 
distress  and  prostration  preceded  it  ?  When  that  prostration  oc 
curred,  the  duties  were  still  the  same  that  they  were  in  1840,  when 
our  mills  and  factories  were  active.  Which  is  the  more  reasonable, 
to  suppose  that  the  expectation  of  a  reduction  of  duty  from  $15  to 
$13  a  ton  on  bar-iron  caused  people  to  stop  making  iron,  or  to  sup 
pose  that  the  contraction  of  the  banks,  the  refusal  of  depreciated 
currency,  the  change  of  prices  from  one  currency  to  another,  and  the 
universal  return  to  economy  and  patient  industry,  caused  the  pros 
tration  ?  May  not  the  question  be  left  to  reasoning  men,  without 
argument  ? 

Of  a  paper  circulation  of  $107,290,204  in  use,  January  1,  1841, 
nearly  fifty  millions  were  virtually  thrown  out  and  discredited  in  a 
single  year,  and  twenty-four  millions  were  withdrawn  altogether  be 
fore  January  1,  1842.  To  ignore  such  a  fact  as  this,  and  to  assign 
instead  of  it  the  prospect  of  a  change  of  duty  for  eight  years  pro 
vided  for  by  law  as  the  cause  of  the  prostration  in  1841,  is  indeed  a 
mode  of  reasoning  in  which  its  author  can  find  few  equals.  The 
change  of  duty,  when  it  came,  did  not  cause  an  importation  of  iron 
as  great  as  the  average  of  the  two  years  preceding,  nor  materially 
greater  than  that  of  ten  years  before,  under  the  extreme  protection 
of  1832.  To  ascribe  to  such  importation  the  prostration  of  manufac- 
14 


194  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

tures  would  be  absurd ;  but  to  ascribe  the  prostration  to  the  mere 
apprehension  of  it,  passes  comment. 

Mr.  Carey  studiously  represents  this  period  as  one  of  absolute  pa 
ralysis,  and  asserts — without  an  atom  of  proof — that  the  production 
of  pig-iron  fell  to  220,000  tons  in  1842. 

A  single  fact  shows  whether  "the  societary  movement"  was 
"completely  paralyzed."  The  record  of  produce  moved  by  the 
Erie  Canal  to  tide-water  shows  that  the  value  of  manufactured  prod 
ucts — moved  not  from  the  sea  to  a  consumer,  be  it  observed,  but 
from  the  interior  to  the  sea — was  $1,312,231  in  1840,  and  $2,159,832 
in  1841,  and  $1,949,541  in  1842.  That  no  difference  of  value  may 
seem  to  account  for  this  increase,  it  may  be  added  that  the  quan 
tity  of  manufactured  products  so  moved  to  the  sea  in  1840  was 
1,267  tons,  and  in  1841  it  was  3,702  tons,  and  2,659  in  1842.  In 
1843,  after  the  tariff  had  taken  effect,  there  was  a  reduction  to  2,077, 
and  in  1844  a  startling  decline  to  853  tons.  Is  this  a  "  paralysis  of 
the  societary  movement,  more  complete  with  each  succeeding  day," 
when  the  quantity  of  manufactured  products  sent  forward  to  market 
more  than  doubles  in  a  single  year  ?  Or  has  Mr.  Carey  once  more 
drawn  upon  his  imagination  for  his  facts  ? 

In  the  year  1841,  according  to  the  records  of  the  Iron  Association, 
as  already  stated,  six  new  furnaces  went  into  operation  in  Pennsyl 
vania,  and  four  in  other  States;  and  in  1842  eight  went  into  opera 
tion  in  Pennsylvania,  and  two  in  other  States.  Nor  were  the  furnaces 
alone  increased.  In  1841  a  nail-factory  was  built  at  Weymouth, 
Massachusetts ;  the  Hecla  rolling-mill  at  Pittsburg,  and  the  Brady's 
Bend  rolling-mill  were  built.  In  1842  the  Agawam  rolling-mill  of 
Massachusetts  was  rebuilt,  the  Fall  River  was  built,  the  Cold  Spring 
of  Connecticut,  the  Heshborn  and  Crescent  of  Pennsylvania,  and  the 
Falcon  of  Ohio,  were  built.  These  facts  appear  in  the  statistics  of  the 
Iron  Association.  "With  each  succeeding  day,  therefore,  the  socie 
tary  movement  became  more  completely  paralyzed,"  and  the  quantity 
of  manufactured  products  sent  to  market  doubled,  ten  new  blast 
furnaces  were  built  each  year",  and  several  new  rolling-mills  ! 

Early  in  1844,  in  an  elaborate  speech  in  favor  of  protective  duties 
on  iron,  Mr.  Bidlack,  of  Pennsylvania,  made  some  statements  deserv 
ing  of  notice,  as  follows :  "  It  is  now  only  about  four  years  since  the 
first  successful  experiment "  (in  smelting  iron  wTith  anthracite  coal) 
"  was  made,  and  there  have  already  been  erected  no  less  than  twenty 
furnaces  on  this  principle,  sixteen  in  Pennsylvania  and  four  in  New 
Jersey,  and  others  are  about  to  be  erected.  These  furnaces  are 


IROX.— THE   COMPROMISE  TARIFF.  195 

capable  alone  of  producing  60,000  or  70,000  tons,  being  more  than 
one-fifth  of  the  whole  production  from  charcoal  in  the  United 
States." 

Now,  Mr.  Carey  himself  states  that  there  were  six  such  anthracite 
furnaces  in  1841,  and  we  find  twenty  at  the  close  of  1843.  Are  we  to 
suppose  that  none  of  them  were  erected  and  put  in  operation  in  the 
year  1842  ?  But  Mr.  Bidlack  goes  on  to  name  "  six  furnaces  in 
Columbia  County,"  and  two  more  near  Danville ;  "  these  have  been 
built  within  four  years."  Had  these  furnaces  been  built  within  one 
year  (since  the  tariff),  would  he  not  have  said  so  ?  Again,  he  tells 
us  of  a  new  and  extensive  rolling-mill  just  put  in  operation  which 
"  Vas  commenced  in  1841,"  and  of  another  furnace  and  rolling-mill 
just  starting,  "  after  a  suspension  of  about  a  year,"  and  this  was 
early  in  1844.  The  suspension,  then,  must  have  taken  place  in  1843, 
after  the  tariff  was  passed.  These  are  given  as  samples  only  of 
indications,  which  meet  every  reader  of  the  records  of  those  times, 
and  they  prove  not  that  there  was  no  depression,  but  that  it  was 
not  a  prostration  of  the  whole  iron  interest,  as  some  have  represented, 
followed  by  a  magical  revival  as  soon  as  the  tariff  was  passed.  No 
one  can  read  that  new  furnaces  and  mills  were  built,  and  new  modes 
of  manufacture  adopted  in  the  years  1841  and  1842,  without  realizing 
that  the  statements  of  Mr.  Carey  are  not  in  strict  accord  with  facts. 
People  do  not  build  new  mills  and  put  money  into  new  furnaces, 
when  half  the  furnaces  in  the  country  are  idle.  The  larger  furnaces 
would  hold  out  longest ;  more  than  half  the  furnaces  in  the  country 
must  therefore  have  been  idle  in  1842,  if,  as  Mr.  Carey  says,  "there 
is  the  best  reason  for  believing  "  the  product  of  pig-iron  was  reduced 
from  347,000  tons,  in  1840,  to  less  than  200,000  tons.  The  produc 
tion  in  the  year  1840  was  347,000  tons,  and  in  that  year,  and  in 
1841  and  1842,  furnaces  of  the  capacity  of  44,000  tons  more  were 
built  and  put  into  operation,  so  that  the  productive  power  increased 
at  the  least  to  376,000  or  387,000  tons  before  the  adoption  of  the 
protective  tariff,  and  yet  Mr.  Carey  asserts  that  less  than  200,000 
tons  were  actually  produced ! 

In  this  same  period  of  alleged  complete  paralysis,  we  began  to 
make  railroad  iron  for  our  own  railroads.  The  first  rail-mill  was 
built,  it  is  stated,  in  1841 ;  but  in  the  "  Iron  Manufacturer's  Guide  "  it 
is  stated  that  the  Mount  Savage,  Md.,  was  built  in  1839,  and  the 
Cosalo,  Pa.,  "  in  1839  or  1840,"  and  the  Brady's  Bend,  Pa.,  in  1841. 
Once  more  Mr.  Carey  seems  to  be  at  war  with  facts,  for  he  asserts 
that,  after  the  passage  of  the  tariff  of  1842,  the  first  rolling-mill  for 


196  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

railroad  iron  "made  its  appearance  on  American  soil."  In  this 
same  period  of  "  complete  paralysis,"  American  mechanics  built 
locomotives  to  order  for  English  railroads.  In  1842  it  was  stated 
in  Congress  that  American  locomotives  were  then  rolling  on  railroads 
in  England,  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria.  Under  the  system  of  pro 
tection,  England  began  to  supply  our  railroads  with  rails.  But, 
Under  the  system  of  protection,  we  began  to  supply  England 
"with  railroad  engines.  To  those  who  believe  that  the  high  wages 
of  labor  in  this  country  make  protection  necessary,  it  may  be  difficult 
to  explain  how  labor  of  the  most  costly  kind  can  be  put  into  a 
machine  so  expensive  and  ponderous  for  transportation,  and  that  ma 
chine,  shipped  across  the  ocean,  can  be  sold  at  a  rate  defying  foreign 
competition,  at  a  time  when,  Mr.  Carey  asserts,  the  pauper  labor  of 
England  was  prostrating  our  industry,  and  making  it  impossible  for 
us  to  produce  even  the  rudest  and  simplest  form  of  iron !  In  1842, 
iron  sold  here  for  $25,  and  in  England  for  $16.50  per  ton;  wages 
here  were  fully  20  per  cent,  higher  than  in  England;  yet  our 
labor  was  so  much  more  intelligent,  and  therefore  efficient,  that  the 
more  costly  iron,  worked  up  by  more  costly  labor,  was  shipped  to 
England  in  the  form  of  locomotives. 

What  was  the  "  prostration  of  the  iron  interest "  in  1841-'42  ? 
A  very  simple  explanation  is  consistent  with  all  the  reliable  records. 
Though  the  price  of  iron  had  fallen  to  $25  a  ton,  the  importation  of 
pig-iron  was  only  18,694  tons — not  enough  to  interfere  in  the  least 
degree  with  our  production.  But  the  whole  people  had  begun  to 
economize,  and  to  consume  as  little  as  possible.  __The  production  of 
iron  had  been  pushed  fully  to  the  consuming  power  of  the  country. 
The  fall  in  price  had  driven  men  to  apply  new  methods,  and  the 
cheaper  method  of  smelting  with  anthracite  or  coke  began  to  be 
adopted.  In  1837  the  first  anthracite  furnace  was  built;  two  more 
followed  in  1839,  two  more  in  1840,  two  in  1841,  and  three  in  1842. 
These  ten  furnaces,  producing  perhaps  thirty  thousand  tons — certainly 
far  more  than  the  whole  quantity  imported — were  offering  iron  for 
sale  at  low  rates  in  a  market  already  stocked  beyond  the  power  of 
consumption.  The  country  was  struggling  out  of  debt,  and  re 
ducing  consumption,  at  the  very  time  that  the  producing  power 
was  thus  increased,  not  only  by  the  building  of  anthracite  furnaces, 
but  by  the  opening  of  furnaces  with  coked  bituminous  coal,  and  the 
building  of  twenty-three  new  charcoal  furnaces,  mentioned  in  the 
"Iron  Manufacturer's  Guide"  as  erected  in  1840-'42.  These,  no 
doubt,  were  in  localities  most  favored  by  natural  advantages,  and 


IRON.— THE   COMPROMISE  TARIFF.  197 

able  to  supply  the  iron  at  low  rates.  With  the  market  in  such  a 
condition,  furnaces  less  advantageously  situated,  or  adhering  to 
more  expensive  methods,  were  forced  to  stop.  Accordingly,  it  is 
stated  in  a  record  which  appears  in  De  Bow's  "Industrial  Re 
sources,"  apparently  taken  from  a  memorial  of  the  Pennsylvania 
iron  manufacturers  to  Congress  in  1849,  that  thirty-five  iron  works 
failed  in  Pennsylvania  in  the  years  1840-'42,  inclusive — though,  ac 
cording  to  the  same  table,  a  larger  number  were  put  in  operation  in 
the  very  same  years.  And  this  change,  from  old  and  expensive  to 
new  and  cheaper  methods,  was  the  "  complete  paralysis  "  of  the  iron 
manufacture  which  Mr.  Carey  finds  "  the  best  reason  for  believing " 
reduced  the  production  of  pig-iron  to  less  than  200,000  tons  in  the 
year  1842. 

How  long,  it  may  be  fairly  asked,  would  our  beds  of  anthracite 
have  slept  undisturbed,  had  protection  sheltered  our  iron-makers 
from  competition,  and  made  it  profitable  to  continue  making  iron  in 
the  most  expensive  locations  and  by  the  most  wasteful  processes? 
For  twenty  years  England  had  been  using  mineral  coal  for  fuel,  and 
had  so  vastly  increased  her  production,  that  at  this  very  time  her 
furnaces,  by  mutual  agreement,  stopped  work  for  a  time,  to  let  the 
market  relieve  itself.  The  price  in  England  had  been  reduced  from 
about  $40  a  ton  in  1828,  to  $16.50  in  1842,  and  to  $20  in  1841. 
Yet,  through  all  the  era  of  protection,  and  through  all  the  prosperity 
and  extravagant  prices  of  1836,  our  furnaces  continued  to  use  old 
methods ;  and  it  was  only  when  revulsion  and  trial  came,  that  they 
began  to  use  the  anthracite  that  lay  in  masses  beneath  their  feet.  In 
the  year  of  panic,  1837,  the  first  furnace  was  built  to  test  the  anthracite ; 
in  the  year  of  the  second  suspension,  1839,  two  such  furnaces  were 
built,  and  in  the  three  years  of  "  hard  times"  and  low  prices,  1840-'42, 
no  less  than  seven  anthracite  furnaces  were  erected.  At  the  same 
time,  the  use  of  this  coal  in  working  iron  was  more  generally  adopted. 
The  production  increased  from  738,697  tons  in  1838,  to  818,402  in 
1839,  to  864,384  in  1840,  and  959,972  in  1841,  and  to  1,108,418,  ris 
ing  for  the  first  time  above  one  million  tons,  in  the  very  year  when 
Mr.  Carey  represents  that  the  paralysis  was  most  complete !  Jit  is 
plain  that  the  iron  manufacture  was  greatly  stimulated  by  the  low 
cost  of  iron.  It  is  equally  plain  that  the  making  of  iron,  instead  of 
being  prostrated  beyond  all  parallel,  was  simply  changing  its  method 
from  the  old  to  the  new,  and  preparing  for  a  real  and  solid  progress. 
This  period,  1840  to  1842,  may  therefore  be  styled  the  new-birth  of 
the  iron  manufacture.  From  the  trials  which  forced  it  to  better 
methods,  dates  its  modern  growth. 


198 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


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IRON.— THE   COMPROMISE  TARIFF. 


199 


IMPORTS  OF  IRON. 
By  Quantities  (Treasury  Report  of  1845) — Continued. 


YEAR. 

Anvils. 

Blacksmiths' 
Hammers. 

Cables  and 
Chains. 

Braziers' 
Rods. 

Wood  Screws. 

*  Implements. 

1824. 

Lbs. 

116387 

Lbs. 
10  144 

Lbs. 
210  550 

Lbs. 
2  128 

Values. 
$5  206 

Values. 
$6  095 

1825  
1826  
1827  

596.426 
407,344 
1,011  412 

72,897 
22.153 
41  003 

423,766 
431,766 
388  893 

224,086 
498,404 
771  944 

67.316 
86,285 
112  790 

80,621 
81.457 
105  329 

1828. 

972  129 

58  855 

847  655 

730  031 

87  100 

119'S49 

1829.... 

699,836 

65.896 

810372 

169,531 

61  '967 

77  262 

1830  

677.246 

75  616 

540628 

218428 

66  817 

95  004 

1831.  .  . 

1  253450 

116  166 

1  004540 

487  013 

112  545 

118  743 

1832.. 

1  393  295 

90637 

2  454  360 

525  313 

133  698 

133  677 

1833  

943.  203 

63,418 

4,216.261 

506,447 

110343 

97  071 

1834  

989.091 

76,888 

2,931  936 

297,529 

141  560 

114003 

1835.. 

1  386  293 

120  328 

2  023  332 

254  665 

150  063 

97  626 

1836 

1  573  367 

180  339 

2  925  527 

537  817 

161  769 

137  378 

1837.... 

1,177.735 

93.931 

2.&30.878 

450,817 

145  565 

133  949 

lass  

524,343 

60.740 

2,089,259 

319,474 

107  256 

49  520 

1839  

1  026.497 

116  271 

3  486  810 

852  695 

166  570 

88  126 

1840. 

324698 

35  729 

2  114  760 

433  620 

131  986 

63  515 

1841 

558237 

36  150 

3  825  038 

367  090 

138  527 

60  035 

1842  

518.361 

45.231 

2,488.852 

1,178,374 

113  469 

52953 

1843  

266,452 

19  307 

884259 

378  415 

7  551 

10  602 

1844. 

894565 

62528 

2  390  195 

805  906 

6  135 

1845.... 

1846  

1,270,451 

103  411 

2  374  925 

305883 

64  177  Ibs 

f  Includes  Cutting-Knives,  Scythes,  Sickles,  Reaping-Hooks,  Spades,  and  Shovels. 


IMPORTS  OP  IRON  AND  ITS  PRODUCTS. 
JBy  Values  ( Treasury  Report  of  1845). 


YEARS 

Pig- 

SteeL 

Scrap. 

BAR. 

M£  Specific. 

Ad  Valorem. 

Total  Value. 

Rolled. 

Hammered. 

1821 

$131,291 

$1.213  041 

$238  400 

$1,630,129 

$3  212  861 

1822 

18<)'613 

l!864,?868 

387^818 

2'767?757 

s!21o'056 

1823.   . 

224595 

l,'89l'635 

398^279 

2!568l842 

5,^083^51 

1824. 

$3,444 

236,405 

. 

962,897 

$483,686 

326,411 

2,505,291 

4,518,134 

1825. 

36.513 

291,515 

224.497 

1,562,146 

393,658 

3,312.758 

5,821,087 

1826. 

67,004 

384,235 

223,259 

1,590.350 

355,152 

2,831,333 

5,451,333 

1827: 

46.881 

310,197 

. 

.. 

347,792 

1,323.749 

448,154 

3.525,433 

6,002,206 

1828. 

93,025 

430,425 

. 

441,000 

2.141,178 

620,933 

3,559.982 

7,286.543 

1829. 

28,811 

289,831 

119,326 

1,884,049 

330,278 

3,100,630 

5,752,925 

1830. 

25,644 

291257 

226,336 

1,730,375 

283,702 

3.372.146 

5,929,460 

1831. 

160.681 

399:635 

544,664 

1,260,166 

468,912 

4:358.921 

7.192,979 

1832. 

222.303 

645,510 

701.549 

1,929,493 

608,733 

4,697,512 

8,805,100 

1833. 

217,668 

523,116 

$24.('35 

1,002,750 

1,837,473 

773,855 

3,361,582 

7,740,479 

1&34. 

270,325 

554.150 

33,243 

1,187.236 

1,742,883 

656.000 

4.090,621 

8,534,458 

1835. 

289.770 

576,988 

11.609 

1,050,152 

1,641,859 

524,155 

4,827,461 

8.921.503 

1836. 

272.978 

686,141 

28.224 

2,131.828 

1,891.214 

879.465 

7,001,404    12.891,254 

1837. 

422.929 

804.817 

18,391 

2.573,367 

2.017,346 

1,038,382 

5,488,311    12,36/3,543 

1838. 

319.099 

487.334 

7,567 

1,855,121 

1,166,196 

543.779 

3,069,507      7.418,603 

1839. 

285.300 

771.804 

10,161 

3.181,180 

2.054.094 

922,447 

5,585,063    12,810.049 

1840. 

114.562 

528,716 

15,749 

1,707.649 

1.689,831 

609.671 

2,575,229      7.241.407 

1841. 

228.228 

609,201 

10.587 

2,172,278 

1,614,619 

827.820 

3,428,140      8.885.8-23 

1842. 

295,264 

597,317 

8,207 

2,053,453 

1,041.410 

652,583 

2.919.498  j    7,567,752 

1843. 

48.251 

201,772 

2,743 

511.282 

327,550 

977,849 

734,737  ;    2,103.684 

1844. 

200,522 

487,462 

43,396 

1,065,582 

583.065 

531,659 

2,782.137      5.693.823 

1845.. 

506.291 

775,675 

119.740 

1,691,748 

872,157 

908,043 

4,169,745      9,0-13.399 

1846.. 

489,573 

1.234,408 

56,534 

1,127,418 

1,165,429 

951,868 

3,933,817  ;    8,959,047 

The  figures  for  1845  and  1846,  as  far  as  I  can  find  them,  are  added  to  the  tables  from  the 
report  of  1845,  which  give  none  later  than  1844. 


200 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


ANTHRACITE    COAL    TRADE. 
[FROM  THE  MINER'S  JOURNAL.] 

The  following  Table  exhibits  the  Anthracite  Coal  sent  to  Market  from  the  different  regions  in 
Pennsylvania,  from  the  commencement  of  the  Trade,  in  1820,  to  1868,  inclusive,  to  which 
is  appended  the  aggregate  of  Anthracite,  Semi-Anthracite,  and  Bitum.lnous  Coal,  moved 
toward  the  seaboard. 

HARD  ANTHRACITES.       ill 


Years. 

SCHUYLKILL.                      .     \       \>TJ 

Sold  on 
Line  of 
Schuyl. 

LMHIGH. 

Canal. 

R.  Road. 

Total. 

Pine- 
Grove. 

Little 
Schuyl. 

Canal. 

L.  Valley 
Railr'  ad. 

Lehigh  * 
Susq. 
Railroad. 

Total. 

1820 

365 
1,073 
2*240 

5,823 
9541 
28,393 
31,280 
32,074 
30,232 
25,110 

V.bes 

165,740 
418,235 
471,030 
577,652 

1,058,054 

365 
1,073 
2,240 
6,823 
9,541 
28,393 
31,280 
32,074 
30,232 
25,110 

1821  .... 

1822  
1823  

1,480 
1,128 

1,480 
1,128 

1824  
1825  
1826  
1827  
1828  

1,567 
6,500 
16,767 
31,360 
47,284 

::: 

1,567 
6,500 
16,767 
31,360 
47,284 

"3.154 
3,332 

1829  
1830  .  . 

79,973 

79,973 

186,059 
89,984 

•  •  •• 

*"  "  " 

186,059 
89,984 

7,486 
5,321 
6,150 
10,048 
13,429 
19,429 
18,571 
17,863 
21,749 
28,775 
30,390 

166,131 
41,750 
40,966 
70,000 
123,000 
106,244 
131,250 
148,211 
223,902 
213,615 
221,025 

166,131 

41,750 
40,966 
70,000 
123,000 
106,244 
131,250 
148,211 
223,902 
213,615 
221,025 

1,319,963 
225,318 
143,037 
272,546 
267,793 
377,002 
429,453 
517,116 
633,507 
670,321 
781,656 

1831  
1832  
1833  
1834  
1835  
1836  
1837  
1838  
1839  

1840  
1841  
1842  
1843  
1844  
1845  
1846  
1847  
1848  
1849  

1850  
1851  
1852  
1853  
1854  
1855  
1856  
1857  
1858  
1859  

1860  
1861  
1862  
1863  
1864  
1865  
1866  
1867  
1868  

81,854 
209,271 
252,971 
226,692 
339,508 
432,045 
523,152 
433,875 
442,608 

3,031,960 
452,291 
584,692 
491,602 
447,058 
398,887 
263,587 
3,440 
222,693 
436,602 
489,208 

"850 
49,902 
230,254 
441,491 
820,237 
1,233,142 
1,360,681 
1,216,233 
1,115,918 

81,854 
209,271 
252,971 
226,692 
339,508 
432,045 
523,152 
433,875 
442,608 

17,000 
13,000 
20,539 

50,539 
23,860 
17,653 
32,381 
22,905 
34,916 
47,928 
58,926 
67,457 
61,530 
78,299 

14",bbo 
40,000 
34,000 
41,000 
35,000 
31,000 
13,000 
9,000 

3,031,960 
452,291 
585,542 
541,504 
677,312 
840,378 
1,083,796 
1,236,582 
1,583,374 
1,652,835 
1,605,126 

217,000 
20,000 
40,000 
37,000 
31,000 
57,000 
74,000 
91,000 
106,401 
162,626 
174,758 

171,725 
28,924 
41,223 
40,584 
34,619 
60,000 
90,000 
155,460 
226,610 
252,837 
239,290 

1,319,963 
225,318 
143,037 
272,546 
267,793 
377,002 
429,453 
517,116 
633,507 
670,321 
781,656 

3.790,360 
288,030 
579,156 
800,038 

907,'354 
1,105,263 
1,169,453 
1,275,989 
1,323,804 
1,372,021 

6,468,708 
1,423,977 
1,650,270 
1,650,912 
1,582,248 
1,987,854 
2,213,292 
2,088,903 
1,709,552 
1,542,645 
1,632,932 

10,358,740 
1,712,007 
2,229,426 
2,450,950 
2,470,943 
2,895,208 
3,318,555 
3,258,356 
2,985,541 
2,866,449 
3,004,953 

445,855 
70,919 
none. 
66,543 
80,660 
91,462 
112,213 
157,152 
145,012 
137,376 
125,262 

793,788 
211,960 
310,307 
325,099 
389,295 
444,184 
426,208 
454,515 
346,877 
383,931 
366,343 

1,169,547 
207863 
312,367 
322,211 
394,078 
444,160 
471,861 
620,499 
511,977 
441,166 
554,774 

4,317,749 
690,456 
964,224 
1,072,136 
1,054,309 
1,207,186 
1,275,050 
1.186,230 
900,314 
909,000 
1,050,659 

4,317,749 

690,456 
964,224 
1,072,136 
1,054,309 
1,207,186 
1,284,113 
1,351,970 
1,318,541 
1,380,030 
1,628,311 

11,951,286 
1,821,674 
1,738,377 
1,351,054 
1,894,713 
2,054,669 
1,822,535 
2,128,867 
2,062,44ft 
2,507,582 

9,709,803 
1,356,688 
1,183,570 
981,729 
885,842 
1,000,500 
1,022,740 
1,297,047 
1,030,235 
987,628 

17,482,585 
1,878,156 
1,460,832 
2,305,606 
3,065,216 
3,065,577 
3,090,814 
3,714,644 
3,446,826 
3,574,874 

27,192,390 
3,270,516 
2,697,489 
2,890,598 
3,433,265 
3,642,218 
3,735,802 
4,633,487 
4,334,820 
4,414,356 

986,599 
152,957 
167,357 
183,985 
212,794 
211,216 
157,840 
167,833 
157,817 
163,633 

3,658,719 
323,136 
171,432 
249,451 
385,788 
537,498 
585,534 
617,278 
549,097 
389,994 

4,181,156 
608,877 
435,320 
545,916 
671,589 
748,448 
746,629 
1,010,905 
1,107,826 
1,268,573 

10,309,564 
1.091,032 
994,705 
396,227 
699,558 
758,087 
888,784 
1,066,303 
1,006,604 
989,947 

1,641,720 
730,642 
743,672 
882,573 
1,195,155 
1,295,419 
1,402,277 
1,730,475 
1,948,385 
2,603,103 

26,458,061 

49,503,881 

73,804,982 

3,057,945 

8,468,475 

12,654,000 

24,105,781 

14,143,411 

1,058,054 

35,157,158 

IRON.— THE  COMPROMISE  TARIFF. 


201 


ANTHRACITE  COAL  TRADE— (Continued). 


HARD  ANTHRACITES. 


Year*. 

1820.. 

WYOMING  RKQION. 

SHAMO- 

Kl.N. 

AeesK- 

GATS. 

Annual 
Increase. 

AGGBB- 

GATE  OP 
ALL  KINDS. 

BvLe- 

nigh 
R.R. 

Del.  and 
Hudson 
Coal  Co. 

Penna. 
Coal  Co. 

.By 

Canals. 

G.  West 
ern  R.  R. 

L.4B. 
R.  R. 

Total 

365 
1,073 
3,720 
6,951 
11,108 
34,893 
48,047 
63,434 
77,516 
112,083 

'"708 
2,647 
3,231 
4,157; 

23,785 
13,154 
15,387 
14,082' 
34,567 

62,651 
2,0861 
187,051  i 
123,877 
dill,  112 
184,122 
1  23,359  i 
195,327! 
140,747; 
79,805 

45,982 
95,589 
148,445 
155,180 
367,252 
382,163 
330,992 
5:>.::<  4 
205,929 
128,403 

103,495 
1,008,394 
570,445 
197,169 
734,690 
654,263 
256,445 
rf320,164 
93,460; 
1,092,678 

626,422 
^522,663 
rf!21,799 
1,937,064, 
564,388 
<?725,866 
•_','.<-:;,  <'<4n 
155,508 
1,193,801 

365 
23,195 
38,243 
37,384 
18,336 
60,538 
83,712 
103,691 
109,818 
157,476 

1821.. 

1822.. 

1823.. 

1824.. 

1825.. 

1826.. 

1827.. 

1828 

1829.. 

1830.. 
1831.. 

1  -:•-'.. 
1833.. 

:::: 

7,000 

7,000 

I 

7,000 
43,000 
54,000 
84,600 
111,777 

7,000 
43,000 
54,000 

359,190 
174,734 

176,820 
363,871 
487,748 
376,636 
660,758 
684,117 
879,444 
738,697 
818,402 

636,903 
232,870 
213,329 
436,849 
580,180 
448,262 
610,727 
792,549 
1,032,894 
867,780 
999,953 

84,600 
111,777 
43,700 
90,000 
103,861 
115,387 
78,207 
122,300 

ii^g'so 

1834.. 

mi.. 

BM.. 

1837.. 
1838.. 
1839.. 

1840.. 
1841.. 

:::: 

43.700 
90,000 
103,861 
115,387 
78,207 
122,300 

.... 

.... 

846,332 
148,470 
192,270 

846,832 
148,470 
192,270 
252,599 
285,605 
365,911 
451,836 
518,389 
583,067 
685,196 
732,910 

11,930 
15,505 
21,463 
10,000 
10,000 
13,087 
10,000 
12,572 
14.904 
19,356 
19,650 

5,261,197 
864,384 
959,973 
1,108,418 
1,263,598 
1,630,850 
2,013,013 
2,344,005 
2,882,309 
3,089,238 
3,217,641 

6,015,443 
1,027,251 
1,115,367 
1,251,645 
1,314,843 
1,732,813 
2,123,443 
2,520,653 
3,088,170 
3,364,977 
3,583,628 

1842.. 
1843.. 
1844.. 
1845.. 
1846.. 
1847.. 
1848.. 
1849.. 

1850.. 
1851.. 
1852.. 
1853.. 
1854.. 
1855.. 
1856.. 
1857.. 
1858.  . 
1859.. 

I860.. 
1861.. 
1862.. 
1863.. 
1864.. 
1865.. 

inc.. 

1867.. 
1868.. 

"5,886 

10,466 
10,425 
19,590 

205,253 
227.605 
251,005 
273,435 
320,000 
388.203 
437,500 
454,240 

111,014 

316,017 
426,164 
512,659 
496,648 
504,S03 
612,500 
536,008 
630,056 
688,854 

47,346 
58,000 
114,906 
178.401 
192,503 
284,398 
237,271 
259,080 

133,965 

187,000 
305,530 
490,023 
683,411 
829,435 

2'lb',042 
223,806 

46,367 
32,156 
J5,072 
41,890 
26,235 
39,232 
50,209 
44,270 
37,959 
69.644 
71,399 

2,897,981 
441403 
479,078 
497.105 
494,327 
440,944 
565,460 
499,650 
480,699 
348,789 
591,000 

1,371,905 
243,250 
336,000 
319,341 
442,511 
492,689 
464,039 
510,631 
407,914 
346,430 
453,548 

4,216,253 
827,823 
1,156,167 
1,284,500 
1,475,732 
1,608,478 
1,771,511 
1,972,581 
1,952,603 
2,186,094 
2,731,236 

146,537 

»Jwi 

24,899 
25,846 
15,500 
63,500 
116,117 
137,406 
155,806 
135,893 
180,753 

19,373,429 
3,321,136 
4,329,530 
4,899,975 
5,097,144 
5,831,834 
6,486,097 
6,751,542 
6,431,378 
6,524,838 
7,517,516 

21,109,575 
3,736,186 
4,876,183 
5,510.664 
5,959.639 
6,903,498 
7,556,030 
7,858,959 
7,593.118 
7,774,388 
8,889,787 

66,169,401 
9,629,455 
8,980,646 
9,015,504 
11,580,356 
11,747,984 
11,340,675 
14,337,950 
14,541,498 
15,848,410 

438,066 
100,277 
111,073 
26^723 

*9',314 
250,694 
344,218 
452,935 
811,316 

4,838,455 
499,568 
726,644 
637,066 
828,150 
852,136 
759,575 
1,302,894 
1,  42-2*29 
1,611,113 

4,834,723  4,016,353 
701,5231    435,306 
629,6571    316,765 
601,091     559,246 
662,904     662,721 
759,544     630,142 
577,494     358,463 
•535,385     569,401 
861,730     451,475 
953,855     429,642 

2,629,364 
1,080,227 
1,104,319 
1,094,315 
1,223,165 
1,302,457 
1,007,074 
1,519,538 
1,719,321 
1,728,785 

433,848 
519,777 
648,399 
767,661 
964,753 
929,374 
674,744 
1,050,313 
1,184,110 
1,291,839 

12,961,725 
2,941,817 
3,055,140 
3,145,770 
3,759,610 
3,960,836 
3,256,658 
4,736,616 
5,328,322 
5,990,813 

875,641 
210,108 
241,451 
241,642 
274,936 
333,478 
457,162 
557,161 
485,697 
492,265 

56,954,864 
8,143,938 
7,621,354 
7,499,555 
9,427,619 
9,998,046 
9,272,157 
12,055,797 
12,216,215 
13,405,016 

^,590,983  17,229,658 

11,11  1,905  9,803,569  j  14,408,565 

8,464,818 

58,107,921 

4,627,008 

171,578,026 

201,362,074 

In  making  up  this  table,  the  coal  transported  over  all  the  railroads  is  given  in  full— but  a 
large  portion  of  the  coal  is  transported  over  two  or  more  roads  from  the  same  regions.  In 
our  tables  the  coal  reported  double  is  separated,  deducted  and  credited  to  the  different  re 
gions. 


202 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


CHAPTER  XV. 

IRON.— THE    TARIFF   OF   1842. 

THE  protective  tariff  of  1842,  passed  in  August  of  that  year,  re 
stored  hi£h  duties  on  iron,  and  imposed  duties  higher  than  ever 
before  were  imposed  on  steel,  castings,  anchors,  anvils,  screws,  sad 
irons,  hinges,  axle-trees,  wrought  iron,  and  wire,  and  the  whole  list 
of  articles  admitted  under  ad-valorem  duties,  such  as  axes,  adzes, 
hatchets,  knives,  sickles,  scythes,  spades,  shovels,  saddlery,  vices, 
chisels,  etc.  The  importance  of  this  tariff  in  the  history  of  the  iron 
interest  justifies  the  following  detailed  statement,  taken  from  the 
Treasury  report  of  1845,  in  which  the  duty  and  its  equivalent  pro 
portion  to  the  cost  of  the  article  is  stated : 


Castings,  other 31.78 

Blacksmith's  Hammers 52.46 

Anvils 45.09 

Anchors 62.91 

Steam,  Gas,  or  Water  Pipes 

Mill  and  other  Saws 

Malleable  Iron  or  Castings 46.22 

Wrought  Iron 88.03 

Chains 101.02 

Chain  Cables 87.20 

Spikes 168.14 

Nails,  cut ...  39.00 

"      wrought 58.31 

Wood  Screws 60.70 

Tacks,  Brads,  Springs,  etc 49.20 


Pig  Iron,  duty— percentage 

Scrap  Iron 48.83 

Rolled  Iron 75.22 

Hammered  Iron 35.56 

Steel,  cast 11.65 

"     other 38.24 

Band  Iron 70.47 

Hoop  Iron 115.98 

Sheet  Iron 60.20 

Nail  Rods 98.99 

Braziers1  Rods 56.10 

Axle-trees 41.03 

Hinges 41.14 

Sad-irons  87.54 

Glazed  Hollow- ware 33.76 

Castings,  Vessels 51.31 


Pins  and  wire  were  classified,  and  bore  duties,  according  to  quali 
ty,  from  18.42  per  cent,  to  70.31  per  cent.  This  was  the  tariff  of 
1842,  which  continued  in  operation  until  December  1,  1846,  and  we 
have  now  to  ascertain  its  effect.  At  the  outset  we  must  remember  that 
the  iron  interest,  when  this  tariff  was  passed,  was  just  entering  upon 
the  great  change  spoken  of  already,  from  older  methods  to  the  gen 
eral  use  of  anthracite  fuel.  This  change  had  been  forced^by  the 
pressure  of  1837  to  1842,  and,  as  we  have  seen,  it  had  increased  the 
consumption  of  anthracite  coal  to  1,108,418  pounds  in  1842,  many 
mills  having  adopted  the  use  of  the  mineral  coal,  while  at  least  ten 
anthracite  furnaces  were  in  existence  at  the  close  of  1842.  It  need 
not  be  said  that  a  change  so  important  and  advantageous,  once  be 
gun,  must  have  continued  had  there  been  no  change  of  duty.  The 
same  tariff  which  caused  it  to  be  commenced  would  have  caused  its 


IRON.— THE  TARIFF  OF  1842.  203 

completion,  and  it  may  be  doubted  whether  the  change  would  not 
have  been  more  rapid  and  thorough  had  the  same  conditions  of  ne 
cessity  and  sharp  competition  been  maintained.  By  the  tariff  of 
1842,  foreign  competition  was  checked  during  the  year  1843,  and 
part  of  1844 ;  but  the  change  still  went  on,  and  in  consequence  the 
production  of  iron  was  still  retarded,  while  old  furnaces  were  being 
abandoned  or  modified.  That  this  change  actually  took  place,  is 
proved  by  the  record  of  consumption  of  anthracite,  which  increased 
155,180  tons  in  1843,  in  spite  of  the  extreme  depression,  and  367,252 
tons  in  1844.  In  1845  and  1846  it  increased  382,163  tons  and 
330,990  tons,  so  that  the  consumption  in  1846  was  2,344,005  tons, 
against  1,108,418  tons  in  1842.  This  record  is  proof  that  the  revo 
lution  which  had  commenced  in  the  production  and  manufacture  of 
iron  was  not  entirely  arrested,  and  the  deliveries  by  the  several  lines 
of  transportation  show  that  the  whole  of  this  vast  increase  was  sup 
plied  by  improvements  made  before  the  tariff  of  1842  went  into 
effect.  The  Schuylkill  and  Lehigh  Canals  had  been  delivering  since 
1822  and  1820 ;  the  Schuylkill  Railway  began  to  deliver  in  1841 ; 
the  canals  from  the  Wyoming  region  in  1842,  and  the  Shamokin  in 
1839.  Not  a  single  new  line  was  opened  during  the  tariff  period  of 
1842-346,  except  the  Lehigh  Railway,  which  made  its  first  delivery  of 
5,886  tons  in  1846,  the  last  year  of  that  tariff. 

Such  a  revolution  in  the  iron  manufacture  having  been  commenced, 
due,  as  we  have  seen,  not  to  the  tariff  of  1842,  but  to  the  conditions 
preceding  its  adoption,  it  must  inevitably  have  resulted  in  large  in 
crease  of  the  production  of  iron  without  corresponding  increase  of 
price  as  a  stimulus — in  other  words,  in  a  healthy  growth.  That  this 
effect  did,  to  some  extent,  follow  independently  of  the  tariff  and  in 
spite  of  its  encouragement  to  iron-makers  to  adhere  to  less  economi 
cal  methods,  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  after  the  tariff  was  removed, 
when  the  price,  temporarily  raised  by  the  duties,  had  fallen  much 
below  the  level  of  1840— to  little  more  than  $20  a  ton  in  1849  and 
1850 — the  production  of  pig-iron  was  564,000  tons.  This  increase 
of  over  two  hundred  thousand  tons  in  the  decade,  we  may  reasonably 
infer,  is  less  than  that  which  would  have  followed  had  no  tariff  inter 
vened  to  check  the  general  adoption  of  the  most  economical  methods 
of  manufacture. 

But,  it  is  said,  the  production  under  the  high  duties  and  high 
prices  of  1844-'46  was  far  greater  than  that  of  1850.  Was  it  an  ad 
vantage  to  the  country,  then,  or  to  the  iron  manufacture  as  a  whole 
if,  by  taxing  the  whole  people,  by  enhancing  the  cost  of  the  raw  ma- 


204  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

|  terial  of  that  manufacture,  men  were  induced  to  continue  to  make 
iron  in  the  least  favorable  localities  and  at  the  greatest  waste  of 
time  and  labor,  when,  without  interference,  they  would  have  been 

I  driven  to  adopt  better  and  more  economical  methods?  Is  the  mak 
ing  of  a  great  quantity  of  pig-iron  in  itself  the  chief  end  of  man  ? 
Is  a  large  product  the  greatest  of  all  blessings,  however  much  it 
may  cost  ?  Which  is  better,  to  keep  an  industry  on  stilts,  or  to 
push  it  to  a  healthy  and  vigorous  progress  ? 

It  is  at  least  certain  that  the  tariff  of  1842-'46  rendered  iron 
much  more  costly.  Before  that  tariff  was  passed,  in  June,  July,  and 
August,  1842,  Scotch  pig  sold  for  about  $25  a  ton,  and  yet  American 
makers  at  that  very  time  were  erecting  new  furnaces.  After  that 
tariff  was  repealed,  pig-iron  fell  in  1848  to  $25,  in  1849  to  $22.50, 
and  in  1850  to  $21  a  ton,  and  even  then  American  furnaces  produced 
more  than  half  a  million  tons.  It  is,  therefore,  plain  that  the  ac 
tual  cost  of  making  pig-iron  here,  in  localities  reasonably  favorable, 
and  with  proper  facilities,  was  not  greater  than  $21  a  ton.  But, 
while  the  tariff  was  in  force,  the  price  went  so  high  that  in  one 
month,  May,  1845,  Scotch  pig  was  sold  for  $50  and  $52.50  a  ton  in  New 
York,  and  during  that  year  and  the  next  was  never  quoted  lower 
than  $30.  American  iron  sold  at  the  furnace  at  prices  varying  from 
$30  a  ton  upward  according  to  locality.  The  whole  iron  manufac 
ture,  then,  was  forced  to  pay  about  ten  dollars  a  ton  more  than  the 
real  cost  of  its  material,  to  enable  certain  men  to  continue  the  pro 
duction  in  old  modes,  while  others  were  adopting  the  new.  Is  this 
truly  protecting  the  iron  manufacture  ? 

How  greatly  the  production  was  thus  increased  is  a  matter  of 
dispute.  Mr.  Carey,  devoting  to  this  point  his  utmost  skill  in  the 
handling  of  facts,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  not  small,  claims  that  the 
production  in  1846  reached  758,000  tons,  and  that  a  still  greater 
increase  in  1847  and  1848  was  caused  by  the  tariff,  which  had  then 
ceased  to  operate.  But,  while  he  claims  to  have  for  these  statements 
authority  in  some  "  statistics  of  the  Iron  and  Steel  Association,"  to 
which  the  writer  has  not  access,  his  language  betrays  the  fact  that 
these  statistics,  whatever  they  may  be,  do  not  absolutely  establish 
any  thing,  even  in  his  own  estimation.  Thus,  speaking  of  the  pro 
duct  in  1842,  he  says :  "  That  it  was  under  200,000  tons,  there  is  the 
best  reason  for  believing,  yet  I  have  always  placed  it  at  220,000." 
Of  1845  he  says :  "  There  exists  no  certain  evidence  thereto,  and  I 
feel  assured  that  it "  (the  production)  "  must  have  exceeded  half  a 
million."  That  of  which  Mr.  Carey  "  feels  assured,"  with  "  no  certain 


IRON.— THE   TARIFF  OF   1842.  2^5 

evidence  "  to  sustain  him,  other  people  are  at  liberty  to  doubt.  This 
language  shows  that  his  "  statistics "  are  not  derived  from  actual 
records,  but  rather  evolved  from  his  inner  consciousness.  And,  again, 
of  the  product  of  1848,  which  he  asserts  was  846,000  tons,  he  adds : 
"  By  no  correction  of  the  figures  that  can  be  even  attempted  will  it 
be  possible  to  reduce  the  quantity  to  750,000.  Admitting,  however, 
that  such  a  reduction  be  made,"  etc.  This  is  not  the  language  of 
one  who  has  reliable  records  before  him.  And  again,  we  find  his 
inner  consciousness  called  upon  for  statistical  information :  "  That 
that  presents  more  nearly  ~than  any  other  figure  the  quantity  of  iron 
actually  produced  in  the  closing  years  of  that  prosperous  protective 
period  is  my  firm  belief"  This  in  regard  to  the  year  1848,  two 
years  after  the  protective  tariff  had  been  repealed  !  And  again, "  As 
early  as  1849,  the  product  was  supposed  to  have  fallen  off  to  650,000." 
These  phrases  show  that  Mr.  Carey  is  dealing  not  with  statistical 
records  of  any  kind,  but  with  guesses.  Yet  in  the  same  chapter  he 
abuses  Mr.  Wells,  because  that  official  had  not  copied  these  guesses 
as  established  facts !  It  is  proper  to  observe  that  in  the  report  by 
Secretary  Meredith,  in  1849,  there  appears  a  statement  as  to  the 
production  of  iron  in  Pennsylvania,  prepared  by  S.  J.  Reeves  from 
data  obtained  by  a  committee  appointed  in  1846,  by  the  Iron  Asso 
ciation  ;  and  from  this  statement  it  seems  that  the  Association  itself, 
in  the  year  1849,  was  obliged  to  rely  almost  wholly  upon  estimates, 
because  it  had  been  unable  to  obtain  answers  from  the  great  majority 
of  furnaces  then  in  existence.  The  committee  obtained  answers  from 
seventy-nine  furnaces,  which  produced  84,885  tons  in  1842,  and 
guessed  that  a  hundred  and  thirty-four  others  were  in  existence,  and 
that  their  product  was  67,000  tons,  and  the  total  production  of 
Pennsylvania  in  1842  was  thus  estimated  at  151,885  tons.  Yet,  in 
this  same  year,  Mr.  Carey  asserts  that  the  production  of  the  whole 
country  was  about  200,000  tons.  By  supposing  that  all  the  imagi 
nary  one  hundred  and  thirty-four  furnaces  continued  in  existence,  and 
were  increased  25  per  cent,  in  power,  the  Iron  Association,  in  1849, 
calculated  that  the  quantity  produced  in  Pennsylvania  was  373,231 
tons  in  1846,  and  this  guess,  based  upon  such  slender  foundation, 
embodied  the  best  information  which  the  Iron  Association  could  then 
obtain.  But  Mr.  Reeves,  writing  in  1849,  plainly  admits  that  the 
production  began  to  decrease  in  1848 :  "  The  greatest  production  was 
during  the  last  half  of  1847  and  the  first  half  of  1848,  when  it  must 
have  been  nearly  400,000  tons."  Even  this  guess,  based  upon  the 
supposed  increase  of  power  of  imaginary  furnaces,  does  not  sustain 


206  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

the  guess  of  Mr.  Carey,  for  the  iron-masters  asserted  that  the  produc 
tion  of  Pennsylvania  was  then  more  than  one-half  of  the  whole  pro 
duction  of  the  country.  Nor  does  the  statement  of  Mr.  Reeves,  as 
to  the  number  of  new  furnaces  built,  correspond  with  that  of  Mr. 
Carey.  It  must  be  apparent  that  estimates  so  contradictory,  and 
resting  upon  such  slender  foundation  of  facts,  are  not  entitled  to 
acceptance  as  indisputable  records. 

There  is  one  test  of  the  correctness  of  Mr.  Carey's  guesses  which 
it  may  be  well  to  apply  at  once.  Of  the  production  of  anthracite 
coal,  there  are  very  complete  and,  apparently,  very  reliable  records. 
Long  before  1840,  anthracite  had  been  used  very  generally  in  the 
manufacture  of  iron,  and,  after  1840,  it  began  to  be  much  used  in 
the  smelting  also.  Every  one  will  understand  that  the  production 
of  iron  could  not  very  greatly  have  increased,  the  manufacture 
requiring  about  five  tons  of  coal  to  work  up  a  ton  of  iron,  also 
increasing  in  like  proportion,  without  a  corresponding  increase  in 
the  production  of  anthracite.  In  the  diagram  appended  are  two 
lines,  one  showing  the  actual  production  of  anthracite  coal,  and  the 
other,  the  production  of  iron  according  to  Mr.  Carey's  assertions. 
This  contrast  will,  at  least,  warrant  a  little  inquiry  as  to  the  facts, 
before  we  accept  those  assertions. 

The  only  statements  in  the  nature  of  fact  which  Mr.  Carey  gives 
are  these,  that  eight  new  anthracite  furnaces  were  blown  in  from 
1841  to  1844,  inclusive,  and  twenty-six  charcoal  furnaces  in  Pennsyl 
vania  ;  that  eighteen  new  anthracite  furnaces  were  blown  in  during 
1845  and  1846,  and  (apparently)  forty-one  charcoal  furnaces  in  Penn 
sylvania  ;  and  that  eleven  anthracite  furnaces  were  blown  in  during 
1847  and  1848,  and  eighteen  charcoal  furnaces  in  Pennsylvania.  Mr. 
Carey  infers  that  as  many  more  charcoal  furnaces  were  started  in 
other  States.  He  guesses  that  enlargements  of  old  furnaces  added 
70,000  tons  to  the  product.  He  asserts  that  the  furnaces  in  exist 
ence  in  1840,  which  actually  produced  347,000  tons,  could  then  have 
produced  430,000.  Of  these  assertions  there  is  not  a  particle  of 
proof  presented  by  him,  or  attainable  by  the  writer.  But  it  is  by 
means  of  these  data  that  he  arrives  at  a  production  of  557,000  tons 
in  1844,  and  846,000  in  1848.  The  assertions  of  a  writer  who  does 
not  know  that  there  was  a  panic  in  1837,  are  not  statistics  of  un 
questionable  authority.  Again,  Mr.  Carey  asserts  that  the  furnaces 
which,  "  in  1840,  when  pig  had  fallen  to  little  more  than  half  the 
price  of  1837,  had  yielded  but  347,000  tons,  were  now  (1844)  being 
driven  to  their  utmost  capacity,  estimated  at  450,000  tons."  Mr. 


IKON,  COAL,  AND  RAILROADS.-MR.  CAREY  AND  FACTS  CONTRASTED. 

The  black  line  represents  Mr.  Carey's  estimate  of  the  production  of  pig-iron. 

The  medium  dotted  line,  the  recorded  consumption  of  anthracite  coal. 

The  fine  dotted  line,  the  number  of  miles  of  railroad  built. 

From  1844  to  1850,  the  dotted  coarse  line  represents  an  estimate  of  the  actual  product  of 
pig-iron,  allowance  being  made  for  charcoal  furnaces  disused,  and  the  consumption  of  1848, 
other  than  for  railroads,  being  supposed  equal  to  that  of  1850. 


built 800,000   •--• 


1831  »32  '3J3  '34  '35  '36  '37  '38  '39|'40  '41  '42  '43  '44  '45  '46  '47  '48  '49  '60  '51  '52  '53  '54  '55  '56  '57  '58  '59  '60 
Product  of  Anthracite  Coal 

Fig-Iron.  produced. 


IRON.— THE  TARIFF  OF   1842.  207 

Carey  wishes  to  have  his  readers  believe  that  the  low  prices  of  1840 
caused  these  furnaces  to  produce  little,  and  higher  prices  in  1844  to 
produce  much ;  but  in  1840,  as  the  table  elsewhere  given  from  official 
sources  wrill  show,  pig-iron  did  not  sell  in  New  York  at  any  time  be 
low  $32,  and  in  1844  it  never  rose  as  high  as  it  did  in  1840,  and  was 
quoted  at  $31  in  January,  and  $30  in  December.  Such  a  witness 
clearly  needs  cross-examination. 

In  the  diagram  will  be  seen  a  dotted  line,  representing  the 
number  of  miles  of  railroad  built  each  year.  If  a  vast  quantity  of  iron 
was  produced  in  the  years  1843-'46,  where  was  it  consumed  ?  Not 
in  railroad-building,  as  a  single  glance  will  show.  Yet  in  1850  the 
quantity  of  iron  used  in  building  and  repairing  railroads  alone  must 
have  been  more  than  half  as  large  as  the  whole  quantity  then  pro 
duced.  Without  that,  demand,  with  scarcely  any  railroad-building 
until  the  tariff  of  1846  was  repealed,  where  did  the  country  manage 
to  consume  the  quantity  which  it  is  asserted  was  produced — vastly 
in  excess  of  the  known  product  of  1850  ?  In  the  year  1848  only  397 
miles  of  road  were  built,  and,  according  to  the  statistics  given  in 
Bannon's  work,*  these  averaged  86  tons  of  rail  to  the  mile ;  adding 
for  other  iron  used  in  building,  and  in  cars,  locomotives,  and  other 
equipment,  the  quantity  of  iron  used  in  building  and  stocking  is 
fully  one  hundred  tons  to  the  mile  ;  hence  there  were  thus  used,  in 
1848,  39,700  tons  of  iron.  But,  upon  the  same  basis,  there  were 
used  in  1850,  for  1,656  miles  of  road  constructed,  165,600  tons  of 
iron.  Again,  in  1848,  there  had  been  laid  4,633  miles  of  road,  aver 
aging  50  tons  of  rail  to  the  mile,  and  966  miles  averaging  nearly  90, 
making  about  364,920  tons  of  rail  then  laid,  to  undergo  yearly  re 
pairs.  Bannon  states  that  the  average  life  of  rails  is  17f  years ;  if 
we  suppose  20  years,  5  per  cent,  of  the  whole  quantity  laid  must  be 
allowed  each  year  for  renewals.  Upon  this  basis,  there  were  required 
for  repairs  in  1848  only  18,246  tons,  and  in  1850,  on  523,860  tons  of 
rail  then  laid,  26,193  tons.  Thus  there  were  used  for  all  railroad 
purposes,  in  1848,  about  57,946  tons  of  iron,  and  in  1850  about 
191,793  tons. 

Other  facts  appear  to  prove,  beyond  possibility  of  dispute,  that 
the  entire  demand  for  and  consumption  of  iron  were  at  least  as  great 
in  1850  as  in  1848.  In  1848  there  were  175  steamers  built,  but  in 
1850  there  were  259.  Nor  is  there  any  evidence  in  the  records  of 
domestic  commerce  that  the  ordinary  demand  for  iron  was  dimin- 

*  ^Coal,  Iron,  and  OiL" 
15 


208  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

ished,  either  by  general  prostration  of  industry  and  arrest  of  the  so- 
cietary  circulation,  or  by  especial  disaster  to  manufactures.  The 
number  of  tons  of  manufactured  products  moved  eastward  on  the 
Erie  Canal — to  the  sea,  and  not  from  the  sea — was  5,560  in  1848, 
and  7,858  in  1850.  The  number  of  tons  of  all  products  moved  to 
tide-water  was  650,154  in  1848,  and  850,239  in  1850.  Tonnage  on 
the  lakes  increased  from  160,250  in  1848  to  186,790  in  1850,  and  our 
domestic  exports  to  Canada  were  $6,399,959  in  1848,  and  $7,758,291 
in  1850.  Imports  of  lumber  largely  increased,  showing  increased 
activity  in  building,  and  in  every  house  iron  is  consumed.  Our  for 
eign  tonnage  increased  from  1,360,887  tons  in  1848,  to  1,585,711  in 
1850,  and  in  every  ship  built  there  was  needed  a  large  quantity  of 
iron.  Most  conclusive  proof  that  there  was  no  general  arrest  of 
trade  or  industry,  the  circulation  of  the  banks  increased — in  Massa 
chusetts  from  thirteen  to  seventeen  millions,  and,  in  the  whole  coun 
try,  from  one  hundred  and  twenty-eight  to  one  hundred  and  thirty- 
one  millions;  the  deposits  in  Massachusetts  savings-banks  grew 
from  twelve  to  thirteen  and  a  half  millions ;  the  deposits  in  all  banks 
slightly  increased,  and,  at  the  same  time,  as  all  know,  the  supply  of 
gold  from  California  began  to  swell  the  circulation,  and  to  give 
greater  life  to  all  business.  The  coinage  at  the  mint  rose  from  less 
than  five  millions  in  1848  to  over  thirty-three  millions  in  1850.  The 
property  assessed  in  Boston  in  1848  was  one  hundred  and  sixty- 
seven  millions,  and  in  1850  it  was  one  hundred  and  seventy-nine 
millions  ;  in  Baltimore,  1848,  it  was  seventy-four,  and  in  1850  it  was 
eighty  millions ;  in  New  York,  in  1848,  it  was  two  hundred  and  fifty- 
four,  and  in  1850  it  was  two  hundred  and  eighty-six  millions.  In 
1848  the  receipts  for  letter  postage  were  three  millions  and  a  third, 
and  in  1850  over  four  millions  and  a  half.  The  aggregate  receipts 
for  taking  produce  from  the  West  to  the  Atlantic  cities  on  the  New 
York,  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  Illinois  canals  in  1848  were 
$5,822,083,  and  in  1850  they  were  $6,018,340.  The  receipts  for  the 
same  kind  of  freight  on  the  Erie,  Little  Miami,  Michigan  Central, 
Georgia  Central,  Macon  and  Western,  Philadelphia  and  Baltimore, 
Reading,  and  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Roads  were  in  1848,  in  the  aggre 
gate,  $5,244,246,  and  in  1850,  $6,219,582,  every  road  showing  an  in 
crease.  The  total  tonnage  arriving  at  tide-water  on  the  Erie  Canal 
in  1848  was  1,447,905,  and  in  1850  it  was  2,033,863.  _  In  short,  this 
volume  would  not  suffice  to  contain  the  facts  which  could  be  pre 
sented  to  prove  that  the  general  business  and  industry  of  the  coun 
try  in  all  its  main  branches  was  more  vigorous  and  active  in  1850 


IROX.— THE  TARIFF  OF   1842. 


209 


than  in  1848.  But  the  facts  presented  surely  suffice  to  prove  that 
there  was  no  sucfi  arrest  of  business  and  industry  as  to  cause  a  de 
creased  consumption  of  iron.  Meanwhile,  a  few  facts  decisively 
"prove  that  the  manufacture  01  iron  was  itself  not  decreased.  The 
consumption  of  anthracite  coal  in  1848  was  3,089,238  tons,  but  in 
1850  it  was  3,321,136  tons.  The  records  of  the  Ohio  and  Miami 
Canals  show  the  quantity  of  different  products  moved  each  year,  and 
the  number  of  pounds  of  iron,  manufactured  iron,  and  nails,  moved 
by  those  canals  *  in  the  two  years  compares  thus : 

1848.  1850. 

From  Cincinnati 6,301,364  10,823,804 

Total 22,424,277  44,328,431 

It  needs  but  few  facts  like  these  to  dispose  of  the  assertion  by 
Mr.  Carey,  that  the  demand  for  iron  so  decreased  that  the  produc 
tion  in  1850  was  "  less  than  two-thirds  of  that  of  1847-'48  ! "  One 
other  fact  must  be  added.  It  is  recorded  that  in  the  year  1849  there 
were  ten  new  iron  establishments  built  in  Pennsylvania  alone,  and 
twelve  in  other  States,  and  in  the  year  1850  there  were  seven  in 
Pennsylvania,  and  seven  in  other  States. 

Here,  then,  is  a  solid  basis  of  ascertained  fact :  that  the  demand 
for  and  consumption  of  all  iron  in  the  aggregate,  foreign  and  do 
mestic,  was  at  least  as  great  in  1850  as  in  1848.  In  the  presence  of 
abundant  proof  that  it  must  have  been  greater,  it  will  at  least  be 
conceded  that  it  was  as  great.  But  it  is  easy  to  determine  how  this 
consumption  was  supplied.  In  1850  the  total  supply  was  887,600 
tons,  of  which  180,789  tons  were  pig  and  bar  imported,  142,036  tons 
were  railroad  iron,  and  564,775  tons  were  of  domestic  production. 
From  this  deduct  iron  used  for  railroads,  as  already  stated,  191,793 
tons,  and  there  remain,  for  consumption  otherwise,  695,807  tons. 
But  in  1848  the  quantity  used  in  railroads  was  57,946  tons,  and  the 
quantity  imported  was  133,216  tons ;  the  entire  consumption,  other 

*  IRON  AND  NAILS. 

Pounds  cleared  on  the  Ohio  and  Miami  Canals. 


YEAR. 

Cincinnati. 

Total. 

YEAR. 

Cincinnati. 

TotaL 

1841.      . 
1842.     . 
1843.     . 
1844.     . 
1845.     . 
1846.     . 

2.389,306 
1.653,890 
1,930,318 
2.403,725 
3,026.385 
3,696.200 

13,172.295 
10.153.652 
10.363.223 
9,597.340 
11.049.652 
14.569,755 

1847..   . 

1848..   . 
1849..   . 
1850..   . 
1851..   . 

4,945,800 
6.301.364 
8,781,467 
10,823,804 
19,345,053 

15.674,326 
22,424.277 
28,449,934 
44,328,431 
63,136,687 

210  DOES  PROTECTION   PROTECT? 

than  for  railroads,  of  iron  of  domestic  production,  therefore,  could 
not  have  been  greater  than  620,537  tons.  For,  had  it  been,  the  en 
tire  demand  and  consumption  in  1848  must  have  been  greater  than 
in  1850.* 

It  is  plain  that  Mr.  Carey's  estimates  and  guesses  have  in  some 
way  led  him  astray.  Taking  now  the  facts  which  he  states,  and 
leaving  out  of  sight  for  the  moment  his  guesses,  we  have  a  known 
production  in  1840  of  347,000  tons,  and,  as  the  price  was  as  high 
then  as  in  1844,  we  infer  that  the  furnaces  were  worked  as  nearly  at 
their  full  capacity.  Mr.  Carey  states  that  eight  anthracite  furnaces 
were  put  in  operation  in  1841-'44,  and  26  charcoal  furnaces  in 
Pennsylvania,  and  that  their  "estimated"  capacity  was  66,000  tons. 
The  total  capacity  of  furnaces  in  1844  would  then  be  413,000  tons. 
Mr.  Wells  states  that  the  actual  product  in  1845  was  486,000  tons. 
Again,  Mr.  Carey  asserts  that  18  anthracite,  and  41  f  charcoal 
furnaces  in  Pennsylvania  went  into  operation  in  1845  and  1846,  with 
estimated  product  of  125,000  tons.  The  capacity  at  the  close  of 
1846  would  therefore  be  538,000  tons.  Again,  he  states  that  11 
anthracite  furnaces  and  18  charcoal  furnaces  in  Pennsylvania  were 
opened  in  1847  and  1848,  with  an  estimated  capacity  of  72,000  tons ; 

*  The  following  statement  will  make  the  reasoning  more  easily  understood  : 

1850. 

Tons.  Tons. 

Production  (census) 564,775 

Imports,  pig  and  bar 180,789 

Imports,  railroad  iron 142,036 

Total  supply 887,600 

Deduct  for  1,656  miles  of  road 165.600 

Deduct  for  renewals 26,193 


Used  in  Eailroads 191,793 

Consumption  other  than  for  Eailroads 695,807 

1848. 

Consumption  other  than  for  Eailroads 695,807 

Add  for  397  miles  built 39,700 

Add  for  renewals 18,246 

Total  consumption 753,753 

Deduct  imports,  rails 29,489 

Deduct  imports,  pig 51,632 

Deduct  imports,  bar 52,095 

Total 133,216  133.216 

Total  domestic  production, 620,537 

•}•  Mr.  Carey  estimates  eighty-two  charcoal  furnaces  in  all,  but  I  suppose  that  in 

this  case,  as  in  the  others,  he  has  taken  double  the  number  supposed  by  him  to  be 

opened  hi  Pennsylvania  alone. 


IRON.— THE  TARIFF  OF   1842.  211 

adding  for  these,  we  have  a  production,  at  the  close  of  1848,  of 
610,000  tons.  But  by  another  method  it  has  already  been  ascertained 
that  the  production  in  1848  was  less  than  620,537  tons.  This  cor- 

'  respondence  is  so  complete  as  to  give  strong  reason  to  believe  that 
these  estimates  are  quite  close  to  the  truth.  So  perfect  a  coincidence 
of  ascertained  facts  is  at  least  worthy  of  some  weight  as  against 
mere  assertions. 

Not  only  are  the  guesses  and  allowances  of  Mr.  Carey  evidently 
erroneous,  but  the  truth  seems  to  correspond  very  closely  with  the 
facts  which  he  states  without  any  estimated  addition  or  allowance 
whatever.  As  to  the  year  1848,  it  is  at  least  plain  that  the  produc 
tion  was  not  greater  than  620,537  tons ;  for,  had  it  been,  the  total 

"  consumption  in  that  year  must  have  been  greater  than  in  1850 — and 
^rCarey,  who  estimates  the  product  of  1848  at  846,000  tons, 
must,  therefore,  be  in  error  by  at  least  226,537  tons ! 

Where,  then,  is  the  fault  in  Mr.  Carey's  reckoning  ?  He  makes 
no  allowance  for  furnaces  disused  or  abandoned.  All  charcoal 
furnaces  after  a  time  consume  the  available  supply  of  wood  around 
them,  so  that  the  abandonment  of  the  furnace  and  the  erection  of  a 
new  one,  near  a  fresh  supply  of  wood,  become  necessary.  But,  apart 
from  this,  in  the  change  from  smelting  by  charcoal  to  the  use  of 
anthracite,  many  charcoal  furnaces  situated  where  supplies  of  coal 
were  attainable  were  abandoned  altogether,  or  rebuilt  for  the  use 
of  anthracite.  In  Mr.  Carey's  reckoning,  furnaces  built  or  rebuilt 
are  noted,  but  he  is  careful  not  to  mention  the  great  number  that 
were  disused  and  abandoned.  From  1850  to  1860,  according  to 
census  reports,  the  whole  number  of  furnaces  in  the  United  States 
decreased  from  404  to  286,  although  the  quantity  of  iron  produced 
increased  from  564,000  to  987,000  tons,  because  the  anthracite  fur 
naces  yield  several  times  more  than  the  charcoal.  There  were  118 
more  furnaces  abandoned  than  were  built  in  this  decade,  though  the 
product  increased  more  than  400,000  tons.  JThe  change  from  char 
coal  to  anthracite  began  in  1840,  and,  if  the  proportion  of  furnaces 
disused  to  the  number  built  was  as  large  in  the  decade  1840-'50  as 
in  the  following,  there  must  have  been  sixty  furnaces  abandoned 

"~mpre  than  all  that  were  put  in  operation.  But,  of  all  this,  Mr.  Carey 
makes  no  account  or  mention.  In  a  memorial  of  the  iron  manufac 
turers  of  Pennsylvania  in  1849  (quoted  by  De  Bow,  "  Industrial  Re 
sources"),  it  was  asserted  that  Pennsylvania  then  had  doubled  its 
production  of  iron,  and  made  one-half  of  all  the  iron  produced  in  the 
United  States,  and  the  article  then  gives,  in  support  of  the  claim 


212  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

that  the  manufacturers  were  not  sufficiently  protected,  a  statement 
of  the  number  of  iron-works  which  had  failed  in  that  State  since  1840, 
from  which  it  appears  that  28  failed  in  the  three  years  of  extreme 
depression,  1840-'42  inclusive;  that  25  failed  during  the  years 
1843-'46,  while  the  protective  tariff  was  operative,  and  61  more  dur 
ing  the  two  years  1847  and  1848  which  followed.  Here  is  a  state 
ment,  derived  apparently  from  the  iron  manufacturers  themselves, 
that  114  iron- works  in  Pennsylvania  alone  stopped  operations 
during  the  very  years  1840-'48,  inclusive,  during  which  Mr.  Carey 
supposes  that  the  production  was  increased  by  the  full  capacity 
of  all  furnaces  built,  without  any  allowance  whatever  for  furnaces 
abandoned. 

Not  only  does  Mr.  Carey  omit  this  all-important  item,  but  he 
allows  70,000  tons  for  enlargements,  and  supposes  that  as  many 
charcoal  furnaces  were  built  in  the  other  States  as  in  Pennsylvania. 
But  in  1840,  according  to  the  census,  only  98,395  tons  were  pro 
duced  in  that  State,  and  in  1850,  according  to  the  census,  285,702 ; 
increase,  in  Pennsylvania  alone,  187,307  tons,  while  the  increase  in 
the  whole  country  was  only  217,000  tons— from  347,000  to  564,000. 
Nearly  the  whole  increase  in  that  decade,  therefore,  was  in  the  State 
of  Pennsylvania ;  and,  even  if  it  be  granted  that  the  figures  of  the 
census  of  1840  were  about  30,000  tons  below  the  actual  product  of 
Pennsylvania,  the  increase  in  that  State  would  still  be  between  two 
and  three  times  as  great  as  the  increase  in  all  the  other  States  to 
gether.  It  is  plain,  therefore,  that  this  allowance  by  Mr.  Carey  is 
entirely  at  variance  with  the  facts. 

There  remains  still  another  apparent  error.  Mr.  Carey  allows, 
for  all  anthracite  furnaces  built,  an  estimated  product  of  about  five 
thousand  tons  each.  But  the  earlier  anthracite  furnaces  produced 
much  less.  In  a  review  of  the  history  of  the  use  of  anthracite,  in  the 
census  report  of  1860,  it  is  stated  that  there  were  in  1845  "  nineteen 
furnaces  with  anthracite,  four  out  of  blast,  and  ten  others  erecting," 
and  "  they  produced  annually  about  57,000  tons  of  pig  metal."  This 
is  a  product  of  three  thousand  tons  each.  Again,  Mr.  Carey  allows 
138,000  tons  as  the  product  of  twenty-nine  furnaces  put  in  blast 
from  1845  to  the  close  of  1848,  which  would  make  in  all  195,000  tons 
of  anthracite  coal.  But  the  same  census  report  states  that  the  product 
of  anthracite  coal  in  1849  was  only  115,000  tons,  and  the  Miner's 
Journal  states  it  at  118,664  tons,  so  that  Mr.  Carey  seems  to  be  in 
error  to  the  extent  of  seventy-six  thousand  tons  in  this  item  alone. 
Indeed,  the  "Iron  Manufacturer's  Guide,"  issued  by  the  association 


IRON.— THE  TARIFF  OF   1842. 


213 


upon  which  Mr.  Carey  claims  to  depend  largely  for  his  facts,  states 
that  in  1856  the  product  of  121  furnaces  was  394,509  tons  of  anthra 
cite  iron,  which  is  but  little  more  than  three  thousand  tons  to  each 
furnace. 

These  most  palpable  errors  certainly  render  Mr.  Carey's  calcula 
tions  quite  as  valueless  as  his  remarkable  history  of  the  panic  period 
of  1837 — with  the  panic  of  1837  omitted.  The  reasonings  already 
offered,  based  upon  ascertained  facts,  assuredly  have  more  weight 
than  estimates  confessedly  based  upon  "  firm  convictions,"  and  so 
grossly  erroneous.  The  facts  already  observed  certainly  warrant 
the  conclusion  that  the  production  of  pig-iron  in  1848  was  less  than 
620,000  tons,  the  firm  belief  of  Mr.  Carey  to  the  contrary  notwith 
standing. 

The  iron  manufacturers  of  Pennsylvania,  in  their  memorial  in 
1849,  stated  that  there  was  produced  in  that  State  more  than  half 
of  the  pig-iron  produced  in  the  whole  country,  and  in  the  next  year 
the  quantity  actually  produced,  according  to  the  census,  was,  in 
Pennsylvania,  285,702  tons,  and  in  other  States  279,053  tons.  The 
increase  during  the  decade  had  been  mainly  in  Pennsylvania; 
if  we  suppose  that  its  product  in  1840  was  fully  130,000,  the  in 
crease  in  that  State  was  155,000,  and  in  all  other  States  only  62,000 
tons.  The  table  already  referred  to,  apparently  based  upon  the  me 
morial  of  1849,  states  that  there  were  in  Pennsylvania,  in  1840,  in 
cluding  those  built  in  that  year,  135  iron-works,  of  which  six  failed 
in  that  year ;  and  the  statement,  evidently  based  upon  guesses  only 
as  to  the  years  1842  and  1843,  continues  thus — (there  are  added  to 
it  a  column  showing  the  number  of  works  remaining,  if  the  account 
is  correct,  and  another  showing  the  number  of  anthracite  furnaces 
built  in  Pennsylvania  to  the  close  of  each  year) : 


YEAE. 

Opened. 

Closed. 

Remaining. 

Anthracite. 

1841                               

6 

2 

133 

6 

1842         

20 

20 

133 

8 

1843  

7 

7 

133 

8 

1844                  

21 

11 

143 

13 

1845  

30 

'6 

170 

20 

1846.  .                      

53 

4 

219 

27 

1847  

25 

24 

220 

32 

1848  

17 

37 

200 

37 

1849  

10 

41 

169 

41 

If  this  statement  is  correct,  the  whole  number  of  iron-works  re 
maining  in  operation  at  the  beginning  of  1850  was  169,  of  which 


214  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

41  were  anthracite  furnaces.  But  the  number  actually  reported  in 
1850,  according  to  the  census,  was  168,  so  that  the  statement  cor 
responds  with  the  census.  If  it  is  correct,  there  were  in  operation 
at  the  beginning  of  1848  only  220  works,  of  which  32  were  anthra 
cite,  and  at  the  end  of  that  year  only  200,  of  which  37  were  anthra 
cite  ;  the  production,  therefore,  from  an  average  of  35  anthracite, 
and  176  charcoal  works,  could  not  have  been  greater  than  281,000 
tons  in  Pennsylvania,  and,  allowing  300,000  for  other  States,  only 
581,000  in  the  whole  country.  But,  if  this  is  the  truth,  Mr.  Carey 
is  in  error  as  to  the  production  that  year  no  less  than  265,000  tons. 
Again,  the  statistics  of  the  Iron  and  Steel  Association,  to  which 
Mr.  Carey  so  constantly  refers  as  his  authority,  assert  that  the  pro 
duction  of  charcoal-iron  in  Pennsylvania,  in  1847,  was,  hot  blast 
94,519,  and  cold  blast  125,155;  total,  219,674;  and  that  the  quan 
tity  produced  then  declined  to  138,967  in  1849,  and  113,282  in 
1850.  Now,  the  statement  for  1847  is  larger  than  is  warranted  by 
any  record  of  furnaces  in  existence  which  the  writer  can  discover ; 
but,  accepting  it  as  correct,  and  adding  90,000  tons  for  the  produc 
tion  of  anthracite  (from  27  furnaces  at  the  beginning  and  32  at  the 
end  of  the  year),  we  have  a  production  of  pig-iron  in  Pennsylvania 
of  309,674  in  1847,  and,  adding  as  much  for  other  States,  of  619,348 
for  the  whole  country.  The  quantity  of  charcoal-iron  produced,  the 
statistics  say,  then  declined,  so  that  the  aggregate  production  of 
1848  cannot  have  been  materially  greater.  But  once  more  the  fig 
ures  correspond  closely  with  the  quantity,  620,000  tons,  which  it 
was  shown  could  not  have  been  exceeded  by  the  consumption  of 
1848.  Finally,  the  record  of  furnaces  given  in  the  "  Iron  Manufac 
turer's  Guide,"  if  we  include  every  furnace  erected  prior  to  and  dur 
ing  1848,  and  suppose  them  all  to  have  been  in  operation  during  all 
that  year,  at  the  rate  of  3,000  tons  for  anthracite,  and  1,000  for  char 
coal  furnaces,  thus  making  no  allowance  whatever  for  the  furnaces 
abandoned  or  disused  from  1840  to  1848  inclusive,  gives  the  follow 
ing  result : 

Total  number  of  anthracite  furnaces  built  in  Pennsylvania  prior  to  and 

including  1848 37 

Charcoal 227 

Product 227,000 + 11 1,000=  338,000 

Total  number  of  anthracite  furnaces  built  in  other  States  prior  to  and 

including  1848 7 

Charcoal 268 

Product 268,000+21,000=  28&,000 

Product  of  the  whole  country 627,000 


IROX.— THE  TARIFF  OF   1842. 


215 


Since  this  result  is  reached  with  no  allowance  whatever  for  fur 
naces  disused  since  1840,  and  thus  gives  another  and  independent 
proof  that  the  actual  production  in  the  year  1848  must  have  been 
less  than  620,000  tons,  it  may  be  stated  without  hesitation  that  Mr. 
Carey  is  proved,  by  the  statistics  of  the  very  association  which  he 
claims  to  quote,  to  be  at  least  226,000  tons  out  of  the  way  as  to  the 
actual  production  of  pig-iron  in  1848. 

By  four  distinct  methods,  each  based  upon  records  of  fact,  the 
same  conclusion  has  been  reached,  that  tne  actual  production  of  pig- 
iron  in  1848  was  less  than  620,000  tons.  To  reach  a  just  estimate, 
a  comparison  of  the  records  is  necessary.  The  "  Iron  Manufacturer's 
Guide"  gives  the  date  of  the  building  of  furnaces,  but  rarely  states 
when  they  were  closed.  The  statement  supposed  to  be  based  upon 
the  memorial  of  1849,  if  incorrect  as  to  earlier  years,  is  probably  ac 
curate  as  to  the  number  of  iron-works  closed  during  the  years  1844- 
'48,  inclusive.  The  statistics  of  the  production  of  charcoal-iron  in 
1847,  1849,  and  1850,  and  of  the  quantity  of  anthracite-iron  pro 
duced  in  1845  and  1849,  may  also  aid  to  reach  the  truth.  The  num 
ber  of  furnaces  which  are  recorded  in  the  "Iron  Manufacturer's 
Guide  "  as  built  in  the  years  1840-'50,  in  Pennsylvania  and  in  the 
other  States,  is  given  in  the  following  table : 


YEAK. 

CHARCOAL. 

ANTHRACITE. 

Pennsylvania. 

Other. 

Pennsylvania. 

Other. 

1840  

3 
4 
6 
6 
13 
20 
30 
13 
1 
2 

6 
3 
1 
3 
10 
15 
14 
21 
11 
12 

1 
2 

2 

V 

7 

7 
5 
5 
4 

1 

1 

1 
1 

1 

1 

1 

1841.    .. 

1842  

1843  ... 

1844  

1845    .  . 

1846  

1847  

1848  

1849 

The  actual  production  in  1840  was  347,000,  and  it  may  fairly  be 
supposed,  for  reasons  already  given,  that  the  average  production  of 
anthracite  furnaces,  prior  to  1850,  did  not  exceed  three  thousand 
tons,  and  that  the  other  furnaces  averaged  one  thousand  tons  each. 
Upon  this  basis  the  productive  power  of  all  the  furnaces  in  the 
country  may  be  estimated,  and  we  may  thus  reach  the  highest  pos 
sible  production  for  the  years  1845  and  1846,  thus : 


216 


DOES  PROTECTION   PROTECT  ? 


YEAE. 

PENNSYLVANIA. 

OTHER  STATES. 

TOTAL. 

Increase. 

Productive 
Power. 

Increase. 

Productive 
Power. 

Productive 
Power. 

1840            !  

6,000 
10,000 
12,000 
6,000 
28,000 
41,000 
51,000 

130,000 
140,000 
152,000 
156,000 
184,000 
225,000 
276,000 

9,000 
3,000 
4,000 
6,000 
13,000 
18,000 
14,000 

217,000 
220,000 
224,000 
230,000 
243,000 
261,000 
275,000 

347,000 
360,000 
376.000 
386^000 
427,000 
486,000 
551jOOO 

1841                     .... 

1842  

1843                         .... 

1844      

1845 

1846  

So  far,  no  deductions  have  been  made  for  failures  or  abandon 
ments  of  furnaces.  It  may,  therefore,  be  assumed  that  the  produc 
tion  of  pig-iron  in  the  last  year  of  this  tariff,  1846,  cannot  possibly 
have  been  greater  than  551,000  tons,  and  was  probably  less.  It 
will  be  observed  that  the  result  for  1845,  thus  arrived  at  by  adding 
the  product  of  all  furnaces  built,  as  recorded  in  the  "  Iron  Manufac 
turer's  Guide,"  happens  to  be  precisely  the  estimate  which  Mr.  Wells 
gave  of  the  production  in  that  year.  The  protective  tariff  of  1842, 
it  appears,  with  the  adoption  of  anthracite  for  fuel,  increased  the 
productive  power  of  the  iron  furnaces  from  376,000  to  551,000  tons, 
^or'46  per  cent. 

In  1847,  according  to  the  statistical  report  of  the  Iron  Associa 
tion,  the  production  of  charcoal-iron  in  Pennsylvania  was  219,674 
tons,  and  it  happens  that  the  record  prepared  from  the  "  Iron  Manu 
facturer's  Guide,"  adding  all  furnaces  built  since  1840,  gives  just  220 
as  the  number  of  charcoal  furnaces  in  Pennsylvania  at  the  close  of 
that  year.  But  the  production  of  anthracite-iron,  which  was  57,000 
tons,  in  1845,  had  been  increased  by  the  erection  of  seven  furnaces 
at  the  beginning  of  1847,  and  six  more  during  that  year,  so  that 
about  81,000  tons  could  be  produced  in  Pennsylvania,  and  96,000  at 
the  end  of  the  year.  Probably  the  actual  production  was  about 
81,000  tons,  which,  with  the  charcoal-iron,  gives  300,674  tons  as  the 
production  of  Pennsylvania  in  1847.  It  happens  that  the  aggregate 
power  of  production,  adding  for  furnaces  built  according  to  the 
table,  was  304,000,  but  it  has  also  been  stated  that  four  establish 
ments  failed  in  1846.  The  correspondence  is  sufficiently  accurate, 
and,  deducting  also  2,000  tons  from  the  aggregate  power  of  produc 
tion  of  other  States,  we  have  a  production  for  1847  of  597,674  tons. 

This,  however,  makes  no  allowance  for  the  twenty-four  establish 
ments  stated  to  have  failed  in  the  year  1847,  while  all  furnaces  built 
in  that  year  are  added.  The  estimate,  therefore,  is  probably  larger 


IRON.— THE  TARIFF  OF   1842.  217 

than  the  actual  product.  Deducting  now  from  the  number  of  fur 
naces  in  Pennsylvania  twenty-four  for  failures  in  1847,  and  adding 
for  furnaces  built  in  the  year  1848,  it  appears  that  the  highest  pos 
sible  production  of  charcoal-iron  in  that  year  was  203,000,  but,  before 
the  year  closed,  thirty-seven  other  works  had  stopped,  reducing 
the  productive  power  as  to  charcoal-iron  to  166,000  tons.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  anthracite  furnaces  increased  from  thirty-two  to 
thirty-seven  in  that  year,  so  that  the  productive  power  at  the  begin 
ning  of  the  year  1848  was  299,000,  and  at  the  end  of  the  year 
273,000  tons.  The  average,  281,000  tons,  therefore,  represents  the 
utmost  productive  power  of  the  furnaces  in  Pennsylvania  in  that  year. 
Making  deduction  also  from  the  productive  power  of  furnaces  in 
other  States  for  less  than  half  as  many  failures  as  occurred  in  Penn 
sylvania,  namely,  twelve  in  1847  and  sixteen  in  1848,  we  reach  an 
average  production  of  289,000  tons,  making  for  the  whole  country 
570,000  tons,  as  the  product  of  the  year  1848. 

In  the  year  1849,  two  furnaces  for  charcoal  were  built  in  Penn 
sylvania,  but  forty-one  stopped ;  the  highest  productive  power  in 
that  year  was  therefore  168,000,  and  the  lowest  127,000.  The  actual 
production  of  charcoal-iron  is  stated  by  the  statistical  report  of  the 
Iron  Association  at  138,967  tons,  thus  fully  confirming  the  correct 
ness  of  the  computation  for  the  year  1848.  The  production  of  all 
anthracite  coal  in  1849  is  stated  as  118,664  tons ;  if  so,  the  produc 
tion  of  Pennsylvania  and  anthracite  furnaces  outside  of  that  State  was 
257,567  tons,  and,  with  allowance  for  failure  of  twenty  charcoal  fur 
naces  in  other  States — half  the  number  of  failures  in  Pennsylvania — 
the  production  of  the  whole  country  was  517,567  tons.  But,  if  we 
allow  for  the  whole  number  of  anthracite  furnaces  in  operation 
during  the  year,  the  product  will  be  increased  to  542,903  tons, 
which  represents  the  productive  power  at  the  close  of  the  year 
1849.  ^ 

Again,  deducting  from  the  number  of  charcoal  furnaces  in  Penn 
sylvania  for  twenty-two  failures  in  that  year,  the  result  is  a  produc 
tive  power  of  127,000  at  the  beginning  and  105,000  at  the  end  of 
the  year  1850;  but  the  actual  product,  according  to  the  statistical 
report,  was  113,282  tons,  so  that  the  estimates  again  are  confirmed. 
But  the  production  of  anthracite-iron  had  increased,  and  the  quan 
tity  of  all  iron  produced  in  Pennsylvania,  according  to  the  census, 
was  285,702  tons.  Meanwhile  the  records  show  that  there  were 
built  in  other  States  four,  charcoal  and  three  anthracite  furnaces,  and 
the  lowest  production  of  the  previous  year — 273,000  tons — thus  in- 


218  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

creased,  amounts  to  286,000  tons,  or,  with  allowance  for  seven  fail 
ures,  to  279,053,  the  quantity  produced  according  to  the  census. 

This  computation,  then,  accords  at  every  point  with  the  recorded 
facts.  Is  it  not  absolutely  impossible  that  estimates  so  fortified  on 
all  hands  by  records  of  the  Iron  Association,  by  statistics  of  the  date 
of  erection  of  furnaces,  by  records  of  the  number  of  failures,  and  by 
the  census  report  of  1850,  can  be  in  error  to  the  extent  of  276,000 
tons  ?  Yet  they  must  be,  in  regard  to  the  year  1848,  unless  Mr. 
Carey  has  been  teaching  his  readers  to  believe  that  which  is  not  the 
truth. 

Having  now  some  basis  of  fact,  we  may  inquire  whether  the 
tariff  of  1842  really  aided  the  iron  manufacture.  Under  its  oper- 
^ation,  the  production  of  pig-iron  increased  from  a  known  quantity 
of  347,000  tons,  in  1840,  to  not  more  than  551,000  tons  in  1846, 
^biit  twenty-two  anthracite  furnaces  had  been  opened,  by  which 
6^,000  tons  of  this  increase  were  produced,  and  twenty- three 
charcoal  furnaces  built  in  the  years  1840-'42,  inclusive,  also  swelled 
the  increase.  Deducting  these,  we  have  JL15,000  tons,  the  product 
of  furnaces  other  than  anthracite,  built  under  this  tariff.  But  this 
increase  was  at  a  cost  of  about  ten  dollars  a  ton  to  the  manufac 
turer  and  consumer  of  iron.  The  increase  by  the  use  of  anthracite, 
it  may  fairly  be  reasoned,  would  have  been  at  least  as  rapid  if 
iron-makers  had  not  been  tempted  by  high  duties  to  continue 
the  use  of  old  furnaces  and  less  economical  methods.  The  quan 
tity  of  anthracite  iron  produced  increased,  after  the  repeal  of 
this  tariff,  from  118,000  tons  in  1849  to  307,000  tons  in  1854, 
while  under  the  tariff  of  1842  only  twenty-two  anthracite  furnaces 
were  built,  producing  about  60,000  tons.  In  the  four  years, 
1853-'56  inclusive,  85  charcoal  furnaces  were  also  built,  while  111 
were  built  in  the  four  years  1843-'46.  It  will  be  conceded,  in  the 
presence  of  these  facts,  that  a  very  large  increase  in  the  production 
of  iron  would  have  followed  the  introduction  of  anthracite,  whether 
high  duties  had  been  imposed  on  foreign  iron  or  not ;  and  the  question 
may  fairly  be  asked,  whether  the  iron  interest,  as  a  whole,  would  not 
have  prospered  quite  as  much  in  the  end,  had  the  production  advanced 
a  little  less  rapidly  in  quantity  of  charcoal-iron  produced,  a  little 
more  rapidly  in  quantity  of  anthracite-iron  produced,  and  at  less  cost 
of  the  raw  material  to  the  manufacturer. 

Of  the  progress  of  the  manufacture,  no  reliable  statistics  can  be 
given.  It  appears  that  in  1842,  the  last  fiscal  year  preceding  this 
tariff,  the  imports  of  iron  were  $7,567,752,  and  in  1845  they  were 


IRON.— THE  TARIFF  OF   1842.  219 

$9,043,399,  and  in  1846  they  were  $8,959,047.  The  quantity  of  bar 
and  pig  iron  imported  in  1845  was  78,698  tons,  about  16  per  cent, 
of  the  domestic  production,  but  in  the  next  year,  and  the  last  of  the 
tariff,  it  fell  to  69,624  tons,  or  about  12  per  cent.  Without  ques 
tion,  the  use  of  anthracite  and  the  adoption  of  better  modes  of  man 
ufacture  combined  with  the  tariff  to  cause  this  reduction  in  the  pro 
portion  of  foreign  raw  iron  consumed,  but  no  statistics  are  attainable 
for  a  like  comparison  as  to  manufactured  products. 

In  1840  we  consumed  414,163  tons  of  iron,  or  20J  tons  to  every 
thousand  of  population,  and  46  pounds  per  capita.  In  1846  we  con 
sumed  about  620,000  tons,  or  27  tons  to  the  thousand,  and  about  60 
pounds  per  capita.  But  jn  1854  we  consumed  1,222,000  tons,  or  47 
tons  to  the  thousand,  and  105  pounds  per  capita.  The  increase  in 
the  consumption  was  therefore  less  rapid  under  the  protective  tariff 
than  after  its  repeal.  This  appears  to  indicate  that  the  natural  in 
crease  in  the  use  of  iron  was  retarded  by  its  cost.  It  appears  plainly 
that  the  production  itself,  pushed  fully  to  the  power  of  the  country 
to  consume  at  the  ruling  prices,  might  have  been  more  rapidly  in 
creased  had  the  prices  been  such  as  to  invite  the  more  rapid  con 
sumption  which  followed  the  repeal  of  duties.  But  prices  were  not 
reduced,  because  the  making  of  iron  by  economical  methods,  and  in 
the  most  advantageous  localities,  had  not  been  stimulated  but  re 
tarded  by  the  high  duties.  Sooner  or  later,  the  business  remaining 
in  this  condition,  there  must  have  come  general  disaster  to  those 
engaged  in  producing  iron  at  a  disadvantage  in  method  or  location, 
and  many  establishments  must  have  been  driven  to  bankruptcy,  if 
not  by  the  pressure  of  foreign  competition  and  reduction  of  prices, 
then  by  the  excess  of  production  over  the  power  of  the  country  to 
consume,  prices  being  maintained.  To  this  very  cause  are  partly  at 
tributable  the  disasters  and  failures  of  1847-'50.  The  foreign  im 
portations  were  not  then  very  large,  nor  was  the  price  greatly  re 
duced,  but  the  pressure  was  sufficient  to  close  a  hundred  and  fifty 
furnaces,  mainly  in  Pennsylvania,  where  the  anthracite-iron  could  be 
more  cheaply  made,  while  in  other  parts  of  the  country  the  produc 
tion  was  but  little  reduced,  new  and  improved  furnaces  almost  sup 
plying  the  places  of  those  which  were  abandoned.  Was  it  well  for 
the  country,  then,  that  Pennsylvania  was  paid,  at  public  cost,  for 
erecting  so  large  a  number  of  furnaces  destined  surely  to  be  closed 
and  abandoned  whenever  the  use  of  anthracite  became  more  general  ? 

Pointing  to  the  wrecks  scattered  all  over  Pennsylvania,  where 
millions  of  money  were  lost  by  men  who  were  tempted  by  the  tariff 


220  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

of  1842  into  the  making  of  iron  at  the  public  expense,  the  advocate 
of  protection  asks  whether  the  country  did  not  lose  by  the  destruc 
tion  of  these  works.  It  did  lose,  not  by  their  destruction,  but  by  their 
establishment.  It  lost  by  the  investment  of  large  sums  of  money 
and  much  energy  and  enterprise  in  a  wasteful  instead  of  a  profitable 
manner.  It  lost  money  whenever  a  capitalist  was  led  to  invest  his 
money  in  making  iron  where  iron  could  not  be  profitably  made  ex 
cept  with  protective  duties  and  at  the  public  cost.  Each  one  of 
those  blackened  wrecks  bears  witness  to  the  folly  of  teaching  men 
to  rely  upon  legislation  rather  than  natural  advantages  and  enter 
prise  as  a  basis  for  their  industry.  The  same  blackened  ruins  would 
be  seen  to-day  had  the  protective  tariff  never  been  repealed.  Sooner 
or  later,  Pennsylvania  would  have  learned  to  use  her  richest  deposits 
of  metal  and  fuel  in  a  more  economical  manner,  and  then  charcoal 
furnaces  least  advantageously  situated  or  skilfully  managed  would 
have  been  abandoned  or  changed  to  the  use  of  coke.  Every  wreck 
is  eloquent.  It  teaches  that  a  protective  system,  unavoidably  tran 
sient  and  fluctuating,  is  not  the  safest  basis  for  industry. 


IRON.— THE   TARIFF  OF  1842. 


221 


IMPORTS  OF  IRON— SINCE  1840. 


YKAB. 

Imports 
Pig-iron. 

Duty. 

Imports 
Bar-Iron. 

DUTY. 

Imnorts 
Railroad 
Iron. 

Duty. 

Value  of  all  Iron 
imported. 

Rolled. 

Ham'd. 

1840  

Tons. 
5,516 
12,267 
18,694 
3.882 
14,944 
27,510 
24,187 

27,655 
51,632 
105,6S2 
74.874- 
67.249- 
91.873 
114,227 
160,483 
98.924  - 
59.011 
51.794 
41,985 
72,517 
71.497 
110,025 

22.147 
31.007 
102.223 
44.601 
101.261 
112,042 
112,133 

$7.60 
7.60 
5.31 
9.00 
9.00 
9.00 
9.00 

30  p.  c. 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
24 
24 
24 
24 

$6.00 
6.00 
6.00 
9.00 
9.00 
9.00 
9.00 

Tons. 

61,647 
92,661 
81.111 
22,011 
49,713 
42,364 
45,437 

*26.642 
52,095 
104,294 
105,915 
65,676 
45,761 
88,358 
45,551 
95.141 
91,579 
69,875 
52,657 
81,902 
134.199 
77,968 

24.250 
64,210 
96,380 
40,512 
54,904 
68,212 
59,270 

$21.00 
21.00 
14.50 
25.00 
25.00 
25.00 
25.00 

$15.00 
15.00 
13.00 
17.00 
17.00 
17.00 
17.00 

Tons. 
29,092 
23.253 
24,970 
9,654 
15,577 
21,812- 
5,897 

13,536 
29,489 
69,163 
142,036 
188,625 
245.625 
298,995 
282.866 
127,516  -j 
155.495X 
179.305 
75.745 
69,965 
122,174 
74,490 

8,488 
17,088 
118.714 
74,702 
73,510 
114,683 
203,819 

$25.00 
25.00 
25.00 
25.00 

30  per  ct. 

u 

24  per  ct. 

u 

$12.00 
13.50 
13.50 
13.50 
13.50 
15.68 
15.68 

$7,241,407 
8.885.823 
7,567,752 
2,103,684 
5,693,828 
9,043,399 
8,959,047 

8,781,252 
12,526,854 
13,831.823 
16,333,145 
17,306,700 
18,957,993 
27,255,425 
29,341,775 
22,980,728 
22.041,939 
23,320,497 
14,454,928 
15,000,866 
18,802,227 

1841 

1842  

1*43 

1844  
1845  
1846  

1847... 
1848  

All  Bar. 

30  per  cent. 
u 

U 
U 

II 
II 

U 
U 

All  Bar. 
$15.00 
17.00 
22.40 
22.40 
22.40 
22.40 
22.40 

1849  
1850 

1851     .  . 

1852 

1853  
1854 

1855 

1856  

1857  
1858 

1859  

1860  . 

1861 

1862 

1863  

1864  

1865 

1866  

25.360,861 
23,496,835 

1867  

1868  

PRICE  OF  PIG-IRON. 
Average  of  Monthly  Quotations  in  New  York. — (From  Treasury  Report  of  1863.) 


YBA*. 

Pig-iron. 

Bar-Iron, 

Sheet-Iron. 

YKAK. 

Pig-Iron. 

Bar-Iron. 

Sheet-Iron. 

Average. 

Average. 

Average. 

Average. 

Average. 

Average. 

1825. 

1826. 

$57.08©  63.12 
55.83©  «i(5.2r> 

$104  ©108 
91.25@97.50 

$7.25©8.72 
7.70©8.95 

1845. 
1846. 

$37.16©38.79;  $73.54@75.62'll&@123jf  Ib. 
37.33©3920i    76.96©79.54  11    ©12      ' 

1827. 

50.00(7753.00 

82.91@87.95 

7.08©8.00 

1847. 

33.96@34.92j    71.46©73.12ll    ©12      ' 

1828. 

50.17©54.25 

79.  37©  80.83 

6.62©7.50 

1848. 

28.50©29.71|    68.76@69.87  HM©12i£  ' 

1829. 

45.83(T/  .VJ>J 

78.54©80.42 

6.75@<S.OO 

1849. 

23.87@24.87i    46.75©47.50  12^©13K  ' 

1830. 

42.00©.47.92 

74.04©75.&3 

6.75©  8.  00 

1850. 

22.23 

41.04@42.7113    ©14      ' 

1831. 

40.OT@46.66 

71.50©73.75 

6.75^78.00 

1851. 

20.77@21.85     30.04©36.95  18    ©14     ' 

1832. 

40.00©,46.46 

72.00©.  73.25 

6.75©-8.00 

1852. 

22.29@23.14 

39.16©,40.45 

IOK@UK  ' 

1833. 

38.17©45.21 

74.29©75.00 

6.66©.7.50 

1853. 

33.54©35.50     63.37©66.87 

u  ©113^  ' 

1834. 

38.00©44.79 

70.96©  T-.'.ir, 

3.25@3.75 

1854. 

37.79©,39.16     69.79©72.46  12^©12%  ' 

1835. 
1836. 

38.00©  42.50 
50.46©54.91 

68.33©70.41 
92.71©95.37 

6.66©7.33 

1855. 
1856. 

28.25©29.25;    67.60@60.00  14#@17     ' 
31.87@32.96    68.08@80.70  14?tf@16X  ' 

1887. 

49.79©54.16 

94.79©%.  fit) 

7.00@-7.50 

1857. 

30.54©31.71     66.69@56.66  12    ©12     ' 

JOS. 

41.87©45.21 

86.25@90.21 

6    ©  7    Ib. 

1858. 

28.91®26.04    50.83©52.95 

ii/^©i2j^'  ' 

1839.     38.33©40.91 

87.71©S!).17 

6    @  7    " 

1859. 

24.58©25.96    44.88@46.04 

10^©ll      ' 

1840.1   88.6e@86.7l 

74.17©  77.08 

6    ©  7    " 

1860. 

23.15@23.87    41.96@42.92 

13    ©13^  ' 

1841. 

33.37©35.83 

67.33©0!».37 

6    @  7    " 

1861. 

21.54@22.96     43.04©44.75 

16    @16>^  " 

1842. 

27.95©29.37i    56.04©58.12   13    ©14    " 

18(52. 

25.33©26.66     58.00©60.00 

15    ©16      " 

1843. 

25.46©26.79     56.46©57.50   11    ©12    " 

1863. 

36.50@37.83    72.93@74.21 

17    @18      ' 

1844.     32.04©33.08    60.37©62.29  ll.J£@13}£" 

From  1847  to  1865  this  column  includes  only  bar  imported  from  Great  Britain. 


222 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


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IROX.— HISTORY  SINCE   1846.  223 

CHAPTER    XVI. 

IRON.  —  HISTOKY    SINCE   1846. 

THE  tariff  of  1846 — the  free-trade  tariff,  as  Mr.  Carey  has  called 
it— went  into  effect  December  1,  1846.  As  American  iron-makers 
had  been  selling  at  artificial  prices,  the  change  of  duty  forced  them 
to  moderate  their  demands.  The  progress  of  the  manufacture  in 
England  had  greatly  reduced  the  cost  of  iron;  Scotch  pig,  which 
sold  at  Glasgow  for  $20  in  1845,  fell  to  $11.10  in  1848,  to  $11.37  in 
1849,  to  $11.15  in  1850,  and  to  $10.02  in  1851.  It  was  with  such 
prices  as  these,  and  a  vigor  and  skill  of  industry  which  made  such 
prices  profitable^jthat  our  furnaces  were  called  to  contend,  habituated 
as  they  were  to  artificial  prices,  and  to  reliance  upon  government, 
rather  than  skill.  The  price  of  Scotch  pig  in  New  York,  which  had 
I5ee~n  $38  to  $42.50  during  the  earlier  part  of  1846,  fell  to  $35  to 
$36  December  1,  to  $33  to  $34  January  1,  1847,  and  to  $30  in 
June,  July,  and  August  of  that  year ;  and,  after  a  rise  during  the 
winter,  to  $26.50  in  June,  1848,  and  $25  to  $26  in  December,  1848 ; 
to  $22.50  in  June,  1849,  and  $22  in  June,  1850. 

In  spite  of  the  reduction  of  price,  it  is  admitted  by  all  that  the 
production  continued  to  increase  in  1847,  and  Mr.  Carey  asserts  that 
in  1848  it  reached  846,000  tons.  It  is  not  worth  while  to  inquire 
with  what  reason  he  ascribes  this  increase  to  a  tariff  which  had  then 
ceased  to  exist.  The  facts  show  that  the  maximum  of  production 
was  reached  in  1847,  and  that  the  building  of  new  furnaces  in  that 
year  and  in  1848  nearly  balanced  the  stoppage  of  the  works 
run  at  the  public  cost  in  1846.  It  appears  also  that,  while  the  pro 
duction  of  charcoal-iron  in  Pennsylvania  decreased,  it  rapidly  in 
creased  in  other  States — twenty-one  furnaces  being  built  in  1847, 
eleven  in  1848,  and  twelve  in  1849.  In  Pennsylvania  the  pro 
duction  had  been  overdone,  and  the  removal  of  the  duty  and  fall  of 
price  brought  disaster,  but  in  many  other  States  the  production  con 
tinued  to  increase  through  all  the  years  1846-'50,  and  in  all  other 
States  except  Pennsylvania  it  was  but  20,000  tons  lower  in  1850 
than  in  1848.  Yet  many  furnaces,  chiefly  in  Virginia,  Maryland, 
and  New  Jersey,  were  driven,  by  competition  of  the  growing  anthra 
cite  production,  to  stop  work  or  to  adopt  the  use  of  coke  or  coal. 
Eight  in  New  Jersey  alone,  and  ten  in  Virginia,  are  mentioned  as 


224  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

having  stopped  work  in  consequence  of  the  supply  of  cheaper  an 
thracite  coal,  and  it  will  at  once  be  seen  that,  after  deducting  the 
stoppages  from  this  cause,  in  Pennsylvania,  and  the  States  adjacent 
to  the  anthracite  region,  the  aggregate  production  of  charcoal-iron 
in  all  the  rest  of  the  country  must  have  been  very  much  larger  in 
1850  than  in  1848.  Hence  it  appears  that  the  charcoal  furnaces 
which  had  been  artificially  sustained  at  public  cost  in  the  region 
which  could  be  more  cheaply  supplied  with  anthracite-iron,  hin 
dered  the  growth  of  production  in  other  States,  and  that,  when 
they  were  stopped,  the  production  of  charcoal-iron  elsewhere  in 
creased. 

What  was  the  effect  of  the  removal  of  protection,  then?  In 
States  beyond  the  immediate  influence  of  the  anthracite  region,  the 
lower  tariff  did  not  prevent  an  increase,  steady  and  quite  rapid,  in 
the  production  of  charcoal-iron.  But  within  that  circle,  in  the  States 
of  Pennsylvania,  Virginia,  Maryland,  and  New  Jersey,  charcoal-iron 
makers  were  prostrated,  precisely  as  they  must  have  been  in  any  state 
of  tariff  whenever  the  general  use  of  anthracite  began  to  force  down 
prices  within  that  circle  of  supply.  What,  then,  did  the  tariff  do  ? 
It  simply  fixed  the  time  at  which  certain  charcoal-iron  furnaces  within 
that  circle  should  stop  operations.  Had  high  duties  been  retained, 
they  might  have  continued  work  a  little  longer,  but  the  cost  of  all 
iron  would  have  been  greater.  Had  high  duties  been  retained,  they 
must  have  failed  before  long,  and  the  change  of  tariff  simply  short 
ened  by  a  few  years  the  life  of  furnaces  which  involved  from  the 
outset  a  wasteful  expenditure  of  capital  and  labor.  Meanwhile,  all 
the  rest  of  the  country  continued  to  increase  its  production  of  iron, 
and  the  whole  country  obtained  its  iron  at  a  lower  cost. 
~~f  The  iron-makers  in  Pennsylvania  and  the  adjacent  States  were 
forced  to  consider  whether  they  could  make  iron,  not  at  the  public 
expense,  but  to  the  public  profit.  They  were  slow  to  adjust  them 
selves  to  the  new  situation,  and  foreign  iron  flowed  in  largely — to 
the  value  of  $16,333,145  in  1850.  The  proportion  of  foreign  raw 
iron  consumed  rose  to  24  per  cent.,  and  by  far  the  greater  part  of  it 
was  consumed  in  States  near  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  which  Pennsyl 
vania  had  not  yet  learned  to  supply  at  a  reasonable  cost. 

Then  the  question  was  fairly  tested  whether  American  industry 
was  equal  to  competition  with  British.  The  foreigner  found  our  in 
dustry  on  crutches,  habituated  to  false  prices,  wasteful  methods,  and 
no  competition,  and  he  began  to  carry  all  before  him,  in  that  very 
region  which,  being  most  richly  endowed  with  materials  for  the  cheap 


IRON.— HISTORY  SINCE   1846.  225 

production  of  iron,  should  have  been  best  able  to  sustain  the  shock. 
While  the  manufacture  in  other  States  moved  steadily  forward,  in 
Pennsylvania  and  the  adjacent  Eastern  States  it  was  prostrated.  Then 
the  healthful  discipline  of  1840-'42  found  its  value.  Twenty-seven 
anthracite  furnaces  are  mentioned  as  having  been  built  in  the  years 
1S47-'50  inclusive,  and  the  consumption  of  anthracite  coal  rose  from 
2,882,309  tons  in  1847,  and  2,344,005  tons  in  1846,  the  last  year  of 
protection,  to  3,321,136  tons  in  1850,  an  increase  of  one  million  tons 
in  four  years,  while  under  the  protective  tariff  the  increase  had  been 
from  eleven  to  twenty-three  hundred  thousand  tons.  But  the 
Pennsylvania  iron-masters  had  not  yet  begun  to  work  in  earnest.  In 
1851  the  consumption  of  anthracite  coal  suddenly  rose  to  4,329,530 
tons,  an  increase  of  1,008,394  in  a  single  year — nearly  as  great  in  one 
year  as  had  been  the  increase  in  four  years  of  protection.  In  1852  it 
rose  again  to  4,899,975  tons,  a  further  increase  of  570,445  tons;  in 
1853  it  increased  nearly  200,000  more,  and  in  1854  it  increased  three- 
quarters  of  a  million,  reaching  5,831,834  tons.  The  product  of  an 
thracite  iron  was  118,664  tons  in  1849,  and  it  was  340,555  tons  in 
1854,  according  to  statistics  in  the  Miners'  Journal,  or  307,710  ac 
cording  to  tables  of  the  Iron  Association,  an  increase  of  about 
200  per  cent.,  in  five  years.  To  this  must  be  added  54,485  tons 
of  iron  produced  with  coke  or  raw  bituminous  coal  in  1854,  for  many 
of  the  furnaces  which  had  been  forced  to  stop  using  charcoal,  adopted 
better  methods  and  cheaper  fuel.  In  1854  anthracite-iron  was  made 
in  Pennsylvania  at  a  cost  of  $15  a  ton.  Nor  did  the  production  stop 
in  its  increase,  for  in  1854  nineteen  new  anthracite  furnaces  were 
built,  and  in  1855  ten,  and  in  1856  ten  more.  The  production  of 
anthracite-iron  rose  to  444,012  tons  in  1856  (according  to  the  Miners' 
Journal,  and  394,509  according  to  the  Iron  Association)  and  the 
production  of  coke-iron  to  69,554  tons,  so  that  the  total  production  of 
that  year  was  874,428  tons. 

While  the  iron  interest  in  the  anthracite  region  achieved  this 
magnificent  victory  over  foreign  competition,  the  production  of  iron 
iff  other  parts  of  the  country,  never  seriously  affected  by  changes  of 
xtiify,  moved  steadily  forward.  In  the  Hanging  Rock  region  (South 
ern  Ohio  and  Eastern  Kentucky),  thirty  furnaces  were  erected  since 
1850,  there  being  59  in  operation  in  1856,  and  the  product  (nearly 
all  charcoal)  reached  92,116  tons  in  the  latter  year.  In  Northern 
Ohio,  Western  Tennessee,  and  Kentucky,  Indiana,  Illinois,  and 
Missouri,  the  production  of  charcoal-iron  was  71,934  in  1854,  and 
77,858  in  1856.  In  Michigan  and  Wisconsin  splendid  deposits 


226  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

were  opened,  and  the  production,  only  990  tons  in  1854,  rose  to 
6,178  tons  in  1856. 

The  panic  of  1857  reduced  production  to  798,157  tons  in  that 
~~year7and  to  705,094  tons  in  1858,  but  the  importations  of  foreign 
iron  were  at  the  same  time  reduced  far  more  largely — from  a  value 
of  twenty-three  millions  in  the  fiscal  year  1857,  to  fourteen  millions 
in  the  fiscal  year  1858.  As  soon  as  the  panic  passed,  the  domestic 
production  revived  again ;  new  furnaces  were  built ;  and  in  1860,  in 
spite  of  large  importations  caused  by  over-production  and  low  prices 
in  England,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  the  price  of  iron  here  was  lower 
than  it  ever  had  been,  except  in  the  years  1851  and  1852;  the 
domestic  production  of  iron  was  913,774  tons  according  to  the  Iron 
Association,  and  987,559  tons  according  to  the  census,  which  must 
be  supposed  the  more  reliable.  In  either  case  it  was  larger  than  it 
had  ever  been  before.  In  that  year,  of  raw  iron  (pig  and  bar)  we 
imported  177,371  tons,  and  consumed  1,164,930  tons,  so  that  only 
15  per  cent,  of  the  unmanufactured  iron  used  was  imported.  Yet 
the  duties  on  iron  were  then  lower  than  they  had  been  at  any 
time  since  1816,  and  had  been  reduced  from  30  to  24  per  cent, 
in  1857. 

In  review  of  the  history  of  the  production  of  iron  in  this  decade 
of  non-protection,  it  may  be  said  that  it  demonstrates  most  con 
clusively  the  fact  that  the  production  increases  more  rapidly  and 
surely  without  protection  than  with  it.  From  1842,  when  the  pro 
ductive  power  of  furnaces  built  was  at  least  376,000  tons,  the  actual 
production  being  unknown,  to  1846  when  the  productive  power  was 
551,000  tons,  the  increase  was  46  per  cent.  But  from  1852,  when 
Mr.  Carey  states  that  the  production  was  about  the  same  as  in  1850, 
namely,  564,000  tons,  to  1856,  when  it  was  874,428  tons,  the  in 
crease  was  over  55  per  cent.  Under  protection,  the  gain  was 
effected  by  the  wasteful  expenditure  of  money  and  skill  in  continu- 
•  ing  the  production  of  charcoal-iron,  within  the  region  which  could 
be  and  was  destined  surely  to  be  more  cheaply  supplied  with  an 
thracite,  and  over  one  hundred  companies  were  thus  induced  to 
devote  their  capital  to  certain  destruction.  But,  under  non-protec 
tion,  a  larger  gain  was  effected  by  leaving  men  to  adapt  their  indus 
try  to  the  natural  resources  of  the  country — to  make  anthracite-iron 
when  that  could  be  made  most  cheaply,  and  charcoal-iron  where 
natural  conditions  favored.  Under  protection,  a  gain  of  46  per  cent, 
was  effected,  but  under  such  circumstances  that  it  was  sure  to  be 
balanced  by  subsequent  loss.  Under  non-protection,  a  gain  of  55  per 


IRON.— HISTORY  SINCE   1846.  227 

cent,  was  effected,  and  neither  panic  nor  war  has  since  broken  down 
any  considerable  number  of  the  establishments  then  opened, 

Again,  the  history  of  this  decade  demonstrates  conclusively  that 

the  country  has  now  become  so  great,  and  its  demand  for  iron  so 

enormous,  that  it  is  no  longer  possible  for  foreign  makers  to  control 

\    or  seriously  affect  the  market.     In  1850  Great  Britain  found  this  in- 

v  dustry  disabled  by  its  fall  from  the  crutches  of  protection.  English 
iron  began  to  flood  our  market,  but  its  cheapness  invited  an  enor 
mous  consumption.  We  began  to  build  railroads  at  the  rate  of  two 
thousand  miles  a  year.  So  vast  was  the  demand,  that  it  was  impos 
sible  for  England  to  supply  it,  and  prices  rose  in  1852  in  Glasgow  to 
$11.37,  and  in  New  York  to  $30  a  ton.  In  1853  the  average  price 
at  New  York  was  $34.50,  and  in  1854  $38  a  ton!  In  Great  Britain, 
the  same  year,  the  average  price  was  $17.05  per  ton,  a  remarkable 
increase.  The  demand  was,  in  fact,  greater  than  Great  Britain  with 
all  her  energy  could  supply,  and  it  forced  up  prices  here  almost  as 
high  as  the  protective  tariff  itself  had  done.  But  by  1852  our  in 
dustry,  no  longer  on  crutches,  but  treading  with  firm  foot  the  solid 
earth,  was  ready  for  the  struggle.  In  the  face  of  enormous  importa 
tions,  it  made  that  wonderful  progress  which  has  been  described,  and 
by  1854  our  domestic  production  began  to  force  down  the  price  of 
iron,  which  fell  to  $28.75  (average)  in  1855,  to  $24.50  in  1858,  and 
to  $23.50  in  1860.  Finding  our  industry  prostrated  in  1850,  the 

~~  British  manufacturer,  had  it  been  within  his  power,  would  have  kept  V 
it  from  recovering  control  of  tne  market,  and  held  prices  so  low  as  to  \ 
prevent  any  increase  of  domestic  production.     But  it  was  not  in  his 
power.     The  demand  was  too  vast.     The  little  colonies  had  grown 
to  a  great  nation,  needing  iron  in  such  quantities  that  the  price  in 
England  was  forced  up  by  our  demand  in  1853  and  1854,  and  forced 
down  by  our  production  from  that  time  until  1860.   Jn  a  word,  dur-    C^ 
ing  the  decade,   1850  to  1860,  we  achieved  our  independence  of 

""Great  Britain  in  the  production  of  iron.  We  won  back  that  mas 
tery  of  our  own  market  which  we  enjoyed  in  colonial  times,  but  of 
which,  by  a  false  system  of  protection,  we  had  been  so  long  almost 
deprived, 

[in  the  production  of  iron  mining  and  smelting,  the  value  of  the 
product  returned  in  1850  was  fourteen  millions,  but  in  1860  it  was 
twenty-three  millions.  In  rolling  or  forging  iron,  a  smaller  number 
of  establishments  was  engaged  in  1860  than  in  1850,  but  the  num 
ber  of  hands  employed  had  increased  from  eleven  to  twenty  thou 
sand,  and  the  value  of  the  product  from  sixteen  to  thirty-three  mill- 


228  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

ions.  Including  all  branches  of  preparation  and  production,  we  find 
an  increase  of  four  thousand  in  the  number  of  hands,  and  of  twenty- 
six:  millions  in  the  value  of  jjhp  p^rinr*  Moreover,  the  average 
wages  of  hands  employed  both  in  mining  and  smelting,  and  in  the 
rolling  mills,  increased  materially  from  1850  to  1860.  This,  then, 
was  a  healthy  growth.  Though  the  cost  of  iron  to  the  consumer 
'was  about  the  same — in  1850  the  average  price  was  $22.33,  and  in 
1860  $23.50 — the  aggregate  value  of  the  product  had  nearly  doubled, 
and  the  wages  of  labor  had  increased.  Of  the  branches  of  the  manu 
facture  proper,  those  classed  as  protected  (see  table  of  the  iron  in 
terest),  namely,  the  making  of  castings,  forged  iron,  hardware,  cut 
lery,  tools  of  all  kinds,  and  wire,  increased  in  number  of  establish 
ments  from  2,290  in  1850,  to  2,318,  in  number  of  hands  from  thirty- 
four  to  forty-seven  thousand,  and  in  value  of  product  from  thirty- 
seven  to  fifty-two  millions.  This  is  a  gain  far  more  rapid  than  the 
increase  of  population,  and  it  proves  that,  even  in  those  branches  sup 
posed  to  especially  need  protection,  the  manufacture  moved  forward 
magnificently  under  duties  lower  than  have  been  in  force  at  any 
other  time  since  1816.  If,  under  this  "  free-trade  tariff,"  as  it  has  been 
called,  the  progress  was  so  rapid,  can  it  be  said  that  protection  is 
needed  even  for  these  branches  ?  ]Finally,  in  the  branches  of  manu 
facture  not  protected,  namely,  the  making  of  machinery,  nails,  bolts, 
scales,  agricultural  implements,  stoves,  and  sheet-iron  articles,  and  in 
blacksmithing,  there  were  employed,  in  1850,  about  seventy-three,  and 
in  1860  about  one  hundred  thousand  hands — an  increase  just  propor 
tioned  to  that  of  population.  But  the  value  of  the  product  increased 
from  sixty-seven  millions  in  1850,  to  one  hundred  and  twenty-two 
millions  in  1860.  This  vast  increase  in  the  efficiency  of  labor  is  one 
of  the  most  striking  features  in  the  history  of  that  periodj  In  every 
branch  of  the  manufacture  there  was  wonderful  progress;  indeed, 
no  better  proof  of  the  general  prosperity  of  the  manufacture  can  be 
asked  than  the  fact  that  the  consumption  of  anthracite  coal  mounted 
from  3,321,136  tons  in  1850,  to  7,517,816  tons  in  1860.  The  product 
of  steel  was  in  value  $172,080  in  1850,  but  it  was  $1,778,240  in 
1860,  a  gain  of  nearly  900  per  cent.  The  manufactures  of  steel  pro 
duced  in  1860  to  the  value  of  $9,151,893.  The  value  of  machinery 
produced  in  1850  was  $27,998,344,  and  in  1860  it  was  146,644,586, 
a  gain  of  66.6  per  cent.  The  forges  and  mills  produced  in  1850  to 
the  value  of  $15,938,786,  and  in  1860  to  the  value  of  $31,888,705,  a 
gain  of  about  100  per  cent.  The  whole  iron  interest  employed  in 
1850  about  142,534  hands,  and  in  1860  about  198,532  hands,  while 


IRON.— HISTORY  SINCE   1846.  229 

its  aggregate  product  in  1850  was  $135,672,171,  and  in  1860  it  was 
8256,137,736.  In  this  same  year,  I860,  under  the  lowest  duties 
which  have  been  imposed  since  1816,  the  whole  value  of  foreign  iron 
and  manufactures  of  iron  imported  was  $18,812,227,  or  barely  7  per 
cent,  of  the  value  of  all  products  of  iron  consumed. 

"  Can  it  hereafter  be  said  that  low  duties  will  destroy  the  iron 
interest  ?  sJThe  facts  given  show  how  splendid  was  the  victory  which 
American  industry  achieved,  without  protection,  in  its  struggle  with 
the  iron  manufacture  of  England.  By  them  it  is  demonstrated  that, 
since  1853,  at  least,  the  iron  interest  has  been  able  not  only  to  face, 
but  to  overpower  all  foreign  competition.  If  the  production  of  iron 
advanced,  without  protection,  55  per  cent,  in  four  years;  if  the 
manufacture  advanced,  without  protection,  from  60  to  100  per  centv 
in  its  different  branches  from  1850  to  1860 ;  and  if,  at  the  close  of 
that  period,  the  proportion  of  foreign  iron  consumed  in  this  country 
was  barely  seven  per  cent. ;  what  is  the  necessity  of  the  protective 
duties  which  have  since  been  imposed  ? 

That  the  iron  interest  has  made  progress  under  protective  duties, 
seems  to  some  a  proof  that  the  duties  have  caused  that  progress. 
Jn  the  face   of   the  marvellous  victory  achieved  over  competition 
'" during  the  last  decade,  this  idea  must  be  abandoned.     It  must  be 
"conceded  that,  unless  the  progress  since  1860  has  been  greater  than 
It  was  at  any  time  under  the  non-protective  duties,  the  country  has 
~~lslmply  been  taxed  by  high  duties  on  iron,  without  any  benefit  what 
ever.     But  if  the  progress  has  been  greater  than  it  was  under  non- 
protection,  it  remains  to  ask  whether  the  acceleration  in  the  growth 
of  this  industry  has  been  such  as  to  compensate  the  country  for  the 
increased  cost  of  iron  and  its  products. 

The  quantity  of  pig-iron  produced  in  the  year  1865  is  stated  at 
931,582  tons.  Five  years  of  protection  and  war,  it  seems,  had  not 
only  brought  no  increase,  but  an  absolute  decrease  in  the  quantity. 
But  since  that  time  there  has  been  a  very  large  increase — to 
1,350,943  tons,  in  1866,  to  1,461,626  tons  in  1867,  and  to  about 
1,600,000  tons  in  1868.  The  quantity  now  produced  is  known  only 
by  estimates  and  statements  of  the  Iron  Association,  and  these,  as 
has  been  discovered  in  examination  of  the  history  of  the  years  1842- 
v  '48,  are  not  always  accurate.  It  is  stated  that  the  production  for 
1869  was  1,750,000  tons,  but  no  facts  are  accessible  to  the  writer 
which  enable  him  to  verify  or  correct  the  estimate.  The  quantity 
produced  in  1868,  stated  by  some  as  low  as  1,550,000  tons,  and  by 
others  as  high  as  1,650,000,  was,  undoubtedly,  not  greater  than  the 


230  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

/ 

latter  estimate,  and  the  increase^in  eight  years  since  1860  was, 
^therefore,  less  than  66  per  cent.  But  the  increase  under  non- 
protection  from  1832  to  1840  was  73J  per  cent.,  and  from  1852  to 
I860  it  was  just  75  per  cent.  If  the  production  in  1869  was 
1,750,000  tons,  as  has  been  stated,  the  increase  in  nine  years  was 
77  per  cent.,  and  it  may  then  be  said  that  the  production  of  pig-iron 
has  increased  a  very  little  more  in  nine  years  of  protection  than  it 
did  in  eight  years  of  non-protection.  An  increase  in  nine  years,  3  \ 
per  cent,  greater  than  in  the  eight  years  1832  to  1840,  or  2  per  cent, 
greater  than  in  the  eight  years  1852  to  1860,  is  certainly  not  a  proof 
that  the  production  of  pig-iron  has  been  remarkably  increased  by 
protective  duties ! 

Yet  there  is  reason  to  believe  that  without  the  tariff  the  increase 
would  have  been  more  rapid  than  at  any  former  period.  The  war 
itself  created  an  almost  immeasurable  demand  for  products  of  iron — 
in  arms,  projectiles,  iron-clad  vessels,  and  railroads,  laid  or  repaired 
for  military  use,  while  nearly  eighteen  thousand  miles  of  railroad 
have  been  built  since  1860,  government  having  given  subsidies  or 
grants  to  aid  not  less  than  four  thousand,  and  about  ten  thousand 
miles  of  road  at  the  South  have  been  restored,  repaired,  and  newly 
supplied.  Not  less  than  2,800,000  tons  of  iron  must  have  been  used 
in  building  new  roads  or  restoring  those  of  the  South,  while  the 
quantity  yearly  required  for  repair  of  track,  at  one-twentieth  of  the 
quantity  laid,  is  now  fully  240,000  tons,  and  in  1860  was  only 
150,000  tons.  Yet,  with  all  this  enormous  demand  for  iron,  both 
during  the  war  and  since,  the  production  has  certainly  increased  little 
more  in  the  nine  years  to  June,  1869,  than  it  increased  in  eight  years 
under  the  "  South  Carolina  nullification  tariff,"  from  1832  to  1840, 
or  in  eight  years  under  the  "  British  free-trade  tariff,"  from  1852  to 
186.0—y  If  these  names,  which  Mr.  Carey  so  freely  applies,  have  any 
meaning,  it  must  appear  that  "  British  free  trade  "  is  more  beneficial 
to  the  iron  interest  than  the  system  called  protective. 

The  importation  of  iron  in  1860  was  to  the  value  of  $18,802,227, 
and  in  1869  the  value  imported  was  $29,443,917,  and  the  increase 
was  56  per  cent.  But  in  ten  years  under  low  duties,  from  1850  to 
1860,  the  increase  of  importations  was  only  15  per  cent.,  while  the 
domestic  production  increased  as  largely  as  it  has  since  the  year 
1860.  It  must  therefore  be  conceded  that,  under  protection,  the 
country  has  not  advanced  in  independence  of  foreign  countries  as 
rapidly  as  it  did  under  non-protection. 

Statistics  cannot  be  obtained  of  the  progress  of  other  branches 


IRON.— HISTORY  SINCE   1846.  231 

of  the  iron  interest.  But  it  is  reasonable  to  infer  that  they  have 
suffered,  first,  because  the  cost  of  iron  has  been  greatly  increased ; 
second,  because  the  importations  of  manufactured  iron  have  largely 
increased ;  and  third,  because  Congress  is  even  now  assailed  with 
passionate  appeals  for  still  higher  duties,  to  protect  the  true  manu 
facturer,  not  against  foreign  nations,  but  against  the  exactions  of 
those  who  produce  the  pig-metal. 

The  price  of  iron  averaged  $23.50  in  1860,  and  was  only  $20.09 
in  18G1,  but  was  increased  to  $50.22  in  1864,  to  $48  in  1866,  and 
during  the  year  1869  has  averaged  about  $39.  With  gold  at  $1.27, 
near  the  close  of  the  year,  Scotch  pig  sold  at  New  York  for  $31.50 
in  gold,  and  the  same  metal  sold  in  1860,  at  the  close  of  the  year,  for 
about  $21.50.  Whatever  progress  has  been  made  in  the  production, 
then,  has  been  at  a  cost  of  about  ten  dollars  a  ton  in  gold  to  the 
consumer,  and  to  that  extent  the  raw  material  of  the  manufacturer 
has  been  rendered  more  costly.  Indeed,  the  disadvantage  has  been 
still  greater,  for  the  better  qualities  of  American  iron  have  been  en 
hanced  in  price  much  more  than  the  Scotch  pig,  and  the  lower  qual 
ities  which  sell  at  nearly  the  same  price.  An  increase  of  ten  dollars  / 
in  gold  in  the  cost  of  the  material  is  equivalent  to  a  tariff  of  twelve  / 
dollars  and  a  half  in  gold  against  the  domestic  maker  of  bar-iron. 

In  consequence,  the  value  of  railroad  iron  imported  has  increased 
from  $3,700,000  in  1860  to  $7,281,005  in  1869,  and  the  imports  of 
sheet,  band,  and  other  manufactured  iron,  have  largely  increased.  At 
the  same  time  the  value  of  pig  and  scrap  iron  imported,  which  was 
$1,106,000  in  1859,  has  increased  to  over  $4,700,000  in  1869.  _Jt_is_ 
impossible  to  deny,  what  the  iron  manufacturers  themselves  indig 
nantly  assert,  that  the  other  branches  of  the  iron  interest  suffer 
greatly  from  the  cost  of  the  material.  But  while  they  complain  that 
"  all  the  profits  in  the  iron  business  go  to  the  pig,"  and  clamor  for 
increased  duties  on  iron  manufactures  and  steel,  the  production  of 
pig-iron  increases  less  rapidly  than  the  importation  of  pig  and  scrap, 
and  not  more  than  it  increased  during  eight  years  under  non-pro 
tective  duties,  when  the  manufacture  also  throve.  It  is  known  that 
the  consumption  of  anthracite  coal  in  manufacture  bears  so  large  a 
proportion  to  the  whole  consumption  that  the  manufacture  cannot 
have  increased  much  more  rapidly  than  the  production  of  coal.  But 
the  quantity  of  anthracite  sent  to  market  in  1860  was  8,143,938  tons, 
and  in  1868  it  was  13,405,016,  an  increase  of  only  64  per  cent,  in 
eight  years.  It  is  not  possible  that  the  manufacture  can  have  in 
creased  so  much  more  rapidly  as  to  equal  the  growth  from  1850  to 


232  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

1860,  when  the  consumption  of  anthracite  advanced  from  3,321,136 
to  8,143,938  tons,  an  increase  of  146  per  cent. 

The  manufacture  of  iron  has  therefore  been  retarded,  the  impor 
tation  of  foreign  iron  has  been  increased  56  per  cent.,  and  the  pro 
duction  of  pig-iron  has  advanced  in  nine  yeaxs  to  June,  1869,  scarcely 
more  than  it  advanced  without  protection  in  eight  years.  What, 
then,  is  the  effect  of  the  protective  system  ?  Simply  to  put  money 
into  the  pockets  of  those  who  smelt  iron,  to  the  disadvantage  of  all 
other  iron-workers,  and  at  the  expense  of  the  whole  nation.  Nine 
teen  thousand  men  were  employed  in  1860  in  producing  ore  and  pig 
metal,  and  over  198,000  in  all  the  branches  of  the  iron  manufacture. 
To  enrich  one-tenth  at  the  expense  of  nine-tenths  of  this  same  iron 
interest,  and  at  a  cost  of  many  millions  to  the  nation — is  this  "  pro 
tecting  American  industry?"  Is  it  not,  rather,  taxing  American 
industry  for  the  benefit  of  a  monopoly?  In  January,  1868,  Mr. 
Hewitt,  reporting  upon  the  manufacture  of  iron  as  illustrated  by  the 
Paris  Exposition,  said : 

In  the  Cleveland  region  (Great  Britain),  which  is  most  favorably  situated  for  the 
cheap  production  of  iron,  the  cost  of  producing  a  ton  of  pig-iron  is  about  forty  shil 
lings,  which,  at  the  average  rate  of  wages  paid  around  the  blast-furnace,  is  equiva 
lent  to  eleven  -days'  labor — that  is  to  say,  the  labor  of  eleven  men  for  one  day.  It  is 
possible  that  in  one  or  two  works  this  may  be  reduced  to  ten  days,  but  in  other's  it 
rises  to  twelve  or  thirteen.  In  the  United  States,  the  cheapest  region  for  the  manu 
facture  of  pig-iron,  as  yet  extensively  developed,  is  on  the  Lehigh  River,  in  the  State 
of  Pennsylvania,  where,  taking  coal  and  ore  at  their  actual  cost  of  mining,  pig- 
iron  is  produced  at  an  average  cost  of  $24  a  ton,  which  represents  at  the  present 
rate  of  wages  the  labor  of  about  thirteen  days.  But,  when  the  iron  business  is 
established  along  the  Great  Yalley  which  extends  from  Virginia  to  Alabama,  the 
labor  of  bringing  the  coal  and  ore  together  will  be  considerably  less  than  on  the 
Lehigh  River,  and  it  is  safe  to  say  that  then  iron  can  be  made  in  any  required  quan 
tity,  when  the  avenues  of  communication  are  sufficiently  opened,  with  as  little  labor, 
to  say  the  least,  as  it  can  be  produced  in  the  Cleveland  region. 

The  statement  of  Mr.  Hewitt  was  made  when  gold  was  worth 
about  140 ;  the  average  cost  in  gold,  therefore,  as  stated  by  him,  is 
$17.28.  In  1854  the  cost  was  not  over  $15  ;  anthracite  coal  being 
82  a  ton.  It  requires  now  not  more,  but  less,  of  human  labor  to 
make  a  ton  of  iron  than  it  did  it  1854;  the  mines  are  better  devel 
oped,  the  facilities  for  transportation  and  for  saving  waste  are  more 
complete,  and  the  construction  and  management  of  furnaces  are 
much  improved.  If  Mr.  Hewitt's  statement  is  correct,  the  protective 
system  has  increased  the  cost  of  production  $2.28  in  gold,  partly  by 
giving  a  monopoly  to  the  coal-mines,  and  partly  by  the  increased 


IRON.— HISTORY  SINCE   1846.  233 

cost  of  living,  which  necessitates  higher  wages  for  labor.  Pig-iron 
has  never  sold  below  $10  a  ton  in  England,  and  the  cost  of  trans 
portation,  twenty  shillings,  with  insurance,  interest,  commissions, 
and  brokerage,  about  six  shillings  more  at  the  least,  increases  the 
cost  of  imported  iron  without  duty,  or  any  allowance  whatever  for 
profits  or  transportation  from  shipboard  to  consumer,  to  at  least 
$16.50  in  gold.  When  iron  could  be  made  at  a  cost  of  $15  in  gold, 
the  business  prospered,  and  foreign  iron,  had  there  been  no  duty  at 
all,  could  not  have  been  sold,  even  in  the  seaports,  as  low  as  the  cost 
of  production  here.  Not  only  was  this  true  as  regards  anthracite-iron, 
but  charcoal-iron  then  cost,  according  to  a  statement  by  the  manu 
facturers  themselves  at  Constantia,  New  York,  only  $16.25  per  ton — 
the  items  being  for  150  bushels  charcoal  at  5  cents,  $7.50 ;  for  2  tons 
ore  at  $1.75,  $3.50;  for  flux,  25  cents;  for  labor,  $2,  and  for  interest 

'  and  repairs,  $3  a  ton.  To  get  the  imported  iron  to  Constantia  cost 
$2  a  ton  freight  from  the  seaport,  and  in  proportion  as  furnaces  are 
located  farther  inland,  the  natural  protection  in  cost  of  transporta 
tion  becomes  greater.  Prior  to  the  war,  therefore,  iron  could  be 
made,  both  with  anthracite  and  charcoal,  at  lower  cost  than  imported 
iron,  of  inferior  quality,  could  have  been  delivered  at  any  seaport 

"  ffeejof  duty.  But  the  actual  cost  in  human  labor  is  less  now  than 
it  was  then.  If  artificial  burdens  and  prices  have  raised  the  cost  of 
production,  as  measured  in  gold,  to  $17.28,  and  in  currency  to  $24  a 
ton,  they  have  to  that  extent  rendered  the  country  less  independent 
in  its  industry.  But  Mr.  Hewitt's  statement  is  far  below  the  figure 
at  which  iron-makers  now  put  the  cost.  In  memorials  published, 
makers  in  different  parts  of  the  country  now  assert  that  the  actual 
cost  of  making  iron  is  from  $29  to  $32  in  a  currency  now  worth 
about  80  cents.  They  assert,  therefore,  that  the  cost  of  making 
pig-iron  is  now  $24  or  $25  a  ton  in  gold,  whereas  in  1854  it  was  $15 
in  gold,  and  in  1860  the  average  price  of  all  the  iron  made  in  Penn 
sylvania,  according  to  the  census  report,  was  only  $19.41  per  ton, 
after  yielding  to  makers  a  fair  profit.  If  their  statements  are  truth 
ful,  the  system  of  artificial  prices  and  burdens  has  simply  increased 
the  cost  of  making  a  ton  of  pig-iron  $9  a  ton  in  gold,  or  60  per 
cent.  Evidently,  then,  the  duty  ought  to  be  raised  still  higher, 
because  the  poor  iron-maker  is  actually  worse  off  than  he  was  in 
1860 !  By  all  means,  let  us  have  duties  still  heavier,  so  that  the 
cost  of  production  may  be  still  more  increased,  and  our  dependence 
upon  foreign  countries  may  be  rendered  more  complete ! 

The   real   cost  of  a  ton   of  pig-iron,  according   to   statements 


234 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


recently  published  by  Mr.  Wells,  is  not  more  than  $24  to  $26  in 
currency,  but  in  almost  every  part  of  the  country  it  is  claimed, 
apparently  with  truth,  that  furnaces  favorably  situated  and  well 
managed  are  making  iron  at  a  cost  not  exceeding  $23.  At  Brazil, 
Indiana,  it  is  asserted  that  the  actual  cost  is  $22.50,  and  that  one 
furnace  returned  to  the  owners  in  seven  months  all  the  money  in 
vested.  At  Clarksville,  Tennessee,  according  to  a  statement  by 
Mr.  George  T.  Lewis,  iron  can  be  made  and  delivered  at  Nashville 
at  a  cost  of  $19  a  ton,  currency.  At  Round  Mountain,  Alabama, 
works  located  upon  the  banks  of  the  Coosa  River  can  make  iron  at  a 
cost  of  $16  to  $20  a  ton.  At  Youngstown,  Ohio,  the  Mahoning 
works  make  iron,  according  to  a  statement  of  the  proprietors,  at  a 
coast  of  about  $25.  At  St.  Louis,  Missouri,  the  actual  cost  is  be 
lieved  to  be  less  than  $23.  The  following  actual  record  of  a  week's 
work  in  the  Carondelet  furnace  shows  the  items  of  cost : 


Quantity  used. 

Cost. 

Per  ton. 

Coal                  

163  tons. 

$978. 

$5.87 

Coke  

52    " 

468. 

2.81 

Ore               .                    

222    " 

1,276.50 

7.66 

42    " 

37.80 

.22 

Mill  cinder         

11    " 

27.50 

.16 

738.18 

4.43 

166| tons  produced;  cost,  $3,525.98  ;  per  ton,  $21.15 


Allow  for  repairs  $5,000  a  year,  which,  the  statement  of  one  of 
the  largest  iron-makers  in  Pittsburg  asserts,  is  sufficient  to  cover  re 
pairs  and  incidentals,  and  the  cost  will  be  $21.75.  The  furnace  at 
Carondelet  was  an  old  charcoal  furnace,  height  40  feet,  width  of  bosh 
11  feet  3  inches,  never  suitable  for  smelting  with  raw  coal,  and  very 
imperfectly  repaired  for  the  purpose  of  testing  the  Big  Muddy  coal. 
Its  expense  for  repairs,  therefore,  is  not  properly  included ;  and  in 
the  above  statement  the  actual  weighings  of  material  and  payments 
for  labor  are  given  from  the  books  of  the  company,  but  for  coal  $6  a 
ton  is  allowed,  and  for  ore  $5.75.  But  the  ore  actually  costs  at  the 
mines  $3.50  per  ton,  and  for  freight  74-J-  miles  $1.90;  total,  with  al 
lowance  of  5  per  cent,  for  waste,  $5.67.  The  coal  costs  at  the  mines 
$3.85  per  ton ;  freight  to  Carondelet  75 ;  total  $4.60,  but  the  arrange 
ments  for  transfer  are  so  imperfect  that  it  is  claimed  that  25  per  cent, 
of  the  coal  is  wasted,  and  the  cost  of  a  ton  weighed  into  the  furnace 
is  $5.75.  Yet,  with  all  these  disadvantages  and  with  allowance  for 


IRON.— HISTORY  SINCE   1846.  235 

more  than  the  alleged  waste,  the  cost  of  iron  was  only  $21.15,  or, 
allowing  ordinary  repairs,  $21.75.  In  the  same  town  two  large  and 
splendidly-equipped  furnaces  have  been  operated  since  July  by  the 
Kingsland  Company,  who  state  (January  1st)  that  they  made  7,000 
tons  of  metal,  used  11,083  tons  of  ore,  and  8,300  tons  of  coal.  But  the 
ore  cost  $5.40,  and  the  coal  $4.60:  the  cost  per  ton  of  metal  made 
was  therefore  of  ore  $8.55,  and  of  coal  $5.45,  and,  supposing  that  the 
other  expenses  were  the  same  as  those  of  the  other  company,  the  cost 
was  $21.62  per  ton,  or,  allowing  as  before  for  repairs,  $22.22. 

These  are  estimates  of  the  actual  cost  of  making  iron  at  present, 
when  the  coal  costs  $4.60  and  the  ore  $5.40  per  ton.  But  the  cost 
of  mining  coal  in  1860  was  about  50  cents  a  ton,  and  it  is  now  arti 
ficially  increased.  The  cost  of  mining  ore,  accessible  in  inexhausti 
ble  quantities  on  the  level  of  a  railroad  track,  as  at  the  Iron  Moun 
tain,  should  not  be  more  than  50  cents  a  ton ;  in  1857  the  Pilot 
Knob  ore  was  delivered  at  the  furnace  at  a  cost  of  20  cents.  Adding 
freight,  the  cost  of  the  coal  at  Carondelet  would  not  necessarily  be 
more  than  $1.25  a  ton,  and  the  ore  $2.40  a  ton.  Where  does  the 
difference  go  ?  The  greater  part  of  it  in  profits  to  two  monopolies, 
one  of  coal,  and  the  other  of  iron.  In  like  manner  the  cost  of  trans 
portation  of  ore  by  railroad  is  increased,  because  there  is  but  one 
road  and  it  chooses  to  make  somebody  else  pay  for  the  increased 
cost  of  iron,  rolling-stock,  and  machinery.  The  necessary  cost  of 
transportation  is  not  more  than  $1  per  ton  of  ore,  and  the  necessary 
cost  of  the  ore  delivered  is  not  more  than  $1.50  a  ton.  Allowing  the 
same  for  other  expenses  as  before,  the  necessary  cost  of  making  iron 
at  Carondelet  would  be  11,083  tons  ore,  $16.624,  or  $2.37  per  ton 
of  iron;  8,300  tons  coal  $10.373  or  $1.48  per  ton  of  iron;  flux,  labor, 
coke,  and  repairs,  $8.22  per  ton ;  total  cost,  $12.07  per  ton.  The  iron 
sells  for  $36  to  $38  a  ton.  The  difference  goes  in  part  to  the  owner 
of  the  coal-mine,  in  part  to  the  owner  of  the  iron-mine,  in  part  to  the 
owner  of  the  railroad,  in  part  in  the  increased  cost  of  production 
caused  by  artificial  burdens,  and  after  paying  all  these  charges  there 
remains  a  profit  of  fourteen  to  sixteen  dollars  a  ton  to  the  makers  of 
iron. 

It  is  probable  that  iron  can  be  made  as  cheaply  in  Missouri,  or 
near  the  coal-fields  in  Illinois,  as  anywhere  else  in  the  country,  and 
in  quantity  unlimited.  But  in  other  States,  if  the  statements  of  Mr. 
Hewitt  and  Mr.  Wells  are  correct,  iron  can  be  made  at  a  cost  below 
the  lowest  price  at  which  foreign  iron  can  be  imported  free  of  duty. 
It  was  made  before  the  war  at  such  cost  as  to  defy  competition,  not 


236  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

only  by  Pennsylvania,  but  by  other  States.  If  the  cost  is  greater 
now,  to  that  extent  has  the  system  of  protective  duties  deprived  us 
of  the  industrial  independence  achieved  before  the  war,  and  the 
plain  remedy  is  to  remove  the  artificial  burdens  which  increase  the 
cost  of  production.  Take  away  the  duty,  so  that  the  owners  of 
mines  may  be  driven  to  consult  their  own  interests,  by  selling  a 
larger  quantity  of  coal  or  ore  at  a  smaller  profit ;  so  that  railroad 
transportation  may  cost  less ;  so  that  the  making  of  iron  may  be  in 
creased  in  those  regions  where  it  can  be  made  at  reasonable  cost. 
The  duty  on  pig-iron  is  not  merely  unnecessary.  It  works  great 
injury  to  the  makers  of  bar  and  wrought  iron  and  steel,  to  the 
makers  of  castings,  hardware,  and  other  products,  in  which  compe 
tition  is  apprehended ;  to  the  manufacturers  of  all  machines,  agri 
cultural  implements,  and  nails,  and  to  all  blacksmiths  and  others  in 
cluded  in  the  non-protected  branches ;  to  all  other  branches  of  manu 
facture  in  which  machinery  or  tools  are  used ;  to  all  transporters  by 
rail  or  steamer,  and  consumers  of  products  transported,  and  finally — 
and  mainly,  for  upon  the  producer  all  burdens  at  last  must  mainly . 
fall — to  the  whole  agricultural  interest.  If  that  duty  were  entirely 
removed,  the  whole  iron  interest  would  prosper.  The  rolling-mills 
could  afford  to  reduce  the  price  of  railroad  iron  at  least  $12.50  in 
gold,  and  not  a  single  ton  of  British  rails  could  be  imported  at  that 
price,  while  more  railroads  could  be  built,  and  transportation  could 
be  rendered  less  costly.  It  is  a  trifle  in  comparison  with  other 
benefits,  that  we  should  then  keep  at  home  87,281,000  nqw^sent 
abroad  to  pay  for  rails.  Bar-iron  could  be  likewise  reduced  in  price, 
and  the  makers  would  not  be  forced,  as  many  have  been  during  the 
past  year,  to  stop  work  or  sell  at  a  sacrifice.  The  makers  of  steel, 
wTho  are  now  begging  for  higher  duties,  would  be  aided  more  by  a 
reduction  in  the  cost  of  the  material  than  by  an  addition  of  $20  a  ton 
to  the  duty  on  steel.  Manufacturers  of  machinery  of  every  kind 
could  make  better  profits  and  pay  better  wages,  and  yet  supply  ma 
chines  at  less  cost.  Nails,  which  sold  before  the  war  at  3  cents  and 
now  sell  at  4J  cents,  the  mills  even  at  that  price  losing  money,  could 
once  more  be  reduced  in  cost,  while  the  factories  would  become 
profitable.  The  founderies  would  prosper,  and  the  poor  man  pay  less 
for  his  stoves.  Agricultural  implements  and  machines  would  cost 
the  farmer  less,  and  the  blacksmith,  getting  iron,  and  anvils,  and 
hammers  for  less,  could  make  more  money,  and  work  more  cheaply. 
Thus  the  whole  iron  interest  would  prosper,  and  the  increased  de 
mand  for  iron  of  all  kinds  would  compel  an  increased  production  of 


IROX.— HISTORY  SINCE   1846.  237 

pig-iron.  American  industry  would  thus  be  truly  protected,  and  the 
benefits  would  be  diffused,  as  the  burdens  are  now,  through  the  whole 
community. 

Would  the  removal  of  the  duty  close  the  furnaces  ?  Does  not 
the  history  of  the  last  decade  answer  the  question?  American 
stone-coal  iron  sells  at  about  three  dollars  a  ton  more  than  Scotch 
pig,  because  of  its  superior  quality.  While  anthracite  sells  for  $38, 
charcoal  mill  iron  sells  for  $42  to  $44,  and  foundery-iron  for  $46  to 
$50.  If  the  other  qualities  are  so  much  more  valuable  that  they 
command  from  $4  to  $12  more  per  ton  than  the  anthracite,  it  is 
plain  that,  if  the  anthracite-iron  can  meet  foreign  competition,  no 
other  need  fear.  But  that  iron  is  also  worth  more  than  the  foreign. 
It  sells  for  about  $38,  and  the  duty  on  the  foreign  iron  is  $9  in  gold, 
or,  when  gold  is  at  130,  $11.70  in  currency.  The  price  could  not, 
therefore,  be  reduced  by  removal  of  the  duty  lower  than  $26.30.  If 
the  iron  costs  $24  a  ton,  as  Mr.  Hewitt  states,  the  repeal  of  the  duty 
would  still  leave  a  profit  of  $2.30  on  every  ton.  But,  if  the  actual 
cost  is  not  greater  than  it  was  before  the  war,  $15  in  gold,  or  (at 
130)  $19.50  in  currency,  the  profit  on  every  ton  would  be  $6.80. 
If  the  cost  is  greater,  then  protection  has  crippled  our  strongest 
industry,  and  the  sooner  we  tear  that  industry  from  the  lap  of 
Delilah  the  better  for  the  iron  manufacture  and  for  the  country. 

That  the  manufacture  of  iron  suffers  from  the  protective  system, 
is  confessed  in  frequent  declarations  like  the  following,  from  a  letter 
published  by  W.  H.  Powell,  superintendent  of  the  Clifton  Iron 
Works,  Ohio : 

It  is,  however,  very  true,  as  has  been  claimed  by  you  in  your  issue  of  the  llth 
instant,  that,  at  the  present  prices  of  pig-iron  in  the  West,  the  entire  rolling-mill, 
nail-factory,  and  foundery  interests  of  the  West,  are  completely  paralyzed  and  ren 
dered  unremunerative,  while  the  furnace  interests  have  beyond  all  possible  contradic 
tion  paid  enormous  dividends  ;  and  were  it  not  for  the  fact  that  the  production  of 
pig-iron  must,  and  will  of  necessity,  in  consequence  of  the  largely- increased  produc 
tive  capacity,  exceed  the  demand  to  the  extent  of  a  gradual  decline,  such  as  we  have 
predicted,  and  which  result  will  be  reached  in  as  short  a  period  as  could  possibly 
be  reached  through  Congressional  legislation,  we  would  earnestly  and  industriously 
advocate  the  change  of  the  present  tariff  on  pig-iron  from  $9  to  $4  per  ton,  and  an 
increase  on  bar-iron,  etc.,  of  $5  per  ton.  We  are  decidedly  opposed  to  the  frequent 
Congressional  tampering  with  and  changes  in  the  laws  that  regulate  the  great  in 
dustrial  pursuits  of  our  country. 

The  expectation  that  the  price  of  domestic  iron  will  in  time  be 
reduced  (the  tariff  remaining),  is  not  warranted  by  any  incident  in 
17 


238  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

our  history.  For  fifteen  years  under  protection,  from  1818  to  1832, 
the  price  was  sustained,  with  scarcely  any  reduction.  During 
the  last  year  of  the  tariff"  of  1842,  when  the  production  was  over 
half  a  million  tons,  the  price  was  over  $38 ;  though  in  the  first  year 
of  that  tariff,  when  the  production  was  much  smaller,  the  price  was 
less  than  $26.  In  1860  we  produced  987,000  tons,  at  a  cost  of  little 
more  than  $22,  and  now  it  is  claimed  that  the  production  has  in 
creased  77  per  cent.,  but  the  price  remains  over  $31  in  gold — higher 
than  in  1860,  by  just  the  amount  of  the  duty.  The  truth  is,  that 
there  is  really  a  monopoly  in  this  branch  of  production,  and  as  long 
as  the  iron-producers  maintain  their  association,  and  prefer  to  stop 
work  than  to  encourage  the  manufacture  by  lower  prices,  the  ex 
perience  of  1832  and  1846  is  likely  to  be  repeated.  But,  if  the  state 
ment  of  the  iron-makers  be  accepted  as  truth,  there  is  another  reason 
for  high  prices.  They  assert  that  the  actual  cost  of  production  has 
been  increased  from  $15  a  ton  in  1860  to  $25  a  ton  in  gold,  or  $30 
currency.  If  nine  years  of  protection  have  so  increased  the  cost,  how 
many  years  more  will  be  necessary  to  make  it  impossible  to  sell 
iron  lower  than  $40  in  gold  without  a  sacrifice  ?  If  nine  years  in 
creased  the  cost  60  per  cent.,  continued  protection  nine  years  longer, 
until  1878,  would  raise  the  cost  of  producing  pig-iron  above  $41  in 
gold! 

The  country  can  no  longer  afford  to  garrote  its  most  important 
branch  of  manufactures..  In  the  iron  interest  alone,  we  are  strang 
ling  nine- tenths  to  protect  one-tenth.  Nor  does  that  protection 
accelerate  the  increase  in  the  quantity  of  pig-iron  produced,  but  it 
increases  importations,  increases  the  cost  of  production,  and  thus 
renders  that  industry  permanently  more  feeble,  more  exposed  to 
assault,  and  of  less  profit  to  the  country.  At  every  point  the  sys 
tem  is  wasteful.  Which  is  the  true  protection  of  American  industry, 
to  secure  a  profit  of  $17  a  ton  to  the  owners  of  a  few  hundred  fur 
naces,  or  to  secure  prosperity  to  thirty  millions  of  laborers ;  to  secure 
more  work  and  better  wages  to  fifteen  thousand  blacksmiths,  eleven 
thousand  workers  in  sheet-iron,  sixteen  thousand  makers  of  agricul 
tural  implements,  forty-eight  thousand  makers  of  machinery,  and  to 
put  sixty-seven  thousand  people  engaged  in  the  manufacture  of  iron 
beyond  the  reach  of  foreign  assault  ?  Let  that  question  be  asked  in 
Congress  !  Let  it  be  determined  whether  "  protection  to  American 
industry  "  means  a  monopoly  for  the  furnace-owner,  or  prosperity  to 
the  manufacturer,  the  machinist,  the  blacksmith,  the  transporter, 
the  farmer,  and  the  whole  body  of  workmen  of  these  United  States. 


ARE   MONOPOLIES  BLESSINGS? 


239 


PRICE  OF  IRON. 
Average  yearly,  as  stated  in  the  Special  Report  of  Commissioner  Colwell,  1866. 


YEAR. 


YEAR. 


1838 

1839 

1840 

1841 

1842 

1843.... 

1844 

1845 

1846 

1847 

1848 

1849.  ... 

1850 

1851 

1852 

1853 

1854 

1855 

1856 

1857 

1858... 

1859. 

1860. 

1861. 

1862. 

1863. 

1864. 

1865. 


29 
20 
20 
16.50 


PRICE  or 

PlG-lRON. 


Great 
Britain 


10.02 


BAR-IKON. 


RAIL'D 


United 
States.  Britain. 


40  46@58 
37  46@51 
29.8540@56 
29.3340@45 
25.2934 
25.28J  23.44 
25.72  26.87 


29.25 
27.81 
30.21 
26.50 
21.02 
20.82 
21.38 
..  22.63 
10.24f  36.07 
17.05i  37.16 
16.19  27.74 
14.83'  27.18 
12. 301  26.35 
10.09  22.19 
10.32!  23.32 


United 

States. 


41.25 
43.50 
45.47 
32.13 
88.181 
26.681 
25.90 
29.25 
43.85 
48.25 
43.50 
44.86 
41.22 
41.15 
42 

10. 83 -22. 17^38. 19 
10  20.09  36.98 
10.56!  23.92  37.18 


States. 


11.25 
11.13 


35.24 

1.22 


10.64-46.25 


39.61 
37 


88.02 
88.43 
75 

68.16 
57.91 
56.54 
60.60 
74. ( 
78.71 
74.29  69.10 
59.06  62.25 
43.38!  53.88 
41.87i  47.83 
37. as!  45.60 
38.64  48.43 
64.77  77.23 
70.04  80.08 
58.54  62.90 
58.72  64.33 
55.14!  50 
48.11  50 


45.37 
42.43 
44.02 
59 


47.95. 
42.38 
41.73 


73.57    76.84 
.    1126.02 


By  comparing  this  statement  with  the  official  record  of  actual 
quotations  at  New  York  (see  pp.  221,  222),  it  will  be  seen  that  this 
table,  which  is  supposed  to  be  taken  from  "  Statistics  of  the  Iron  and 
Steel  Association,"  is  often  (and  sometimes  widely)  in  error  in  regard 
to  American  prices,  and  comparison  with  other  records  shows  that  it 
is  entirely  unreliable  as  to  British  prices.  But  it  is,  nevertheless, 
the  only  information  obtained  as  to  the  price  in  certain  years. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 

ARE     MONOPOLIES     BLESSINGS  ? 

THE  three  great  manufacturing  interests — iron,  cotton,  and  wool — 
employing,  with  dependent  branches,  in  1860,  not  less  than  387,964 
hands,  and  yielding  an  aggregate  product  of  $468,600,000,  have  now 
been  considered.  It  has  appeared  that,  of  the  iron  interest,  less  than 


240  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

one-tenth  is  protected,  to  the  injury  of  nine-tenths,  and  at  the  ex 
pense  of  the  whole  people,  and  that  the  single  branch  of  industry 
thus  favored — the  making  of  pig-iron — has  never  by  high  duties 
been  truly  benefited,  or  stimulated  permanently  to  greater  produc 
tion  of  wealth,  but,  by  putting  great  profits  in  the  pockets  of  a  few 
men,  the  true  progress  of  that  industry  has  been  retarded.  It  has 
appeared  that  the  cotton  manufacture  has  never  needed  protection, 
and,  with  or  without  it,  has  advanced  in  proportion  to  the  increase 
of  the  cotton  crop,  but  has  been  only  retarded  in  a  healthy  growth 
by  the  protective  system  and  the  frequent  changes  therewith  insep 
arably  connected.  It  has  appeared  that  the  woollen  manufacture  has 
been  repeatedly  prostrated  by  the  duties  on  wool,  while  those  duties 
have  never  benefited,  but  uniformly  injured,  the  wool-grower,  and 
that  this  industry  would  now  be  stronger  without  the  protective 
system  and  its  fatal  changes  than  with  it. 

Space  does  not  permit  a  similar  minute  examination  in  regard  to 
all  other  branches  of  manufacture.  Nor  is  it  necessary  for  the  satis 
faction  of  any  candid  inquirer.  For  it  will  surely  be  acknowledged 
that,  if  the  system  of  protective  duties  has  failed  to  strengthen  or 
benefit  these  three  great  branches,  which  have  been  more  assiduously 
guarded  by  legislators,  and  fenced  about  with  higher  duties  than  any 
others,  then  indeed  no  results  more  satisfactory  can  be  expected 
from  the  less  persistent  and  less  careful  protection  which  has  been 
granted  to  other  industries.  No  reasoner,  whose  object  is  the  dis 
covery  of  the  truth,  will  pretend  for  a  moment  to  defend  the  system 
of  protective  duties,  unless  it  can  be  sustained  in  its  application  to 
these,  the  main  objects  of  its  care.  No  general  tariff  act,  having 
protection  in  any  degree  for  its  object,  has  ever  been  passed  in  an 
American  Congress,  except  at  the  urgent  demand  of  one  or  more  of 
these  interests,  and  in  the  hope  of  aiding  them.  Take  away  the 
strength  which  those  interests  have  in  Congress,  and  there  would  not 
be  left  of  the  advocates  of  protection  a  force  large  enough  to  call 
the  yeas  and  nays.  Remove  from  the  popular  mind  the  feeling  that 
those  great  branches  of  manufacture  need  artificial  support,  and  can 
by  such  support  be  really  aided,  and  there  is  not  a  State,  from  the 
Atlantic  to  the  Pacific,  in  which  persons,  proposing  to  tax  the  people 
for  the  benefit  of  any  other  interest,  would  have  strength  enough  to  - 
secure  a  hearing  in  any  convention  of  any  party.  These  three  inter 
ests  are  the  backbone  of  the  whole  protective  policy ;  let  it  once  be 
conceded  that  they  cannot  be  aided,  but  have  in  fact  been  retarded 
by  duties  designed  to  aid  them,  and  the  policy  of  protection  would, 


ARE  MONOPOLIES  BLESSINGS?  241 

with  almost  absolute  unanimity  of  opinion,  be  instantly  and  forever 
abandoned. 

Neither  is  it  necessary  to  the  logical  completeness  of  this  inquiry, 
to  trace  the  history  of  other  branches  of  manufacture  in  detail.  For 
it  has  been  ascertained  that  the  production  of  wealth  by  agriculture 
has  been  retarded  by  protective  duties,  and  from  agriculture  come 
three-fourths  of  our  annual  product.  Of  those  branches  of  industry 
from  which  the  remaining  fourth  is  derived,  it  was  first  ascertained 
that  industries  yielding  two-thirds  of  that  fourth  were  not  aided  by 
protection,  and  of  the  other  third  more  than  three-fourths  are  derived 
from  the  three  great  industries  examined.  The  account  stands  thus : 

SOURCES  OF  WEALTH. 

Industry.  Effect.  Net  Product 

Agriculture Injured.  2,600,000,000 

Natural  Manufactures "  478,100,000 

L~on,  Cotton,  aud-Wx>ol "  243,400,000 

All  other  branches Unknown.  80,900,000 

So  small  in  relative  importance  are  the  branches  of  industry  re 
maining,  that  if  every  one  of  these  had  been  absolutely  created  by 
protection,  and  had  its  entire  product  been  due  to  that  influence,  it 
could  not  compensate  for  the  actually  ascertained  injury  to  agricul 
ture  alone — namely,  the  loss  of  seven  and  a  half  per  cent,  in  its 
yearly  increase.  Still  less  could  it  compensate  for  that  injury  and 
the  further  injury  to  the  more  important  branches  of  manufacture 
already  examined.  It  is  therefore  plain  that  the  production  of 
wealth,  in  the  aggregate,  has  not  been  increased,  but  has  been  re 
tarded  in  its  natural  progress,  by  the  tariffs  called  protective.  And, 
were  logical  completeness  only  desirable,  this  branch  of  the  inquiry 
might  here  be  dismissed.  But  it  is  also  desirable  to  show,  some 
what  more  fully,  the  effect  of  the  protective  system  upon  other 
branches  of  industry  which  produce  necessaries  of  daily  life,  or  the 
materials  for  such  production.  And,  in  glancing  somewhat  hastily  at 
these,  we  shall  find  new  illustrations  and  convincing  proofs  of  the 
two  principles  which  have  already  been  so  constantly  traced,  namely, 
that  protection  artificially  increases  the  cost  of  production,  and  that 
security  against  competition  prevents  the  surest  and  most  rapid 
progress. 

An  important  industry,  and  one  formerly  supposed  to  need  pro 
tection,  is  the  manufacture  of  paper,  in  which  there  were  employed, 
in  1860,  10,911  hands,  who  produced  to  the  value  of  $21,216,802. 


242  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

At  the  first  step  in  tracing  its  history  there  is  found  proof  that,  what 
ever  it  may  once  have  needed,  this  industry  does  not  now  need  arti 
ficial  aid.  For,  in  1850,  the  number  of  hands  employed  in  this  branch 
was  6,785,  and  its  product  was  $10,187,177.  A  manufacture  which 
increased  110  per  cent,  in  a  decade  of  non-protective  duties,  the  low 
est  since  1816,  can  scarcely  be  thought  to  need  any  extraneous  assist* 
ance.  Indeed,  this  is  par  excellence  the  paper-making  and  paper- 
using  nation  of  all  the  world ;  we  made  more  paper  in  1860  than 
either  England  or  France,  and  were  believed  to  consume  more  than 
both  together.  Those  two  countries  produced  in  1854  only  334,600,000 
pounds  of  paper,  while  this  country  in  that  year  produced  270,000,000 
pounds,  and  the  production  of  England  and  France  was  4. 5 5  pounds  per 
capita,  while  that  of  the  United  States  was  10.80  pounds  per  capita. 
As  early  as  1790,  Alexander  Hamilton  classed  the  manufacture  of 
paper  among  those  which  had  arrived  at  the  greatest  maturity,  and 
was  most  adequate  to  a  national  supply.  The  census  of  1810  showed 
that  the  consumption  was  supplied  almost  wholly  by  the  domestic 
manufacture,  and  from  that  time  to  this  rags  have  been  largely  im 
ported  to  supply  a  lack  of  material.  After  the  war,  among  other  manu 
factures  which  suffered  from  the  competition  stimulated  by  fictitious 
prices  was  that  of  paper,  and  duties  were  imposed  in  protective  tariffs 
for  its  support,  of  30  per  cent,  in  1816,  specific  from  3  to  20  cents  a 
pound  in  1824,  and  from  3  to  17  cents  in  1842.  But  in  the  general  prog 
ress  of  manufactures  in  the  period  of  the  compromise  tariff  this  branch 
became  one  of  the  most  firmly  established.  In  1830,  just  before  pro 
tection  ceased,  the  Fourdrinier  machine  was  first  manufactured  here, 
and  that  and  other  greatly-improved  mechanism  were  very  generally 
adopted  during  the  period  from  1832  to  1840.  In  1836,  when  the  im 
portations  of  all  articles  were  extravagantly  large,  we  imported  only 
$152,000  worth  of  paper  of  all  kinds,  and  in  the  same  year  exported 
$44,85  7.  So  insignificant  were  our  imports  of  this  article  that  in  many 
Treasury  reports  of  that  date  they  are  not  specified  at  all,  but  our  ex 
ports  of  paper  and  stationery  became  a  regular  item  of  consequence  in 
the  yearly  account.  In  1847,  we  were  exporting  paper  worth  $88,731 ; 
in  1850,  $99,696 ;  in  1855,  $185,637 ;  and  1860,  $285,798.  At  no 
time  have  our  imports  of  paper  formed  any  appreciable  share  of  our 
consumption ;  thus  in  1840  we  made  paper  worth  $5,641,499,  and  im 
ported  less  than  $100,000 ;  in  1850  we  made  paper  worth  $10,187,177, 
and  imported  less  than  half  a  million;  and  in  1860,  when  our  product 
was  over  twenty-one  millions,  we  imported  writing-paper  worth 
4300,000,  wall-paper  worth  $144,000,  and  manufactures  of  paper 


ARE  MONOPOLIES  BLESSINGS?  243 

amounting  to  about  8200,000  more.  In  1868,  under  the  high  duties, 
we  imported  about  one  million  worth  —  more  than  before,  but  still  not 
enough  to  be  seriously  compared  with  the  domestic  product.  The  truth 
is,  that  since  the  manufacture  with  the  modern  machinery  became  thor 
oughly  established  in  this  country,  which  had  taken  place  by  1840,  the 
paper  manufacture  has  been  absolutely  independent  —  so  independent, 
indeed,  as  to  form  at  times,  by  combinations  among  makers,  a  most 
odious  monopoly.  The  importation  has  been  mainly  confined  to  such 
products  as  the  fancy  or  taste  of  consumers  may  prefer  to  the  cheaper 
American  article.  From  1840  to  1850,  with  four  years  of  protective 
duties,  the  manufacture  increased  81  per  cent.  ;  and  from  1850 
to  1860,  without  protective  duties,  110  per  cent.  It  would  be  a  waste 
of  time  to  consider  this  manufacture  more  at  length,  did  not  its  recent 
history  afford  some  instructive  items. 

When  protection  came  as  an  epidemic  in  1861,  it  attacked  this 
s,  and  gave  it  35  per  cent,  duties  upon  foreign 
which  still  remains.     Not  long  after,  the  war  and 


other  causes  having  induced  a  very  rapid  increase  of  consumption, 
the  paper-makers  found  themselves  in  possession  of  a  valuable  mo 
nopoly,  which-they  used  remorselessly.  Prices  beyond  all  reason 
were  demanded  and  obtained,  and,  all  checks  through  foreign  com 
petition  upon  this  plundering  of  the  public  being  removed,  the  paper- 
manufacturers  realized  enormous  incomes.  In  one  collection  district 
ninety-nine  persons  interested  in  this  industry  returned  in  1865-'66 
incomes  of  $948,988  ;  one  corporation  an  income  of  $178,000,  and 
ten  individuals  an  average  of  $31,430  each.  In  consequence,  after 
the  public  had  been  fleeced  in  this  way  for  three  years,  1863-'65, 
the  manufacture  began  to  extend  very  rapidly  ;  and  more  paper- 
mills  were  put  in  operation  in  the  years  1865-'66  than  in  a  long 
period  before.  But  the  production  had  not  been  much  less  than  the 
demand,  and  prices  fell  with  great  rapidity.  The  whole  industry 
was  prostrated  more  seriously  than  ever  before  ;  many  men  lost  all 
their  capital  ;  many  mills  were  sold  at  a  great  sacrifice  ;  and  in  the 
spring  of  1869  the  manufacturers  in  New  England  met  in  conven 
tion  to  discuss  the  propriety  of  "  decreasing  the  production  of  paper." 
In  October,  1869,  a  great  storm  helped  them  by  destroying  many 
mills  and  dams,  and  this  providential  interposition  was  regarded  as 
a  real  relief.  Was~it  for  4he^.good  of  the  country  to  induce  so 
many  men  to  ruin  themselves,  in  order  to  effect  what  foreign.  com 
petition,  if  let  alone,  would  have  effected  without  injury  to  anybody 
—  a  reduction  of  the  cost  of  paper  ?  Can  any  system  be  a  blessing 


244  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

to  a  country  which  needs  a  foreign  war  to  give  it  a  fair  start,  and 
an  occasional  earthquake  or  tornado  as  an  antidote  to  its  poison  ? 

Yet  is  not  this  the  very  core  of  the  protective  theory — that  with 
drawal  of  foreign  competition,  by  giving  to  an  industry  unnatural 
profits,  will  force  it  to  a  growth  unnaturally  rapid  ?  It  has  been 
proved  that  this  supposed  law  is  not  alwaj^s  sustained  by  facts ;  that 
in  some  cases  the  unnatural  profits  do  not  accelerate  but  really  re 
tard  the  growth  of  an  industry.  But  in  the  history  of  the  cotton 
manufacture,  and  now  in  that  of  the  paper  manufacture,  it  also  ap 
pears  that,  in  every  case  where  the  unnatural  growth  is  produced,  it 
is  followed  by  a  prostration  correspondingly  severe.  That  prostra 
tion  cripples  hundreds  of  the  most  enterprising  men,  sweeps  away 
an  enormous  capital,  and  so  crushes  an  industry  that  an  earthquake 
or  a  tornado  seems  a  blessing  if  it  annihilates  a  property  wasted  in 
over-production,  and  then,  with  reduced  energy  and  means,  the  in 
dustry  begins  once  more  the  Sisyphus-labor  of  rolling  the  rock  of 
protection  up-hill ! 

If  it  be  true — and  facts  prove  that  it  is  true — that  these  prostra 
tions  retard  the  progress  of  an  industry  more  than  the  seasons  of 
forced  growth  help  it ;  that  they  undermine  its  vitality  by  crushing 
not  the  worst  but  many  of  the  best  men  engaged  therein,  whereas 
natural  competition  weeds  out  the  poorer  and  strengthens  the  more 
competent  manufacturers  •  then  does  it  not  follow  that  the  system 
of  protection,  even  when  its  very  best  results  are  realized,  and  all 
its  theories  are  answered  by  facts,  simply  retards  real  progress  in 
the  production  of  wealth  ?  Does  it  not  induce  to  wasteful  employ 
ment  of  capital  and  energy,  and  sustain  men  for  long  series  of  years 
in  such  waste  of  means,  when  natural  competition  would  quickly 
warn  them  of  their  error  ?  Does  it  not  in  this  way  undermine  and 
weaken  even  the  most  vigorous  industry,  and  prepare  it  to  need 
perpetual  nursing  in  hospital,  and  shelter  from  that  very  competi 
tion  which  would  have  preserved  its  health  ?  These  surely  are  ques 
tions  which  go  to  the  very  root  of  the  matter,  and  the  records  of  the 
manufacturers  of  paper  and  cotton  supply  the  answers.  The  pro 
tective  system  is  a  boomerang — a  weapon  fit  only  for  barbarians  to 
use,  which,  in  civilized  hands,  is  quite  apt  to  knock  the  thrower  on 
the  head. 

Paper-making  employed  10,911  hands,  printing  employed  20,159, 
in  1860,  and  yielded  a  product  of  $31,063,898.  Whenever  high  du 
ties  on  paper  increase  its  cost,  they  injure  the  larger  industry  of 
printing.  Thus,  during  the  years  of  extravagant  prices  already 


ARE  MONOPOLIES  BLESSINGS?  245 

mentioned,  the  cost  of  paper  forced  hundreds  of  newspapers  to  sus 
pend,  while  others,  raising  their  price,  checked  the  increase  of  their 
subscriptions.  Hundreds  of  job-offices  were  broken  down ;  and  all, 
obliged  to  charge  more  for  work,  had  less  work  to  do.  Many  a 
book  went  unpublished  which  might  have  yielded  a  profit  to  pub 
lisher  and  author ;  many  more  which  were  published  met  with  a 
sale  limited  by  their  enhanced  cost,  and  resulted  in  loss  instead  of 
profit,  because  of  the  extravagant  prices  of  paper.  Thus  the  legis 
lative  boomerang  not  only  came  back  with  force  upon  the  paper 
monopolists,  who  deserved  it,  but  it  damaged  another  industry  far 
more  important  in  the  production  of  wealth,  and  incomparably  more 
important  in  its  bearing  upon  the  education  of  the  people. 

But  it  is  not  true  that,  even  at  the  expense  of  prostration,  a  mo 
nopoly  always  cures  itself.  The  history  of  the  pig-iron  interest  has 
proved  that  the  monopoly  sometimes  perpetuates  itself  by  checking 
consumption  in  time  of  high  prices,  and  in  the  cotton  and  woollen 
manufacture  it  has  appeared  that  over-production  of  a  particular  ar 
ticle  is  often  relieved  by  working  short  time  without  a  reduction  of 
price.  Perhaps  the  most  striking  illustration  of  this  method  of 
evading  natural  laws  is  found  in  the  history  of  coal-mining. 

In  mining  coal  there  were  employed,  in  1860,  36,486  persons, 
and  the  value  of  their  product  was  $20,579,329.  At  that  time  there 
were  mined  14,577,648  tons  of  coal,  according  to  the  census  reports, 
and  the  number  of  hands  employed  had  increased  from  15,124  per 
sons  in  1850,  or  nearly  150  per  cent.,  while  the  capital  invested  in 
this  branch  of  industry  had  increased  within  the  decade  over  twenty- 
one  millions,  or  253  per  cent.  It  needs  no  other  demonstration  to  show 
that  this  industry,  as  a  whole,  requires  no  protection  whatever;  and 
the  least  consideration  of  the  cost  of  transporting  a  product  so  bulky 
in  proportion  to  its  value,  will  make  it  clear  that  any  duties,  however 
heavy,  can  have  effect  only  within  a  short  distance  from  the  sea 
board.  In  1860  the  cost  of  moving  coal  from  the  mines  to  market 
was  declared  by  the  census  reports  to  be  at  least  50  per  .cent,  on 
its  cost  at  the  mines,  which  was  then  $1.34  for  bituminous,  and 
$1.46  for  anthracite  coal.  But  the  freight  on  coal  from  Port  Carbon, 
Pennsylvania,  to  New  York,  in  April,  1869,  was  $2.33  a  ton,  and  in 
August,  $4.08  a  ton,  while  the  price  of  coal  in  June  was  $3.75.  One 
hundred  per  cent,  on  the  cost  is  therefore  charged  for  transportation 
175  miles.  It  is  plain  that  no  foreign  coal  can  be  transported  to 
this  country,  and  then  moved  more  than  fifty  miles  inland,  except  in 
New  England,  without  meeting  a  cheaper  supply  from  our  own 


246  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

mines ;  for  our  deposits  of  coal  are  scattered  over  the  whole  country, 
from  tide- water  in  Pennsylvania  to  Monte  Diablo  in  California,  and 
foreign  coal  cannot  possibly  compete  with  our  own,  except  in  cities 
on  the  Atlantic  coast  and  on  the  lakes,  and  in  New  England.  The 
coal  duty  affects  those  localities  only.  In  New  England,  Northern 
New  York,  and  New- York  City,  foreign  coal  might  be  used  in  place 
of  the  American  anthracite,  if  no  duty  hindered. 

Coal  is  power.  A  vast  manufacturing  industry  of  New  England 
and  New  York  is  by  protection  compelled  to  depend  for  its  power 
upon  supplies  of  coal  from  Pennsylvania.  Anthracite-coal  owners 
in  the  State  of  Pennsylvania  tax  all  iron  manufacturing  in  the  Eastern 
States,  and  all  other  manufacturing  which  depends  upon  this  coal 
for  power.  They  are  not  slow  to  use  the  monopoly  thus  bestowed 
upon  them  by  the  aid  of  New-England  votes  in  Congress ;  and,  as 
long  as  they  can  persuade  Eastern  members  to  vote  for  protective 
duties,  so  long  will  Eastern  constituents  pay  tribute  to  Pennsylvania. 
Millions  of  them,  who  use  anthracite  for  fuel,  have  had  occasion 
within  the  last  year  to  thank  their  representatives  for  a  tariff  by 
which  the  cost  of  that  fuel  has  been  more  than  doubled.  With  them 
the  burden  and  the  remedy  might  be  left,  since  their  votes  contribute 
to  sustain  the  very  system  which  plunders  them,  were  it  not  instruc 
tive  to  see  how  a  monopoly  can  be  prolonged  without  benefit  to 
anybody.  For  the  anthracite  mining  is  really  a  monopoly,  controlled 
in  part  by  the  mining  companies,  and  in  part  by  the  combination  of 
miners  themselves.  Having  within  a  narrow  boundary  the  only 
considerable  deposit  of  anthracite  in  the  country,  they  control  the 
price  at  their  pleasure,  and  New  York  and  New  England,  from  which 
Nova-Scotia  coal  is  practically  excluded  by  the  tariff,  form  their 
principal  market. 

Early  in  the  year  1869  it  was  discovered,  by  no  means  for  the  first 
time,  that  the  supply  of  anthracite  coal  exceeded  the  demand.  When 
.the  same  thing  had  occurred  before,  the  mining  companies,  by  agree 
ing  among  themselves  to  stop  production,  or  by  getting  up  strikes 
I  among  their  men,  had  repeatedly  contrived  to  diminish  the  supply 
without  permitting  a  reduction  of  the  price.  In  1869,  the  miners, 
who  had  learned  the  lesson  thoroughly,  took  the  matter  into  their 
own  hands.  Out  of  thirty  thousand  men  employed  in  the  entire 
anthracite  region,  over  twenty-five  thousand  stopped  work.  The 
suspension  continued  for  months.  The  price  of  coal  rose  to  ten  dol 
lars  a  ton  in  New  York,  and  the  miners,  in  their  negotiation  with 
employers,  formally  demanded  that  it  should  be  agreed  that,  when- 


AKE  MONOPOLIES  BLESSINGS?  247 

ever  the  price  of  coal  should  fall  below  five  dollars  a  ton,  all  work 
should  cease.  Before  the  strike,  miners  were  paid  about  90  cents  a  car, 
or  45  cents  a  ton,  for  mining,  and  at  this  price  were  making  better 
wages  than  the  very  best  mechanics,  the  lowest  order  of  unskilled 
and  newly-imported  labor  in  the  mines  being  paid  $12  a  week. 
After  the  strike  the  miners  obtained  $2.39  a  car,  or  about  $1.20  per 
ton  for  mining,  and  laborers  received  as  much  as  $22  a  week.  The 
object  of  the  strike  was  to  secure,  first,  such  wages  as  these,  and 
second,  the  agreement  that  work  should  stop  whenever  the  price 
should  fall  so  low  as  to  make  it  impossible  to  pay  such  wages. 

It  is  easy  to  see  that,  if  the  consumption  is  not  checked,  the  price 
of  coal  can  be  kept  as  high  as  the  miners  please,  and  they  can  charge 
the  public,  if  they  like,  a  year's  wages  for  doing  only  a  day's  work, 
provided  all  competition  can  be  excluded.  But,  if  the  coal  of  Nova 
Scotia  were  admitted  free  of  duty,  these  monopolists  could  not  plun 
der  the  public  beyond  that  point  at  which  it  would  be  profitable  to 
import.  No  argument  is  needed  to  show  that  the  production  of 
wealth  is  retarded  by  this  combination  to  keep  up  prices,  and  by  the 
duty  which  makes  it  practicable.  The  direct  and  avowed  object  of 
the  combination  is  to  prevent  the  natural  increase  in  the  production 
of  coal,  and  to  compel  other  laborers  to  pay  an  unnatural  price  for 
their  fuel,  and  other  industries  an  unnatural  price  for  their  power. 
In  a  word,  this  is  the  protective  system  stripped  bare  of  all  disguises. 
Its  object  is  to  pay  men  for  a  wasteful  application  of  capital  and 
industry,  either  to  the  production  of  articles  which  can  be  more 
cheaply  imported,  or  to  the  production  by  methods  or  in  localities 
not  the  most  advantageous  and  economical ;  and  this  it  does  by  com 
pelling  other  industries  to  pay  the  favored  one  an  artificial  price  for 
its  product.  When  foreign  competition  is  naturally  excluded,  by 
cost  of  transportation,  from  a  large  part  of  the  country,  and  no  duty 
whatever  is  necessary,  the  effect  of  the  duty  is,  first,  to  plunder  that 
part  of  the  country  which  might  otherwise  supply  itself  more  cheaply ; 
and  second,  to  create  an  absolute  monopoly,  like  the  mining  of  an 
thracite,  with  power  to  impose  almost  any  tax  it  may  please,  and,  by 
stopping  production  from  time  to  time,  to  compel  the  consumer  to 
pay  more  and  not  less,  whenever  over-production  threatens  to  reduce 
the  price. 

Twenty-five  thousand  men  idle  for  four  months,  and  as  many  more 
idle  because  mills  and  factories  could  not  afford  to  buy  coal  at  $10  a 
ton — is  this  the  road  to  wealth  ?  It  is  an  absolute  waste  of  the  in 
dustry  of  two  hundred  thousand  men  for  a  month — of  one-sixth  of 


248  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

all  the  laborers  engaged  in  non-agricultural  production.  But  the 
same  stoppage  of  production,  to  keep  up  prices,  has  been  seen  dur 
ing  the  past  year  (1869),  in  the  cotton  and  woollen  manufacture,  and 
in  paper-making.  Suppose  a  law  should  require  that  one-third  of  all 
laborers  employed  in  manufacturing  should  lie  idle  every  month, 
taking  turns,  and  that  those  who  work  should  pay  the  expenses  of 
the  idle  third;  would  any  one  think  that  a  wise  and  economical  dis 
position  of  our  industrial  energies  ?  Precisely  the  same  in  kind,  if 
not  in  degree,  is  the  effect  of  any  law  which,  by  securing  artificial 
profits  to  any  industry,  prompts  more  persons  to  engage  therein  than 
the  demand  for  its  products  will  sustain,  and  enables  them,  by  re 
peated  seasons  of  idleness,  to  keep  up  prices  in  spite  of  the  excess 
of  production.  High  duties  invite,  in  certain  cases,  an  unnatural 
increase  of  the  manufacture.  Sometimes  the  result  is  a  prostration, 
such  as  the  paper  manufacture  has  recently  experienced.  Some 
times,  by  perfect  combination,  the  loss  by  wasteful  over-production  is 
thrown  upon  the  consumer,  as  in  the  case  of  coal,  and  the  country  then 
pays  three  men  for  doing  the  work  of  two.  The  protectionist,  when 
he  interferes  with  natural  laws,  can  never  know  with  certainty  which 
of  these  results  will  follow.  But  either  of  them  involves  a  waste  of 
energy,  capital,  and  labor — a  destruction  of  a  certain  share  of  the 
wealth-producing  power  of  the  country.  If  thirty  thousand  men, 
working  eight  months,  can  supply  all  the  anthracite  coal  we  need, 
twenty  thousand,  working  the  whole  year,  can  do  the  same  at  two- 
thirds  of  the  cost,  and  the  remaining  ten  thousand  ought  to  be  forced, 
by  natural  competition,  to  go  to  work  at  some  other  industry,  in  which 
they  could  contribute  to  the  national  prosperity.  But,  the  fact  is. 
that  the  consumption  is  checked  by  the  price.  The  work  of  thirty 
thousand,  full  time,  is  needed  to  give  other  industries  cheaper  power, 
so  that  the  thirty  thousand  and  all  other  laborers  may  have  cheaper 
tools  and  clothing.  And  each  man  of  them  would  get  as  much 
money  in  a  year,  with  coal  reduced  in  price  and  wages  also  reduced, 
as  he  now  receives,  working  only  two-thirds  of  a  year.  But  a  law  has 
created  a  monopoly,  and  the  miner  tries  to  use  it.  The  consequence 
is,  that  he  must  be  idle  one-third  of  the  time,  the  country  must  pay 
him  for  doing  nothing,  his  tools  and  clothing  become  more  costly, 
and  all  the  country  is  taxed  and  all  industry  embarrassed. 

The  manufacture  of  glass  employed  9,016  persons  in  1860, 
and  yielded  a  product  of  $8,775,155.  This  is  another  industry 
which  increased  about  100  per  cent,  in  the  last  decade  of  low 
duties ;  for  in  1850  the  number  of  hands  was  5,668,  and  the  prod- 


ARE  MONOPOLIES  BLESSINGS?  249 

uct  $4,641,766.  ''And  in  this  case  also  we  observe  a  less  rapid 
increase  in  the  previous  decade,  during  which  the  protective  tariff 
of  1842-'46  occurred.  For  in  1840  the  glass  manufacture  employed 
3,236  persons,  and  produced  to  the  value  of  $2,890,293.  The  history 
of  this  industry  shows  a  natural  and  steady  growth,  not  greatly 
affected  at  any  time  since  1820  by  foreign  competition.  In  1791  it 
had  hardly  found  a  footing ;  but  in  1810  Mr.  Gallatin  reported  that  the 
manufacture  was  firmly  established,  and  the  census  showed  a  produc 
tion  of  4,967,000  square  feet  of  window-glass,  while  only  27,000 
boxes  were  imported.  This  was  before  the  adoption  of  any  protec 
tive  tariff ;  thirty  years  afterward,  after  many  years  of  high  duties, 
the  value  of  the  entire  product  of  glass-works  was  less  than  three  mill 
ions,  while  the  value  of  the  window-glass  alone  produced  in  1810  was 
over  one  million.  The  manufacture  of  window-glass  and  bottles  for  or 
dinary  use  had  become,  as  Mr.  Dallas  stated  in  his  report  of  1816,  so 
firmly  and  permanently  established  as  to  wholly  or  almost  wholly 
supply  the  consumption ;  but  the  protective  theory  of  that  period 
seems  to  have  been  to  place  the  heaviest  duties  on  those  articles  the 
manufacture  of  which  least  needed  aid,  and  accordingly  heavy  spe 
cific  duties  were  placed  on  window-glass,  while  other  glass  was  ad 
mitted  at  a  revenue  duty  of  20  per  cent.  By  1818  it  is  mentioned 
that  the  New-England  Glass  Company  was  established,  which  made 
"  every  variety  of  fine,  plain,  and  the  richest  cut-glass  for  domestic 
supply  and  exportation  to  the  West  Indies  and  South  America ; " 
and  in  1823  ten  glass  establishments  had  been  started  in  New  York 
alone  since  1818.  The  prostration  of  1819  and  1820  severely  affected 
the  glass  manufacture  in  Pittsburg,  but  with  the  revival  of  business 
it  became  more  powerful  than  ever,  and  the  New-England  Com 
pany  was  in  1823  making  22,400  pounds  of  glass  a  week.  In  Pitts- 
burg  there  were,  in  1825,  seven  glass-works,  producing  27,000  boxes 
annually,  and  about  $100,000  worth  of  domestic  glass  was  then  ex 
ported.  In  1827  the  manufacture  of  stained  glass,  decanters,  white,  flint 
and  green  glass,  rivalling  any  foreign  glass  in  excellence,  is  mentioned, 
and  among  the  many  manufacturers  who  then  appealed  for  more  aid 
there  were  none  of  this  branch.  In  1829  the  manufacture  of  watch- 
crystals  by  two  establishments  is  mentioned,  and  in  1831  it  was  es 
timated  that  the  manufacture  employed  2,140  persons  and  yielded  a 
product  of  three  millions.  Whether  all  this  progress  was  due  to  the 
protective  duties  on  window-glass,  bottles,  phials,  and  cut-glass  im 
posed  in  1824  and  yet  in  force,  we  can  judge  from  certain  facts,  namely: 
the  manufacture  had  grown  prior  to  the  imposition  of  these  duties 


250  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

so  as  to  become  firmly  established  in  1816  ;  it  grew  rapidly  after  the 
prostration  in  1819,  and  before  the  duties  of  1824  were  imposed ; 
and,  when  those  duties  were  reduced  in  1832  by  the  compromise 
tariff,  the  price  of  American  glass  was  affected  very  slightly.  The 
tables  of  prices  at  the  close  of  this  chapter  show  that  the  price  per 
50  feet  had  been  absolutely  unchanged  during  the  whole  period  of 
protection  from  1824  to  1832,  namely,  $3.12,  which  shows  that  the 
manufacture,  sheltered  against  competition,  either  made  no  improve 
ments  or  suffered  no  improvement  to  diminish  the  cost  to  consumers. 
But  in  1834  the  price  fell  to  $2.75,  and  in  1836  to  $2.25  @  $2.37.  In 
that  year  the  importation  of  foreign  window-glass  was  only  $190,000 
— not  enough  to  interfere  with  the  manufacture  in  any  degree.  But 
this  competition  simply  proved  that  the  domestic  manufacturer  could 
afford  the  ordinary  qualities  cheaper  than  the  foreign  glass  could  be 
imported.  From  that  time  the  price  was  steadily  reduced  to  $1.87 
@  $2.67  in  1842,  and  to  $1.83  @  $2.62  in  1843,  according  to  the 
statement  of  Philadelphia  sales.  In  1840  the  importation  had  fallen 
to  $56,000,  and  was  almost  wholly  of  plate-glass. 

While  the  manufacture  of  window-glass,  by  far  the  most  im 
portant  branch  of  this  industry,  thus  proved  its  independence,  the 
domestic  manufacture  was  pushed  by  competition,  after  the  change 
of  tariff  in  1832,  to  that  invention  which  has  given  it  in  this  country 
a  peculiar  success.  In  1834  the  invention  of  pressed  glass  is  first 
mentioned  as  having  been  adopted  in  this  country,  and  it  caused  a 
complete  revolution  in  the  manufacture,  enabling  it  to  produce  a 
great  variety  of  articles  at.  prices  much  below  those  attained  by 
methods  formerly  in  use.  This  invention,  though  borrowed  from  us 
by  England,  helped  to  put  this  industry  beyond  the  reach  of  danger, 
and  the  importation  was  reduced  from  $618,107  in  1836  to  $360,847 
in  1840,  while  the  number  of  hands  employed  increased  from  2,140 
in  1831  to  3,236  in  1840.  With  such  an  increase  of  the  manufac 
ture,  and  importations  decreased  so  largely  in  spite  of  reduced 
duties,  and  so  trifling  in  comparison  with  the  domestic  production, 
this  industry  may  certainly  be  considered  in  little  need  of  the  pro 
tection  given  by  the  tariff  of  1842.  At  least,  that  tariff  did  not 
diminish  the  trifling  importation,  but  increased  it  to  $519,210  worth 
of  window  and  plate,  and  $167,019  of  other  glass  in  the  closing  year, 
1846.  It  is,  perhaps,  a  suggestive  fact  that  the  years  1845  and  1846 
are  the  only  ones,  prior  to  1860,  in  which  English  crown-glass  is 
quoted  in  the  tables  of  prices  published  in  the  Treasury  report  of 
1863.  In  those  years  English  glass  is  quoted  at  $3.50  to  $4,  and 


ARE  MONOPOLIES  BLESSINGS?  251 

American  glass,  which  before  the  tariff  had  sold  at  $1.87  @  $2.67, 
rose  in  1846  to  $2.06  @  $2.81,  according  to  the  Philadelphia  tables. 
But  after  the  expiration  of  that  tariff  the  price  fell  to  $1.65  @  $2.16. 
These  facts  appear  to  indicate  that  prices  of  American  glass  were  so 
high  in  1846  under  protection  that  the  English  glass  began  to  be 
considerably  imported.  For  ordinary  use,  however,  the  American 
glass  completely  excluded  the  foreign,  both  before  and  after  this 
protective  period,  and  the  importation  then  and  since  has  been 
mainly  of  the  finer  qualities  and  larger  sizes  of  plate  and  of  silvered 
glass.  In  1860  these  items  amounted  to  $1,630,000,  while  all  other 
imported  glass  was  valued  at  about  $500,000.  Importations  not 
greater  than  these  it  will  not  be  supposed  could  have  retarded  the 
manufacture,  and  it  has  been  shown  that  the  increase  during  the 
decade  of  low  duties  was  100  per  cent.  During  the  same  non-pro 
tective  period  we  increased  our  exports  of  glass  more  than  200  per 
cent. ;  from  $90,860  in  1846,  the  closing  year  of  protection,  to  $136,682 
in  1850,  and  $277,948  in  1860. 

The  high  protective  duties  recently  imposed  have  not  prevented 
an  importation  of  glass  nearly  double  that  of  1860.  For  in  that 
year  the  value  of  glass  imported  was  $2,175,000,  and  in  1869  it  was 
$4,194,881.  No  facts  are  accessible  to  the  writer  which  indicate 
that  the  domestic  manufacture  has  grown  with  equal  rapidity, 
though  it  has  been  much  extended.  Several  times,  within  the  past 
few  years,  the  price  has  been  put  up,  strikes  of  workmen  being 
alleged  as  the  cause,  and  recently  the  workmen  seem  to  have 
learned,  like  the  coal-miners,  to  manage  the  matter  for  themselves, 
and  the  rates  now  paid  are  extravagantly  high.  Meanwhile  the  im 
portation  has  increased  most  largely  of  those  very  qualities  which 
we  long  ago  demonstrated  our  ability  to  exclude  by  domestic  pro 
duction.  In  1868  the  cast  polished  plate  imported,  silvered  or  not, 
amounted  to  $712,608.  But  the  "  cylinder,  crown  or  common  win 
dow  glass  "  was  imported  to  the  value  of  $1,238,239.  Of  this  quality 
there  was  imported  in  1860  only  18,827,897  square  feet,  and  in 
1868  not  less  than  29,325,991  pounds  !  The  importation  of  1869  was 
very  much  larger ;  in  seven  months  in  1868  the  quantity  imported  was 
less  than  15,000,000  pounds,  and  in  the  same  seven  months  in  1869  the 
quantity  wa*s  24,301,262  pounds.  How  much  longer  must  this  "  pro 
tection  "  continue,  before  it  brings  into  absolute  peril  that  very  manu 
facture  of  window-glass  which,  far  back  in  1810,  was  officially  de 
clared  to  be  permanently  established,  and  which  under  the  low  duties 
in  1840  had  excluded  all  foreign  window-glass  except  to  the  value  of 


252 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


$56,746  ?  Truly,  if  this  is  the  effect  of  protection  as  compared  with 
non-protection,  the  glass  manufacture  may  well  pray  to  be  pro 
tected  against  its  protectors ! 

PRICE  OF  WINDOW-GLASS. 

From  1835  to  1849,  at  Philadelphia. — (Statement  by  Hay  and  Coffin,  Treasury  Re 
port,  1849.) 


YEARS. 

8x10. 

10  x  12. 

10  x  14. 

18  x  18. 

YEARS. 

8  x  10, 

10  x  12. 

10  x  14. 

1«  x  18. 

18:35  

$2  37 

$2  37 

$3  09 

$3  56 

1843. 

$1  83 

$1  92 

$2  36 

$2  62 

1836  

2  49 

2  49 

3  09 

3  56 

1844 

1  80 

1  90 

2  30 

2  57 

1837  
1838  
1839  

2  36 
2  23 
2  22 

2  48 
2  46 
2  35 

2  93 
2  90 

2  87 

3  37 
3  35 
3  19 

1845. 
1846. 

1847 

1  70 
2  06 
1  92 

1  79 
2  25 
2  10 

2  19 
2  44 
2  28 

2  44 
2  81 
2  63 

1840  ,. 
1841  

2  23 
2  05 

2  35 
2  26 

2  87 
2  76 

3  19 
3  07 

1848. 
1849. 

1  79 
1  65 

1  95 
1  80 

2  11 
1  87 

2  44 
2  16 

1842  

1  87 

1  96 

2  40 

2  67 

PRICE   OF  AMERICAN  GLASS  AT  NEW  YORK. 
From  Treasury  Report,  1 863. 


YEARS. 


1825 

1826 

1827 

1828 

1829 

1830 

1831 

1832 

1833 

1834 

1835... 


1837. 


Per  Box. 


12 

19@3  25 

12 

12 

12 

12 

12 

12 

12 

75@3  00 

25@2  37 


YEAR. 


1838.. 
1839.. 
1840.. 
1841.. 
1842.. 
1843.. 
1844.. 
1845*. 

1846* 

1847 

1848 

1849 

1850... 


$2  75@,3  00 


YEAR. 


1851 

1852 

1853 

1854 

1855 

1856 

1857 

1858... 


1861.. 


1863 


Per  Boz. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 


THE    SALT    MANUFACTURE. 

LONG  ago,  when  Albany  was  a  frontier  town,  the  Indians  used 
to  bring  salt  from  Onondaga  to  Albany  with  their  furs.  The  manu 
facture  which  these  savages  were  able  to  continue,  though  having  to 
carry  their  product  hundreds  of  miles  on  foot,  now  demands  a  duty 
of  130  per  cent,  to  keep  it  alive ! 

In  1629,  the  fishermen  of  Cape  Cod  brought  back  from  the  sea 
shore  good  salt,  spontaneously  produced  by  the  evaporation  of  the 

*  For  these  two  years  the  Treasury  table  gives  no  quotation  of  American  glass, 
but  gives  "  English  crown  "  instead. 


THE  SALT  MANUFACTURE.  253 

water  left  upon  marshes  and  rocks.  Then  it  was  first  learned  that 
our  warmth  and  dryness  of  climate  are  peculiarly  adapted  to  the 
manufacture  of  salt.  But  the  work  which  the  sun  did  spontaneously 
for  the  fishermen  of  1648 — of  whom  Plantagenet  writes  that  "  with 
out  boiling,  only  in  pans  with  the  sun,  each  laborer  may  make  six 
bushels  a  day  " — that  work  their  descendants  cannot  do  without  a 
duty  of  130  per  cent,  to  protect  them  ! 

In  1787,  the  Oneida  Indians  ceded  to  New  York  the  Onondaga 
salt-lands,  and  in  1797  the  State  first  legislated  on  the  subject ;  and 
the  product  of  the  springs  was  25,474  bushels.  Sixty  miles  west 
ward,  this  salt  could  then  be  sold  for  half  a  dollar  a  bushel,  or  $2.50 
a  barrel;  in  1867,  its  price  at  Syracuse  was  $2.35  per  barrel,  and  at 
Buffalo,  82.50;  but  in  New- York  City  the  patriotic  owners,  after 
paying  37J  cents  a  barrel  for  transportation,  could  afford  to  sell  it 
for  $1.75,  and  in  Canada  they  are  selling  it  even  now  at  $1.35  a 
barrel,  in  gold. 

These  wells  yield  a  bushel  of  salt  for  every  30  to  50  gallons  of 
brine  evaporated,  and  the  actual  cost  per  bushel  in  1858  was  not 
more  than  6  cents.  If  the  cost  was  doubled  in  1867  —  and  it 
was  not — the  Onondaga  Company  realized  on  every  barrel  of  five 
bushels,  costing  60  cents,  a  profit  of  $1.75,  at  the  Syracuse  price — 
not  quite  300  per  cent.  An  industry  so  needy  and  deserving  as  this 
surely  should  be  carefully  protected  by  every  statesman  ! 

In  the  War  of  1812,  the  salt-wells  on  the  Alleghany  were  opened, 
and  before  the  close  of  the  century  salt  was  made  and  sold  at  mod 
erate  prices  in  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  on  the  Illinois  and  Wabash,  and 
west  of  the  Mississippi ;  and  the  Wabash  salines  had  been  used  for 
more  than  half  a  century  by  the  Indians  for  the  manufacture  of  salt, 
before  the  Americans  came  into  possession.  In  1809  these  supplied 
130,000  bushels  of  salt,  and  many  other  works  at  the  West  so  reduced 
the  price  that  during  the  war  with  England  salt  averaged  only  87J 
cents  a  bushel  at  the  West,  while  worth  from  three  to  six  dollars  at 
the  seaboard.  Yet  Mr.  Greeley  thinks  we  must  put  on  high  duties 
to  prevent  the  West  being  forced  to  pay  too  large  prices.  There 
are  a  great  many  people  at  the  West,  at  this  moment,  who  would  be 
pleased  to  get  foreign  salt  at  the  cost  of  importation,  so  remorseless 
have  the  monopolists  learned  to  be  under  protective  duties. 

In  1789  Congress  imposed  a  duty  of  six  cents  a  bushel,  and  in 

1790  we  imported  2,337,920  bushels.     But,  finding  that  a  then  far 

more   important  industry  would   suffer   in   consequence,   Congress 

authorized  a  drawback  on  salt  intended  for  the  fisheries,  and,  when 

18 


254  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

the  duty  was  increased  in  1797  to  20  cents  a  bushel,  an  increased 
drawback  was  authorized.  But,  in  1806,  convinced  that  the  whole 
duty  was  onerous  and  worse  than  useless,  Congress  repealed  it,  in 
spite  of  protests.  The  product  of  the  Onondaga  salt-works  in  this 
year  was  165,448  bushels,  and  by  1809,  or  within  three  years  after 
the  duty  was  repealed,  it  had  increased  to  300,000  bushels.  The 
importation  was  neither  materially  increased  nor  diminished,  but  for 
six  years  ending  1807  had  averaged  about  3,000,000  bushels,  exclu 
sive  of  the  quantity  used  in  fishery  and  for  exported  meats.  During 
the  next  ten  years  after  the  repeal  of  the  duty,  extensive  works  were 
erected,  and  the  domestic  production  greatly  increased.  By  1810, 
works  in  North  Carolina,  covering  275,000  square  feet,  had  been 
erected,  and  the  Western  States  supplied  about  300,000  bushels.  The 
census  of  1810  reported  62  salt-works,  producing  1,238,365  bushels. 
During  the  war  our  foreign  trade  was  greatly  interrupted,  first 
by  hostilities,  and  second  by  another  blessing — in  the  estimation  of 
protectionists — enormous  duties.  A  duty  of  20  cents  a  bushel  on 
salt,  with  the  interruption  of  trade,  caused  the  price  to  rise,  in  1814, 
at  New  York,  to  $3  a  bushel.  The  production  was  rapidly  increased, 
but  could  not  supply  the  demand,  and  in  spite  of  the  duty,  after  hos 
tilities  ceased,  imports  became  larger  than  ever.  In  1826  it  was 
stated,  in  documents  laid  before  the  Senate,  that  the  quantity  of  salt 
made  in  the  United  States  was  4,113,000  bushels.  If  this  estimate 
be  accepted  as  correct,  it  enables  us  to  make  a  comparison  of  do 
mestic  production  with  imports.  For  in  that  year,  notwithstanding 
the  duty  of  180  per  cent,  on  the  first  cost,  the  imports  of  salt  for  con 
sumption  were  4,534,040  bushels ;  total  consumption,  8,647,000  bush 
els,  of  which  47  per  cent,  was  of  domestic  production.  At  that  time 
the  price  was  50  cents  in  New  York,  although  Turk's  Island  salt 
cost  at  the  island  eleven  cents,  and  New- York  salt  was  not  claimed 
to  cost  the  producer  more  than  20  cents.  In  1829,  three  years  after, 
a  report  to  the  New- York  Legislature  recommended  a  bounty,  in  addi 
tion  to  the  enormous  duties,  to  still  further  stimulate  this  needy  manu 
facture.  Yet  this  same  report  admitted  that  salt  was  made  at  the  works 
at  a  cost  of  12J  cents  a  bushel  with  fair  profit  to  the  makers,  though 
it  sold  in  New- York  City  at  about  50  cents.  Meanwhile  the  cost  of 
Turk's  Island  salt  had  been  somewhat  reduced,  and  the  importations 
had  increased  to  5,945,547  bushels,  while  the  domestic  production 
had  increased  to  4,444,929  bushels.  Thus,  in  three  years,  the  pro 
portion  of  domestic  salt  to  the  whole  consumption  fell  from  47  per 
cent,  in  1826,  to  44  per  cent,  in  1829. 


THE  SALT   MANUFACTURE.  255 

Very  sensibly,  Congress  reduced  the  duty  to  15  cents  in  1830, 
and  to  10  cents  after  that  year,  but  in  1831  a  committee  reported  that 
the  poor  manufacturer  would  be  ruined  unless  the  duty  was  restored. 
The  same  report  stated  that  the  average  price  at  the  West  was  then 
62J  cents  a  bushel,  and  yet  the  manufacturer  who  could  produce  at 
a  cost  of  12  J  cents  a  bushel  could  not  live !  Under  the  reduction  of 
duty  the  price  fell  in  1831  to  42  cents  in  New  York,  and  to  38  cents 
in  1833.  In  that  year  Baltimore  merchants  petitioned  for  a  further 
reduction  of  duty,  stating  that  a  factory  in  Maine  was  able  to  sell 
rock-salt  at  25  cents  a  bushel,  and  cleared  $100,000  a  year.  But, 
although  the  manufacturers  had  declared  that  they  would  be  ruined 
by  the  reduction  of  duty,  it  appears  that  the  product  of  New  York 
State  increased  from  one  million  bushels  in  1829,  to  2,209,867  in 
1834 — a  gain  of  more  than  120  per  cent,  in  five  years.  Thencefor 
ward,  with  duties  reduced  under  the  compromise  act  to  almost  noth 
ing,  the  manufacture  rapidly  increased,  so  that  in  1840  the  domestic 
production  was  6,179,174  bushels,  while  the  price  at  New  York  fell 
to  32  cents  in  1840,  and  to  26  cents  in  1841.  But  the  admission  of 
foreign  salt  at  lower  duty  did  not  materially  increase  the  importa 
tion,  for  in  1829  the  quantity  imported  was  5,945,547  bushels,  and 
in  1842  it  was  6,127,439  bushels ;  in  1834  the  value  of  salt  imported 
.was  $839,315,  and  in  1842  it  was  $841,572. 

Contrast  now  the  two  periods,  protective  ending  in  1830,  and 
non-protective  ending  in  1840.  The  protective  period  held  up  the 
price  of  salt  to  50  cents,  though  it  actually  cost  only  12J  cents,  and 
increased  production  from  4,010,569  bushels  in  1820,  to  4,444,929 
bushels  in  1830 — an  increase  of  10  per  cent,  in  ten  years.  Mean 
while,  the  importation  of  salt  had  increased  from  4,200,000  bushels 
to  5,945,547  bushels,  or  42  per  cent.  But  the  non-protective  period 
lowered  the  price  of  salt  from  50  to  30  cents,  increased  domestic  pro 
duction  from  4,444,929  bushels  to  6,179,174  bushels,  or  42  per  cent, 
in  ten  years,  while  the  importation  increased  scarcely  any.  Is  it  not 
plain  that  the  non-protective  period,  increasing  the  production  of  salt 
40  per  cent.,  and  lowering  the  price  to  consumers  40  per  cent,  with 
out  increasing  imports,  was  really  of  greater  benefit  to  the  country 
at  large,  and  more  truly  beneficial  to  the  salt  manufacture  itself,  than 
the  protective  period,  which  increased  production  10  per  cent.,  kept 
up  the  price,  and  permitted  an  increase  of  imports  of  40  per  cent.  ? 

This  contrast  ought  to  be  forced  upon  the  attention  of  every  man 
who  claims  that  high  duties  must  reduce  prices,  and  at  the  same 
time  check  imports,  and  increase  domestic  production.  The  same 


256  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

principles  which  govern  one  branch  of  industry,  also  govern  others. 
If  these  theories,  the  pet  arguments  of  those  who  defend  monopoly, 
are  conclusively  proved  to  be  false  in  one  case,  they  are  unworthy 
of  reliance  in  every  case. 

The  tariff  of  1842  imposed  a  duty  of  about  75  per  cent,  on  for 
eign  salt,  and  the  domestic  production  increased  from  6,100,000  in 
1840  to  6,500,000  in  1845.  (The  production  in  1846  the  writer  has 
been  unable  to  ascertain.)  But  in  the  same  time  the  value  of  im 
ports  had  increased  from  $841,572  in  1842  to  $911,512  in  1844,  and 
$898,663  in  1845,  and  the  quantity  of  salt  imported  from  6,127,439 
bushels  to  8,543,527  bushels  in  1845. 

The  tariff  of  1846  reduced  the  duty  to  about  two  cents  a  bushel, 
and  the  production  of  salt  at  once  rose  from  6,500,000  in  1845  to 
9,763,849  bushels  in  1850,  a  gain  of  50  per  cent,  in  five  years.  Yet 
salt  sold  for  35  cents  in  New  York,  in  1845,  and  for  40  cents  in 
1846,  and  it  fell  in  1850  to  21  cents.  Here  was  a  gain  of  50  per 
cent,  in  the  quantity  manufactured,  and  a  gain  of  nearly  50  per  cent, 
in  the  cost  to  the  consumer.  During  the  same  time,  imports  had  in 
creased  only  to  11,224,185  bushels — barely  30  per  cent. 

Here  is  the  same  contrast  again.  Protection  increased  the  do 
mestic  production  6  per  cent.,  at  a  cost  of  5  to  10  cents  a  bushel, 
imports  meanwhile  increasing  40  per  cent.  Non-protection  in 
creased  domestic  production  50  per  cent.,  and  lowered  the  price 
14  to  19  cents,  imports  meanwhile  increasing  30  per  cent.  The  two 
periods  were  each  of  five  years,  and  each  began  with  a  year  of  con 
trary  character — the  protective  period  with  the  year  1841,  non-pro 
tective  ;  and  the  non-protective  period  with  the  year  1846,  protective. 
Is  it  not  time  for  some  advocate  of  high  duties  to  reconcile  these 
oft-recurring  contrasts,  so  striking  and  so  impressive,  with  the  theories 
upon  which  all  protective  tariffs  are  based  ?  Does  it  seem  strange 
that  high  duties  check  production  ?  It  is  not  strange  at  all.  They 
create  a  monopoly,  increase  the  cost  of  production,  keep  up  prices, 
and  pay  people  for  adhering  to  wasteful  methods.  Meanwhile, 
prices  elsewhere  being  reduced,  partly  because  our  duties  force  for 
eigners  to  cheaper  production  or  smaller  profits,  importations  in 
crease  more  rapidly  than  domestic  production.  But  low  duties  and 
low  prices  increase  consumption,  invite  competition,  and  compel  our 
industry  to  strengthen  itself  against  that  of  other  countries  by  better 
methods  or  development  of  greater  natural  advantages. 

The  duty  on  salt  was  reduced  still  further,  to  1  £  cents  a  bushel, 
by  the  tariff  of  1857,  and  the  production  of  salt,  during  this  entire 


THE  SALT  MANUFACTURE.  257 

period  of  low  tariff,  increased  more  rapidly  than  population.  It  is 
noteworthy  that  this  increase  was  not  only  in  that  locality  which 
has  the  greatest  natural  resources  then  developed.  The  New  York 
product  increased  from  3,838,851  bushels  in  1846,  to  7,521,335  bush 
els  in  1860 — a  gain  of  about  100  per  cent.  But  the  product  of  the 
whole  country  increased  from  6,500,000  to  12,717,200  bushels— a 
nearly  equal  gain.  The  average  value  of  the  product  for  the  whole 
country  was  about  18  cents  a  bushel  in  1860,  and  that  of  New  York 
about  17  cents.  In  1846  salt  sold  in  New  York  for  40  cents,  and  in 
1850  for  21 ;  it  rose  during  the  years  1853,  1854,  and  1855,  but  fell 
again  to  26  cents  in  1856,  to  20  cents  in  1857,  to  16  cents  in  1858, 
and  was  sold  at  17  in  1859  and  1860,  and  as  low  as  15  in  1861. 
Under  these  low  prices  the  consumption  rose  enormously,  and  while 
Great  Britain  consumed  only  25  pounds  of  salt  per  capita,  and 
France  only  21-J-  pounds,  our  whole  consumption  in  this  country  in 
1860  was  26,811,427  bushels,  or  nearly  a  bushel  per  capita,  and  our 
domestic  product  alone  was  22^  pounds  per  capita,  or  more  than  the 
whole  consumption  of  France.  Thus  do  low  duties  stimulate  con 
sumption,  create  an  enormous  demand,  and  consequently  invite  and 
sustain  a  great  increase  of  the  producing  industry. 

Because  this  manufacture  had  not  absolutely  excluded  foreign 
salt,  and  though  it  had  grown  in  New  York  and  in  the  whole  country 
100  per  cent,  under  low  duties,  there  was  still  more  salt  imported 
than  was  produced,  our  legislators  imposed  duties  designed  to  be 
prohibitory.  By  records  of  actual  importations,  Mr.  Wells  has 
proved  that  these  duties  range  from  115  to  170  per  cent  on  the  cost 
of  the  article.  The  price  in  other  countries  has  not  yet  been  so 
much  reduced  as  to  entirely  overcome  this  obstacle,  and  the  impor 
tations  for  1868  were  636,041,262  pounds,  or,  at  56  pounds  to  the 
bushel,  about  11,358,000  bushels— a  reduction  of  2,700,000  bushels. 
The  quantity  actually  produced  in  the  country  is  not  known  to  the 
writer,  but  the  price  is  so  largely  increased  that  it  may  well  be  sup 
posed  that  consumption  has  been  checked.  The  same  salt  which 
sold  as  low  as  15  cents  in  1861,  and  17  eents  in  1860,  at  New  York, 
now  sells  at  48  to  50  cents,  while  Onondaga  salt  sells  at  Buffalo  at 
$2.45  a  barrel ;  salt  made  on  the  Ohio  River  sells  at  Cincinnati  for 
46  to  48  cents,  and  the  price  at  New  Orleans  is  about  50  cents. 

If  we  have  increased  the  domestic  production  of  salt,  we  have 
done  it  at  the  expense  of  an  increase  of  price  from  17  cents  in  1860 
to  37  cents  (gold)  in  1868-'69,  so  that,  if  consumption  is  as  large  in 
proportion  to  population  as  it  then  was,  we  are  paying  a  tax  of 


258  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

seven  millions  and  a  quarter  in  gold,  in  increased  cost  of  the  salt 
which  we  use,  and  of  that  tax  precisely  $1,136,225.76  is  paid  to  the 
government.  Over  six  millions  a  year  in  gold  is  paid  in  the  shape 
of  bounty,  and  those  who  wish  to  know  where  it  has  gone,  may  read 
the  testimony  of  the  secretary  of  the  Onondaga  monopoly,  who 
states  that  the  company  has  increased  stock  worth  $160,000  in  1860 
to  not  less  than  $4,498,969  in  1867.  The  letter  of  Duncan  Stewart, 
president  of  the  Saginaw  Salt  Association,  who  declares  "  the  pres 
ent  high  tariff  simply  an  outrage  on  the  best  interests  of  the  coun 
try,"  and  the  pertinent  facts  presented  by  Mr.  Wells  in  his  reports, 
must  surely  convince  any  man  that  the  protective  duty  on  salt  is  not 
now  necessary  for  the  support  of  that  industry ;  and  the  facts  here 
given  prove  that  it  never  has  been  of  any  service,  but  has  simply 
retarded  the  growth  of  this  manufacture.  Let  the  facts  be  remem 
bered  : 

Protection.  Product  to 

consumption 
YEAR.          Domestic  product.  Imported.  Consumed.         per  cent. 

1820 $4,010,569  $4,200,000  $8,210,569  48 

1826 4,113,000  4,534,040  8,647,040  47 

1829 4,444,929  5,945,547  10,390,476  44 

Average  price,  50  cents  a  bushel. 

Increase  of  product,  10  per  cent. 

Increase  of  imports,  42  per  cent. 

Non-pro  tection. 

1842 $6,179,174*  $6,127,439  $12,306,613  50 

Price  reduced  from  50  to  30  cents. 
Increase  of  product,  40  per  cent. 
Increase  of  imports,  3  per  cent. 

,  Protection. 

1845 $6,500,000  $8,543,527  $15,043,527  43 

Price  increased  to  35  and  40  cents. 
Increase  of  production,  6  per  cent. 
Increase  of  imports,  40  per  cent. 

Non-protection. 

1850 $9,763,849  $11,224,185  $20,988,034  46£ 

1860 12,717,200  14,094,227  26,811,427  47£ 

Price  reduced  to  17  cents. 

Increase  of  production,  95  per  cent. 

Increase  of  imports,  65  per  cent. 

*  The  product  of  1840  is  given  instead  of  that  of  1842,  which  is  not  known,  but 
supposed  to  be  at  least  as  great.  The  figures  for  1846,  the  last  year  of  the  second 
protective  period,  are  not  known  to  the  writer. 


THE  SALT  MANUFACTURE.  259 

Readers  will  ask  with  surprise  two  questions :  "  How  does  it  come 
to  pass  that  any  American  Congressman  can  suppose  a  duty  on  salt 
necessary  or  useful  for  protection  ?  "  "  How  does  it  happen  that 
duties  of  more  than  100  per  cent,  have  not  checked  the  importation 
of  this  article?"  The  first  question  can  be  answered  only  by 
Congress  itself.  The  second  is  within  the  understanding  of  the 
ordinary  human  intellect. 

Twenty-five  years  ago  it  was  declared  that  "  provisions  packed 
with  ordinary  domestic  salt  suffer  a  depreciation  in  value,  not  only 
in  foreign  but  in  our  own  markets."  There  is  a  chemical  difference 
between  the  salt  spontaneously  produced  under  a  tropical  sun  and 
any  which  has  yet  been  manufactured  by  any  process,  dear  or  cheap, 
in  more  northern  latitudes,  and  the  salt  of  the  West  Indies  is  there 
fore  superior  for  use  in  packing  meats,  fish,  and  provisions,  to 
any  which  this  country  produces.  When  we  import  Turk's 
Island  salt,  we  are  importing  so  much  tropical  sunlight,  as  the  raw 
material  of  our  packing  industry — and  the  attempt  to  shut  it  out  is 
simply  an  endeavor  to  deny  to  our  provision-packers  the  benefit  of 
that  tropical  sunlight,  and  to  "  light  the  world  with  gas  ! " 

No  wonder  it  is  impossible  to  exclude  this  necessary  material  of 
an  industry  so  important !  In  1860  the  packing  of  provisions  em 
ployed  7,479  persons,  and  yielded  a  product  of  over  $31,000,000.  The 
salt  manufacture  employed  2,213  persons,  and  yielded  a  product  of 
two  millions  and  a  quarter.  But  under  the  name  of  protecting 
American  industry  we  are  taxing,  prostrating,  and  driving  out  of  the 
country,  an  industry  worth  thirty  millions  a  year,  in  a  futile  attempt 
to  help,  which  in  fact  only  injures,  an  industry  worth  two  millions  a 
year !  The  number  of  hogs  packed  at  the  West,  under  the  protec 
tive  tariff,  when  salt  cost  from  30  to  40  cents  a  bushel,  was  1,079,082 
in  1844,  781,372  in  1845,  and  1,087,862  in  1846 ;  but  when  the  duty 
was  reduced  to  20  per  cent.,  and  the  cost  of  salt  to  21  to  24  cents 
in  1850,  the  number  of  hogs  packed  increased  to  1,652,220,  to 
2,201,116  in  1853,  and  2,350,822  in  1860,  when  salt  cost  18  cents. 
In  this  industry  there  was  an  increase  under  low  duties,  from  1846 
to  1860,  of  more  than  120  per  cent.,  and,  were  statistics  acces 
sible,  it  would  probably  appear  that  the  whole  packing  business  of 
the  country  increased,  if  not  quite  as  largely,  at  least  more  largely 
than  the  importation  of  foreign  salt.  When  this  industry  is  re 
tarded,  a  part  of  the  loss  falls  upon  the  farmer.  In  1826,  when  the 
duty  on  salt  was  20  cents,  and  salt  cost  over  50  cents  in  New  York, 
the  price  of  hogs  in  Cincinnati  was  $2  per  cwt.  In  1835,  when 


260  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

the  duty  was  about  seven  cents,  and  salt  sold  in  New  York  from  30 
to  40  cents,  the  price  of  hogs  in  Cincinnati  was  $3.12  per  cwt.  In 
1846,  when  the  duty  was  eight  cents  a  bushel,  and  the  cost  of  salt 
about  the  same  as  in  1835,  the  price  of  hogs  was  $3  per  cwt.  But, 
after  the  reduction  of  the  duty  to  20  per  cent.,  the  price  of  salt  fell 
to  20  cents  in  1852,  and  26  cents  in  1853,  and  to  17  to  18  cents  in 
1859-'60,  and  the  price  of  hogs  at  Cincinnati  rose  to  $4  per  cwt.  in 
1853,  and  to  $6.21  in  1860. 

Two  facts  prove  at  once  the  uselessness  of  the  present  duty  for 
protection,  and  the  evil  effect  of  that  duty  upon  other  industries. 
From  Mr.  "Wells's  report  it  appears  that  the  salt  company  in  New 
York  not  only  can,  but  actually  does,  send  the  salt  to  New  England 
seaport  towns,  and  there  sell  it  to  the  fishermen,  who  are  by  law 
privileged  to  use  foreign  salt  free  of  duty,  at  as  low  a  rate  as  that 
foreign  salt  can  thus  be  obtained.  At  the  same  time,  we  annually 
export  to  the  British  possessions  over  half  a  million  bushels  of 
American  salt,  which  can  there  be  sold  at  lower  rates  than  foreign 
salt  can  be  obtained.  The  Toronto  Globe  states  that  the  Onondaga 
Salt  Company  (December,  1869)  are  offering  salt  in  that  city  at  $1.35  a 
barrel,  and  at  the  same  time  the  very  same  salt  cannot  be  bought  on 
this  side  of  Lake  Ontario  for  less  than  $2.45,  currency,  or  $1.94, 
gold.  Nothing  can  more  forcibly  illustrate  the  character  of  the 
shameless  and  soulless  monopoly,  built  up  and  sustained  by  the  pro 
tective  duty,  than  these  facts.  The  company  can  afford  to  sell,  and 
actually  do  sell,  their  salt  in  Toronto,  after  paying  the  cost  of  trans 
portation  to  and  across  the  lake,  at  27  cents  a  bushel,  and  as  trans 
portation  costs  probably  10  cents  a  bushel,  they  make  a  satisfactory 
profit,  even  now  selling  their  salt  for  17  cents — just  what  it  was 
worth  in  1861.  But  on  this  side  of  the  lake,  having  a  comfortable 
monopoly,  they  refuse  to  sell  for  less  than  $1.94,  gold,  a  barrel,  or 
about  39  cents  in  gold  a  bushel.  With  satisfactory  profit  at  17 
cents,  they  are  permitted,  under  the  name  of  "  protection  to  Amer- 
can  industry,"  to  force  every  American  wool-grower  to  pay  22  cents 
more  in  gold — $1.10  gold,  or  $1.43  currency  per  hundred  sheep — for 
his  salt ;  to  force  every  American  pork-packer  to  pay  $110,  gold,  or 
$143,  currency,  more  than  a  fair  price  for  every  hundred  barrels  of  salt 
used ;  to  force  the  whole  people  to  pay,  upon  perhaps  35,000,000 
bushels  consumed,  not  less  than  $7,250,000  in  gold,  or  over  $9,000,000 
in  currency,  more  than  their  salt  actually  costs.  The  duty  robs  the 
whole  people.  It  plunders  the  farmer  and  the  provision-packer.  It 
does  not  even  increase  the  production  of  salt,  but,  as  statistics  have 


THE  SALT  MANUFACTURE.  261 

proved,  only  retards  the  growth  of  that  industry,  and  places  it  at  a 
disadvantage  compared  with  foreign  competition.  Whom,  then, 
does  it  benefit  ?  The  salt  monopolists.  The  men  who  have  been 
able  to  realize  a  profit  of  $4,338,969  in  seven  years  on  an  invest 
ment  of  $160,000. 

This  same  duty  is  driving  a  more  important  manufacture  to 
Canada.  The  Toronto  Globe,  already  quoted,  shows  that  American 
beef  and  pork  can  be  packed  more  cheaply  in  that  country,  with 
foreign  or  even  with  American  salt,  than  in  this  country  within  the 
clutches  of  the  monopoly.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  therefore,  seventeen 
millions  of  pounds  of  salt  passed  across  this  country  in  bond,  im 
ported  and  then  exported,  in  1868,  to  supply  packing-establishments 
in  another  land  where  industry  is  not  so  marvellously  benefited  by 
legislation.  Large  packing-establishments  have  already  been  re 
moved  to  Canada,  and  American  beef  and  pork,  there  put  up, 
already  are  exported  from  Canada  to  Liverpool.  In  1860  there 
were  2,350,822  hogs  packed  at  the  West ;  in  1868-'69,  for  a  popula 
tion  increased  from  thirty-one  to  thirty-eight  millions,  there  were 
packed  only  2,781,084  hogs,  and  the  statistics  thus  far  published  in 
dicate  that  the  number  for  the  season  1869-'70  will  be  still  smaller. 
Thus,  to  enrich  a  monopoly,  we  retard  the  salt  industry,  worth 
$2,500,000  yearly,  tax  the  wool  industry,  rob  the  people  of  ten 
million  dollars,  and  drive  the  packing  industry,  worth  over  thirty 
millions  yearly,  to  cross  the  border.  How  long  shall  we  do  this 
thing,  and  call  it  "  protecting  American  industry  ?  " 


262 


DOES  PEOTECTION  PROTECT? 


PRICE  OF  TURK'S   ISLAND  SALT   AT  NEW  YORK. 
From  Report  of  Secretary  of  the  Treasury ',  1863. 


YEAR. 

Jan. 

Feb. 

March. 

April. 

May. 

June. 

July. 

August. 

Sept. 

Oct. 

Nov. 

Dec. 

1825 

48 

48 

49 

51 

52 

53 

50 

51 

50 

53 

56 

58 

1826    .  . 

53 

50 

50 

50 

53 

50 

52 

49 

48 

48 

49 

49 

1827 

50 

50 

54 

60 

62 

62 

55 

58 

58 

58 

1828 

53 

50 

50 

48 

48 

48 

47 

46 

48 

52 

53 

1829  
1830  

47 
45 

45 

45 

48 
40 

48 
44 

51 
46 

51 
48 

51 
45 

47 
45 

48 
45 

50 

49 
56 

45 
55 

1831  

1832 

45 

42 

42 

45 
46 

47 
50 

50 
50 

54 
45 

48 
48 

49 
48 

52 
46 

56 
53 

62 
53 

51 

1833  
1834  

45 

38 

41 
35 

40 
36 

46 
40 

42 

38 
40 

44 
38 

46 
38 

46 
38 

50 
38 

45 
42 

42 
37 

1835 

32 

30 

35 

37 

40 

40 

35 

35 

35 

35 

41 

35 

1836 

84 

32 

32 

35 

40 

40 

38 

38 

38 

37 

41 

45 

1837 

40 

40 

40 

43 

40 

31 

33 

34 

35 

40 

41 

37 

1838 

35 

35 

35 

35 

38 

33 

42 

41 

38 

45 

48 

47 

1839  

35 

35 

35 

41 

41 

38 

37 

38 

40 

36 

32 

1840   

33 

36 

34 

34 

34 

35 

35 

1841 

30 

31 

32 

30 

31 

30 

29 

26 

27 

28 

1842 

1843  

28 

22 

25 

27 

31 

si 

29 

26 

24 

26 

31 

30 

1844 

1845 

24 

26 

26 

25 

24 

27 

30 

33 

35 

1846  

28 

20 

45 

40 

25 

29 

28 

28 

29 

32 

31 

32 

1847  
1848  
1849  
1850  

25 
26 
21 
23 

24 

25 
24 

34 

27 

31 

26 

21 

28 
25 
29 

30 
25 
25 
22 

32 
23 
22 
24 

30 
24 
23 
27 

32 

26 
24 

28 

33 
26 
25 
23 

28 
22 
24 
21 

1851 

22 

25 

•22 

21 

20 

1852  

20 

19 

20 

21 

23 

22 

21 

21 

1853  

27 

26 

26 

35 

30 

40 

32 

31 

32 

50 

49 

1854  

45 

42 

45 

47 

46 

45 

50 

42 

53 

50 

47 

1855  
1856 

50 

•• 

48 

27 

30 

27 

32 

29 

37 
30 

40 
34* 

56 
33 

45 
31 

40 
26 

1857 

22 

20 

24 

26 

23 

23 

21 

22 

22 

19 

19 

1858  

16 

18 

18 

17 

18 

22 

19 

19 

17 

18 

1859  

17 

18 

20 

20 

18 

17 

16 

19 

20 

I860   

19 

18 

17 

18 

18 

19 

19 

18 

20 

21 

19 

1861  
1862  

17 
20 

15 
30 

15 
30 

19 
24 

20 
24 

21 
27 

19 
30 

20 
31 

22 

30 

24 
31 

23 
36 

21 
32 

1863  

31 

34 

36 

37 

38 

40 

42 

40 

42 

44 

49 

50 

CHAPTER    XIX. 

SKILLED   LABOR  PROTECTS   ITSELF. 

NEITHER  space  nor  accessible  statistics  permit  a  detailed  exami 
nation  of  the  history  of  minor  branches  of  manufacture ;  yet  there 
are  many  which  illustrate,  with  peculiar  force,  principles  already  de 
duced  from  the  history  of  those  branches  which  are  recognized  as  of 
chief  importance,  and  which  have  been  most  zealously  protected. 
Nor  can  any  reasoning  person  escape  the  conclusion  that,  if  high 
tariffs  have  been  unnecessary  to  sustain  those  industries  which  re 
quire  the  largest  capital,  they  have  also  been  unnecessary  to  sustain 
others.  If  high  tariffs  have  increased,  in  those  industries,  the  cost 


SKILLED  LABOR  PROTECTS  ITSELF. 


263 


of  production  in  this  country  as  compared  with  that  in  others,  and 
have  thus  tended  to  defeat  themselves,  the  same  effect  must  have 
extended  to  minor  branches  of  manufacture ;  and  if  high  tariffs,  in 
terrupting  the  natural  effect  of  competition,  have  checked  real  prog 
ress,  the  minor  branches  must  also  have  been  deprived  of  a  healthy 
and  natural  growth,  in  proportion  as  they  have  been  interfered  with 
by  legislation. 

It  must  at  least  be  conceded  that  if  tariff  discriminations  have 
really  given  stimulus  to  any  industry — if  protection  has  been  real, 
and  not  a  sham — those  branches  which  have  received  especial  aid 
must  have  increased  more  rapidly  than  those  which  have  been  less 
favored,  or  which  have  received  no  artificial  aid  whatever.  But,  if 
the  principles  just  stated  are  correct,  those  industries  which  have  been 
left  to  the  operation  of  natural  laws,  or  but  little  considered  in  schemes 
of  protection,  must  have  progressed  the  more  surely  and  rapidly.  A 
comparison  is  possible.  The  principal  manufactures  which  protec 
tion  has  been  designed  to  stimulate  have  been  those  already  exam 
ined,  namely,  of  iron,  cotton,  wool,  paper,  glass,  and  salt.  The  fol 
lowing  table,  prepared  from  the  census  returns  for  1840,  1850,  and 
1860,  will  show  whether  the  increase  in  these  branches  of  industry 
has  been  more  rapid  than  the  increase  in  other  branches  of  manufac 
ture,  which  have  been  in  a  less  degree  or  not  at  all  objects  of  pro 
tective  care: 


TEAK. 

Six  BRANCHES. 
PROTECTED. 

UNPROTECTED. 

Hands. 

Product. 

Hands. 

Product. 

1840  ... 

152,413 
342,748 
411,474 

$127,759,260 
309,904,014 
503,257,210 

144  per  cent. 
63  per  cent. 

303,256 
614,311 
899,772 

$112,076,964 
709,202,602 
1,381,016,320 

533  per  cent. 
94  per  cent. 

1850  

I860       .  .                      

Increase,  1840-50  

"         1850-60  

The  greater  completeness  of  the  census  in  1850  than  in  1840  ex 
plains  the  apparent  increase  in  that  decade,  both  in  the  protected 
and  the  unprotected  branches.  But  in  both  decades  the  unprotected 
— those  branches  of  manufacture  which  have  been  in  a  less  degree 
or  not  at  all  the  objects  of  legislative  aid — have  grown  more  rapidly 
than  those  already  considered  in  detail,  which  have  been  most  assid 
uously  cared  for  by  legislation.  No  just  comparison  between  the 
two  decades  can  be  instituted,  because  the  returns  of  1840  embrace 
only  the  leading  branches  of  manufacture  in  each  class,  thus:  the 


204  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

only  entries  for  iron  in  1840  are  cast,  rolled,  hardware,  and  ma 
chinery,  which  yielded  in  1850  less  than  seventy  millions  out  of  a 
total  of  one  hundred  and  thirty-six  millions  produced  by  the  whole 
iron  interest.  In  like  manner,  more  than  half  of  the  industries 
classed  as  unprotected  were  omitted  from  the  account  of  manufac 
tures  altogether  in  1840,  so  that  the  increase  in  that  decade  is  appar 
ent  and  not  real.  But  the  differences  in  the  returns  do  not  account 
for  the  fact  that  in  each  decade  the  product  of  the  six  industries 
chiefly  protected  increased  less  rapidly  than  the  product  of  gthers 
not  so  favored.  It  should  also  be  observed  that  during  these  de 
cades,  and  all  other  decades  in  our  history,  whether  we  have  had 
high  duties  or  low,  the  country  has  increased  more  rapidly  in  manu 
factures  than  in  population,  and,  regardless  of  all  changes  of  tariff 
or  in  spite  of  them,  we  are  steadily  progressing  toward  a  healthy 
and  natural  diversification  of  industry. 

It  is  argued,  by  the  advocates  of  protective  duties,  that  such 
duties  are  needed  because  of  the  higher  rate  of  wages  in  this  than 
in  other  countries.  To  this  it  is  enough  to  reply,  that  Continental 
nations  are  trying  in  vain  to  fence  in  their  industries  against  British 
competition,  although  wages  in  England  are  higher  than  in  any  of  those 
countries.  Mr.  Wells,  in  his  report  of  1869,  presents  this  fact  clearly 
and  forcibly,  and  from  his  statistics  we  find  that  the  wages  in  Belgium 
are  actually  lower,  as  compared  with  those  of  Great  Britain,  than 
are  those  of  Great  Britain  as  compared  with  the  United  States. 
Yet  England  floods  Belgium  even  more  than  this  country  with  her 
manufactured  goods.  It  is  also  argued  that  the  higher  rate  of 
interest  in  this  country  than  in  England  places  us  at  a  disadvantage 
in  manufacturing.  Yet  tables  of  the  rate  of  interest  in  England  and 
France  for  every  month  since  1830,  published  in  "  Bigelow  on  the 
Tariff"  (p.  204),  show  that  the  rate  during  by  far  the  greater  part  of 
thirty  years  has  been  higher  in  England  than  in  France.  It  is  a 
well-known  fact  that  the  rate  is  higher  in  England  than  in  Germany, 
or  in  other  Continental  countries.  Yet  British  manufacturers  over 
power  those  of  all  Continental  nations,  in  spite  of  the  higher  rate  of 
interest  and  the  higher  wages  of  labor.  With  what  reason,  then, 
can  it  be  claimed  that  the  difference  in  these  respects  would  be  fatal 
to  our  manufacturers  if  unprotected  ? 

The  rate  of  wages  measures  the  value  of  labor.  The  rate  of  in 
terest  measures  the  value  of  money.  In  countries  where  labor  is 
valuable,  because  ample  opportunities  exist  for  its  profitable  employ 
ment,  wages  are  high.  In  countries  where  money  is  valuable,  be- 


SKILLED  LABOR  PROTECTS  ITSELF.  265 

cause  opportunities  for  profitable  investment  are  numerous,  the  rate 
of  interest  is  high.  Other  things  being  equal,  then,  high  wages  and 
high  rates  of  interest  in  tliis,  as  compared  with  other  countries,  simply 
prove  that  labor  and  capital  can  be  more  profitably  employed  here  than 
in  other  countries.  Now,  if  labor  and  capital  can  be  more  profitably 
employed  here  than  elsewhere,  so  much  the  less  need  of  "  protec 
tion,"  or  artificial  remuneration  for  either.  It  must  be  remembered 
that  wages  may  be  nominally  when  they  are  not  really  high,  because 
the  purchasing  power  of  money  is  temporarily  diminished,  and  that 
currency  may  command  high  rates  of  interest,  simply  because  the 
interest  itself  is  to  be  paid  in  depreciated  currency ;  that  whenever 
prices  are  artificially  swollen,  whether  by  depreciation  of  currency, 
or  by  tariffs  interfering  with  free  exchange,  the  high  rate  of  interest 
or  of  wages  is  imaginary  rather  than  real.  But,  these  causes  of  dis 
turbance  aside,  if  the  rate  of  wages  or  interest  is  higher  here  than 
in  other  countries,  it  only  proves  that  labor  or  money  can  be  more 
profitably  employed  here  than  there,  and  hence  stands  in  the  less 
need  of  any  artificial  reward. 

p3ut  facts-  test  the  truth  of  these  theories.  Pig-iron,  wheat,  salt, 
coal,  lumber,  are  products  in  which  comparatively  a  small  amount  of 
labor  and  capital  is  invested.  A  steam-engine,  a  gold  watch,  a  sew 
ing-machine,  are  products  requiring  not  only  the  labor  of  many  men, 
but  the  most  costly  and  skilled  labor,  and  the  employment  of  large 
capital.  These  products  this  country  either  exports  largely  now,  or 
did  export  before  an  artificial  cost  of  production  interrupted  the  trade. 
In  1842,  American  locomotives  were  rolling  on  British  railroads. 
The  labor  put  into  those  machines  was  the  dearest  labor  in  any 
country,  because  it  was  the  best,  and  because  in  this  country  were 
the  best  opportunities  for  its  employment.  The  labor  and  capital 
invested  in  those  engines  were  dearer  than  labor  and  capital  in  Eng 
land,  but  we  could  export  these  machines  requiring  for  their  produc 
tion  large  capital,  and  much  labor  of  the  costliest,  while  we  could 
not  export  to  that  country  a  ton  of  pig-iron  or  a  bushel  of  salt,  re 
quiring  far  less  capital,  and  far  less  labor,  as  well  as  labor  of  less 
skill.  To-day,  in  spite  of  our  artificial  prices,  and  in  spite  of  the  ex 
travagant  cost  of  iron,  we  can  send  our  agricultural  and  sewing  ma 
chines  to  Europe,  why  ?  Because  the  production  requires  a  higher- 
priced  labor  than  England  possesses.  Yet  these  machines  are  in 
every  part  finished  products  of  skilled  labor,  and  they  require  far 
more  capital  to  produce  them  than  the  ton  of  pig-iron  or  the  bushel 
of  salt.  In  spite  of  the  fact  that  England  has  cheaper  iron,  we  can 


266  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

send  her  these  machines,  but  we  cannot  send  her  the  iron  or  the  salt. 
Must  England  "  protect "  herself  against  the  skilled  labor  and  inven 
tive  genius  of  this  country,  just  as  we  protect  ourselves  against  her 
"  pauper  labor  ?  "  Certainly,  if  all  "  protection  "  is  not  a  blunder 
and  a  failure !  If  England  pleases  to  deny  herself  the  use  of  our 
machines,  as  we  try  in  vain  to  deny  ourselves  the  use  of  her  worsteds 
and  of  the  salt  of  the  tropics,  will  anybody  imagine  that  English 
labor  is  "  protected,"  because  English  farmers  still  have  to  use  the 
sickle,  and  English  sewing-girls  still  sing  Hood's  "  Song  of  the  Shirt," 
while  ours  do  not  ? 

One  other  illustration  must  suffice.  No  other  article  of  general 
use  embodies  so  much  money  or  so  much  labor  as  the  watch.  If 
high  rates  of  interest  and  of  wages  render  our  manufacturers  inca 
pable  of  competing  with  those  of  Europe,  then,  surely,  of  all  manu 
factured  products,  the  watch  must  be  the  very  one  which  we  can 
least  afford  to  produce  without  aid.  If  pig-iron  needs  a  duty  of  50  per 
cent.,  if  salt  needs  a  duty  of  130  per  cent.,  to  secure  high  wages  to 
American  labor  and  interest  to  American  capital,  then  the  watch,  em 
bodying  more  money,  more  labor,  and  the  most  costly  kind  of  labor, 
must  require  a  duty  of  1,000  per  cent.  Yet  we  are  to-day  exporting 
American  watches  to  London  and  to  Paris  !  Unaided  by  any  duty, 
but  greatly  embarrassed  by  the  almost  prohibitory  duties  on  the  fine 
steel  springs  and  some  other  materials  required,  the  American  watch 
maker  nevertheless  has  contrived,  by  the  help  of  a  labor  more  intel 
ligent  and  skilful,  and  therefore  better  paid  than  that  of  other  coun 
tries,  to  import  the  springs  paying  the  enormous  duty,  to  import 
other  materials,  and  then  to  send  back  the  finished  American  watch 
to  the  very  country  from  which  the  materials  were  brought,  there  to 
be  sold  at  a  lower  price  than  any  foreign  watch  of  like  quality. 
Will  some  advocate  of  protective  duties  explain  how  this  branch  of 
manufactures  has  contrived  to  conquer  foreign  competition,  in  spite 
of  the  rate  of  interest  and  the  high  wages  of  labor  ? 

If  those  branches  of  industry  which  require  the  largest  propor 
tion  of  labor  and  capital  need  no  protection,  but  conquer  foreign 
competition  on  foreign  soil,  and  with  all  the  advantages  against 
them ;  and  if  unprotected  industries  thrive  better  and  grow  faster, 
both  under  low  and  under  high  duties,  than  those  which  we  have 
weakened  by  a  fruitless  and  unwise  attempt  to  shelter  them  from 
competition,  must  it  not  be  admitted  that  "  protection "  does  not 
protect  ? 

We  are  now  prepared  to  give  definite  answer  to  the  question, 


SHALL  OUR  LABOR  BECOME  PAUPER  LABOR?      267 

Have  high  duties  on  imports  increased  the  production  of  wealth  by 
domestic  industry  ?  We  have  ascertained  that  the  progress  in  the 
production  of  wealth  by  agriculture  was  less  in  periods  of  high  du 
ties  than  in  periods  of  low  duties.  We  have  ascertained  that  the 
production  of  wealth,  by  the  six  great  branches  of  manufacture 
which  duties  have  been  especially  designed  to  protect,  has  not  in 
creased  under  high  duties  as  rapidly  as  under  low  duties.  We  have 
ascertained  that,  in  attempting  to  aid  these,  we  inevitably  embarrass 
other  branches  of  manufacture  more  important  both  in  number  of 
persons  employed  and  in  value  of  product.  We  have  ascertained 
that  other  branches  of  manufacture  which  have  not  been  protected 
at  all,  or  have  at  most  received  but  slight  attention,  have  progressed 
more  rapidly  in  the  production  of  wealth  than  those  with  which  legis 
lation  has  most  interfered.  We  have  ascertained  that  the  production 
of  wealth  by  manufactures,  therefore,  has,  on  the  whole,  been  re 
tarded  by  high  duties,  and  most  greatly  increased  under  low  reve 
nue  tariffs,  while  industries  not  protected  at  all  have  proved  them 
selves  strongest  in  open  competition  with  those  of  other  countries. 

It  follows  that  the  production  of  wealth  has  been  retarded  by 
high  duties,  and  has  been  most  accelerated  by  non-interference  with 
the  natural  laws  of  trade  and  industry. 

Nor  is  it  difficult  now  to  understand  why  the  growth  of  agricul 
ture  has  been  retarded  by  high  duties.  Three  causes  will  occur  to 
any  who  have  studied  the  facts  already  presented :  The  demand  for 
agricultural  products  for  export  has  been  checked.  The  increase  of 
facilities  for  transportation  has  been  checked.  The  cost  of  imple 
ments  and  machines,  of  clothing  and  furniture,  and,  finally,  of  labor, 
has  been  artificially  increased,  while  the  value  of  farming  products 
has  been  reduced.  These  causes,  operating  together,  though  in 
different  degrees  in  different  localities,  have  placed  agriculture  at  a 
disadvantage  in  times  of  high  duties,  and  have  retarded  the  produc 
tion  of  wealth  by  agricultural  labor. 


CHAPTER   XX. 

SHALL   OUR  LABOR  BECOME    PATJPEK  LABOR? 

IP  high  duties  do  not  benefit  a  country  in  its  exchanges  with 
other  countries,  and  if  they  do  not  increase  the  production  of  wealth 
within  the  country  itself,  in  what  way  can  they  benefit  it  ? 


268  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

The  advocate  of  protection,  driven  from  point  to  point  by  facts, 
finds  in  his  reply  to  this  question  his  "  last  ditch."  He  answers  : 
"  The  aggregate  production  of  wealth  may  not  be  increased  by  pro 
tection,  but  its  distribution  is  changed.  There  are  better  things  for 
a  country  than  the  mere  accumulation  of  wealth.  If  the  rich  grow 
rapidly  richer,  while  the  poor  do  not  advance  in  condition,  or  become 
poorer,  the  nation  may  get  rich  at  the  expense  of  the  laboring 
classes ;  it  may  coin  wealth  from  the  sufferings  of  the  poor.  This, 
we  maintain,  is  the  fact  under  free  trade,  while  protection,  by  en 
abling  the  employer  to  pay  higher  wages,  improves  the  condition 
of  the  laborer,  and  increases  the  proportion  of  the  aggregate  increase 
of  wealth  which  falls  to  his  share."  And  we  then  listen  to  eloquent 
words  upon  the  necessity  of  securing  high  wages  and  comforts  to 
the  laboring  people  in  this  country,  because  here  they  are  invested 
with  the  responsibilities  of  freemen.  This  reasoning  has  proved 
more  effective  than  all  others  to  reconcile  Americans  to  the  burdens 
of  high  tariffs. 

An  argument  addressed  to  popular  feeling  must  be  met  with 
facts.  Theories,  though  never  so  sound,  do  no  good.  The  political 
economist  may  prove,  ever  so  conclusively,  that  the  tariff  system 
only  gives  greater  power  to  the  capitalist ;  that  the  distribution  of 
wealth  cannot  be  changed  to  the  advantage  of  the  laborer  by  taxing 
a  whole  community  to  secure  large  profits  to  a  few  manufacturers, 
or  to  build  up  an  unnatural  industry  by  artificial  prices  for  its  prod 
ucts  ;  and  these  reasonings  cannot  be  controverted ;  but  they  do 
not  meet  the  necessity.  The  laborer  points  to  his  weekly  receipts, 
and  replies :  "  I  used  to  get  six  dollars  a  week.  Now  I  get  nine. 
Protection  to  American  industry  is  a  good  thing ! "  Intelligent  men 
may,  indeed,  see  that  the  nine  dollars  in  currency  is  worth  not  quite 
seven  dollars  in  specie ;  that  the  actual  increase  of  wages  is  therefore 
not  more  than  16  per  cent.,  and  that  the  increase  of  the  cost  of  living, 
reduced  to  gold  prices,  has  been  in  much  greater  ratio.  But,  to  the 
great  body  of  laborers,  it  is  a  very  satisfactory  fact  that  they  now 
receive  nine  dollars  where  they  formerly  received  only  six. 

In  any  attempt  to  meet  this  reasoning,  we  are  brought  face  to 
face  with  the  whole  problem  of  wages  and  prices — one  of  the  most 
intricate  and  difficult  of  all  the  questions  which  political  economy 
presents.  It  is  in  the  last  degree  intricate,  because  in  all  times  the 
wages  of  different  kinds  of  labor  vary  considerably,  and  the  wages 
of  the  same  kind  of  labor  vary  in  different  places  at  the  same  time ; 
while  there  is  a  still  greater  diversity  in  the  mode  of  living  of  dif- 


SHALL  OUR  LABOR  BECOME  PAUPER  LABOR?  2C9 

ferent  families  in  the  same  place  and  the  same  or  in  different  em 
ployments,  or  of  families  in  the  same  employment,  but  in  different 
localities.  The  question  becomes  still  more  complicated  because 
both  wages  and  prices  are  affected  in  different  degrees  by  fluctua 
tions  of  the  currency.  These  complications  render  necessary  to  any 
complete  investigation  of  the  subject  a  mass  of  detailed  information, 
as  to  wages  of  different  classes  of  laborers,  at  different  localities, 
and  for  a  series  of  years,  and  as  to  prices  of  many  articles,  at  dif 
ferent  periods,  and  in  different  localities.  Such  information  it  is 
extremely  difficult  to  obtain. 

Efforts  have  recently  been  made  to  contrast  the  condition  of 
laborers  in  this  country  at  different  times,  or  of  laborers  in  this  and 
other  countries,  by  selecting  certain  articles  and  comparing  the 
prices  of  these  articles  with  the  wages  of  laborers.  Thus  we  are  told 
that  the  wages  of  one  week's  labor  in  a  particular  employment  will 
buy  in  England  of  felt  carpets  133f  yards,  while  in  Hartford,  Con 
necticut,  near  the  great  carpet  manufactory,  the  higher  wages  of  the 
laborers  in  the  same  employment  will  buy  only  113f  yards  of  the 
same  kind  of  carpet.  A  thousand  such  illustrations  are  current, 
and  they  have  truth  to  give  them  force.  But  they  scarcely  convince 
the  inquirer.  Human  beings  do  not  live  altogether  on  carpets, 
on  woollen  blankets,  on  Irish  poplins,  on  pig-iron,  or  on  common 
salt.  While  the  prices  of  these  and  other  articles  may  be  extrava 
gantly  high,  the  prices  of  some  other  articles  of  necessity  or  common 
use  are  lower  in  this  country  than  in  England,  and  the  illustration 
leaves  upon  the  candid  mind  a  sense  of  incompleteness.  Most  men 
know  that  carpets,  blankets,  and  salt,  are  greatly  enhanced  in  price 
by  extravagant  duties,  and  the  question  at  once  suggests  itself 
whether  these  articles  are  not  chosen  for  illustration  because  they 
are  extravagantly  high.  The  advocate  of  protection  has  at  hand  a 
very  conclusive  reply  to  all  comparison  of  prices  and  wages  in  this 
country  and  in  Europe :  "  How  does  it  happen  that  people  fly  from 
Europe,  where  wages  are  relatively  high  and  prices  relatively  low, 
to  this  country,  where  the  laborer  is  so  badly  off?"  It  does  not 
answer  to  say  that  political  freedom  attracts  them.  That  is  indeed 
true,  but  all  men  know  that  the  material  condition  of  immigrants  is 
also  improved,  and  that  they  come  to  this  country  in  part  because 
they  know  that  they  can  improve  their  condition. 

Sophistries  do  not  pay  in  argument.     Candid  men  are  repelled 
by  them.     It  is  a  sophistry  to  reason  that  the  high  price  of  blankets 
and  pig-iron  renders  the  laborer,  on  the  whole,  worse  off  in  this  coun- 
19 


270  DOES  PROTECTION   PROTECT? 

try  than  in  Europe.  It  is  no  less  a  sophistry  to  reason  that  the 
laborer  is  in  better  condition  here  than  in  Europe  because  of  protec 
tive  tariffs.  Labor  is  generally  better  paid  in  this  country  than  in 
others,  because  it  is  more  valuable — can  be  employed  more  profit 
ably.  And  this  is  because  in  this  country  cheap  and  rich  land  is 
accessible  to  every  one ;  because  facilities  exist  for  transportation  of 
products  to  a  market ;  because  mines  the  richest  in  the  world,  and 
other  resources  almost  boundless,  lie  yet  undeveloped ;  because  in 
many  branches  manufacturing  has  not  yet  attained  its  natural 
growth;  because  the  rapid  growth  of  the  country  constantly  opens 
a  new  demand  for  labor  of  all  kinds,  and  renders  speedily  remunera 
tive  enterprises  which,  in  an  older  and  more  fully-settled  country, 
would  wait  for  years  or  generations  before  attaining  a  solid  success. 
In  a  word,  labor  is  profitable  here  because  this  is  a  new  country,  of 
extraordinary  natural  resources,  in  which  the  political  institutions, 
and  the  character  of  the  people,  stimulate  enterprise  to  the  utmost 
vigor.  These  causes  exist  independently  of  changes  of  tariff.  No 
tariff  causes  the  ore  to  burst  from  the  earth  in  mountains  of  iron. 
No  tariff  has  overlaid  vast  tracts  'of  earth  with  the  rich,  black  loam 
of  Western  bottoms  and  prairies.  No  tariff  has  caused  immense  for 
ests  of  splendid  timber  to  grow,  or  the  broad  and  navigable  streams 
to  flow  which  bear  their  products  to  the  sea.  We  have  proved  that 
high  tariffs  have  not  accelerated,  but  have  absolutely  retarded  the 
development  of  these  natural  resources,  especially  by  checking  the 
increase  of  facilities  for  transportation,  by  enhancing  the  cost  of  pro 
duction  and  consequently  of  development,  and  by  interrupting  the 
natural  demand  for  our  products  for  export  to  other  countries.  of_ 
the  natural  development  of  the  country_has^  been  retarded,  the 
natural  demand  for  labor  mtist  have  been  checked.  It  follows,^there- 
fore,  as  a  logical  result  of  the  facts  already^  established,  that  in  con 
sequence  of  high  duties  the  demand  for  labor  inl;his  country  must, 
on  the  whole,  have  been  checked,  and  its  remuneration  diminished., 
although  in  some  branches  of  industry  the  demand  may  have  been 
increased  by  the  protective  duties.] 

This  is  the  true  question  to  be  considered.  We  have  no  reason 
to  maintain  that  at  any  time  the  general  demand  for  labor  here  has 
been  less  than  in  Europe,  or  that  at  any  time  the  general  condition 
of  the  laborer  has  been  worse.  In  some  branches  of  industry  it  has 
been  true  at  other  times,  or  may  be  true  now,  that  the  laborer  in 
Europe  is  actually  better  paid,  considering  the  purchasing  power  of 
wages,  than  the  same  class  of  laborers  in  this  country.  But  this,  if 


SHALL  OUR  LABOR  BECOME  PAUPER  LABOR?      271 

it  were  true,  would  not  be  conclusive  as  to  the  general  effect  of  high 
duties,  for  labor  of  other  kinds  may  have  been  at  those  periods  in 
an  equal  or  greater  degree  benefited.  The  question  is,  whether  the 
laborers  of  this  country,  in  the  aggregate,  have  been  benefited,  or 
the  contrary,  by  the  protective  system.  For  the  discussion  of  that 
question,  we  may  suppose  that  labor  in  the  aggregate  has  at  all 
times  been  better  paid  here  than  in  Europe.  The  sole  question  is, 
whether  it  has  been  better  paid  under  one  system  of  duties  than 
under  another. 

The  reasoning  already  offered  will  to  many  minds  be  conclusive. 
If  the  development  of  the  country  has,  on  the  whole,  been  retarded 
in  times  of  high  duty,  and  if  the  production  of  wealth  has,  on  the 
whole,  been  checked  in  its  natural  increase,  it  follows,  as  an  inevi 
table  consequence,  that  the  demand  for  labor  in  the  aggregate  must 
have  been  checked,  and  that  its  remuneration,  on  the  whole,  must 
have  been  diminished.  But  to  the  majority  of  readers  one  fact  ap 
peals  more  strongly  than  a  thousand  syllogisms.  Therefore,  let  us 
ascertain  facts.  At  all  times  the  majority  of  American  laborers 
have  been  employed  in  agriculture.  According  to  the  census  of 
1860,  out  of  7,259,155  persons  enumerated  as  employed  in  different 
forms  of  non-professional  labor,  3,375,141  were  in  agriculture — and 
the  slave-laborers,  mainly  engaged  in  agriculture,  do  not  appear  to 
have  been  included.  There  are  also  enumerated  as  "  laborers,"  not 
otherwise  classified,  969,301 ;  and,  while  many  of  these  were  en 
gaged  in  building  railroads,  digging  canals,  or  in  various  occupa 
tions  in  cities  or  towns,  no  small  portion  were  probably  employed, 
partially  or  entirely,  in  agriculture.  In  trade  and  transportation 
there  were  enumerated  as  employed  800,575  persons,  and  in  me 
chanic  arts,  mining,  fisheries,  or  manufacturing,  2,114,138  persons. 
But,  of  the  persons  enumerated  as  employed  in  manufactures  and 
the  mechanic  arts,  there  were  many  women  and  children.  The 
tables  of  manufactures  show  that  more  than  one-fourth  of  the  whole 
number  were  females,  and  a  considerable  number  of  the  males  were 
children — how  many  the  census  does  not  state.  In  agriculture  both 
women  and  children  are  actively  engaged  in  contributing  to  produc 
tion  of  wealth  on  every  farm,  but  they  are  not  included  in  the  record 
of  occupations.  Allowing  for  this  difference,  and  for  the  omission 
of  slave-laborers,  it  may  be  presumed  that  at  least  two-thirds  of  all 
our  labor  was  engaged  in  agriculture.  The  census  of  1840,  less 
minute  in  its  information  regarding  the  mechanic  arts,  appears  to 
have  been  somewhat  more  precise  in  regard  to  occupations;  for, 


272  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

according  to  that  census,  there  were  employed  in  agriculture 
3,717,756  persons,  and  in  all  other  employments  1,078,661,  divided 
thus :  Manufactures  and  trades,  791,545 ;  mining,  15,203 ;  com 
merce,  117,575 ;  ocean  navigation,  56,025 ;  internal  navigation, 
33,067;  professions,  65,236.  Here  fully  three-quarters  appear  to 
have  been  engaged  in  agriculture.  In  1820  the  proportion  was 
still  greater;  in  agriculture  2,070,646  persons,  and  in  commerce, 
manufactures,  and  trades,  only  421,999.  The  natural  progress  in 
diversification  of  industry  appears  in  these  statistics  somewhat 
greater  than  it  really  has  been,  since  it  is  probable  that  the  records 
of  1820  and  1840  were  less  complete  than  those  of  1860  in  enumera 
tion  of  the  persons  employed  in  non-agricultural  industry.  But  it 
is  apparent  that  more  than  two-thirds  of  our  labor  has  at  all  times 
been  employed  in  cultivation  of  the  earth. 

If  the  wages  of  labor  employed  in  agriculture  have  at  any  time 
been  decreased,  as  compared  with  prices  of  products  by  farmers  pur 
chased  and  consumed,  fully  two-thirds  of  all  American  laborers  have 
been  injured,  while  less  than  one-third  can  have  been  benefited.  In 
that  case,  to  maintain  the  aggregate  remuneration  of  American  labor, 
the  few  must  have  gained  per  capita  more  than  twice  as  much  as 
the  many  lost  per  capita. 

Of  labor  employed  in  agriculture,  a  large  proportion  obtains  its 
only  remuneration  through  the  sale  ojf  farm  products.  The  very 
large  majority  of  farming  laborers  either  own  or  hire  the  land  which 
they  cultivate,  or  are  the  sons  of  farmers,  and  their  labor  is  paid 
precisely  in  proportion  to  the  price  of  farm  products  sold,  as  com 
pared  with  the  price  of  articles  bought  for  use  and  consumption. 
The  farmer  and  his  sons  have  no  other  wages,  can  in  no  way  get 
any  other  remuneration  for  their  labor,  than  by  the  excess  of  the 
price  of  farm  products  sold,  over  the  price  of  articles  of  food, 
clothing,  and  convenience,  and  implements  and  machines  purchased 
and  consumed.  The  rise  in  the  value  of  land,  by  reason  of  the  labor 
expended  in  fencing  and  reducing  it  to  cultivation,  or  by  reason  of 
the  settlement  of  the  country,  and  the  increased  facilities  for  trans 
portation,  though  a  most  important  part  of  the  remuneration  of  the 
farmer,  may  better  be  considered  as  the  profit  on  his  investment  of 
capital,  for  every  farmer  who  owns  or  rents  land  is  at  once  capital 
ist  and  laborer.  These  profits  of  his  investment  can  be  realized  only 
when  he  chooses  to  sell  or  leave  the  farm.  As  a  laborer,  his  condi 
tion  must  be  measured  by  the  comforts  which  he  can  afford  to  enjoy, 
and  the  money  which  he  can  save  or  apply  to  objects  of  desire.  And 


SHALL  OUR  LABOR  BECOME  PAUPER  LABOR?      273 

these  depend  upon  the  price  which  he  receives  for  farm  products,  as 
compared  with  the  price  which  he  pays  for  articles  purchased. 

The  wages  of  agricultural  laborers  hired  by  the  year,  month,  or 
day,  we  shall  find,  will  depend  closely,  though  not  absolutely,  upon 
the  same  conditions.  On  one  side  of  the  equation,  the  conditions 
affect  -both  alike ;  both  have  to  purchase  clothing  and  comforts,  and 
the  purchasing  power  of  wages  depends  upon  the  prices  of  clothes, 
hats,  boots,  and  other  articles  of  use.  To  both,  board  is  ordinarily 
the  same,  and,  if  high  prices  of  articles  of  food  prevent  their  use, 
the  laborer  equally  with  the  farmer  is  forced  to  deny  himself.  The 
wages  paid  in  money  vary,  generally,  with  the  prices  obtained  for 
agricultural  products,  but  not  in  every  fluctuation  nor  to  the  full  ex 
tent.  But,  since  cheap  land  is  always  to  be  had,  high  prices  for  agri 
cultural  products,  operating  as  an  inducement  to  every  laborer  to 
seek  land  for  himself,  unless  balanced  by  increase  of  wages,  will 
soon  diminish  the  supply  of  laborers  and  thus  compel  higher  wages. 
In  general,  therefore,  the  money  paid  for  wages  to  hired  laborers 
will  vary  with  the  price  of  agricultural  products  as  compared  with 
the  cost  of  articles  which  the  farmer  has  to  buy,  and  the  purchasing 
power  of  the  money  also  varies  with  the  prices  of  articles  of  neces 
sity  or  consumption,  so  that  the  hired  laborer  does  well  when  the 
farmer  does  well,  and  his  condition  deteriorates  when  that  of  the 
farmer  deteriorates.  But  the  number  of  persons  so  employed  is  not 
large  compared  with  that  of  owners  or  lessees  of  land  and  their 
sons.  In  1860  it  was  less  than  one-fourth.  We  may,  therefore, 
safely  assume  that  the  wages  of  farming  labor,  that  is,  of  two-thirds 
of  all  American  labor,  depend  upon  the  prices  of  agricultural  prod 
ucts  as  compared  with  the  prices  of  articles  of  necessity  or  comfort. 

We  have  already  traced  year  by  year  the  prices  of  some  most  im 
portant  articles  of  agricultural  production,  namely,  cotton,  wool,  and 
flour,  and  in  each  case  have  found  that  statistics  establish  the  rule 
that,  in  time  of  high  duties,  the  price  has  been  lower  than  in  time  of 
low  duties.  The  price  of  flour,  it  need  not  be  said,  depends  upon 
and  indicates  the  price  of  wheat.  And  these  three  products,  wheat, 
wool,  and  cotton,  constitute  in  value  about  one-third  of  our  entire 
agricultural  product. 

But,  since  this  point  is  of  vital  importance,  and  the  advocate  of 
protective  duties  rests  every  thing  upon  the  oft-repeated  assertion 
that  high  tariffs  will,  in  some  way,  secure  to  the  farmer  a  better 
market  and  higher  prices  for  his  products,  a  few  stubborn  facts  may 
be  presented. 


274 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


The  tables  which  follow  are  prepared  from  the  tables  of  monthly 
quotations  of  prices,  given  in  the  official  report  of  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  for  1863.  Only  the  average  of  the  monthly  quotations 
in  each  year  is  given,  but,  as  these  quotations  cover  the  highest  and 
lowest  prices,  and  the  averages  for  each  month  in  the  year,  the  com 
parison  is  as  perfect  as  can  be  made.  The  average  prices  are  also 
given  for  six  periods,  first,  the  years  covered  by  the  protective  tariff 
of  1824  and  the  higher  protective  tariff  of  1828 ;  second,  the  ten  years 
covered  by  the  compromise  non-protective  tariff,  1833-'42  inclusive ; 
third,  the  protective  tariff  of  1843-'46 ;  fourth,  the  four  years  which 
followed  under  non-protection ;  fifth,  the  succeeding  four  years ;  and, 
finally,  the  remaining  years  of  that  decade  of  non-protection.  Simi 
lar  figures  for  recent  years  are  not  given,  first,  because  no  official 
record  presents  the  data  ;  and,  second,  because  it  may  be  supposed 
that  fluctuations  of  gold  have  unfavorably  affected  the  price  of  agri 
cultural  products  since  1860.  It  is  a  well-known  fact  that  the  prices 
of  nearly  all  products  of  the  farm  are  now  lower  than  they  were  in 
1860,  except  those  of  the  Southern  States,  but  the  fact  is  commonly 
ascribed  to  other  causes  than  to  the  effect  of  a  tariff  upon  the  pro 
ducing  and  consuming  power  of  the  community.  But,  if  it  shall  ap 
pear  that  articles  of  farm  production,  whether  those  which  are 
largely  exported,  or  those  which  are  consumed  almost  wholly  at 
home,  have  commanded  a  higher  average  price  in  every  period  of  low 
duties  than  under  the  preceding  or  following  protective  tariff,  and 
that  this  same  rule  holds  good  in  every  case  for  thirty-five  years,  in 
spite  of  changes  of  currency,  short  crops  or  large  crops,  or  other 
causes  tending  to  affect  the  price,  then,  indeed,  it  must  be  admitted, 
even  by  the  most  obstinate  advocate  of  protective  theories,  that  high 
tariffs  do  not  benefit  the  farmer,  but  in  some  way  deprive  him  of  a 
fair  price  for  his  products.  Let  the  facts  testify  : 


PROTECTION— 1825-'32. 


YEAR. 

Wheat. 

Cotton. 

Corn. 

Rye. 

OstB. 

Butter. 

Cheese. 

1825               

92 

18V 

55 

54 

31% 

15 

7v 

1826 

94 

11 

76)£ 

70)£ 

47/£ 

15V 

8 

1827      

99 

9% 

61 

68 

40^ 

17 

7>£ 

1828                     

122 

10 

52}£ 

53X 

29}£ 

15^ 

6 

1829        

124)£ 

9 

56J£ 

66 

35}£ 

13X 

6 

1830 

107 

10 

£6 

65 

28M 

13^ 

6V 

1831 

118J£ 

9 

69# 

78 

37X 

15 

6 

1832                    

126 

9>£ 

68 

83 

45^ 

15/£ 

6 

Average  

uo# 

10M 

62 

67 

37 

15* 

6M 

SHALL  OUR  LABOR  BECOME  PAUPER  LABOR? 
COMPROMISE  TARIFF. 


275 


YEAR. 

Wheat 

Cotton. 

Corn. 

Rye. 

Oats. 

Butter. 

Cheese. 

1833   ... 

119V 

12^ 

73>£ 

80 

40.V. 

16 

7 

1834 

100 

12^ 

66 

66 

35  14 

14V 

T/1» 

1835  
1836  

121* 

178 

16% 
16# 

8* 

91 

104 

8* 

1% 
19.V 

3* 

1837 

177 

12 

104V 

H2>£ 

52.V 

18 

OJf 

1838  

192 

10% 

84 

104V 

39V 

20 

8 

1839  

124^ 

13 

86 

97 

47 

19 

9^ 

1840  .. 

104.V. 

8% 

57 

59.V 

34 

lT/£ 

7 

1841 

118V 

10 

62>£ 

64 

44 

12 

5V 

1842  

114 

8 

59.V 

65X 

36.V. 

12 

JX 

Average  

135 

12 

77X 

84^ 

43 

16# 

7% 

PROTECTION-1843-M6. 


YEAR. 

Wheat. 

Cotton. 

Corn. 

Rye. 

Oats. 

Butter. 

Cheese. 

1843... 

98% 

6^ 

55 

62 

29 

8V 

4M 

1844 

97.V 

6V 

50 

671^ 

31V 

10 

4s/ 

1845 

104 

6K 

55 

68^ 

38 

13V 

6% 

1846.. 

108)£ 

71^ 

68 

741^ 

39^ 

13 

6% 

Averaere  .  .  . 

102 

6^" 

57 

68 

34^ 

115^ 

53^ 

NON-PROTECTION. 
FIRST   PERIOD. 


YEAR. 

Wheat 

Cotton. 

Corn. 

Rye. 

Oats. 

Butter. 

Cheese. 

1847 

136V 

10K 

85^ 

99 

49 

16 

7 

1848 

116^ 

6 

63X 

73V 

41V 

16 

6V 

1849  

124 

8 

63 

60 

39 

15 

6 

1850  

127>^ 

12 

62.V 

65 

43 

15 

6K 

Average  

126 

9 

68X 

74X 

43 

15^ 

6X 

SECOND     PERIOD. 


YEAR. 

Wheat. 

Coiton. 

Corn. 

Rye. 

Oats. 

Butter. 

Cheese. 

1851  .  . 

107.V. 

10 

71 

73 

43V 

14V 

5V 

0/4. 

1852                     

nox 

9 

62 

81  X 

43 

19 

1853  

139 

10V 

67)£ 

92 

47>^ 

18 

8% 

1854  

219 

9 

84^ 

119^ 

54 

1»# 

9X 

Average  

144 

9>r 

WJtf 

91X 

47 

17% 

?X 

THIRD    PERIOD. 


YEAR. 

Wheat 

Cotton. 

Corn. 

Rye. 

Oats. 

Butter. 

Cheese. 

1855  

243V 

9K 

99 

133V 

59V 

22 

9Jtf 

1857  

175 
167^ 

M* 

81 

96 
94 

43 
53 

21V 

9V 

1858  

132  % 

13 

72 

45 

7 

1859  . 

86V 

48 

19 

8V 

I860             

150 

10V 

74 

82V 

42 

10 

x» 

Average  

169 

11^ 

81^ 

94 

48% 

19# 

8^ 

276 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 
RECAPITULATION. 


Cotton. 


Corn. 


Rye. 


Data. 


Cheese. 


1833-'42 

1843-'46 

1847-'50 

I850-'54 

1855-'60.... 


135tf 
102 
126 
144 


10M 

12 


62 


81* 


11* 


During  eight  years  of  protection,  1825-'32,  the  average  price  of 
wheat  ranged  from  92  cents  to  126  cents,  and  the  average  for  the 
period  was  $1.10|-.  But  the  ten  years  of  non-protection  which  fol 
lowed  gave  an  average  price  of  $1.35 ;  and,  although  the  crop  had 
increased  in  quantity  73^  per  cent.,  and  the  three  years  of  "  hard 
times  "  were  years  of  low  prices,  the  farmer  even  then  received  more 
for  his  wheat  than  the  average  price  during  the  whole  protective 
period  preceding.  The  average  price  of  cotton  during  eight  years 
of  protection  was  lOf  cents;  but,  during  ten  years  of  non-protection, 
though  the  crop  had  been  enormously  increased,  from  less  than  one 
million  bales  in  1832,  to  over  two  million  three  hundred  thousand  in 
1842,  the  average  price  was  12  cents.  The  average  price  of  corn 
during  the  protective  period  was  62  cents ;  but,  during  the  non-pro 
tective  period,  it  was  77J-  cents.  But  these,  it  may  be  said,  are 
crops  whose  price  is  governed  by  the  export  demand.  The  price  of 
rye,  oats,  butter,  and  cheese,  certainly  was  not  so  governed;  the 
quantity  of  these  articles  exported  was  then  too  small  to  affect  the 
price  at  all.  But  the  price  of  rye  under  protection  was  67  cents,  and 
under  non-protection  84£  cents ;  the  price  of  oats,  under  protection, 
was  37  cents,  and  under  non-protection,  43  cents;  the  price  of  but 
ter  was  15J-  cents  under  protection,  and  16J  cents  under  non-protec 
tion  ;  and  the  price  of  cheese  was  6}  cents  under  protection,  and  7f 
cents  under  non-protection.  The  export  theory  does  not  account  for 
these  facts.  If  protection  creates  a  home  market,  how  does  it  hap 
pen  that  eight  years  of  protection  reduced  the  price  of  cheese  from 
7-J  to  6  cents,  while  ten  years  of  non-protection  raised  it  to  7  cents  ? 
If  non-protection  destroys  manufactures,  and  drives  people  into  agri 
culture  for  a  living,  how  does  it  happen  that  ten  years  of  non-protec 
tion  raised  the  average  price  of  every  one  of  these  products,  and 
caused  crops  of  wheat  three-fourths  larger  than  were  raised  in  1830 
to  be  consumed  at  higher  prices  ?  Does  it  not  follow  that  there  were 
more  consumers,  or  a  greater  ability  to  purchase  and  consume,  even 
in  the  hard  time  of  1840-'42,  than  in  the  whole  protective  period? 

But  it  may  be  supposed  that  the  inflation  of  the  currency  in  1836 


SHALL  OUR  LABOR  BECOME  PAUPER  LABOR?  277 

and  1837  accounts  for  these  facts.  Let  it  be  observed,  then,  that  the 
average  price  of  every  article  except  rye,  during  the  whole  protective 
tariff  which  followed,  was  not  only  lower  than  the  average  price  for 
the  period  of  low  duties,  but  was  lower  than  the  price  during  the 
years  of  extreme  contraction  of  the  currency  and  "hard  times,"  1840 
-'42!  Wheat  was  worth  118£  in  1841,  and  114  in  1842;  but,  dur 
ing  the  protective  tariff,  it  never  rose  for  either  year  above  108^,  and 
averaged  102.  Cotton  was  worth  10  cents  in  1841,  and  8  cents  in 
1842 ;  but  it  averaged,  under  protection,  only  6J.  Corn  was  worth 
59-J  to  62  J,  and  it  averaged  under  protection  only  57.  Rye  aver 
aged  lower,  under  protection,  than  it  did  during  the  previous  period, 
but  not  lower  than  during  the  years  of  "  hard  times,"  and  it  is  the  only 
exception.  Cheese,  which  the  home  market,  if  one  had  been  created 
by  the  tariff,  would  surely  have  consumed  at  a  fair  price,  never  rose 
as  high  in  any  year  as  it  was  in  1842,  the  last  year  of  low  duties. 

Still  more  conclusive  is  the  proof,  when  it  is  observed  how  the 
price  of  every  article  bounded  upward  when  the  burden  upon  agri 
culture  was  removed.  During  the  four  years  of  non-protection  which 
followed,  wheat  averaged  $1.26,  or  24  cents  higher  than  it  had  under 
protection ;  cotton  9  cents,  or  3J  cents  higher ;  corn  68^-  cents,  or 
11^  cents  higher ;  rye  74-J  cents,  or  6-J  cents  higher ;  oats  43  cents, 
or  8-J  cents  higher ;  butter  15J  cents,  or  4  cents  higher ;  and  cheese 
6J  cents,  or  f  of  a  cent  higher.  Was  this  change  caused  by  the 
famine  in  Europe  and  the  export  demand  ?  Then  let  it  be  observed 
that  the  next  four  years  gave  a  still  further  increase  of  price,  on 
every  article — those  which  we  consumed  at  home  as  well  as  those 
which  we  exported.  Surely  no  demonstration  can  be  more  con 
vincing.  Of  all  the  articles  named,  not  one  ever  fell  again  for  a 
single  year  lower  than  the  average  price  for  the  whole  protective 
tariff  of  1842-'46,  and  only  one,  cheese,  fell  in  a  single  year  as  low 
as  that  average. 

Facts  have  already  been  given  showing  the  enormous  increase  in 
quantity  of  agricultural  crops  during  the  decade  of  uninterrupted 
non-interference,  and  it  is  interesting  to  remember  those  facts  in 
connection  with  this  record  of  prices.  An  increase  of  nearly  three 
millions  of  bales,  over  100  per  cent,  in  the  cotton  crop,  had  lowered 
the  price  only  1£  cent  as  compared  with  1850,  and  the  price  in  1860 
was  higher  than  the  average  of  the  years  1849-'51.  An  increase  of 
seventy-three  million  bushels  of  wheat  had  occurred,  but  a  crop 
three-quarters  larger  was  consumed  at  a  price  23  cents  higher  by  a 
people  more  prosperous,  because  they  had  been  let  alone  in  their 


278  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

industry.  A  crop  of  corn  two  hundred  and  forty  million  bushels 
larger  was  consumed  at  a  price  11 J  cents  higher.  A  crop  of  rye  50 
per  cent,  larger  was  consumed  at  a  price  17-J  cents  higher.  A  crop 
of  oats  twenty-six  million  bushels  larger  was  consumed  at  a  price 
only  one  cent  lower.  In  1850,  the  farmers  made  313,247,014  pounds 
of  butter,  worth  in  New  York  15  cents  a  pound,  but  in  1860  they 
made  459,681,372  pounds,  worth  in  New  York  16-j-  cents  a  pound.  In 
1850  they  made  one  hundred  and  five  million  pounds  of  cheese,  worth, 
at  6J  cents  a  pound,  $6,560,000;  and  in  1860  they  made  one  hundred 
and  three  million  pounds,  worth,  at  10  cents  a  pound,  $10,366,392. 

Need  these  comparisons  be  pursued  further  to  convince  every 
doubter  that  low  duties  enable  the  farmer  to  get  high  prices  for  his 
products,  while  high  duties  force  him  to  sell  at  lower  rates  ?  The 
fact  being  proved,  it  is  not  necessary  to  propose  any  theory  in  ex 
planation  of  it.  To  variation  in  the  demand  for  export  it  cannot  be 
wholly  or  mainly  due,  because  the  same  effect  extends  to  crops  pro 
duced  for  a  home  market.  Can  there  be  more  than  one  rational  ex 
planation  ?  Is  it  not  plain  that,  under  high  duties,  the  consumers  of 
agricultural  products  are  as  a  whole  unable  to  consume  largely  at  high 
prices,  while,  under  non-protective  duties,  all  trades  and  arts  and 
manufactures  so  thrive  that  a  larger  body  of  more  prosperous  con 
sumers  is  enabled  to  consume  larger  crops  at  prices  more  profitable 
to  the  farmer  ?  Do  not  the  facts  force  this  conclusion  upon  every 
reasoning  mind  ? 

But,  if  so,  high  tariffs  are  not  only  robbery  to  the  farmer,  but  in 
jury  to  the  manufacturer  and  the  mechanic.  No  other  conclusion 
is  possible. 

It  is  at  least  established  that  the  farmer  receives  lower  prices  for 
his  products  under  the  system  miscalled  protective,  than  under  low 
duties  and  non-interference.  To  that  extent,  therefore,  two-thirds 
of  American  laborers  have  been  injured  by  high  duties,  unless  in 
times  of  high  duties  the  prices  of  articles  used  and  consumed  by 
the  farmer  have  been  in  equal  measure  reduced. 

The  prices  of  pig  and  bar  iron,  of  woollen  and  cotton  goods,  of 
glass  and  salt,  have  been  traced,  and  we  have  seen  that  these  have 
been  higher  in  every  period  of  high  duties  than  in  the  following 
periods  of  low  duties.  Upon  the  price  of  iron  depends  in  a  measure 
the  cost  of  stoves  and  utensils,  of  farm  implements,  of  wagons, 
blacksmith's-work,  horseshoes,  of  all  machinery,  of  tools  used  in 
every  trade,  and  of  all  transportation.  The  cost  of  clothing 
and  household  goods  is  affected  by  the  price  of  woollen  and  cotton 


SHALL  OUR  LABOR  BECOME  PAUPER  LABOR?  279 

fabrics,  and  the  cost  of  all  mechanical  work  is  also  affected  by  the 
price  which  workmen  have  to  pay  for  clothing  and  for  tools.  In 
like  manner  every  other  increase  of  prices  which  a  tariff  on  imported 
articles  may  cause  is  passed  on  from  importer  to  retail  dealer,  from 
dealer  to  consumer,  from  consumer  to  those  for  whom  he  performs 
any  service,  and  thus  all  are  diffused  through  the  whole  community, 
falling  at  last,  in  large  proportion,  upon  the  farmers,  who  are  two- 
thirds  of  the  productive  laborers  of  the  country.  If  a  tariff  increases 
the  cost  of  pig-iron  from  $20  to  $40  a  ton,  which  for  two  million 
tons  consumed  would  be  a  tax  of  forty  millions  yearly,  that  tax  ulti 
mately  goes  back  to  the  producers  of  wealth,  and  the  farmers,  being 
two-thirds  of  the  purchasers,  pay  twenty-six  millions  of  the  forty. 
Does  any  one  ask  in  what  form  ?  A  little  in  every  stove  and  iron 
utensil  for  the  household,  in  every  chain,  crowbar,  shovel,  plough, 
fork,  hoe,  or  other  implement ;  a  little  in  every  wagon,  or  job  of  re 
pairs  ;  a  little  in  every  work  which  a  carpenter,  blacksmith,  or  other 
mechanic,  may  do  for  him ;  a  little  in  every  pound  of  nails  used  in  house 
or  barn,  and  a  great  deal  in  increased  cost  of  transporting  to  him  all 
articles  used,  or  from  him  to  market  all  products  of  his  farm.  Sooner 
or  later,  it  all  comes  back  to  the  producers,  and,  of  all  taxes  which 
the  producers  have  to  pay,  the  farmers  pay  two-thirds. 

Here  the  advocate  of  high  tariffs  will  reply  that  the  cost  of  stoves 
and  nails,  implements  and  machines,  is  not  affected  by  the  duty  on 
such  articles,  which  is  in  part  true.  That  is  not  the  tax  which  the 
farmer  pays.  He  pays  the  tax  by  which  the  iron  is  enhanced  in  price. 
If  the  iron  out  of  which  his  stoves  were  made  had  not  cost  the  foun- 
dery  more  than  $20  a  ton,  he  would  have  had  his  stove  for  less  money 
than  he  now  pays. 

"  But,  some  articles  made  of  iron  cost  less  now  than  they  did 
years  ago,  when  iron  was  cheaper ! "  Very  true,  and  they  ought  to 
cost  still  less.  Such  improvements  in  the  manufacture  have  been 
effected,  that  the  machine  can  now  be  made  out  of  iron,  at  $40,  at 
less  cost  than  it  could  once  out  of  iron  at  $20.  But  the  cost  of  iron, 
nevertheless,  increases  the  cost  of  the  machine ;  for,  if  with  the  new 
inventions  it  can  now  be  made  for  any  given  price,  it  could  be  made 
for  less  if  the  iron  had  cost  but  half  as  much. 

The  favorite  device  of  protectionists  is  to  point  to  articles  which 
have  absolutely  fallen  in  price,  and  ascribe  that  fall  to  the  tariff. 
They  know  that  there  is  a  constant  tendency  to  lower  prices  for  all 
manufactured  products,  as  increased  skill  and  new  inventions  dimin 
ish  the  actual  cost  of  production.  That  decrease  should  be  steady, 


280  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

and,  when  no  arbitrary  laws  interfere  to  check  it,  is  sure.  It  is  part 
of  the  blessings  which  science,  art,  and  progressing  civilization,  be 
stow  upon  the  human  race,  and  we  are  all  entitled  to  a  share  in  it. 
The  farmer  has  a  right  to  his  share  as  much  as  the  mechanic ;  the 
laborer  of  this  country  has  a  right  to  his  share  as  well  as  the  laborer 
of  England.  Whenever  arbitrary  laws  in  this  country  arrest  the 
downward  progress  of  the  price  of  any  article,  while  in  other  coun 
tries  the  natural  decrease  continues,  the  tax  is  just  the  same  as  if 
the  cost  of  the  article  had  been  increased  to  the  same  amount.  For 
ten  years  ending  in  1832,  the  price  of  glass  in  this  country,  being 
arrested  by  protective  duties,  stood  unchanged,  while  the  price  in 
England  and  on  the  Continent  was  falling.  If  the  difference  in  1832 
was  fifty  cents  a  box — and  it  proved  to  be  nearly  as  much — then  the 
tariff  in  that  year  taxed  the  consumer  just  fifty  cents  a  box,  as  truly 
as  if  it  had  raised  the  price,  while  in  other  countries  it  remained  sta 
tionary.  The  farmer,  who  wants  glass  for  his  new  house,  has  a  right  to 
his  share  of  the  benefits  which  science  has  conferred  by  the  cheaper 
manufacture  of  glass.  But  the  tariff  steps  in,  arrests  the  price,  robs 
him  of  fifty  cents  a  box,  and  the  advocate  of  protection  then  says : 
"  You  have  not  been  taxed  at  all,  for  glass  is  no  higher  now  than  it 
was  twenty  years  ago ! "  Yet  the  farmer  was  robbed  nevertheless. 
He  had  a  right  to  buy  for  less. 

So  when  prices  have  decreased,  we  are  told  that  this  is  the  effect 
of  the  tariff.  The  introduction  of  the  power-loom  and  other  improve 
ments,  with  the  low  price  of  cotton,  reduced  the  cost  of  shirtings 
from  twenty  to  seven  cents  a  yard,  and  the  protectionist  pointed  to 
the  fact  in  1845,  as  proof  that  the  high  tariff  was  a  good  thing.  He 
forgot  to  mention  that  the  same  goods  had  sold  in  1842,  before  the 
tariff  was  imposed,  for  6-J  cents,  and  that,  instead  of  rising,  they 
should  have  declined  still  further,  had  no  law  interfered.  Other 
goods  were  being  steadily  reduced  in  cost  under  the  low  duties,  and 
yet,  as  we  have  seen,  the  manufacture  of  wool  and  cotton,  iron,  and 
other  products,  was  increasing.  Just  then  the  tariff  arrested  the 
natural  decline,  and  the  prices  of  those  goods  either  increased,  re 
mained  unchanged,  or  declined  but  little  until  its  removal.*  The 
instant  competition  was  readmitted,  it  was  seen  that  prices  in  other 
countries  had  been  still  further  reduced.  The  manufacturers  cried 
"  Fraud ! "  and  there  was  fraud !  They  had  defrauded  the  consumer  of 

*  Facts,  showing  in  detail  the  effects  of  the  tariff  of  1842  upon  prices,  are  given 
in  the  next  chapter. 


SHALL  OUR  LABOR  BECOME  PAUPER  LABOR?      281 

that  natural  decrease  of  price,  and  yet  had  pointed  to  some  slight  re 
ductions  here  as  proof  that  the  tariff  had  been  a  blessing. 

These  considerations  show  how  easy  it  is  for  the  advocate  of  high 
tariffs  to  find  facts  which,  disingenuously  or  dishonestly  used,  seem 
to  sustain  him  in  the  theory  that  "  a  high  tariff  does  not  usually  en 
hance  the  cost  of  manufactured  products."  If  they  have  declined  in 
price,  he  claims  a  victory,  and  conceals  the  fact  that  in  other  coun 
tries  they  have  declined  still  more,  and  that  the  difference  is  a  tax 
caused  by  the  tariff.  If  they  have  remained  stationary  in  price,  he 
declares  that  there  has  been  no  tax ;  and,  as  before,  conceals  the  dif 
ference  in  price  between  other  countries  and  this. 

But  when  the  raw  materials  of  industry  are  increased  in  price, 
then  no  sophistry  can  evade  the  conclusion  that  the  manufactured 
products  have  been  artificially  made  more  costly — either  more 
costly  absolutely,  as  compared  with  the  former  price ;  or  more  costly 
relatively,  as  compared  with  prices  in  other  countries ;  or,  in  a  third 
case,  of  which  some  examples  may  be  seen,  more  costly  than  they 
naturally  would  have  been,  although  both  absolutely  and  relatively 
decreased  in  price.  As  an  example,  we  may  take  the  sewing-ma 
chine.  It  was  an  American  invention,  and  has  been  so  skilfully 
manufactured  here  that  it  can  be  profitably  exported  from  this  to 
other  countries  where  iron  costs  much  less.  It  has  decreased  in 
price,  sharp  competition  between  makers  pushing  all  to  the  lowest 
rates.  And  yet  the  tariff  makes  every  sewing-machine  more  costly 
than  it  ought  to  be,  though  cheaper  now  than  it  was,  and  cheaper 
both  now  and  then  than  in  other  countries.  For,  if  the  iron  of 
which  it  is  made  cost  less,  and  if  the  steel  cost  less,  the  machines 
could  be  furnished  for  less  money,  and  competition  would  push  the 
manufacturers  to  do  so.  Have  not  the  sewing-girls  of  this  country 
a  right  to  every  advantage  over  foreign  labor  which  the  skill  and 
inventive  genius  of  their  own  countrymen  can  give  them  ?  Yet, 
they  are  robbed  of  part  of  that  advantage,  by  a  tariff  which  forces 
them  to  pay  more  for  the  machine  which  earns  their  bread  !  The 
poor  wife,  whose  "  best  friend  "  helps  her  through  the  toil  of  caring 
for  a  family,  is  robbed  by  the  tariff  when  she  pays  five  dollars,  or 
one  dollar,  or  one  cent,  more  for  that  blessing  than  it  should  nat 
urally  have  cost.  Who  pockets  the  money  ?  Not  the  government ! 
Remember  the  figures — one  million  goes  to  the  Treasury,  and  at 
least  twenty  millions  to  the  pockets  of  those  who  own  iron-furnaces, 
and  clear  100  per  cent,  profit  in  seven  months  ! 

This  illustration  will  make  it  clear  how  the  farmer  is  also  taxed 


282  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

in  the  increased  cost  of  every  implement,  utensil,  and  machine,  he 
uses,  even  though  the  machine  may  in  some  cases  cost  less  to-day 
than  it  did  ten  years  ago,  the  manufacture  having  been  improved, 
and  less  now  than  in  any  other  country.  The  farmer,  also,  has  a 
right  to  his  full  share  of  the  blessing  which  the  skill  and  genius  of 
his  countrymen  bestow.  He  has  a  right  to  the  machine,  not  only 
lower  than  it  was  formerly,  not  only  lower  than  it  is  in  Europe,  but 
lower  than  it  is  here  and  now !  For  the  iron  of  which  it  is  made  is 
artificially  increased  in  cost,  and  the  machine  therefore  costs  more 
than  it  naturally  would. 

But  the  manufactured  articles  which  are  cheaper  to-day  than 
they  were  in  1860,  are  few  in  number.  In  one  or  the  other  of  the 
three  ways  described,  all  are  enhanced  in  cost,  but  the  great  ma 
jority  not  only  cost  more  now  than  they  do  in  other  countries,  but  cost 
more  now  than  they  did  here  in  1860.  What,  then,  is  the  truth  ? 

The  farmer  receives  less  for  his  products  than  he  did  under  low 
duties. 

The  farmer  pays  more  for  manufactured  products  used  and  con 
sumed,  for  clothing,  buildings,  implements,  machines,  and  trans 
portation,  than  he  would  have  to  pay  if  no  duties  interfered. 

Therefore  the  farmer  is  injured  at  both  ends  of  the  exchange ; 
his  products  sell  for  less,  and  the  purchasing  power  of  the  price  paid 
is  less  than  it  should  be.  He  is  plundered  when  he  sells,  and  plun 
dered  when  he  buys.  Two-thirds  of  American  laborers,  therefore, 
are  robbed  by  the  high-tariff  system,  both  in  their  wages  and  in  the 
cost  of  their  living ;  a  part  of  their  earnings  are  taken,  and  they  are 
forced  to  spend  more  for  the  necessaries  and  comforts  which  they 
buy.  If  two-thirds  of  American  laborers  have  been  injured,  what 
has  been  the  result  to  the  remaining  third  ? 

It  may  appear  that  if  the  cost  of  agricultural  products  has  been 
less,  in  times  of  high  tariffs,  this,  though  a  disadvantage  to  the  farm 
er,  has  been  a  benefit  to  the  mechanic,  manufacturer,  miner,  and 
other  laborers ;  while,  if  the  price  of  any  manufactured  products  has 
been  increased,  this,  though  a  disadvantage  to  the  farmer,  has  been 
a  benefit  to  the  laborer  by  whom  those  articles  were  produced,  since 
it  has  enabled  his  employer  to  pay  him  more  liberally. 

To  some  extent  these  positions  are  both  true.  Reduced  cost  of 
agricultural  products  does  benefit  other  classes  in  the  community  in 
some  degree.  Increased  price  of  manufactured  prpducts  does  some 
times  enable  the  manufacturer  to  pay  better  wages.  Just  as  far  as 
these  things  are  true,  the  protective  system  does  benefit  other  la- 


SHALL  OUR  LABOR  BECOME  PAUPER  LABOR?      283 

borers  at  the  expense  of  the  farmer — plunders  two-thirds  of  American 
labor  for  the  benefit  of  some  part  of  one-third. 

But  in  the  end  this  benefit  is  usually  more  than  balanced,  and 
the  one-third,  in  the  aggregate,  remain  worse  off  than  if  no  attempt 
had  been  made  to  aid  them.  This  occurs  in  several  ways.  Either 
by  reduced  consumption  or  increased  cost  of  manufactured  products, 
the  benefit  derived  from  increased  price  of  products  may  be  neutral 
ized  to  the  manufacturer.  By  increased  cost  of  preparation  for  use, 
of  transportation  from  producer  to  consumer,  or  increased  friction 
and  waste  in  exchanges,  the  benefit  of  cheap  agricultural  products 
may  be  absorbed  before  they  reach  the  consumer.  When  the  farmer 
finds  himself  pinched,  and  restricts  his  purchases,  the  manufacturer 
finds  a  surplus  left  on  his  hands,  and  must  either  sustain  a  loss,  or 
reduce  production  by  working  short  time.  If  he  loses,  wages  cannot 
be  increased ;  if  work  is  suspended,  wages  are  in  effect  reduced. 

But  the  manufacturing  laborer  must  also  suffer  from  any  increase 
in  cost  of  manufactured  products  of  necessary  use.  Not  more  than 
one-half  of  the  expense  of  living,  even  to  operatives  in  manufactur 
ing  establishments,  is  for  articles  of  food,  and  of  these  not  all  are 
products  of  this  country.  After  extended  investigation,  Commis 
sioner  Wells  stated  that  the  average  expenditure  of  families  in  manu 
facturing  towns  in  1868,  for  articles  of  food,  was,  for  parents  and  one 
child,  $6.39 ;  parents  and  two  children,  $8.15.  In  the  same  tables  it 
appears  that  the  other  expenses  were  from  nine  to  eleven  dollars.  In 
larger  families  a  larger  proportion  is  required  for  food,  but  in  such  fam 
ilies  older  children  often  assist  by  their  work  or  earnings.  Of  the  ex 
penses  of  unmarried  workmen  the  proportion  for  food  is  still  less. 
Taking  all  workmen  employed  in  manufactures  together,  it  is  prob 
able,  therefore,  that  the  cost  of  food  forms  about  one-third  of  their 
expenses,  and  it  is  certainly  less  than  half.  But  of  the  expense  for 
food,  a  part  is  for  articles  not  produced  in  this  country.  In  the  esti 
mate  by  Mr.  Wells,  of  the  $6.39  allowed  as  the  average  weekly  ex 
penditure  for  food,  there  are  73  cents  for  sugar  and  molasses,  26 
cents  for  tea,  20  cents  for  coffee,  and  9  cents  for  spices  and  salt,  and 
none  of  these  articles  are  agricultural  products  of  this  country, 
except  the  sugar  and  molasses,  of  which  the  quantity  produced 
here  is  insignificant  compared  with  the  quantity  consumed.  Not  less 
than  $1.28  is  spent  for  these  articles,  not  produced  by  our  own  agri 
culture,  out  of  $6.39  expended  for  food.  More  than  two-thirds  of  the 
entire  cost  of  living,  and,  taking  the  whole  working-class  together, 
Drobably  three-fourths  of  the  whole,  is  for  articles  other  than  the 


284  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

products  of  our  farms.  If  agricultural  products  have  been  made 
cheaper  to  the  consumer — and  it  does  not  yet  appear  that  they  have 
— he  has,  nevertheless,  been  worse  off  on  the  whole,  wages  remain 
ing  the  same,  if  other  articles  of  necessity,  such  as  clothing  and 
household  goods,  have  been  rendered  in  like  proportion  more  costly. 
If  rents  have  also  been  increased  as  much  in  proportion  as  the  cost 
of  food  has  decreased,  the  balance  is  decidedly  against  the  laborer. 

With  these  facts  in  mind,  to  assist  us  in  judging  how  far  a  gen 
eral  increase  in  the  cost  of  manufactured  products,  or  in  the  cost  of 
agricultural  products,  has  affected  the  cost  of  living  in  the  aggre 
gate,  we  may  now  search  for  facts  to  show  in  what  manner  wages 
on  the  one  hand,  or  the  cost  of  living  on  the  other,  have  been  affected 
by  different  forms  of  the  tariff. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 

WAGES  AND  PRICES  IN  1845. 

OF  documents  accessible  to  the  writer,  the  earliest  reliable  data 
throwing  light'  upon  the  wages  and  expenses  of  laborers  of  different 
classes,  are  supplied  by  the  investigation  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  in  1845.  By  that  officer,  inquiries  were  addressed  to  a  great 
number  of  persons  in  all  parts  of  the  country,  and,  though  a  large  pro 
portion  of  the  manufacturers  declined  to  answer  his  most  important 
questions,  enough  replied,  of  manufacturers,  merchants,  farmers,  and 
others,  to  give  valuable  information.  This,  it  will  be  remembered, 
was  at  the  close  of  the  third  year  of  the  protective  tariff  of  1842,  and 
the  inquiries  invited  information  as  to  the  condition,  not  only  at  that 
time  and  during  the  three  years  under  that  tariff,  but  during  the  ten 
years  of  low  duties  which  had  preceded.  The  replies  given  conflict 
on  many  points,  but  as  to  certain  essential  facts  there  is  very  gen 
eral  agreement. 

First,  as  to  wages  of  agricultural  labor,  it  appears  that  there  had 
been  no  material  change  for  years  in  the  Eastern  States,  until  the  de 
cade  1832-'42,  during  which  wages  rose  a  little — on  an  average,  per 
haps,  from  $9  to  $10  a  month  and  board.  In  some  States,  as  Con 
necticut,  the  price  rose  to  $14.  But  at  the  West  it  reached  $17  a 
month.  There  is  no  room  for  dispute  as  to  the  effect  of  the  tariff  of 
1842.  From  every  quarter  came  detailed  statements  of  the  decreased 
price  of  agricultural  products  since  the  protective  system  was  adopted, 
and  the  strongest  advocates  of  that  system  referred  to  the  fact  as  an 


WAGES  AND  PRICES  IN   1845.  285 

evidence  in  their  favor.  Even  in  the  New-England  States,  New 
York,  and  Pennsylvania,  where  growth  of  manufactures  had  supplied 
that  "  home  market "  upon  which  the  farmers  now  are  asked  to  rely, 
the  same  general  and  marked  decrease  in  the  price  of  agricultural 
products  was  stated  by  one  party  and  admitted  by  the  other.  In 
Maine,  wheat  had  fallen  from  $1  to  90  cents,  corn  from  75  to  70  cents, 
wool  from  42  to  31  cents,  potatoes  from  30  to  25  cents ;  in  New  Hamp 
shire,  wool  from  45  to  35  cents  ;  in  Massachusetts,  wool  from  43  to  35 
cents — in  Berkshire  and  Hampshire  counties  "  its  price  is  so  seriously 
depressed  as  to  induce  a  disposal  or  slaughter  of  very  many  sheep  this 
fall ;  "  in  Rhode  Island,  where  surely  a  "  home  market  "  existed  if 
anywhere,  hay  had  fallen  from  $15  a  ton  to  $12,  corn  from  92  to  70 
cents,  rye  from  $1  to  87  cents,  potatoes  from  33  to  30  cents,  onions 
from  37  to  25  cents ;  beef  from  6  to  4  cents  a  pound,  butter  from  12 
to  10  cents,  and  cheese  from  8  to  6  cents.  In  New  York,  Henry  S. 
Randall,  the  well-known  wool-grower,  gave  several  tables  showing 
that  "  wool  averaged  higher  under  the  compromise  tariff  than  under 
that  enacted  in  1842,"  and  was  higher  even  in  the  years  of  greatest 
prostration  and  contraction  just  before  the  tariff  than  since  its  pas 
sage  ;  that  wheat  from  1832  to  1842  averaged  $1.33|,  and  from  1842 
to  1845  only  92£  cents ;  that  com  had  fallen  from  60  cents  in  1840  to 
50  cents  in  1845  ;  barley  from  45  to  40  ;  buckwheat  from  38  to  31 ; 
peas  from  50  to  40  ;  pork  from  $4.50  to  $3.50  per  cwt. ;  beef  from  $6 
to  $4.50;  and  wages  of  agricultural  labor  from  $12  a  month  to  $10. 

These  records  are  conclusive  for  the  Eastern  States,  but  the  West 
ern  farmers  had  suffered  still  more  severely.  In  Ohio,  wheat  had  sold 
before  1842  on  the  lake-shore  at  $1  a  bushel,  and  since  had  fallen 
to  70  cents,  while  pig-iron  had  advanced  at  the  same  point  from  $18 
to  $25  a  ton.  At  Massillon,  before  the  tariff,  wheat  averaged  $1,  and, 
after  it,  had  fallen  to  65  cents.  In  Indiana,  hogs,  the  principal  prod 
uct,  had  ranged  from  $4  to  $7  per  100  pounds,  but  since  the  tariff 
had  fallen  $2  to  $3.  In  Illinois,  wheat  ranged  before  the  tariff 
from  75  cents  to  $1  a  bushel,  and  corn  from  25  to  40  cents.  In  1844 
wheat  was  50  cents,  and  in  1845,  40  cents,  and  corn  had  fallen  to  12^ 
cents  a  bushel.  No  wonder  that  wages  had  fallen  from  $12  and  $15 
per  month  to  $7  and  even  to  $5  per  month  ! 

Further  quotations  are  needless ;  no  fact  can  be  more  indisputa 
bly  proved  than  this,  that  the  prices  of  agricultural  products,  and 
the  wages  of  agricultural  labor,  were  reduced,  under  the  protective 
tariff  of  1842,  from  20  to  50  per  cent.  Did  the  prices  of  articles 
which  farmers  have  to  buy  decrease  in  like  proportion  ? 
20 


286  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

Among  the  questions  asked  by  the  Secretary  were  these :  of  the 
manufacturer,  "  At  what  prices  have  the  manufactures  been  sold  since 
the  establishment  ?  "  and  of  others,  "  Whether  the  average  prices  of 
what  are  called  the  protected  articles  have  been  as  low  in  proportion 
to  the  average  prices  of  the  staples  for  the  last  three  years  as  in  the 
preceding  ten  ?  "  Of  the  manufacturers  who  sent  replies  to  any  of 
the  questions,  very  few  stated  the  prices  at  which  their  goods  had 
been  sold  in  different  years.  On  the  other  hand,  almost  every  per 
son  of  other  employment  stated  that  the  cost  of  manufactured  arti 
cles  had  been  generally  greater  since  the  tariff  was  adopted  than 
before,  and  proceeded  to  explain  the  fact  according  to  his  individual 
opinions :  if  opposed  to  the  tariff,  ascribing  the  increased  cost  to  the 
duties ;  and,  if  in  favor  of  it,  either  ascribing  the  fact  to  other  causes, 
or  arguing  that  temporary  high  prices,  "  if  they  should  lead  to  a 
large  increase  of  the  manufacture,  sufficient,  within  a  reasonable 
time,  to  supply  the  wants  of  the  country  at  a  price  not  much  above 
the  cost  of  the  same  articles  if  brought  from  foreign  countries  free 
of  duty,  would  in  the  long-run  be  beneficial."  What  the  effect  has 
actually  been  upon  the  manufacture,  we  have  seen.  We  are  now 
seeking  to  ascertain  whether  prices  have  been  increased  by  high 
duties,  and  the  concurrent  testimony  of  advocates  and  opponents  in 
1845  was,  that  the  prices  of  manufactured  articles  had  at  that  time 
been  generally  increased.  Let  it  be  here  well  understood  that  the 
duty  did  not  in  all  cases,  and  does  not  always,  enhance  the  price  to 
the  full  amount  of  the  duty.  No  fallacy  has  been  more  conclusively 
refuted  by  facts  than  this.  On  the  contrary,  we  shall  see  that  many 
articles  were  actually  lower  in  price  after  the  duty  was  imposed 
than  before,  because  the  materials  were  cheaper,  or  the  manufacture 
had  been  improved ;  that  others  remained  unchanged  in  price,  though 
the  materials  were  cheaper ;  and  that,  while  very  many  were  en 
hanced  in  price,  in  many  cases  the  increase  was  not  equal  to  the 
duty  imposed.  But  it  is  maintained,  and  the  facts  prove,  that  there 
was  an  increase  in  the  price  of  manufactured  articles  generally,  and 
that,  when  there  was  no  absolute  increase,  the  cost  of  the  manufac 
tured  article  had  in  nearly  every  case  been  reduced  less  than  the  cost 
of  materials  and  of  manufacturing,  so  that  the  consumer  paid  for  the 
article  more  than  its  natural  price. 

Of  the  manufacturers  who  did  reply,  a  few  were  frank  enough  to 
give  precise  statements,  but  these  were  generally  manufacturers  of 
coarse  cottons,  who  stated  that  they  needed  no  protection,  that  the 
duty  did  not  benefit  them,  that  they  were  exporting  of  their  prod- 


WAGES  AND  PRICES  IN    1845.  287 

ucts  to  other  countries,  and  that  a  reduction  of  price  had  been 
effected  by  improvements  which  had  reduced  the  cost  of  manufac 
ture  from  33  cents  a  pound  in  1828  to  14£  cents  a  pound  in  1840, 
and  to  11  cents  a  pound  in  1845,  and,  by  a  decrease  in  the  cost  of 
the  raw  material  from  12,84  cents  in  1830,  to  7  cents  in  1845.  In 
consequence,  the  price  of  prints  had  been  reduced  in  1841  to  5.85 
cents,  and  in  1842  shirtings  No.  30  sold  at  6.75  cents,  printings  at 
4.75  cents,  and  sheetings  No.  14  at  5.50  cents.  But  since  that  time 
prices  had  slightly  risen,  though  the  cost  of  manufacture  had  been 
reduced  from  14^-  cents  a  pound  to  11  cents  a  pound,  and  the 
cost  of  the  raw  material  from  about  11  to  7  cents  a  pound.  In  1845 
the  prices  were,  for  shirtings  No.  30,  7  cents ;  for  printings  No.  30, 
6  cents ;  for  sheetings  No.  14,  6  cents.  These  are  the  figures  given 
by  the  Great  Falls  Manufacturing  Company.  The  Hamilton  and 
Appleton  Companies  of  Lowell  stated  that  scarcely  any  foreign 
goods  of  similar  descriptions  to  those  of  their  make  were  imported, 
and  "  some  would  not  be  in  any  state  of  duty,  as  they  appear  to  be 
made  cheaper  here  than  in  any  other  part  of  the  world ;  the  others 
are  made  nearly  as  cheap  here  as  anywhere."  Though  neither  these 
nor  any  other  manufacturers  reported  prices  at  which  their  products 
sold  as  plainly  as  did  the  company  above  mentioned,  we  can  under 
stand  that  the  markets  were  the  same  for  all,  and  that  the  same 
causes — improvement  of  manufacture  and  reduced  cost  of  cotton — 
had  affected  the  cost  of  producing  other  classes  of  cotton  goods. 

Other  evidence,  however,  is  accessible,  to  prove  that  cotton 
goods  were  generally  increased  in  price  under  this  tariff.  The 
Treasury  report  of  1849,  a  very  elaborate  work  in  the  interest  of  the 
protective  system,  gives  detailed  statements  of  the  prices  of  many 
articles  which  had  been  reduced  in  price  from  1835  to  1849  by  the 
progress  of  the  home  manufacture.  The  argument  which  these 
selected  facts  were  designed  to  sustain  was,  that  the  cost  of  the  ar 
ticles  named  had  been  reduced  in  consequence  of  the  tariff  of  1842, 
it  being  quietly  taken  for  granted  that  the  domestic  manufacture 
would  not  have  existed,  or  would  have  made  no  progress,  had  not 
that  tariff  been  enacted !  At  this  day  not  a  word  need  be  said  in 
refutation  of  an  assumption  so  contrary  to  the  history  of  our  in 
dustries,  and  it  is  amazing  that  any  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  ever 
resorted  to  such  a  sophistry  in  a  labored  report.  It  is  plain,  too, 
that  the  facts  presented  in  the  report  were  carefully  selected  for  the 
purpose,  for  out  of  thousands  of  articles  of  domestic  make,  not  one 
was  given  the  history  of  which  conflicted  with  the  Secretary's 


288  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

peculiar  theory,  and  only  those  were  selected  which  had  most 
steadily  declined  in  price.  Taken  by  itself,  therefore,  the  report  of 
1849  was  only  calculated  to  create  a  false  impression ;  it  kept  out  of 
sight  the  great  multitude  of  articles  which  had  been  most  enhanced 
in  price,  and  gave  elaborate  records  of  those  only  which  had  been 
reduced  in  price  with  enough  of  regularity  to  sustain  the  reasoning 
of  the  Secretary.  But  the  facts  which  this  report  presented,  taken 
in  connection  with  others  which  it  suppressed,  are  of  great  value. 
Its  statistics  of  the  prices  of  certain  cotton  goods  from  1835  to  1849 
show  most  conclusively  that  the  progress  of  the  manufacture  from 
1835  to  1843  caused  a  very  rapid  reduction  in  the  cost  of  every 
article ;  that  the  tariff  of  1842  simply  arrested  that  reduction,  and  in 
a  great  majority  of  cases  caused  higher  prices  in  1846,  the  last  year 
of  that  tariff,  than  in  1842,  the  last  year  preceding  its  adoption, 
although  the  raw  cotton  cost  less  in  1846  than  in  1842.  This  will 
appear  from  the  accompanying  table,  in  which  those  statistics  of  the 
report  of  1849  are  condensed  which  show  the  prices  of  cotton  goods 
of  certain  qualities  from  1835  to  1849. 

This  table  shows  a  very  great  reduction  in  the  price  of  all  goods 
from  1835  to  1842  inclusive,  under  the  non-protective  duties,  and  in 
1843,  the  raw  material  having  fallen  nearly  two  cents  a  pound,  prices 
of  goods  fell  still  lower.  But  in  1844  every  article  quoted,  except 
one,  increased  again,  many  of  them  30  to  50  per  cent.,  in  a  single 
year ;  in  1845,  notwithstanding  a  fall  of  cotton  to  the  lowest  price 
then  ever  reached,  the  price  of  goods  remained  about  the  same ;  and 
in  1846,  cotton  selling  for  2£  cents  less  than  its  price  in  1841,  and 
for  a  lower  price  than  it  commanded  in  1842,  the  prices  of  goods 
were  with  very  few  exceptions  higher  than  in  1842.  Of  sixty-six  arti 
cles  and  qualities  quoted  in  the  table,  only  nine  were  slightly  lower 
in  price  in  1846  than  in  1842,  and  only  five  remained  unchanged, 
while  forty-seven  had  increased  in  price.  Not  only  was  the  natural 
reduction  of  price  arrested — that  reduction  caused  by  progress  in 
manufacture  which  had  enabled  the  makers  to  sell  sheetings  for  6 
cents,  shirtings  for  6£  cents,  drillings  for  7-J-  cents,  duck  for  12-J-, 
calicoes  for  5.70,  and  cotton  yarn  for  19  cents — not  only  was  the  con 
sumer  deprived  of  all  benefit  from  a  reduction  in  the  price  of  cotton 
from  8.1  cents  in  1842  to  5.9  cents  in  1845,  and  7.8  cents  in  1846, 
but  there  was  an  actual  increase  of  price,  of  sheetings  to  6f  cents ; 
of  shirtings  to  6J  cents,  of  drillings  to  7f  cents,  of  duck  to  13|- 
cents,  of  calicoes  to  5.83,  and  of  cotton  yarn  to  19f  cents.  The  cot 
ton  bought  in  1841  at  10  cents  a  pound,  and  worked  up  by  the 


WAGES  AND   PRICES  IN   1845. 


289 


x  x 


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§  XX 


290  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

manufacturer  at  a  cost  of  11  or  12  cents  a  pound,  he  sold  in  1842  at 
small  profits  in  goods  at  the  prices  quoted,  but  the  cotton  bought  in 
1845  at  6  cents,  if  worked  up  at  the  same  cost,  he  sold,  in  1846,  at 
a  profit  of  more  than  4  cents  a  pound  if  his  goods  were  unchanged 
in  price  since  1842 — a  profit  of  more  than  60  per  cent,  in  sheetings 
and  shirtings.  The  consumer  was  taxed  just  as  truly  as  if  the  price 
in  1846  had  been  60  per  cent,  higher  than  in  1842. 

That  all  consumers  were  thus  taxed  appears  still  more  conclu 
sively  from  the  great  reduction  in  prices  from  1847  to  1849,  on  cali 
coes  from  5.83  to  3.95  cents ;  on  shirtings,  from  9  and  8J  to  6  j-  and 
6  cents ;  on  sheetings,  from  7J  to  6J,  and  from  8  cents  to  6.90  cents ; 
on  duck,  2  cents  a  yard,  and  on  yarn,  2f  cents  a  pound.  The  price 
of  cotton  was  higher  in  1849  than  in  1845,  and  in  1848  than  in  1846, 
and  yet  the  consumer  gained  in  price  just  as  he  had  lost  under  the  pro 
tective  tariff.  It  is  only  necessary  to  remember  that  the  consump 
tion  per  capita  suddenly  increased  from  8.54  under  protection  to 
12.75  under  low  duties  in  1849.  The  manufacturer,  content  with 
smaller  profits,  found  a  larger  market,  and  was  able  to  extend  his 
business  fully  50  per  cent,  in  three  years. 

Under  the  protective  tariff,  therefore,  the  consumer  was  taxed 
fully  60  per  cent,  on  his  cotton  goods.  The  grower  received  less  for 
his  cotton.  The  manufacture  was  extended  much  less  rapidly  in  four 
years  under  protection  than  in  three  years  after  the  protection  had 
been  removed.  And  it  will  presently  appear  that  the  wages  of  oper 
atives  were  lower  in  1845  than  they  had  been  in  1839,  or  than  they 
were  in  1849.  Who,  then,  was  benefited  ?  The  capitalist,  and  no 
body  else.  In  1845  all  companies  reported  profits,  ranging  from  10 
to  30  per  cent.,  and  some  reported  profits  even  during  the  worst 
years,  1841  and  1842 — the  York  Company,  in  Maine,  reporting  a 
profit  in  1840  of  14f  per  cent.;  in  1841,  of  13|  per  cent.;  in  1842, 
of  5  per  cent. ;  in  1843,  of  9  per  cent. ;  and  in  1844,  of  20J  per  cent. 

We  have  not  yet  traced  the  effect  of  the  tariff  to  the  consumer. 
A  statement  of  the  prices  actually  paid  at  Charleston,  South  Caro 
lina,  for  goods  there  most  used,  enables  us  to  realize  better  how  the 
tariff  operated.  Common  calicoes,  costing  the  manufacturer  4-J  cents 
a  yard,  were  selling  to  consumers  at  9  to  16  cents.  The  transporters 
and  middle-men  were  evidently  transferring  their  share  of  all  tHe 
burdens  to  the  consumers.  Cheap  cambrics  were  selling  at  18  to  20 
cents ;  fine  and  checked  cambrics,  from  25  to  30  cents ;  white  dim 
ity,  from  15  to  22  ;  coarse  counterpanes,  for  $1  to  $4  each ;  medium 
quality,  from  $2  to  $4 ;  blue  and  white  checks,  for  10  to  12J  cents ; 


WAGES  AND  PRICES  IN  1845.  291 

plain  negro  cloth,  for  40  to  55  cents ;  and  cotton  thread,  not  on  spools, 
for  40  to  75  cents. 

If  the  cotton  manufacture,  which  needed  no  protection,  at  least 
for  coarser  qualities,  because  the  goods  "are  manufactured  here 
cheaper  than  anywhere  else  in  the  world  " — if  this  manufacture  was 
thus  affected  by  the  high  duties,  so  that  the  price  of  its  products  ac 
tually  increased,  though  the  cost  of  those  products  was  reduced,  and 
if  the  consumer  was  then  forced  to  pay  in  some  localities  several 
times  that  increased  price,  what  shall  we  expect  of  other  manufac 
tures  less  favorably  situated  ? 

The  price  of  leather  was  not  especially  increased,  as  the  manufac 
turers  state,  because  we  "can  manufacture  for  less  than  any  other 
nation."  Yet,  while  the  price  of  some  qualities  of  boots  and  shoes 
and  other  manufactures  of  leather  was  reduced,  the  price  of  others 
was  increased,  not  so  much  because  the  shoemaker  needed  protec 
tion,  as  because,  having  control  of  the  market,  and  having  a  tax  to 
pay,  he  chose  to  make  somebody  else  pay  it.  The  duty  on  hides 
was  5  per  cent.,  and  on  leather  6  and  8  cents  per  pound.  The  man 
ufacture  of  tobacco  was  also  independent  of  duties,  but  the  prices, 
though  lower  than  the  imported  articles,  allowed  large  profits. 
Lumber  and  its  manufactures  had  somewhat  increased  in  price  in 
States  near  the  Canada  border ;  in  Maine,  Washington  County,  pine 
sold  for  $9.50  ;  spruce,  for  $6.50 ;  and  laths,  for  85  cents.  Plaster, 
like  almost  every  thing  else,  was  cheaper  than  it  was  during  the 
inflation  of  1836,  but  still  sold  for  $1  for  ground,  and  $1.62|  to  $1.75 
for  calcined,  while  the  product  from  Canada  could  still  be  imported 
to  some  extent  in  spite  of  the  duty,  so  much  lower  were  prices  there. 
White  lead  (ground  in  oil),  with  a  duty  of  four  cents  a  pound,  had 
risen  to  $7  per  cwt.,  or  about  20  per  cent.,  and  a  manufacturer  re 
ports  that  a  much  lower  duty  would  be  ample.  Soap  and  candles 
were  not  affected,  "  as  the  raw  materials  are  lower  here  than  in  Eu 
rope."  Printing-paper,  which  had  sold  for  12  J  cents  a  pound  in  the 
highest  inflation  of  1837,  was  only  reduced  to  10  cents.  It  may  be 
easily  inferred  that  the  consumer  paid  an  unnatural  price,  and  the 
manufacturer  realized  an  unnatural  profit,  although  the  paper  was 
still  sold  within  the  price  at  which  dutiable  paper  could  be  im 
ported.  Salt,  which  sold  for  22  cents  a  bushel  in  New  York  in  1842, 
cost  35  cents  in  1845,  and  45  cents  early  in  1846,  and  in  the  interior 
was  still  higher. 

The  wool  manufacture  presented  a  curious  phenomenon.  We 
have  seen  that  wool  at  this  time  was  very  cheap — so  low  was  the 


292  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

price,  indeed,  that  actual  exportation  to  Europe  proved  that  the  Eng 
lish  manufacturer  was  at  a  disadvantage  of  5  per  cent,  in  the  cost  of 
material.  Nevertheless,  imports  of  almost  every  kind  ,of  woollen 
goods  increased,  to  the  value  of  over  one  million  in  the  aggregate, 
while  the  wool  was  so  low  that  great  numbers  of  sheep  were  being 
slaughtered.  The  broadcloth  experiment,  sustained,  as  Mr.  Randall 
showed,  by  a  supply  of  cheap  wool  from  South  America,  not  only 
made  some  progress,  but  encouraged  the  growing  of  fine  wool  to 
some  extent,  yet  the  importation  of  foreign  cloths  was  increased, 
which  shows  that  the  price  was  much  higher  here  than  elsewhere. 
Other  goods,  of  a  quality  likely  to  be  imported,  were  increased  in 
price,  while  goods  never  imported,  if  decreased  in  price  at  all,  were 
reduced  less  than  the  cost  of  the  material.  Thus,  goods  which  sold 
for  68  cents  in  1839,  when  wool  cost  40  cents  a  pound,  were  reduced 
in  1844  to  53  cents,  when  wool  cost  only  27  cents  at  that  factory. 
But  flannels  increased  in  price  more  than  30  per  cent,  in  1844,  and 
satinets  25  per  cent. ;  low-priced  cassimeres,  which  cost  in  England  Is. 
4d.  to  2s.,  were  sold  here  in  cities  on  the  coast  for  from  50  to  90  cents ; 
cheap  overcoat  pilot-cloth,  costing  Is.  4d.  to  Is.  6d.  in  England,  sold 
here  for  50  to  65  cents.  This  occurred  while  the  material  was  actu 
ally  cheaper  by  5  per  cent,  to  our  manufacturers  than  to  the  English. 
It  was  not  pretended  by  any  manufacturer  that  the  price  of  goods 
had  been  generally  reduced,  but  nearly  every  one  acknowledged  that 
improvements  in  machinery  and  greater  skill  had  caused  large  prof 
its.  It  is  very  plain,  then,  that  these  improvements  had  not  resulted 
in  benefit  to  the  consumers ;  that  the  low  price  of  his  wool  did  not 
secure  the  farmer  correspondingly  cheaper  cloths,  and  that,  with  an 
actual  advantage  over  the  English  in  cost  of  material,  our  manufac 
turers  sold  at  rates  so  high  as  to  encourage  importations  actually 
larger  than  those  of  1840,  when  the  wool  cost  much  more  here,  and 
when  some  of  the  improvements  in  machinery  had  not  been  made. 
Nor  can  it  be  said  that  the  natural  increase  of  consumption  was 
wholly  unchecked  by  the  high  prices ;  for,  in  reports  from  the  farm 
ing  States,  it  is  recorded  that  a  great  many  people  had  been  obliged 
to  discontinue  the  use  of  woollen  cloths,  other  than  those  made  on 
the  farm.  And  we  shall  see  that  the  manufacturers,  with  all  their 
admitted  profits,  allowed  no  increase  of  wages,  but  were  paying  men 
87J  cents  a  day,  women  from  40  to  50  cents,  and  children  from  20  to 
37J  cents.  While  agriculture  was  depressed,  and  wages  were  reduced 
from  $17  to  "even  $5  a  month"  in  Illinois,  the  labor  thus  forced  to 
seek  employment  from  manufactures  gained  no  increase  of  wages  from 
protection,  though  large  profits  were  realized. 


WAGES  AND   PRICES  IN   1845. 


293 


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294  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

But  was  the  consumer  taxed  ?  Once  more  the  statistics  of  the 
report  of  1849,  although  giving  only  selected  facts,  and  those  the 
most  favorable  that  could  be  ascertained,  help  to  a  correct  decision. 
The  preceding  table  presents  prices  of  woollen  goods,  as  stated 
in  that  report,  for  the  years  1835  to  1849,  and  the  prices  of  merino, 
common  and  pulled  wool,  at  New  York,  as  recorded  in  the  Treasury 
report  of  1863.  Again,  there  is  apparent  a  very  considerable  reduc 
tion  of  prices  from  1835  to  1843,  caused  in  part  by  the  low  price  of 
wool  in  1842  and  1843,  but  in  part  by  the  improvements  in  manufac 
ture.  Broadcloth  had  been  reduced  in  cost  about  one  dollar  a  yard; 
cassimere,  fifty  cents ;  flannels,  18  cents,  or  50  per  cent. ;  linseys,  8 
cents,  nearly  30  per  cent. ;  carpets  from  95  cents  to  65  cents  a  yard. 
Blankets  had  also  been  reduced  in  cost  since  1838  about  $1.25  a 
pair.  The  low  prices  of  1843  were  followed,  after  the  tariff  began  to 
have  effect,  by  an  increase  of  price  in  almost  every  article.  In  1846, 
with  wool  actually  lower  than  in  1842,  and  far  lower  than  in  1841, 
when  the  wool  was  purchased  for  goods  made  and  sold  in  1842,  the 
prices  of  the  goods  selected  by  the  Secretary  show  scarcely  any  de 
crease  in  price,  while  some  of  them  were  higher.  A  cloth  requiring  2-J 
pounds  of  wool  to  the  yard,  made  from  merino  wool  bought  in  1841 
at  the  average  price  for  that  year  in  New  York,  would  have  cost 
for  raw  material  alone  94-J  cents,  but  the  same  raw  material  bought 
in  1845  would  have  cost  68^  cents  to  the  yard ;  and  from  this  cause 
alone  the  price  of  such  cloth  could  have  been  reduced  26  cents  a 
yard,  but  no  quality  of  cloth  was  reduced  in  price  in  that  proportion 
from  1842  to  1846,  while  the  average  price  of  the  Lowell  black  cas- 
simeres  was  precisely  the  same,  the  price  of  satinets  was  4  cents 
higher,  the  price  of  Northampton  broadcloths  was  25  cents  higher, 
linseys  of  Lowell  were  3  or  4  cents  lower,  and  carpets  were  some 
2-J  cents  lower,  and  some  as  high ;  flannels  were  also  about  the  same 
in  price,  and  blankets  were  50  and  75  cents  per  pair  higher  in  1846 
than  in  1842,  and  25  to  50  cents  higher  in  that  year,  or  in  1845,  than 
in  1841  or  1840.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  those  prices  were  doubt 
less  reported  to  the  Secretary  for  publication  which  would  best  sus 
tain  the  protective  policy,  it  is  impossible  to  doubt  that  consumers 
of  woollen  goods  were  generally  taxed,  not  only  by  depriving  them 
of  the  advantage  in  the  price  of  wool,  but  in  the  majority  of  cases 
by  an  actual  increase  in  the  price  of  their  goods.  Not  only  was  the 
wool-grower  deprived  of  a  part  of  the  value  of  his  wool,  but  he  was 
obliged  to  pay  more  for  his  cloth.  The  consumer  was  taxed.  Even 
the  hands  employed  in  woollen  manufacture  gained  nothing  in  wages, 


WAGES  AND  PRICES  IN   1845.  295 

but  had  to  pay  more  of  their  wages  for  clothing.  For  whom  was  the 
whole  community  thus  taxed  ?  For  the  manufacturers,  whose  profits 
were  so  large  that  in  1845  nearly  all  refused  to  report  them. 

All  iron-makers  admitted  that  the  cost  of  making  pig-iron  had 
decreased  since  1840,  and  was  still  decreasing.  It  was  shown  that 
the  actual  cost  of  anthracite  pig-iron  was,  in  some  cases,  not  over 
815  a  ton.  Yet  the  price  of  pig-iron  had  increased  from  $25  a  ton 
in  New  York,  and  $20  a  ton  at  some  of  the  furnaces,  to  $37  to  $39 
in  New  York,  and  from  $30  to  $35  at  the  furnaces,  for  cash.  With 
such  enormous  increase  of  profits,  we  shall  see  the  manufacturer  had 
not  granted  any  corresponding  increase  of  wages ;  at  many  furnaces 
the  workmen  were  paid  an  average  of  87-J  cents.  While  the  raw 
material  was  thus  being  reduced  in  cost  and  increased  in  price,  is  it 
strange  that  the  true  manufacturers  of  iron  complained  ?  A  maker 
of  castings  reported  that  his  product  had  increased  in  price  because 
of  the  increased  cost  of  iron,  and  that  he  needed  a  reduction  of  the 
duty  on  pig.  Another  reported  that  he  sold  castings  at  $70  in  1844, 
when  pig-iron  cost  $30,  and  then  made  a  profit  of  10  per  cent,  only ; 
and  another  stated  that  his  castings  sold  in  1845  for  $80  a  ton ;  that  in 
1842  they  cost  only  $50  a  ton;  and  during  the  inflation  of  1836  sold 
for  $100.  A  manufacturer  of  stoves  reported  no  increase  in  wages, 
but  an  increase  in  the  cost  of  his  products.  A  maker  of  mechanics' 
tools  and  agricultural  implements  speaks  of  "  the  high  price  we  are 
enabled  to  obtain,"  and  adds  :  "  Without  the  protection  at  present 
afforded  by  the  government,  we  could  not  successfully  compete  with 
the  foreign  manufacturer."  This  is  a  confession,  first,  that  the  con 
sumers  were  taxed,  both  farmers  and  mechanics,  and  that  heavily ; 
second,  that  the  price  of  pig-iron  had  brought  this  very  manufacture, 
which  in  colonial  times  had  taught  England  how  to  make  scythes 
and  shovels,  into  such  a  predicament  that  duties  were  necessary  to 
keep  out  foreign  implements.  In  Cincinnati,  rolled  bar  cost  $55  a 
ton  in  1842,  and  $70  a  ton  in  1845,  and  the  effect  on  manufacturers 
who  used  that  material  can  be  easily  inferred.  Nevertheless,  such 
were  the  improvements  in  manufacture,  not  only  during  the  existence 
of  this  tariff,  but  before  and  after  it,  that  many  articles,  the  manu 
facture  of  which  needed  no  protection,  and  in  which  the  raw  material 
consumed  caused  but  a  small  proportion  of  the  cost,  were  reduced 
in  price  during  the  tariff  of  1842,  as  they  had  been  before  its  adop 
tion,  and  were  after  its  repeal.  These  instances  were  paraded  with 
great  spirit  by  the  advocates  of  the  tariff  as  proofs  that  it  had 
decreased  the  cost  of  manufactured  articles.  Thus  in  the  report  of 


296  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

1849,  different  tables  give  the  accompanying  statement  of  the  prices 
of  certain  articles  of  iron,  but  it  is  to  be  observed  that  nearly  all  of 
them  are  products  in  which  the  raw  material  is  not  an  element  of 
chief  cost,  and  nearly  all  are  articles  which  were  successfully  made 
in  this  country  at  an  early  day. 

The  fact  that  of  these  selected  articles  all  except  four  had  been 
reduced  in  price  prior  to  the  adoption  of  the  tariff,  while  every  one, 
without  exception,  was  greatly  reduced  in  price  after  the  removal  of 
the  tariff,  and  nearly  all  far  more  within  the  three  years  1847-1849, 
inclusive,  than  they  had  been  within  the  four  years  1843-1846,  inclu 
sive,  effectually  disposes  of  the  idea  that  any  reduction  of  the  price 
which  took  place  under  the  operation  of  the  tariff  was  attributable 
to  its  influence.  On  the  contrary,  eight  of  these  articles  were  sold 
at  the  same  price  in  1842  or  1843  as  in  1846,  the  last  year  of  the 
tariff,  and  nine  were  sold  at  a  higher  price  in  1846  than  in  1842  or 
1843,  while  nine  were  slightly  lower  in  price.  Only  three  articles 
in  the  list  were  reduced  in  price  as  much  from  1843  to  1846  as  from 
1846  to  1849.  These  very  statistics,  then,  prepared  in  support  of 
the  tariff,  to  prove  that  domestic  competition  had  reduced  the  price 
of  some  articles,  show  very  forcibly  that  the  natural  decline  in  cost 
by  reason  of  improvements  was,  in  almost  every  instance,  retarded, 
and,  in  most  instances,  arrested,  by  the  protective  duties,  while  of 
these  articles  about  one-third  were  rendered  more  costly  by  the  tariff. 
Taken  in  connection  with  the  fact  that  these  are  but  a  few  articles 
selected  from  a  great  number  of  products  of  iron,  and  they  are  gen 
erally  articles  in  which  the  raw  material  used  is  comparatively  a 
minor  element  of  cost,  the  table  will  satisfy  the  mind  that  the  great 
majority  of  products  of  iron  were  actually  raised  in  price  by  the 
tariff;  that,  as  to  almost  all,  the  natural  reduction  of  price  was 
arrested;  and  that  there  were  very  few  indeed  which  were  reduced 
in  price  as  rapidly  during  the  operation  of  the  tariff  as  before  its 
adoption,  or  after  its  repeal.  But  the  consumer  was  taxed  upon  all 
articles  of  which  iron  is  a  material.  If  the  improvements  in  manu 
facture  enabled  the  maker  to  reduce  the  price  of  hoes  from  $3.25  in 
1842  to  $2.37  in  1846,  it  will  not  be  denied  that  he  could  have 
reduced  the  price  to  $2.25,  as  he  did  in  1849,  if  the  iron  had  cost 
less  money.  If  nails  made  of  iron  costing  $40  a  ton  could  be  sold 
in  1845  for  4f  cents  a  pound,  the  same  quality  could  undoubtedly 
have  been  sold  for  4  cents,  as  they  were  in  1849,  if  the  iron  had  not 
been  made  costly.  Thus  every  consumer  was  really  taxed,  if  not  by 
the  duty  on  nails  or  hoes,  or  other  finished  products  needing  no 
protection,  then  by  the  duty  on  pig-iron. 


WAGES  AXD   PRICES  IX   1845. 


297 


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298  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

It  will  not  be  overlooked  that  the  prices  of  cotton  and  wool  cards, 
$4  and  $2.50  per  dozen  in  1843,  were  not  reduced  until  the  repeal  of 
the  tariff,  but  were  then  quickly  and  materially  cheapened.  In  this 
and  other  methods  the  duty  on  iron  simply  embarrassed  other  manu 
facturers,  by  making  it  impossible  for  them  to  cut  down  the  cost  of 
production  as  rapidly  as  manufacturers  elsewhere  were  enabled  to  do. 
It  does  not  seem  possible  to  doubt  that  by  this  tariff  agriculture  was 
doubly  retarded,  by  reduction  of  the  price  of  agricultural  products 
and  the  wages  of  agricultural  labor,  and  by  a  general  increase  in  the 
cost  of  manufactured  articles.  While  many  articles  were  not  affected 
in  price,  implements,  clothing,  and  a  large  proportion  of  articles  used 
by  the  farmer,  were  rendered  more  costly  at  the  place  of  production 
or  in  wholesale  markets,  while  neither  internal  navigation  nor  rail 
road  facilities  increased  at  the  natural  rate,  and  the  cost  of  transpor 
tation  was  enhanced.  Agricultural  labor,  then  three-fourths  of  all 
American  industry,  if  the  census  of  1840  was  reliable,  was  injured 
by  this  tariff,  both  in  its  receipts  and  its  expenditures. 

Injury  to  agriculture  involves  injury  to  the  mechanic,  the  trades 
man,  the  merchant,  the  professional  man ;  for  all  these  classes  depend 
upon  the  farmers,  the  majority  of  the  population,  for  support.  Nor 
can  it  be  supposed  that  the  transporting  interest  was  helped  by  duties 
which  made  iron  cost  from  $35  to  $40  a  ton,  and  increased  the  cost  of 
hemp,  timber,  and  tools.  There  is  no  evidence  known  to  the  writer 
that  the  tariff  of  1842  resulted  in  any  increase  of  wages  or  profits 
to  these  classes  or  either  of  them,  while  every  one  can  understand 
that,  when  a  maker  of  mechanics'  tools  boasted  of  the  high  price 
which  he  was  enabled  to  charge  for  them,  the  mechanic  must  have 
regarded  the  matter  quite  differently.  That  hatters  needed  no  aid  is 
plain  from  the  fact  that  in  1840,  under  extreme  low  duties,  there 
were  imported  of  "  hats,  leather,  wool,  and  fur,"  only  $7,000  worth, 
•  while  there  were  exported  $103,000  worth,  and  in  1846  the  value  of  fur 
hats  alone  imported  was  over  $12,000.  In  1841  we  imported  of  boots 
and  shoes  of  all  kinds  only  $17,166,  and  exported  $100,725,  while  in 
1846  we  imported  $37,572.  In  1840-'42,  inclusive,  the  three  years 
of  lowest  duties  preceding  the  protective  tariff,  there  were  imported 
only  $28,000  of  ready-made  clothing,  an  average  of  $9,000  a  year. 
The  tailors  surely  did  not  need  protection  against  a  competition 
amounting  to  less  than  10  cents  a  year  per  tailor !  But  the  protec 
tive  tariff  so  enhanced  the  cost  of  cloth  that,  though  the  tailors  were 
also  "  protected  "  by  duties  of  33  to  50  per  cent,  on  clothing,  people 
began  to  import  ready-made  clothing  instead  of  cloth,  and  in  1845 


WAGES  AND  PRICES  IN  1845.  299 

there  was  imported  about  $200,000  worth — an  increase  of  more  than 
2,000  per  cent,  in  four  years.  It  is  not  only  plain  that  the  tailors 
were  not  benefited — it  is  plain  that  the  cost  of  clothing  to  consumers 
was  increased  generally  from  33  to  50  per  cent,  in  the  cost  of  material 
alone.  This  tax,  like  that  involved  in  the  cost  of  iron,  bears  upon  all 
classes,  and  to  the  farmers  and  mechanics,  and  persons  employed  in 
non-protected  manufactures,  at  least,  it  was  in  no  wise  compensated. 

There  remain  less  than  one-twentieth  of  the  whole  force  of  labor 
ers — the  number  then  employed  in  manufactures  supposed  to  be  aided 
by  protection.  If  these  were  greatly  benefited,  if  their  wages  were 
increased  tenfold,  did  it  profit  the  country  to  inflict  injury  upon  three- 
fourths  of  its  laborers,  the  farmers,  and  to  embarrass  or  tax  all  others, 
simply  to  benefit  one-twentieth  ?  Is  this  "  protecting  American  indus 
try?" 

But  was  the  one-twentieth  of  American  laborers  benefited  ?  Upon 
them,  as  upon  all  others,  fell  the  burden  of  increased  cost  of  clothing 
and  of  many  other  manufactured  articles.  Were  their  wages  in 
creased  ?  Upon  this  point  the  proof  is  singularly  conclusive. 

The  returns  from  manufacturers  who  answered  the  inquiries  of  the 
Secretary  must  be  accepted  as  at  least  as  favorable  to  the  protective 
tariff  as  the  facts  would  permit.  If  the  manufacturers  strained  the 
truth  at  all,  they  certainly  did  not  do  so  to  the  disadvantage  of  the 
system  intended  to  secure  them  large  profits.  Those  who  did  not  re 
ply  at  all  would  certainly  have  done  so  if  the  facts  had  enabled  them 
to  make  a  more  favorable  showing  for  the  system  than  others  could 
make.  The  vital  importance  of  the  inquiry  in  regard  to  wages  was 
perfectly  understood  by  every  one  ;  and  if  any  manufacturers  were 
paying  wages  above  the  average  of  those  in  the  same  business,  we 
may  be  sure  that  they  would  have  been  the  most  prompt  to  state  the 
fact.  Accepting  the  statements  actually  made  as  a  fair  presentation 
of  the  best  phase  of  the  facts,  we  must  conclude  that  the  average  of 
all  wages  in  any  employment  was  certainly  not  higher  than  the 
average  paid  by  those  who  made  returns. 

In  the  cotton  manufacture,  over  twenty  establishments  in  New 
England  made  returns,  and  the  wages  paid  by  these  averaged,  for 
men,  $1.17  a  day ;  for  women,  50  cents,  and  for  boys  and  children,  32 
cents.  The  wages  of  men  were  ordinarily  $1  a  day,  or  $10  a  month 
with  board,  but  skilled  mechanics  and  experienced  hands  were  some 
times  paid  $1.50  or  even  $2.  The  wages  of  women  ranged  from 
75  cents  a  day,  the  highest,  to  30  cents,  the  lowest ;  and  of  children, 
from  50  cents  to  19  cents.  But  the  vital  question  is,  whether  these 


300  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

wages,  however  small,  were  an  increase  upon  those  paid  in  earlier 
years.  On  this  point  there  can  be  no  doubt.  Not  a  single  one  of 
these  establishments  claimed  to  have  increased  the  wages  paid ;  but, 
while  some  were  paying  "  the  same  as  for  twenty  years  past,"  others 
admitted  that  they  reduced  wages  in  1842.  The  Saco  establishment, 
indeed,  stated  that  it  paid  two  per  cent,  higher  wages  in  1844  than 
it  did  in  1834 ;  but  did  not  give  any  figures  for  1836  to  1842,  when 
other  establishments  increased  or  decreased.  The  Hamilton  mill, 
at  Lowell,  which  gave  more  detailed  information  than  any  other, 
said :  "  The  number  of  persons  employed  is  as  follows :  Men  245, 
average  wages  $1.03  per  day;  women  669,  average  wages  53  cents 
per  day ;  boys  34,  average  wages  44  cents  per  day.  ...  In  1842,  when 
there  were  hardly  any  dividends,  and  when  this  company  made  none 
at  all,  there  was  a  reduction  of  wages,  but  it  was  small  in  propor 
tion."  Of  all  these  companies,  five  worked  ten  hours  a  day,  two 
worked  eleven  hours,  five  worked  eleven  and  a  half  hours,  ten  worked 
twelve  hours,  one  worked  fourteen,  and  the  rest  did  not  state  the 
number.  In  New  York,  fourteen  cotton-mills  reported,  not  one  of 
them  paying  a  higher  average  to  men  than  $1.25,  and  the  average 
of  all  was,  men  $1.15,  women  42  cents,  children  30  cents,  all  boarding 
themselves,  and  all  the  mills  working  twelve  hours.  Four  of  these 
state  that  wages  have  not  materially  varied ;  but  three,  all  paying  the 
highest  wages  reported,  frankly  ascribe  their  prosperity  in  part  to 
"  diminished  wages  paid ; "  a  "  small  percentage  of  reduction,"  or  a 
"decline  of  labor." 

It  may,  therefore,  be  held  established,  from  the  statement  of  the 
manufacturers  themselves,  that  the  tariff  of  1842,  which  caused  some 
increase  in  the  price  of  cotton  goods,  notwithstanding  a  decrease  in 
cost  of  cotton,  did  not  cause  any  improvement  in  wages,  but  that, 
on  the  contrary,  less  wages  were  paid  in  the  majority  of  establish 
ments  in  1845  under  protection  than  in  1840  under  "  free  trade." 
Yet  the  profits  of  the  manufacturers,  according  to  their  own  state 
ments,  had  greatly  increased,  many  admitting  that  they  made  25 
per  cent.,  and  the  great  majority  declining  to  state  how  much  they 
did  realize.  It  is  quite  noteworthy  that  the  Lowell  company,  look 
ing  back  over  years  of  extreme  low  duties  and  financial  prostration, 
refers  to  one  year,  1842,  as  "the  year  in  which  few  dividends  were 
made,  and  in  which  this  company  did  not  make  any."  From  this 
single  remark  we  can  judge  whether  the  whole  period  of  low  duties 
was  absolutely  fatal ! 

It  must  be  admitted,  then,  that  in  the  cotton  business  high  duties 


WAGES  AND  PRICES  IN   1845.  301 

had  not  increased,  if  indeed  they  had  not  really  decreased  wages,  to 
the  year  1845. 

The  iron  interest  was  not  more  liberal  to  labor.  Of  seventeen 
establishments  in  New  England,  New  York,  and  Pennsylvania,  not 
one  reported  paying  to  ordinary  men  more  than  $1,  while  two  paid  only 
$5  a  week,  and  one  87-J  cents  a  day.  To  skilled  mechanics  higher 
wages  were  paid — in  one  establishment  as  high  as  $1.75,  and  one 
other  reported  as  high  as  $2.50.  The  other  establishments,  except 
two  in  Alabama,  which  reported  high  wages,  paid  in  no  case  higher 
than  $2,  and  the  average  of  them  was  $5  to  $6  a  week  for  ordinary 
hands.  The  average  for  the  whole  country,  including  all  classes, 
was  about  $1.12J.  But  the  labor  paid  over  $1  a  day  was  in  the 
machine-shops  or  founderies.  The  pig-iron  establishments,  as  far  as 
reported,  paid  an  average  of  only  87-J  cents  a  day,  and  they  made 
larger  profits  than  others.  Of  all  the  iron  establishments  of  all 
kinds,  not  one  claimed  to  have  granted  an  increase  of  wages,  while 
some  said  that  wages  had  not  materially  varied,  and  one  acknowl 
edged  that  there  had  been  a  reduction. 

Returns  from  plaster,  lumber,  cordage,  tobacco,  flour,  paper,  and 
pottery  establishments,  all  gave  the  rate  of  wages  as  $1  a  day,  and 
not  one  claimed  that  there  had  been  any  increase.  Of  leather  estab 
lishments  one  was  paying  $18  a  month ;  of  ashes  and  wines  one  each 
was  paying  $15  a  month.  In  a  soap  establishment  wages  had  been 
decreased,  and  were  on  an  average  only  69  cents  a  day,  though  the 
profits  were  15  per  cent.  In  one  salt  establishment  the  average 
sum  paid  was  only  $8  a  month,  though  the  duty  on  foreign  salt 
was  over  100  per  cent. 

Finally,  we  take  the  woollen-mills,  of  which  twelve  reported  in 
the  Eastern  and  Middle  States.  Of  these,  several  were  paying  as 
high  as  $1  a  day  to  men,  others  90  cents,  others  88  cents,  while  two 
paid  only  an  average  of  75  cents  to  men,  one  only  65,  and  one  paid 
only  55^-  cents  on  the  average  to  men  and  women.  The  average  for 
all  the  establishments  reported  was  89  cents  for  men,  and  30  cents  for 
boys.  One  establishment  paid  $3.50  a  week  to  women,  four  others 
50  cents  per  day,  some  40  cents,  and  three  as  low  as  37^  cents.  The 
average  was  about  45  cents.  Again,  we  have  to  observe  that  not 
one  of  these  establishments  claimed  that  there  was  any  increase  of 
wages ;  but,  while  several  said  that  wages  had  not  increased — were 
"  the  same  as  ever  " — one,  paying  75  cents  a  day  to  men,  stated  that 
wages  had  decreased.  Another,  paying  the  highest  wages  reported 
— over  one  dollar  to  men,  and  $3.50  a  week  to  women,  claimed  to  be 
21 


302  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

paying  "the  same  as  ever."  If  this,  the  highest  return  in  1845,  was 
the  average  in  former  years,  the  decrease  of  wages  in  the  woollen 
manufacture  must  have  been  considerable.  But  all  the  mills  report 
profits,  due  to  improved  machinery  and  the  low  price  of  wool.  While 
the  farmer  was  injured,  then,  nobody  was  benefited  except  the  capi 
talist,  whose  profits  the  tariff  increased. 

We  have  been  thus  minute  in  examining  these  returns,  because 
they  furnish  conclusive  proofs  as  to  the  working  of  the  only  protec 
tive  tariff  since  the  development  of  manufactures  by  modern  methods, 
and  prior  to  the  war.  The  results  now  ascertained  cannot  be  ascribed 
to  any  fluctuation  of  the  currency  or  of  the  banking  credits,  for  the 
amount  of  currency  in  circulation  during  the  latter  part  of  1845,  and 
through  1846  and  1847,  was  almost  precisely  the  same  as  the  amount 
in  circulation  in  1840  and  1841,  prior  to  the  resumption  of  the  banks, 
while  the  line  of  deposits  was  somewhat  larger,  January,  1845,  than 
in  either  of  the  years  1840  and  1841.  Neither  can  it  be  said  that 
the  condition  of  labor  in  this  year  was  exceptionally  unfavorable,  for 
the  country  had  recovered  from  the  prostration  wilich  followed  the 
return  to  the  specie  basis,  and  was  in  that  condition  which  all  advo 
cates  of  protection  have  been  accustomed  to  mention  as  "marvel 
lously  prosperous."  The  records  of  this  year,  as  it  happens,  are  a 
fairer  test  of  the  effect  of  the  tariff,  than  those  of  the  following  year, 
the  last  of  its  operation;  for,  in  1846,  a  demand  for  breadstuff's  from 
England  began  to  revive  agriculture,  and  the  prospect  of  a  change 
of  the  tariff  gave  hope  to  all  who  were  straitened  by  its  operation. 
What,  then,  is  the  result? 

The  evidence  is  conclusive  that  the  tariff  of  1842  did  depress  the 
agricultural  interest,  reduce  the  price  of  its  products  and  the  wages 
of  agricultural  labor,  and  at  the  same  time  increase  the  cost  of  many 
articles  of  necessity  to  the  farmer,  or  of  universal  use,  particularly 
clothing,  salt,  glass,  and  the  products  of  iron. 

The  evidence  is  conclusive  that  the  wages  of  labor  employed  in 
manufactures  were  not  increased,  but  in  many  cases  had  been  re 
duced  since  1840,  particularly  in  those  very  branches  of  manufacture 
which  were  most  favored  by  duties,  and  which,  owing  to  cheap  ma 
terials  and  great  improvements  in  method  or  machinery,  were  making 
the  largest  profits. 

It  is  conclusively  proved,  then,  that  American  labor  in  the  aggre 
gate  received  less  wages  under  the  tariff  of  high  duties  in  1845,  than 
it  had  under  the  tariff  of  low  duties  in  1840,  and  that  the  cost  of 
many  necessities  and  comforts  of  general  use  was  increased. 


PROTECTION  AND  NON-PROTECTION  CONTRASTED.          303 

To  whom  was  this  tariff  a  benefit  ?  Not  to  the  fanner — it  robbed 
him.  Not  to  the  operative — it  did  not  increase  his  wages,  and  did 
increase  his  expenses.  It  was  a  benefit  to  those  capitalists  who, 
under  it,  were  able  to  charge  people  higher  prices  for  goods  than  the 
cost  of  production  warranted,  and  who  were  blessed  with  large  prof 
its.  To  enrich  them,  the  labor  of  the  whole  country  was  taxed. 


CHAPTER   XXII. 

PROTECTION   AND   NON-PROTECTION   CONTRASTED. 

THE  conclusions  arrived  at  in  regard  to  the  effect  of  the  tariff  of 
1842  are  singularly  confirmed  by  statistics  given  in  one  of  the  most 
elaborate  works  in  defence  of  the  system — "  The  Tariff  Question  " — 
by  Hon.  E,  B.  Bigelow.  In  that  work,  for  the  purpose  of  proving 
that  laborers  in  England  are  paid  less  than  laborers  here,  he  gives 
statistics  of  wages  paid  by  manufacturing  establishments  at  Lowell, 
in  the  years  1839,  1849,  and  1859.  As  these  statistics  are  derived 
from  the  records  of  the  companies,  and  have  the  authority  of  a  gen 
tleman  of  high  reputation,  we  may  accept  them  unhesitatingly,  and 
advocates  of  the  tariff  system  will  be  sure  that  one  of  its  most  sincere 
defenders  has  not  distorted  the  record  to  its  disadvantage. 

Mr.  Bigelow  seeks  to  prove  that  labor  is  dearer  here  than  else 
where,  and  therefore  needs  protection.  This  error  has  already  been 
exposed.  Labor  is  dearer  here  because  it  can  be  more  profitably 
employed,  and  therefore  does  not  need  protection.  The  contrast  be 
tween  the  wages  paid  in  England  and  in  Belgium  or  France  con 
clusively  proves  that  the  higher-priced  labor  is  not  the  less  effective, 
but  the  more  effective;  does  not  give  more  costly  products,  but 
cheaper  products.  The  world  over,  it  is  the  "pauper  labor"  that 
needs  protection  most. 

Mr.  Bigelow  himself  has  contributed  largely  to  the  demonstration 
of  this  truth.  To  him  we  owe  many  inventions  more  ingenious  and 
wonderful  than  any  of  like  object  in  use  in  other  countries,  and  the 
weaving  of  the  Brussels  carpet,  especially,  has  been  revolutionized 
by  the  loom  of  his  invention.  One  who  has  contributed  so  much  to 
make  American  labor  more  effective,  should  surely  have  considered 
the  fact  that  its  inventive  talent  and  its  superior  intelligence  are  a 
better  protection  against  the  world  than  any  that  laws  can  give. 


304  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

Though  useless  for  the  purpose  for  which  they  were  collected, 
the  statistics  given  by  Mr.  Bigelow  happen  to  be  of  great  use  in 
another  quarter.  It  boots  nothing  to  prove  that  our  laborers  get 
better  wages  than  those  of  England ;  we  all  know  the  fact,  and  they 
would  surely  need  protection  if  they  did  not.  But  it  is  of  vital 
importance  to  ascertain  whether  our  labor  is  better  paid  under  the 
protective  system  than  under  a  non-protective  tariff.  That  is  the 
question  of  questions,  and  Mr.  Bigelow  helps  to  settle  it.  The  years 
selected  by  him  happen  to  be  years  just  preceding  the  tariff  of  1842, 
just  after  its  close,  and  just  preceding  the  protective  period  of  1861 
-'69.  Neither  of  them  illustrates  by  itself  the  working  of  the  pro 
tective  system.  But,  contrasted  with  the  facts  already  given,  by 
which  the  record  of  1845  is  quite  clearly  presented,  they  are  of  value. 
As  to  the  manufacture  of  textile  fabrics,  the  record  of  Lowell  will  be 
accepted  as  the  best  test,  for  that  manufacture  is  there  most  exten 
sive  and  successful.  Fortunately,  two  of  the  most  important  estab 
lishments  at  Lowell  made  full  and  detailed  returns  in  1845,  which 
we  can  compare  with  the  record  of  wages  in  1839,  before  the 
tariff,  in  1849,  after  the  tariff,  and  in  1859,  after  thirteen  years  of 
low  duties. 

In  1845,  the  Lowell  companies  stated  that  they  were  paying  to 
men,  on  an  average,  $1.03  and  $1.05  a  day — the  work  being  twelve 
hours  a  day.  In  1839,  as  we  learn  from  Mr.  Bigelow's  statistics,  the 
Lowell  companies  were  paying  to  fifty-two  different  classes  of  male 
hands,  from  overseer  down  to  the  common  laborer,  in  all  branches 
of  the  cotton  manufacture,  $411.30  a  week,  or  an  average  of  $7.91 
a  week,  and  $1.32  a  day.  The  hours  of  labor  were  the  same.  The 
conclusion  already  arrived  at,  that  there  was  a  reduction  of  wages 
from  1840  to  1845,  is  therefore  confirmed. 

The  tariff  was  changed  by  an  act  passed  in  August,  1846.  If 
any  increase  of  wages  had  occurred  prior  to  the  change,  no  record 
of  it  is  known  to  the  writer*  But  in  1849,  three  years  after  the 
change  of  tariff,  what  were  the  wages  ?  The  same  Lowell  com 
panies  were  paying,  to  men  in  fifty-two  different  classes  of  labor  in  the 
cotton  manufacture,  an  aggregate  of  $407.07,  or  an  average  of  $7.82 
a  week,  and  $1.30  a  day.  This  is  not  quite  as  high  as  was  paid  in 
1839,  but  it  is  higher  than  the  companies  reported  in  1845.  And  in 
1845,  when  the  average  of  wages  was  $1.05  for  men,  the  work  was 
for  twelve  hours  a  day ;  in  1849,  when  the  average  of  wages  was 
$1.30  a  day  for  men,  the  work  was  for  only  eleven  hours  a  day. 
Under  the  non-protective  tariff,  therefore,  the  men  were  actually  paid 


PROTECTION   AND  NON-PROTECTION   CONTRASTED.  305 

higher  wages  for  one  hour  daily  less  work  than  they  were  paid  in 
1845  under  the  protective  system. 

In  the  woollen  manufacture,  wages  were  also  lower  in  1845  than 
in  1839.  As  we  have  seen,  some  of  the  mills  were  paying  only  75 
cents  a  day  for  men,  and  40  cents  for  women,  in  1845,  and  only  one 
reported  paying  "  from  $5  to  $8  a  week  for  men,  and  from  $3.50  to 
85  for  women  " — the  highest  wages  then  reported  by  any  company 
in  the  country.  The  average  was  89  cents  for  men,  and  45  cents  for 
women.  Now,  in  1839,  according  to  Mr.  Bigelow's  statistics,  the 
average  wages  of  men  of  all  classes  employed  in  the  woollen  manu 
facture  was  $5.63  a  week,  or  about  94  cents  a  day.  There  had 
therefore  been  some  reduction  of  wages  from  1839  to  1845.  After 
the  high  duties  were  removed,  in  1849,  the  same  statistics  show  that 
the  average  wTages  paid  for  eleven  hours'  work  was  $5.02  a  week  to 
men ;  which,  considering  the  time,  is  about  the  same  as  was  paid  in 
1845.  As  we  shall  see,  the  rate  subsequently  increased  under  the 
non-protective  system.  Meanwhile,  both  woollen  and  cotton  goods 
were  much  cheaper  in  1849  than  in  1845,  although  the  wages  paid 
were  not  reduced. 

With  the  aid  of  Mr.  Bigelow's  statistics,  we  now  proceed  to 
compare  the  wages  in  1845,  under  protection,  and  in  1849,  shortly 
after  its  removal,  with  those  paid  in  1859,  near  the  close  of  the 
longest  period  of  low  duties.  Beginning  with  cotton,  it  appears 
that  the  hands  who  were  paid  for  fifty-two  different  classes  of  labor 
in  1849  an  aggregate  of  $407.07  weekly,  were  paid  in  1859  an 
aggregate  of  $446.85  weekly.  In  1849  the  average  was  $7.82  a 
week  for  eleven  hours'  work.  In  1859  it  was  $8.59  for  eleven  hours' 
work.  The  fact  is  thus  established  that,  during  the  long  period  of 
non-protective  duties,  the  laborers  were  not  "  ground  down  "  to  pov 
erty,  as  it  has  been  asserted  must  be  the  case  under  that  system,  but 
actually  gained  in  their  wages  in  the  aggregate  nearly  forty  dollars 
for  fifty-two  persons,  and  in  the  average,  each  77  cents  a  week. 
Nor  does  the  woollen  manufacture  show  a  different  result.  The  same 
classes  which  were  paid  in  1849  an  average  of  $5.02  a  week  for 
eleven  hours'  work,  were  paid  in  1859'  an  average  of  $5.43  for  eleven 
hours'  work.  Mr.  Bigelow  also  gives  the  wages  for  1849  and  1859 
in  the  manufacture  of  ingrain  carpets,  in  which,  in  1849,  there  was 
paid,  to  twenty-seven  persons  of  the  different  classes  of  labor,  $232.23 
a  week,  and  to  the  same  persons  in  1859  there  was  paid  $246.42  a 
week.  In  1849  the  average  was  $8.60  a  week,  and  in  1859  it  was 
$9.12.  In  brief,  the  result  of  this  comparison  of  records,  the  data 


306 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


being  furnished  in  every  case  by  the  manufacturers  themselves,  is  as 
follows : 

WAGES  AT  LOWELL. 


"Free  Trade." 

"Protection." 

"Free  Trade." 

1889. 

1845. 

1849. 

1859. 

$411.30 
7.91 
1.32 
12 

61.96 
5.63 
.94 
12 

$V.30 
1.05 
12 

'  5.34 
.89 
11  to  12 

$407.07 
7.82 
1.30 
11 

55.22 
5.02 
.84 
11 

$446.85 
8.59 
1.43 
11 

59.70 
5.43 
.90J 
11 

Average  weekly                 .... 

"        daily.   . 

Hours  of  work               

Woollen  11  classes 

Average  weekly  

"        daily 

Hours  of  work  

In  1845,  the  hours  in  the  different  establishments  were  not  the 
same,  and  the  wages  of  women  are  not  given  by  Mr.  Bigelow  by 
the  day  or  week,  but  by  the  job.  They  show  the  same  increase 
from  1849  to  1859,  but  cannot  be  satisfactorily  compared  with  the 
wages  reported  by  the  day  or  week  in  1845. 

If  these  statistics  are  reliable — and  they  are  all  taken  from  the 
statements  of  manufacturers  themselves — we  have  conclusively  estab 
lished  : 

1.  A  reduction  of  wages  from  1839  to  1845,  in  cotton  and  woollen 
manufactures  both,  the  hours  of  work  remaining  in  nearly  all  cases 
the  same. 

2.  An  increase  of  wages  from  1845  to  1849 — from  "protection " 
to  "free  trade" — in  the  cotton  manufacture,  of  $1.52,  in  the  aver 
age  weekly  wages,  the  hours  of  work  being  reduced  from  twelve 
to  eleven.     In  the  woollen  manufacture,  the  wages  were  changed 
from  89  cents,  average  for  eleven  and  twelve  hours,  to  84  cents, 
average  for  eleven  hours. 

3.  An  increase  of  wages  from  1849  to  1859 — during  ten  years  of 
"  free  trade  " — the  hours  of  work  remaining  the  same,  in  the  cotton 
manufacture,  from  $7.82,  weekly  average,  to  $8.59,  weekly  average ; 
in  the  manufacture  of  woollen  goods,  from  $5.02  weekly,  to  $5.43 
weekly ;  and  in  the  manufacture  of  carpets,  from  $8.60  to  $9.12. 

The  increase  of  wages  from  1845  to  1860  was  not  confined  to  the 
two  branches  of  manufacture  just  mentioned.  By  comparing  the 
statistics  gathered  by  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  in  1845  with 
the  records  of  wages  in  1860,  prepared  by  Mr.  Wells,  we  find  that  the 
same  increase  extended  to  other  kinds  of  manufacture,  and  particu- 


PROTECTION  AND  NON-PROTECTION  CONTRASTED.          307 

larly  to  the  iron  manufacture  in  all  its  branches.  In  the  manufacture 
of  edge  tools  in  1845,  the  wages  were  from  $4  to  $12  a  week,  and 
averaged  about  87.50 ;  but,  in  1860,  the  wages  of  all  the  different 
classes  of  workmen  averaged  $10.70  a  week.  In  1845,  the  wages  of 
men  employed  in  hardware  establishments  averaged  $1.25  a  day.  But 
in  1860,  according  to  Mr.  Wells's  statistics,  the  wages  paid  to  thirty- 
three  different  classes  of  laborers  were,  in  the  aggregate,  $307.61  a 
week,  the  females  and  boys  being  omitted,  and  the  average  was 
$9.32  weekly,  or  $1.55  daily.  In  founderies  and  furnaces,  in  1845,  the 
wages  paid  to  men  ranged  from  87  J  cents  to  $1.75  a  day,  and  the 
average  paid  by  all  the  establishments  was  not  over  $1.22  a  day. 
But  in  1860  the  average  was  $9.07  weekly,  or  $1.51  a  day.  In  the 
manufacture  of  leather  in  1845,  the  wages  were  one  dollar  a  day,  or 
$18  a  month  with  board,  but  in  1860  the  wages  were  $8  a  week. 
In  the  paper-mills,  in  1845,  one  dollar  a  day  was  the  average  ;  but 
in  1860  the  average  for  all  classes  of  males  was  $7.38  weekly,  or 
$1.23  daily. 

It  is  placed  beyond  dispute  that  the  wages  of  men  in  manufac 
turing  establishments  of  all  the  leading  branches  increased  quite 
perceptibly  from  1845,  under  protection,  to  1860,  the  close  of  the 
period  of  "  free  trade." 

The  wages  of  agricultural  labor  increased  still  more  largely. 
In  1845,  we  have  seen,  farming  wages  had  fallen  to  $10  a  month,  at 
the  highest,  and  as  low  as  $5  a  month  in  Illinois.  Nowhere  was 
there  reported  for  that  year  any  higher  rate  than  $10,  and  the 
average  for  the  free  States  was  probably  less  than  $9.  But  in  1859, 
according  to  tables  published  in  HunVs  Merchant^  Magazine,  the 
wages  paid  in  eight  localities  in  New  England  averaged  $15  a 
month ;  in  ten  localities  in  New  York,  $13.30 ;  in  Pennsylvania  and 
New  Jersey,  $12.50  and  $13  ;  in  Ohio,  $13.50  ;  in  Illinois,  from  $13 
to  $18 ;  and  in  Iowa,  from  $15  upward.  The  average  for  the  free 
States  must  have  been  about  $14,  a  gain  of  more  than  50  per  cent, 
since  American  industry  had  ceased  to  be  mis- "  protected."  But, 
since  the  large  majority  of  farmers  own  or  rent  the  farms  on  which 
they  work,  it  is  much  more  important  to  determine  whether  the 
prices  of  agricultural  products  had  improved.  The  price  of  wheat 
and  of  flour,  of  wool  and  of  cotton,  as  we  have  already  seen, 
was  somewhat  higher  during  the  period  of  low  duties  than  it 
had  been  under  protection.  Taking  New- York  wholesale  prices, 
the  lowest  quoted,  for  the  1st  of  August,  we  have  the  following 
comparison : 


308  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

LOWEST  PRICES,   AUGUST  1ST,  AT  NEW   YOKK. 

1845.  1860. 

Flour per  bbl.  $4  31  $5  05 

Rye "      "  287  350 

Corn-meal "      "  231  340 

Wheat per  bush.  90        *  1  40 

Rye "       "  68  81 

Oats "       "  42  40 

Corn "       "  51  64 

Lard per  Ib.  7  12 

Butter "     «  15-16  10-19 

Cheese "     "5  7 

Rice per  cwt.  3  50  4  50 

Seeds,  clover per  bush.  6  8 

Sugar,  New  Orleans per  Ib.  5  6 

TaUow "     "  7  10 

Tobacco,  Kentucky "     "  2-7  3-12 

Wool,  common "     "  24-26  34-38 

"      merino "     "  32-34  48-52 

"      puUed,  No.  1 "     "  28-30  28-30 

Yet  these  figures  by  no  means  show  the  full  value  of  the  period 
of  low  duties  to  the  farmer.  These  are  New- York  wholesale  prices, 
but  the  prices  actually  paid  to  the  farmer  are  in  the  main  governed 
by  New- York  prices  and  the  cost  of  transportation  from  the  farm  to 
New  York,  or  some  other  market.  During  the  years  1845-'60, 
greater  reduction  was  made  in  the  cost  of  transportation  than  during 
all  other  years  of  our  whole  history.  Twenty-four  thousand  miles 
of  railroad  were  built,  for  low  duties  on  foreign  iron  enabled  us  to 
build  roads  with  unexampled  rapidity.  Also,  3,512  steamboats  were 
built,  for  iron  was  cheap.  Vast  progress  was  made  in  the  system 
of  canal  transportation.  By  these  great  changes,  the  cost  of  getting 
his  produce  to  a  market  was  so  greatly  reduced  that  the  farmer 
actually  received  much  larger  prices,  in  proportion  to  the  wholesale 
rates  in  New  York,  than  he  received  in  1845.  It  is  impossible  to 
estimate  the  value  of  these  changes  to  the  agricultural  interest  in 
the  increased  prices  received  for  products,  and  it  is  equally  impos 
sible  to  estimate  their  effect  in  the  increased  value  of  farms.  It 
would  not  be  rash  to  say  that  the  entire  value  of  farming  land  in  the 
Northern  States  was  increased  fully  50  per  cent,  by  the  railroads 
alone  that  were  built  during  this  period  of  low  duties. 

It  only  remains,  regarding  the  period  of  low  duties,  to  notice 
that  the  cost  of  many  manufactured  products  was  reduced.  Receiv 
ing  more  for  his  crops,  the  farmer,  in  common  with  all  other  con- 


PROTECTION  AND  NON-PROTECTION  CONTRASTED.          309 

sumers,  paid  less  for  his  iron,  his  glass,  his  salt,  his  clothing,  his 
boots,  and  his  implements  and  machines.  In  the  year  1845  pig- 
iron  ranged  from  $30  to  $50  a  ton ;  in  the  year  1860  it  ranged  from 
$20.50  to  $27  a  ton.  In  1845  the  average  price  was  about  $38, 
and  in  1860  the  average  price  was  $23.50.  A  difference  of  $15  a 
ton  in  the  price  of  iron  involves  a  material  difference  in  the  cost  of 
nails  and  implements,  tools  and  machines.  In  the  year  1845  salt 
sold  at  an  average  of  37£  cents  in  New  York ;  in  the  year  1860  it 
sold  at  an  average  of  18^  cents  a  bushel.  Nails  were  4J  cents  in 
1845,  and  3  cents  in  1860.  Linseed-oil,  the  important  element  in 
the  cost  of  all  paints,  was  73-J  cents  a  gallon  in  1845,  and  58  cents 
in  1860.  Boots  (men's  heavy),  which  cost  $3.50  in  1845,  cost  $2.90 
in  Rhode  Island,  and  an  average  of  $3.30  in  the  Eastern  and  Middle 
States  in  1860. 

The  fact  will  be  observed  that  the  wages  of  labor  at  Lowell  have 
kept  pace  closely  with  the  price  of  wheat.  The  comparison  is  note 
worthy  : 


1889. 

1845. 

1849. 

1859. 

Wa^es  at  Lowell.  .  . 

$1  32 

$1  05 

$1  30 

$1  43 

Price  of  Wheat  

1  24£ 

1  04 

1  24 

1  43| 

Is  there  not  some  law  of  economy  underlying  this  singular  paral 
lelism?  To  all  manufacturers  the  farmers  are  the  consumers.  If 
the  farmers  are  able  to  purchase  largely,  the  demand  for  products 
and  the  demand  for  the  labor  of  operatives  increase,  and  the  rate  of 
wages  rises.  But,  if  the  farmers  are  rendered  unable  to  purchase 
liberally  by  the  low  price  of  their  products,  the  demand  for  manu 
factured  goods  and  for  labor  in  manufactures  must  decrease,  and  the 
rate  of  wages  must  fall. 

Generally,  then,  the  rate  of  wages  in  manufactures  must  rise  or 
fall  with  the  price  of  agricultural  products. 

So  far,  the  cost  of  living  and  the  wages  of  labor  keep  pace  with 
each  other.  The  laborer,  benefited  by  higher  wages,  has  also  to 
pay  in  like  proportion  more  for  his  food.  But  the  cost  of  food  pro 
duced  by  domestic  agriculture  is  not  more  than  one-third  of  the 
whole  cost  of  living.  Other  articles,  if  controlled  in  price  not  by  the 
natural  law  of  demand,  but  in  part  by  an  artificial  law,  may  be  costly 
when  the  price  of  farm  products  is  low,  and  when  the  rate  of  wages 
is  low. 

Whenever  that  occurs,  all  labor,  agricultural  and  manufacturing, 
has  its  cost  of  living  increased  in  proportion  to  its  consumption  of 


310 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


the  article  so  enhanced  in  cost.  And  this  increase,  being  without 
any  corresponding  increase  of  wages  or  of  the  price  of  farm  prod 
ucts,  is  a  burden  upon  farmer  and  manufacturing  operative — a  tax 
which  can  in  no  way  be  compensated. 

The  cost  of  iron  and  of  other  articles,  products  of  protected  in 
dustry,  has  in  fact  been  artificially  increased,  at  a  time  when  both 
agricultural  prices  and  the  wages  of  all  labor  have  been  reduced. 
As  illustrations,  take  iron,  the  material  of  all  tools,  implements,  and 
machinery ;  salt,  which  is  an  element  in  the  cost  of  all  packed  meats 
and  fish ;  nails,  and  linseed-oil,  a  material  of  importance  in  the  cost 
of  paints : 


1889. 

1845. 

1849. 

1859. 

Price  of  Wheat         .... 

$1  24| 
1  32 
39  00 
06| 
75£ 
37 

$1  04 
1  05 
38  00 
04i 
74 
37* 

$1  24 
1  30 
24  37 
04 
63| 
'24± 

$1  434- 
1  43 
25  00 
03 
60£ 
184- 

"Wa°"es  Lowell 

Pig-iron  per  ton  

Nails  cut  per  Ib          .  . 

Linseed-Oil,  per  gallon.. 
Salt,  ner  bushel.  . 

Because  prices  of  manufactured  articles  were  not  lower  in  1845 
than  in  1839,  in  proportion  to  the  decrease  in  agricultural  prices  or 
in  the  wages  of  operatives,  all  classes  were  taxed,  and  all  labor 
burdened.  The  cost  of  living  was  not  in  all  its  elements  reduced  in 
proportion  to  the  reduction  of  wages.  But,  when  the  protective 
tariff  had  been  repealed,  wages  of  labor  and  agricultural  prices  rose, 
but  prices  of  all  the  manufactured  products  declined.  The  cost  of 
living  did  not  increase,  then,  in  proportion  to  the  increase  of  wages 
or  the  remuneration  of  the  farmer,  but,  as  affected  by  the  important 
articles  mentioned,  it  declined.  And  during  the  succeeding  ten  years 
of  non-protection,  while  the  wages  of  labor  and  the  price  of  agricul 
tural  products  materially  advanced,  the  cost  of  living,  as  affected  by 
the  price  of  the  manufactured  products  named,  either  decreased  still 
further  or  increased  but  slightly. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  show  that  prices  of  all  other  manufactured 
products  have  corresponded  with  the  prices  of  those  given,  nor  are 
statistics  for  that  purpose  accessible.  The  conclusion  is  unavoid 
able  that,  if  important  elements  in  the  cost  of  living  have  been 
artificially  increased  by  duties,  at  a  time  when  prices  of  agricultural 
products,  cost  of  domestic  food,  and  wages  of  labor,  were  reduced  in 
correspondence,  then  all  labor  has  been  taxed,  and  all  industry 
burdened  by  interference  with  the  natural  laws  of  exchange.  Capi 
tal  has  pocketed  profits.  But  labor  has  been  taxed  to  pay  them. 


THE  PRESENT  SITUATION.  311 

CHAPTER  XXIII. 

THE    PRESENT    SITUATION. 

THE  conclusions  justified  by  experience  in  former  times  are  pecu 
liarly  valuable  now,  when  all  acknowledge  that  the  condition  of  the 
country  is  most  unsatisfactory,  but  for  the  admitted  fact  different 
causes  are  assigned.  Knowing  how  other  protective  tariffs  have  affect 
ed  farming  and  other  labor,  we  can  judge  more  confidently  whether 
existing  evils  are  due  entirely  to  a  depreciation  of  currency,  or  to  a 
mistaken  interference  with  natural  exchanges. 

Tables  given  at  the  close  of  this  chapter  show  that,  during  the 
war,  the  price  of  'farm-products  was  very  low — hardly  higher  in  the 
average,  measured  in  gold,  than  the  rates  of  the  panic  period,  Janu 
ary,  1858.  During  this  time  manufacturing  was  also  seriously  re 
tarded,  but  all  disorders  were  ascribed  to  the  war.  In  1865  the  crop 
of  wheat  was  short,  and  for  two  years  thereafter  a  continued  defi 
ciency  of  supply  lifted  the  price  of  wheat  above  that  of  1860,  although 
corn  sold  for  very  little  more,  and  hay  and  some  other  products  for 
much  less  than  was  realized  before  the  war.  By  the  high  price  of 
wheat  the  farmer  was  barely  paid  for  a  short  crop,  but,  though  in 
other  respects  worse  off,  he  continued  to  hope.  The  crop  of  1868 
was  ample,  and  a  sudden  and  serious  fall  of  prices  was  the  result. 
Those  who  had  ascribed  the  partial  good  fortune  of  1866  and  1867 
to  the  tariff,  began  to  be  undeceived. 

Meanwhile,  the  condition  of  laborers  in  manufacturing  and  me 
chanical  employments  was  by  no  means  enviable.  In  the  report  of 
1869,  Mr.  Wells,  Special  Commissioner  of  the  Revenue,  presented, 
in  a  very  strong  light,  the  contrast  between  the  condition  of  such 
labor  in  1860  and  its  condition  in  1867-'68,  and  the  mass  of  statis 
tics  gathered  by  him  proved  that  the  average  increase  of  wages  in 
manufacturing  establishments  was  "  for  unskilled  labor  "  50  per  cent., 
and  for  "  skilled  labor  "  60  per  cent.,  while  "  the  increase  of  all  the 
elements  which  constitute  the  food,  clothing,  and  shelter  of  a  family 
had  been  about  78  per  cent.,  as  compared  with  the  standard  prices 
in  1860-'61."  The  material  part  of  these  tables  is  copied  at  the 
close  of  this  chapter,  and  no  inquiry  by  private  individuals  can  add 
weight  to  these  official  statements,  nor  has  any  private  citizen  at 
command  the  facilities  for  a  more  extended  investigation  than  that 
of  the  commissioner.  The  fact  which  the  commissioner  also  records, 


312  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

that  wages  in  the  cotton-mills  were  reduced  in  1868,  and  that  the 
prices  for  puddling  and  rolling  iron  declined  in  that  year,  so  that  the 
increase  since  1860  was  about  67  per  cent.,  though  the  cost  of  making 
iron  was  still  about  75  per  cent,  greater  than  in  that  year,  will  be 
noticed  in  due  season,  for  this  reduction  accompanied  the  sudden  fall 
in  the  price  of  agricultural  products  in  1868.  When  the  tables  were 
prepared,  wheat  was  selling  for  $2  in  gold,  and  yet  the  average  in 
crease  in  the  wages  of  agricultural  labor  was  only  50  per  cent.,  little 
more  than  the  difference  at  that  time  between  currency  and  gold 
values.  The  tables  of  wages,  contrasted  with  those  of  retail  prices, 
in  the  manufacturing  towns  of  New  England,  New  York,  Pennsyl 
vania,  New  Jersey,  and  Delaware,  leave"  no  room  to  dispute  the  con 
clusion  that  at  that  time  wages  had  increased  since  1860  less  than 
the  cost  of  living,  and  the  workmen  in  mechanical  and  manufacturing 
employments  were  actually  worse  off  than  they  were  before  the  war. 
Reducing  the  results  to  gold  values,  at  the  rate  of  1867-'68,  we  find 
that  the  average  increase  of  wages  in  gold  was  for  unskilled  labor  7, 
and  for  skilled  labor  14  per  cent.,  but  the  average  increase  in  the  cost 
of  living  in  gold  was  about  27  per  cent.  The  skilled  workman  who 
received  $100  a  month  in  1860,  and  expended  $90  for  his  living,  in 
1868  received  wages  worth  $114  in  gold,  but  the  cost  of  living,  if  he 
purchased  the  same  quantity  of  the  same  articles  as  in  1860,  was  in 
creased  to  $114  in  gold,  and,  though  he  could  save  $10  a  month  in 
1860,  he  could  save  nothing  from  larger  wages  in  1868.  Nor  was  his 
case  in  any  way  improved  by  calling  his  wages  $160  in  currency,  for 
the  cost  of  living,  reckoned  in  currency,  had  increased  to  $160  also. 
WTiile  the  workmen  in  manufacturing  employments  were  thus  cir 
cumstanced,  the  wages  of  agricultural  labor  had  increased  only  7  per 
cent,  in  gold.  But  not  more  than  one-third  of  the  cost  of  living  is 
for  the  products  of  domestic  agriculture,  and  these  products,  as  the 
tables  show,  had  not  increased  in  cost  more  than  manufactured  or 
imported  articles.  If  the  cost  of  living  to  other  laborers  was  about 
27  per  cent,  higher  in  gold  than  it  was  in  1860,  the  cost  to  farming 
laborers,  after  deducting  all  products  of  agriculture  in  this  country, 
must  still  have  been  increased  more  than  13J  per  cent.  Counting  as 
nothing  the  products  of  the  farm  consumed  in  supporting  its  laborers, 
the  cost  of  their  living  had  still  been  increased  at  least  twice  as  much 
in  gold  as  their  wages  had  been  increased  in  gold. 

At  that  time,  high  prices  of  some  farm-products  were  balanced, 
as  they  were  caused,  by  short  crops.  Having  calculated  to  raise 
one  thousand  bushels,  and  expended  in  seed  and  labor  enough 


THE  PRESENT  SITUATION.  313 

to  raise  that  quantity,  the  farmer  found  that  his  crop  was  from 
five  to  eight  hundred  bushels  only,  and,  even  at  the  high  prices 
then  obtained,  it  returned  to  him  little  more  than  his  outlay. 
Hay,  however,  was  lower  than  in  1860,  and  wool  also.  Had  the 
cost  of  living  been  no  greater  than  it  was  before  the  war,  both  farmer 
and  mechanic  would  have  prospered,  but  the  actual  increase  was  far 
more  than  the  increase  in  wages,  or  in  the  profits  of  farming. 

In  the  year  1868  the  crops  were  ample,  and  the  price  of  wheat 
fell  nearly  a  dollar  a  bushel.  The  first  fair  crop  in  several  years  was 
consumed  at  a  price  scarcely  higher  in  gold  than  the  farmer  had 
obtained  in  1860.  With  an  increase  of  population  from  thirty- 
one  to  thirty-seven  millions,  the  number  of  farmers  and  of  persons 
depending  upon  agriculture  for  support  must  have  increased  one- 
fifth,  and,  to  yield  them  as  fair  wages  as  were  received  in  1860,  the 
value  of  crops  produced  should  also  have  increased  one-fifth.  But 
the  actual  increase  in  the  gold  value  of  Northern  crops,  as  has  been 
shown  in  the  examination  of  the  progress  of  agriculture,  was  from 
$1,079,000,000  in  1860  to  $1,113,000,000  in  1868,  while  the  gold 
value  of  all  crops,  cotton  and  tobacco  included,  was  less  in  1868  than 
in  1860.  The  return  to  each  farmer  or  laborer  per  capita  was,  there 
fore,  materially  diminished;  there  were  about  six  laborers  in  1868 
to  divide  returns  not  greater  in  gold  than  were  divided  by  five  per 
sons  in  1860.  But  the  cost  of  production  and  the  cost  of  living  had 
been  affected  also.  Receiving  less  per  capita  for  products  sold,  the 
farmers  were  compelled  to  pay  more  for  articles  imported  or  manu 
factured;  for  clothing,  boots  and  shoes,  blankets,  household  goods,' 
tea,  coffee,  and  sugar,  and  for  implements.  It  need  not  be  said 
that  the  farmers  generally  suffered.  Within  the  year  ending  June 
30,  1869,  in  some  of  the  agricultural  counties  of  Ohio,  it  has  been 
stated,  more  mortgages  were  effected  than  in  any  preceding  year 
for  a  long  period.  Wool  declined  so  rapidly  in  price  that  the 
slaughter  of  millions  of  sheep  began.  Yet  the  farmer  continued  to 
pay,  to  purchase,  and  to  hope.  One  more  good  crop,  he  trusted, 
would  relieve  him.  It  came — the  excellent  crop  of  1869.  All  know 
the  result.  Prices  have  fallen  still  lower.  Michigan  wheat  sold  in 
New  York,  January  1,  1869,  for  $2.12J,  and  January  1,  1870,  for 
$1.55 ;  No.  1,  spring,  declined  from  $1.70  to  $1.30  a  bushel ;  wheat- 
flour  from  $6.60  to  $4.85 ;  rye-flour  from  $7  to  $5 ;  rye  from  $1.50 
to  $1.02 ;  oats  from  78  to  65  cents;  hay  from  90  to  85  cents.  These 
are  New-York  prices.  At  Chicago,  January  1,  1869,  wheat  was 
worth  $1.13,  and  January  1,  1870,  only  78  @  79  cents ;  oats  had 


314  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

declined  from  46-J  to  41 J  cents ;  rye  from  $1.12  @  66  cents ;  barley 
from  $1.48  to  77  j-  cents;  beans  from  $3  @  $4.25  to  $2  @  $3  per 
bushel;  and  hay  from  $19.50  to  $14  per  ton.  At  Cincinnati  the  fall 
in  flour  was  from  $7.75  per  barrel  to  $5.50;  in  wheat,  No.  1,  from 
$1.75>  to  $1.14;  in  rye  from  1.35  to  93  cents;  in  barley  from  $2.35 
to  $1.35 ;  in  clover-seed  from  15  to  13J  cents ;  in  butter  from  38  to 
30  cents;  apples  from  $4.50  to  $3. 50  per  barrel;  potatoes  from  $2.50 
to  $1.50  per  barrel.  Nor  do  these  prices  at  the  principal  Western 
markets  present  to  the  mind  the  full  extent  of  the  loss  to  the  farmer. 
Thousands  of  bushels  of  wheat  were  bought  in  Iowa  for  40  cents  a 
bushel  during  the  closing  months  of  1869.  No  farmei;  can  afford  to 
produce  wheat  at  such  prices.  In  plain  terms,  the  farmers  of  the 
country  have  quite  generally  failed  to  realize  the  actual  cost  of  their 
products.  They  begin  to  restrict  their  purchases.  The  merchants 
in  the  country  find  it  hard  to  remit  to  the  city ;  and  the  whole  sys 
tem  of  exchange  is  clogged.  The  load  borne  by  two-thirds  of 
American  laborers  has  proved  too  heavy.  They  have  been  taxed 
too  long  to  support  enormous  monopolies,  and  blunders  in  national 
economy  more  fatal  to  industry  than  the  hungriest  monopoly,  and 
their  misfortunes  must  now  be  shared  by  others. 

No  other  branch  of  industry  can  long  continue  to  prosper,  after 
the  farmer  has  been  forced  to  economize.  Accordingly,  in  spite  of  a 
reduction  in  the  cost  of  living  as  far  as  that  is  affected  by  the  price 
of  agricultural  products,  the  condition  of  laborers  in  mechanical  and 
manufacturing  employments  has  not  on  the  whole  improved.  Bad 
as  it  was  in  1868,  it  is  now  even  worse,  and  the  fact  has  been  forced 
upon  the  attention  in  all  parts  of  the  country  by  strikes  of  unusual 
number  and  magnitude.  Many  of  these  have  been  unable  to  resist  a 
reduction  of  wages.  In  one  article,  treating  of  the  condition  of  labor 
in  the  metropolis  and  neighboring  cities,  the  New- York  Times  men 
tions  thirty  strikes,  and  adds,  "  of  these  a  few  only  were  success 
ful."  The  painters  had  1,300  men  idle  for  more  than  three  months ; 
the  iron-moulders  of  Williamsburgh  were  idle  for  three  months ;  the 
potters  of  Trenton  were  on  strike  for  five  months,  with  serious  loss 
to  employers  and  employed.  Carpet-weavers  about  Philadelphia 
were  on  strike  for  some  time,  but  finally  accepted  reduced  wages. 
In  Pittsburg  the  wages  of  plasterers  in  1869  were  11  per  cent, 
lower  than  in  18*65 ;  of  masons  20  per  cent.,  of  blacksmiths  21  per 
cent.,  of  carpenters  20  per  cent.,  of  painters  20  per  cent.,  and  of  ma 
chinists  20  per  cent.  Mr.  Wells  records  the  fact  that  in  1868  the 
wages  of  iron-moulders  were  reduced,  and  it  is  elsewhere  stated  that 


THE  PRESENT  SITUATION.  315 

the  reduction  was  for  puddlers  25  per  cent,,  rollers  40  per  cent.,  and 
laborers  %5  per  cent.^ 

Nor  is  this  the  only  form  in  which  wages  have  been  reduced  dur 
ing  the  past  two  years.  Thousands  of  establishments  have  been 
forced  to  reduce  the  number  of  their  hands.  In  Chicago  alone,  on 
the  1st  of  January,  1869,  it  was  estimated  that  over  twenty  thousand 
persons  were  out  of  employment.  In  every  part  of  the  country,  the 
number  of  hands  employed  in  mechanical  occupations  has  been  di 
minished,  in  consequence  of  the  embarrassment  of  farmers.  The 
country  blacksmith,  carpenter,  or  shoemaker,  finds  little  money  com 
ing  in  when  the  farmers  in  his  neighborhood  are  pinched,  and  he  is 
compelled,  not  only  to  economize  in  his  own  purchases,  but  to  dis 
charge  some  of  his  hands.  Thousands  of  mechanics  and  working- 
men  are  drifting  to  cities,  from  country  towns  where  they  have  been 
employed,  and  seeking  work  at  such  wages  as  any  employer  may 
choose  to  offer. 

Even  where  the  larger  manufacturing  establishments  have  neither 
reduced  the  number  of  hands  nor  the  rate  of  wages,  they  have  in 
very  many  cases  reduced  the  aggregate  sum  paid  in  wages  during 
the  year  by  stopping  work  for  a  time.  In  many  different  branches 
of  manufacture  this  expedient  has  been  resorted  to,  because  it  was 
found  that  the  markets  were  overstocked,  production  having  in 
creased,  while  the  increase  of  consumption  has  been  suddenly  ar 
rested.  Many  cotton-mills  have  worked  short  time ;  yet  the  quantity 
of  cotton  manufactured  has  been  scarcely  greater,  and  actually  less 
in  proportion  to  population,  than  the  quantity  manufactured  in  1860. 
Woollen  and  carpet  establishments  in  considerable  numbers  have 
temporarily  stopped  work  during  the  year.  The  paper-manufactur 
ers  have  held  a  convention  to  agree  to  diminish  production.  The 
American  Workman,  organ  of  the  Shoemakers'  Union,  states  that 
the  men  employed  in  that  branch  of  industry  have  had  work  only 
ten  months  out  of  the  twelve.  Out  of  thirty  thousand  anthracite- 
coal  miners,  twenty-five  thousand  stopped  work  for  months,  demand 
ing  a  formal  agreement  that  production  should  never  be  continued 
when  the  price  of  coal  should  fall  below  five  dollars  a  ton.  Tailors 
in  New  York,  working  less  than  full  time,  found  their  wages  insuffi 
cient,  and  demanded  larger.  Iron  establishments  throughout  the 
West  have  been  greatly  embarrassed,  few  working  full  time ;  and 
notices  in  the  newspapers  indicate  that  many  Eastern  establishments 
have  also  been  working  below  their  full  force.  The  hat-manufacture 
complains  of  extreme  depression,  the  domestic  consumption  having 
been  reduced,  within  the  past  three  years,  fully  twenty-five  per  cent., 


316  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

while  the  large  demand  for  export,  which  for  many  years  before  the 
war  sustained  fully  one-seventh  of  the  production,  has  almost  wholly 
ceased,  our  manufacturers  for  the  first  time  in  many  years  being  un 
able  to  supply  foreign  markets  as  cheaply  as  can  England,  Germany, 
and  France.  The  copper  mining  and  manufacture  are  as  seriously 
depressed  as  ever  before ;  and  though  large  establishments,  engaged 
in  smelting  foreign  ores  at  Boston  and  Baltimore,  have  been  broken 
up  by  the  duties  imposed  by  the  act  of  1869,  the  consumption  has 
been  so  much  more  largely  reduced,  that  the  price  of  the  domestic 
products  has  fallen  four  cents — from  26-27  to  22-23  cents — since  the 
passage  of  that  act.  Manufacturers  of  paper-hangings,  because  of 
the  duty  imposed  by  the  act  of  1869  upon  "Dutch  metal,"  have  been 
obliged  to  raise  the  price  of  their  products  from  five  to  twenty-five 
cents  a  roll,  according  to  the  quantity  of  leaf  used  on  each  roll,  and 
testify  to  a  general  falling  off  in  sales,  "owing  to  the  high  price  and 
the  difficulty  of  making  the  consumer  understand  the  reason  why  we 
charge  more."  It  does  not  occur  to  these  gentlemen  that  the  con 
sumer,  though  he  should  understand  perfectly  well,  might  still  be 
limited  in  his  purchases  by  his  ability  to  pay.  The  number  of  hogs 
packed  at  the  West,  according  to  statements  recently  published, 
will  fall  short  of  the  number  packed  in  1868-'69.  Lumber-dealers 
and  brick-makers,  in  important  centres,  have  been  driven  to  reduce 
their  operations.  Of  several  of  the  large  Western  cities,  in  which 
records  are  published  of  the  number  of  houses  built  each  year,  all 
except  one  show  a  decrease  in  1869  as  compared  with  1868.  While 
these  facts  appear  in  regard  to  the  most  important  branches  of  in 
dustry,  there  is  no  reason  to  doubt  that  the  same  causes  have  in  like 
manner  affected  minor  interests,  whose  complaints  attract  less  atten 
tion  in  public  journals  and  documents. 

These  facts  only  accord  with  the  reasoning  that,  whenever  the 
farmers  are  pinched,  the  consumption  of  products  of  other  industry 
must  be  checked,  the  demand  for  labor  in  other  industry  must  be 
reduced,  and  the  wages  of  such  labor  in  the  aggregate  must  be  dimin 
ished.  During  the  two  years  1868  and  1869,  wages  in  mechanical 
and  manufacturing  employments  have  in  many  cases  been  reduced 
in  rate;  in  other  cases,  the  rate  being  unchanged,  there  has  been  a 
virtual  reduction  by  temporary  stoppage  of  work ;  and,  in  others  still, 
the  aggregate  paid  in  wages  has  been  reduced  by  the  discharge  of 
hands.  It  is  beyond  question,  therefore,  that  the  rate  of  wages  J&o» 
the  whole  lower  than  it  was  in  1867-'68,  when  Mr.  Wells's  inquiries 
were  made ;  and,  if  the  thousands  of  laborers  now  out  of  employment 
be  taken  into  account,  the  aggregate  paid  in  wages  to  non-agricul- 


THE  PRESENT  SITUATION. 


317 


tural  labor  must  be  quite  materially  reduced.  But  in.  1868  the  aver 
age  increase  since  1860  was  only  14  per  cent,  in,  gold  for  skilled  and 
7  per  cent,  for  unskilled  labor.  The  accompanying  table  of  prices, 
January  1,  1860,  and  January  1,  1870,  shows  that  the  cost  of  living, 
measured  in  gold,  has  been  increased  far  more  largely : 

PRICES  IN  I860  AND  1870. 
Manufactured  Products  and  Imported  Articles. 


1860. 

18?0—  Currency 

1870—  Gold. 

Inc.  or  Dec.  p.  c. 

Ashes  pots  100  Ibs 

$5M* 

39 
5  50 
10  50 
8%g 

nx 

4  50 
16  00 
235 
6 

^ 

22  17 
42  25 
3 
20 
30 
75 
3  00 
26 
53 
24 
50 
57 
16  37# 
11  75 
9  50 
9  00 
1450 
9# 
6^ 
M» 
16 
20 
9 

»  a* 

90 

j* 

35 

21 
79 
7% 
10 
U# 
200 
6 
9  00 
75 
3  50 
21  50 
4  50 
24 
14 
6  00 

$7  50 
20# 

fS" 

15  00 
32 
26 
7  50 
27  50 
4  20 
13# 

37  '56 
86  25 
5 
30 
42 
1  50 

"98 
78 
35 
85 
90 
29  75 
24  50 
14  00 
27  00 
33  00 
15 
12 
17* 
30 
42 
17^ 
48 
1  70 
1  50 
10 
13 
70 
87# 
45 

"io% 

14^ 

2'55 
10X 
1200 
1  30 
5  50 
43  00 
6  83 
40 
19 
9  50 

$6  22 

KK 

42^ 
6  43 
12  45 

%* 

6  22 
22  88 
3  48 
11 
14* 
80 
31  12 
71  58 

& 

35 
1  24# 
6  CO 
82 
64 
29 

ro# 

74^ 
2469 
20  33 
11  62 
22  41 
27  39 

8* 

y* 

35 

a* 

1  41 
1  24 

8 

8* 

8* 

87 
9 
11X 

,8* 

»£* 

1  08 
4  56 
35  69 
5  67 
33 
16 
7  88 

+  21 
—    3 

+     8 
+  18 
+  20 
+     4 
+  90 
+  38 
+  42 
+  49 
+  68 
+  130 
+  33 
+  40 
+  70 
+  41 
+  25 
+  16 
+  66 
+  100 
+  200 
+  20 
+  20 
+  34 
+  30 
+  50 
+  73 
+  22 
+  149 
+  88 
+  33 
+  54 
+  40 
+  50 
+  75 
+  24 
+  110 
+  23 
+  37 
+  60 
+  26 
+  132 
+  117 
+  79 
+  10 
+  16 
+  17 
+  36 
+     5 
+  40 
+  10 
+  44 
+  30 
+  67 
+  26 
+  37 
+  14 
+  31 

Candles  —  Adamant.  Ib  

"         Sperm,  Ib  

Coal  —  Anthracite  ton 

"      Liverpool  ton              .... 

Fish  —  Orleans    Ib  

"      Dry  Cod    quintal 

"      No.  1  Mackerel,  bbl  
Fruits  —  Raisins,  box  

"        Currants    Ib 

Hemp—  Manila,  Ib  

Indigo  —  Manila  Ib 

Iron  —  American  Pig  *  ton 

u      English  Bar  ton 

"      Nails,  cut.*  Ib  

Leather  —  Hemlock  Sole,  Ib  

"        Oak  Sole  Ib 

Lime  —  Rockland  bbl 

Liquors  —  Brand  v.  gallon  

"        Whiskey,  gallon    

Molasses  —  No  —  gallon 

u           Cuba,  clayed,  gallon  
Oils  —  Whale,  o-allon  

"      Linseed  gallon          

Provisions—  Pork  Mess  bbl    ... 

"               "      Prime,  bbl  

Beef,  .plain  West.,  bbl. 
"    prime  Mess,  tee.. 
"                 "    Hams,  extra,  bbl. 
Hams,  pickled,  Ib  
Shoulders,  Ib  

Lard  Western  Ib    ... 

"            Butter,  Western,  Ib  — 
"                 "       State,  Ib  

"             Cheese,  factory,  Ib  
Salt—  Turk's  Island,*  bushel  

"      Liverpool,  ground,  sack  
"      Domestic,*  bbl  

Soap  —  Brown  *  Ib          . 

•*      Castile  *  Ib 

"     Oolong  *  Ib    

Tobacco—  Afanuf  d  No  1  *  Ib 

Whalebone    Ib                            ... 

Sugar  —  Cuba,  raw,  Ib  

"      refined,  Ib  

Coffee  Rio  *  Ib               

Laths  *  M 

Paints  —  Red  Lead  *  Ib  

Collins  Axes  t  doz                     

Lowell  Ingrain  2-ply  Carpets,t  
Blankets  10-4  t  pair 

Men's  ordinary  Boots  t  dozen  

Wax-le('fed  Boote  t  pair 

Black  Alpaca  t  yard 

Steel  —  Sheffield  C.t  Ib  

Stoves,  5  hole?  t  

»  Prices  thus  marked  aro  taken  from  the  Treasury  Report  of  1863,  and  newspaper  quotations  of  January  1,  1870, 
mostly  from  the  New  York  Tribune. 

t  Prices  thus  marked  are  given  in  the  report  of  Commissioner  Wells  as  the  prices  for  1859  and  1869. 

All  other  prices  given  are  from  tables  published  by  th«  Journal  «f  Owmerce.  For  American  pip-"™,  however,  the 
price  given  for  1860  is  the  average  for  that  year,  as  stated  by  Mr.  Colwell,  report  of  Revenue  Commission,  1865-'66. 

22 


318 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


PKICES  IN  1860  AND  1870. 
Agricultural  Products. 


1860. 

1870-Currency. 

18TO—  Gold. 

Inc.  orDec.p.e. 

Wheat-Flour    State  bbl  

$530 

$5  35 

$4  44 

—  16 

"        "       Western  bbl 

529 

485 

402 

—  24 

Rye-Flour  bbl             

4  00 

5  00 

4  15 

+     4 

Corn-Meal  (Brandy  wine),  bbl  
Wheat    Michigan   bushel 

3  90 
1  50 

5  00 
1  55 

4  15 
1  28 

+     6 
—  14 

"        No  1  Spring,  bushel  

1  18 

1  30 

1  07 

—  10 

92 

1  02 

84 

Oats  —  State  bushel 

46>£ 

65 

54 

+  16 

"      Western  bushel              . 

453£ 

62 

51 

4-  12 

Com  —  Western    bushel  

90 

1  10 

90 

"      Southern  bushel               .... 

88 

1  02 

-  84 

—    4 

Hay  Shipping  100  Ib                ... 

1  10 

85 

70}£ 

—  36 

Hops,  Ib        =                

16 

25 

20% 

+  25 

Seeds  —  clover   Ib  

83£ 

13 

10% 

+  25 

1  86 

1  50 

1  24 

—    8 

Hides—  B.  A.,  Ib     

24# 

22# 

—  10 

Tobacco  —  Kentucky,  Ib  

12 

13 

10M 

—  10 

Wool    Saxony  t                

54^58 

46-55 

38-45 

—  26 

"      Mprino  %  and  blood        .... 

48-52 

43-50 

35-41 

—  24 

34-46 

40-48 

33-10 

_,       g 

"      Extra  pulled            

42-46 

39^5 

32-37 

—  21 

"      No  1  pulled                 .... 

28-30 

24-29 

20-24 

—  24 

Cotton    Middling  Upland  Ib 

11 

21 

+  90 

Eice,  100  Ibs  

4  20 



725 

+  74 

In  all  the  long  list  of  articles  quoted,  excepting  the  leading  agri 
cultural  crops,  there  are  scarcely  half  a  dozen  which  have  not  in 
creased  in  price  since  1860  more  than  the  average  of  wages  of  skilled 
labor  had  increased  in  1867-'68,  both  being  reduced  to  the  gold  stand 
ard,  while  many  of  the  most  important  have  increased  from  20  to  200 
per  cent,  in  gold.  Prepared  meats  and  other  packed  or  prepared 
food  have  increased  in  cost  remarkably.  Plain  Western  beef,  which 
has  increased  only  22  per  cent.,  and  factory  cheese,  24  per  cent.,  are 
the  lowest,  but  beef  hams  cost  88  per  cent,  more  in  gold,  and  mess 
beef  149  per  cent,  more  in  gold,  than  they  cost  in  1860;  Turk's 
Island  salt  costs  110  per  cent,  more  in  gold ;  fish  from  40  to  90  per 
cent ;  raisins  49  per  cent.,  currants  68  per  cent.,  tea  over  100  per 
cent.,  and  manufactured  tobacco  about  80  per  cent,  more  in  gold 
than  the  same  article  cost  ten  years  ago,  January  1st,  as  quoted  in 
the  same  paper,  the  New-York  Journal  of  Commerce,  from  which 
these  quotations  are  taken.  The  contrast  between  the  prices  of 
farm  crops  and  manufactured  products  will  strike  every  reader. 
While  wheat,  flour,  rye,  corn,  tobacco,  potatoes,  hides,  tallow,  wool, 

*  Not  having  New  York  price  of  potatoes  in  1860, 1  have  given  Cincinnati  prices 
for  December  31,  1860,  and  December  31,  1869. 

\  Wool  prices  for  1860  are  from  tables  in  the  New  York  Chronicle,  and  for  Oc 
tober  31 ;  for  1870,  January  1st,  "  Walter  Brown's  Circular." 

All  other  prices  are  from  the  tables  in  the  Treasury  report  of  1863,  or  from  the 
New  York  Journal  of  Commerce. 


THE  PRESENT  SITUATION.  .319 

and  hay,  sell  for  less  money  in  gold  than  in  1860,  and  oats  and  hops 
for  little  more,  and  the  only  agricultural  crops  of  considerable  impor 
tance  which  command  higher  prices  are  cotton  and  rice,  the  price  of 
nearly  every  manufactured  or  imported  article  in  the  list  is  much 
higher.  To  the  quotations  from  the  Journal  of  Commerce  are  added, 
from  other  papers,  statements  of  the  prices  of  leading  articles  Jan 
uary  1,  1870,  and  statements  by  Mr.  Wells  of  the  price  of  a  few 
manufactured  goods  in  1859  and  in  1869. 

It  is  creditable  to  the  cotton  manufacture  that  its  products  are 
not  now  enhanced  in  price,  in  view  of  the  greatly-increased  cost  of 
raw  material,  and  it  may  be  added  that  from  this  manufacture,  which 
has  thus  given  evidence  of  real  vigor  and  enterprise,  there  come  none 
of  those  clamors  for  yet  higher  protective  duties  with  which  Con 
gress  is  assailed.  Indeed,  some  of  the  ablest  and  most  conspicuous 
cotton  manufacturers  are  earnestly  and  openly  advocating  the  repeal 
of  the  protective  system.  The  prices  of  blankets  and  carpets  may 
fairly  be  taken  as  indicating  the  change  of  price  in  a  large  class  of 
woollen  goods  of  which  the  domestic  manufacture  does  not  fully  sup 
ply  the  demand,  and  in  which  the  protective  system  gives  a  virtual 
monopoly.  But  tables  already  given  show  that  some  other  woollen 
goods  sell  for  about  the  same  in  gold  as  in  1860,  though,  wool  being 
cheaper,  they  should  sell  for  less.  It  may  fairly  be  presumed  that 
products  of  iron  generally  have  not  increased  in  cost  less  than  stoves 
and  cut  nails. 

These,  however,  are  wholesale  prices,  but  the  cost  of  living  de 
pends  upon  retail  prices.  The  statistics  presented  by  Mr.  Wells  show 
that  the  difference  between  wholesale  prices  at  the  principal  markets 
and  retail  prices  paid  by  consumers  in  Eastern  manufacturing  towns 
was  much  wider  in  1868  than  it  was  in  1860. 

In  1860  the  wholesale  price  of  Western  flour  at  New  York  was 
$5.30,  but  the  average  price  to  consumers  in  Eastern  towns,  as  shown 
by  the  elaborate  investigations  of  Mr.  Wells,  was  $7.48,  and  the  dif 
ference,  which  may  be  called  the  cost  of  exchange,  was  then  $2.18 
in  gold  In  1867-'68  the  wholesale  price  of  the  same  grade  at  New 
York  was  $9.55  in  currency,  or  $6.87-J  in  gold,  but  the  average  retail 
price  of  flour  in  the  same  towns  as  before  was  $10.39  in  gold,  and  the 
difference,  or  cost  of  exchange,  was  $3.52  in  gold.  The  gap  between 
the  retail  price  of  flour  and  the  wholesale  price  at  New  York  had 
therefore  enlarged  from  $2.18  to  $3.52  in  gold,  or  about  64  per  cent. 
In  I860,  the  Western  wheat  from  which  this  flour  was  made  sold  at 
Chicago  for  95  cents  to  $1  a  bushel,  but  in  January,  1868,  the  same 


320  .  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

grades  sold  for  $1.25  to  $1.30  in  gold,  and  the  increase  in  the  cost 
of  the  wheat  was,  therefore,  about  30  per  cent.  But  the  increase  in 
the  retail  price  of  the  flour  to  Eastern  consumers  was  from  $7.48  to 
$10.39  in  gold,  or  about  40  per  cent.  In  1860,  the  price  of  live  hogs 
in  St.  Louis  was  about  $6  per  cwt.,  and  in  Cincinnati  $6.20,  and 
at  that  time  the  retail  price  of  smoked  hams  to  Eastern  consumers 
was  12.36  per  pound.  But  in  1867-'68  the  price  of  live  hogs  at 
St.  Louis  ranged  from  $5.50  to  $7.25  in  currency — never  higher  than 
$5.21  gold.  Yet  consumers  in  the  same  Eastern  towns  were  paying 
for  smoked  hams  $22.21  in  currency,  or  $15.86  per  cwt.,  in  gold. 
The  retail  prices  of  pork  in  Eastern  towns  compare  with  the  price  of 
live  hogs  at  St.  Louis,  all  reduced  to  gold,  thus : 

I860.  1868. 

Pork,  fresh $9.54  $12.       Increase. 

"     corned  or  salted 10.39  12.56         " 

"      bacon 10.28  12.6         '" 

"      hams  smoked 12.36  15.86         " 

"      shoulders 9.46  12.20         " 

Live  hogs,  St.  Louis 6.00              5.21  Decrease. 

A  part  of  this  difference  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  in  1860 
Turk's  Island  salt  for  packing  cost  at  St.  Louis  and  Cincinnati  about 
30  cents  a  bushel,  and  in  1868  about  65  cents.  A  part  of  it  is  ex 
plained  by  the  fact  that,  in  moving  from  the  Mississippi  River  to  the 
great  centres  of  manufacturing  industry  in  Eastern  States,  products 
roll  over  about  one  thousand  miles  of  rail,  which  cost  in  1860  $47.95 
a  ton  (American),  and  which  now  cost  about  $75  a  ton.  At  one 
hundred  tons  to  the  mile,  each  line  of  railroad  has  to  pay  nearly 
$3,000  per  mile  more  for  its  iron  alone  than  it  paid  in  1860,  and 
every  barrel  of  flour,  every  bushel  of  wheat,  every  barrel  of  meat,  or 
head  of  cattle,  sent  to  market  over  these  railroads,  must  help  to  pay 
for  the  increased  cost  of  building  and  maintaining  them.  A  part  of 
the  difference,  moreover,  is  explained  by  the  fact  that  in  1860  the 
wholesale  price  of  hams  in  New  York  was  $9.25,  while  the  average 
retail  price  in  Eastern  towns  was  $12.36 ;  difference,  $3.11  per 
cwt. ;  but  in  1868  the  wholesale  price  in  New  York  was  12  cents 
currency,  or  $8.64  in  gold,  while  the  average  retail  price  in  Eastern 
towns  was  $15.86  in  gold;  difference,  $7.22  per  cwt.  In  1860,  lard 
cost  at  wholesale  in  New  York  10£  cents,  and  the  average  retail 
price  in  that  State  was  12  cents ;  the  difference  was,  therefore,  $1.50 
per  cwt.  But,  in  1868,  lard  cost  at  wholesale  in  New  York  12f  cents, 
and  the  average  retail  price  in  towns  in  that  State  was  $18.36; 


THE  PRESENT  SITUATION.  321 

difference,  $5.61  per  cwt.  In  1860,  dry  codfish  cost  per  quintal 
at  New  York  $4.50,  and  the  average  retail  price  in  towns  in  that 
State  was  5  cents ;  difference,  50  cents  per  cwt.  But  in  1868  dry  cod 
sold  in  New  York  for  $5.50,  and  the  average  retail  price  in  towns  in 
that  State  was  9  cents ;  difference,  $4.50  per  cwt. 

These  comparisons  might  be  almost  indefinitely  extended.  But 
they  show  quite  clearly  that  the  cost  of  preparing  and  transporting 
food  has  been  increased,  and  that  the  gap  between  retail  and  whole 
sale  prices  has  been  greatly  widened.  They  reveal  an  increased 
waste  and  friction  in  the  whole  system  of  exchan'ges,  by  which  it 
comes  to  pass  that  the  consumer  at  the  East  does  not  get  the  full 
benefit  of  low  prices  of  agricultural  products,  while  the  farmer  at 
the  West,  receiving  less  than  he  did  in  1860  for  his  products,  is 
compelled  to  pay  not  only  high  prices  for  manufactured  products 
consumed,  but  greatly  increased  charges  for  transportation  and  ex 
change.  Nor  is  this  strange.  The  dealer  and  transporter  have  to 
meet  increased  expenses,  and  they  have  both  the  power  and  the 
will  to  pass  the  burden  over  to  the  producers.  If  a  pair  of  shoes 
actually  costs  5  cents  more  than  it  did  in  1860,  the  dealer  finds  his 
excuse  for  charging  10  cents  more.  If  the  cost  of  making  or  moving 
a  barrel  of  pork,  or  of  flour,  is  increased  20  cents,  the  dealer  has  his 
excuse  for  increasing  his  price  50  cents.  If  one  article  of  woollen 
cloth  is  doubled  in  cost,  the  dealer  knows  that  few  customers  will 
understand  that  other  similar  articles  are  not  equally  affected,  and,  if 
any  customer  complains  at  any  increase  of  price  whatever,  the  high 
tariff  affords  him  an  unfailing  excuse.  At  all  points,  the  friction  of 
"the  societary  movement"  is  increased.  Everybody  is  charged  a 
little  more  for  every  thing,  and,  having  a  burden  to  bear,  feels  that 
he  must  also  charge  everybody  a  little  more.  Thus  it  happens, 
first,  that  the  increase  in  wholesale  prices  of  manufactured  products 
is  multiplied  in  retail  prices  to  consumers,  and,  second,  that  the 
reduction  in  wholesale  prices  of  agricultural  products  does  not  result 
in  a  proportionate  reduction  of  retail  prices  to  consumers.  Much  of 
the  advantage  to  consumers  resulting  from  the  low  price  of  crops  is 
neutralized  by  increased  cost  of  transportation  and  exchange.  But 
the  disadvantage  resulting  from  increased  cost  of  manufactured  prod 
ucts  is  multiplied,  to  all  consumers,  by  the  same  increase  of  friction. 

The  price  of  manufactured  products,  it  would  naturally  be  sup 
posed,  must  be  reduced  in  consequence  of  the  arrest  of  consumption 
already  described.  But  a  reduction  to  the  natural  level  is  prevented 
by  the  increased  cost  of  production.  Many  illustrations  have  already 


322  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

been  given  of  the  effect  of  the  protective  system  in  that  respect,  and 
the  table  of  prices  affords  others.  In  1860,  100  bushels  of  Western 
corn  at  the  New- York  price  would  buy  23  barrels  of  corn-meal,  but 
in  1870  only  22  barrels ;  of  Southern  corn,  in  1860, 100  bushels  would 
buy  22|  barrels,  but  in  1870  only  20|  barrels.  In  1860,  100  pounds 
of  ingot  copper  would  buy  88  pounds  of  copper  sheathing,  but  in 
1870  only  64  pounds.  In  1860, 100  pounds  of  South  American  hides 
would  buy  122J  pounds  of  hemlock  sole-leather,*  but  in  1870  the 
same  weight  of  foreign  hides  would  buy  only  55  pounds  of  that 
leather.  In  1860,  100  pounds  of  hides  would  buy  of  men's  ordinary 
boots  13^-  pair,  but  in  1870  the  same  quantity  of  hides  would  buy  of 
the  same  quality  of  boots  only  6  J  pairs.  In  1860, 100  pounds  of  Ken 
tucky  tobacco  would  buy  of  "  manufactured  tobacco  No.  1 "  50  pounds, 
but  in  1870  only  22  pounds.  In  1860,  100  bushels  of  corn  would 
buy  of  mess  pork  5^  barrels,  but  in  1870  only  3-J  barrels.  It  has 
been  observed  that  all  prepared  meats,  fish,  and  provisions,  are  in 
creased  in  price,  and  this  change  is  not  fully  explained  by  the  cost 
of  live  animals  and  of  salt.  The  farmer,  in  1860,  who  had  for  sale  100 
pounds  New- York  Saxony  fleece,  could  obtain  56  cents  a  pound  in 
gold,  and  could  buy  37  J  yards  of  Harris  cassimere ;  but  in  1870  the 
same  farmer,  selling  100  pounds  of  the  same  fleece  at  48  cents 
currency,  could  buy  only  24  yards  of  the  same  cloth.  Having  100 
pounds  of  full  blood  merino  fleece  in  1860,  he  could  sell  at  50  cents 
in  gold,  and  could  buy  14^-  pairs  of  Holland  10-4  all-wool  blankets ; 
but  in  1870,  with  the  same  fleece  selling  at  45  cents  in  currency,  he 
could  buy  only  8^  pairs  of  the  same  quality  of  blankets.  His  com 
mon  wool  selling  in  1860  at  46  cents,  the  farmer  could  with  100 
pounds  buy  61 J  yards  of  Lowell  ingrain  two-ply  carpeting;  but  in 
1870,  100  pounds  of  the  same  common  fleece,  bringing  only  46  cents 
in  currency,  will  buy  only  35^  yards  of  the  same  quality  of  carpet. 
Illustrations  of  this  kind  need  not  be  multiplied.  It  is  enough  to 
call  attention  to  the  fact  that  in  almost  every  branch  of  industry  the 
cost  of  production  has  been  materially  and  in  some  cases  very  greatly 
increased.  Every  step  from  the  rudest  products  of  unskilled  labor 
toward  the  fashioning  of  any  thing  for  use  or  for  food  seems  to  cost 
more,  not  in  currency  merely,  but  in  proportion  to  the  original  cost 
of  the  material,  than  the  same  process  did  in  1860. 

It  should  not  be  overlooked  that  the  materials  of  house-building 

*  January  1,  1860,  according  to  price  tables  in  the  Treasury  report  of  1863, 
Buenos  Ayres  hides  sold  for  24^,  but  the  Journal  of  Commerce  table  states  the  price 
of  hemlock  sole-leather,  January  1,  1860,  as  20  cents  a  pound. 


THE  PRESENT  SITUATION.  323 

are  all  increased  in  cost,  not  in  currency  alone,  but  in  gold.  Lumber 
is  higher,  lath  cost  a  little  more,  lime  costs  66  per  cent,  more  in 
gold,  nails  cost  41  per  cent,  more  in  gold,  glass  of  the  cheapest 
quality  was  quoted  in  1860  at  $2.75  and  is  now  quoted  at  $6  ; 
linseed-oil,  the  main  element  in  paints,  is  30  per  cent,  higher  in 
gold,  and  red  lead  40  per  cent,  higher ;  and  English  bar-iron  is  70 
per  cent,  higher.  It  is  not  strange,  then,  that  rents  are  much  higher. 
Mr.  Wells  stated  that  the  increase  in  rents  in  New  York  and  other 
large  cities  has  been  from  90  to  100  per  cent.,  in  small  towns  in 
New  Jersey  111  per  cent.,  and  in  small  manufacturing  towns  of 
Pennsylvania  81  per  cent.  The  Pittsburg  Commercial,  indeed, 
states  that  "  within  the  past  Jive  years  houses  containing  two,  twelve, 
and  fourteen  rooms  have  doubled ;  houses  containing  six,  seven,  and 
eight  rooms,  have  advanced  150  per  cent.,  while  three,  four,  and  five 
room  tenement-houses  have  in  a  majority  of  cases  trebled.  These 
are  the  homes  of  the  working-classes."  This  change,  it  will  be  ob 
served,  is  within  five  years — since  the  war-prices  had  culminated. 
The  increase  since  1860  must  therefore  have  been  even  greater  in 
that  city. 

Paying  such  rents,  buying  provisions  costing  from  22  to  88  per 
cent,  in  gold  more  than  in  1860,  buying  clothing,  boots,  carpets, 
blankets,  stoves,  salt,  tea,  coffee,  and  tobacco,  thus  increased  in  cost, 
and  paying  an  increased  tax  for  every  step  in  the  preparation  of  food 
and  clothing  for  use,  how  can  the  laborer  live  without  a  large  increase 
of  wages  ?  It  is  clearly  impossible.  But  the  higher  wages  them 
selves  increase  the  cost  of  producing  other  articles  of  use  or  neces 
sity.  The  prices  of  manufactured  articles  cannot  be  reduced  in  pro 
portion  to  the  prices  of  agricultural  products  until  wages  and  the 
cost  of  production  can  be  reduced ;  but  these,  again,  cannot  be  low 
ered  until  the  cost  of  living  can  be  rednced.  Hence  the  manufacturer, 
unable  to  make  or  to  sell  at  such  rates  as  to  stimulate  purchases,  bur 
dened  with  a  stock  of  goods  left  on  his  hands  by  arrested  consumption, 
and  finding  the  outlet  for  this  surplus  in  the  export  trade  artificially 
clogged,  if  not  plugged  up  entirely,  is  forced  to  reduce  production  by 
discharging  hands  or  working  short  time.  If  he  proposes  a  reduc 
tion  of  wages,  his  hands  protest,  and  with  truth  assert  that  they  are 
worse  off  to-day,  with  wages  nominally  high,  than  they  were  in  1860 
with  wages  and  prices  both  at  a  natural  level.  If  he  discharges 
men,  the  country  loses  their  industry,  but  must  still  pay  in  one  form 
or  another  for  their  living.  If  he  works  short  time,  the  effect  is  worse 
than  a  reduction  of  wages.  A  payment  of  thirty  dollars  a  week  each 


324  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

to  fifty  hands,  while  fifty  men  are  idle,  is  far  worse  for  industry  than 
fifteen  dollars  a  week,  the  whole  number  being  employed.  Twelve 
dollars  a  week,  if  the  factory  stops  work  two  months  in  the  year,  is 
not  better  pay  for  the  operative  than  ten  dollars  a  week  and  full 
time.  The  country  loses  two  months  of  industry ;  prices  must  be 
increased  to  compensate  for  the  loss.  The  production  of  wealth  and 
the  aggregate  wages  of  labor  are  reduced,  but  the  cost  of  living  and 
the  cost  of  production  do  not  correspondingly  decrease. 

It  cannot  be  denied,  in  view  of  the  facts  presented,  that  other 
labor,  as  well  as  agricultural,  has  suffered  in  consequence  of  inter 
ference  with  the  natural  system  of  exchanges.  The  farmer  has  been 
driven  into  debt,  and  consumption  of  manufactured  products  has 
been  arrested.  The  manufacturer  finds  himself  loaded  down  with  a 
stock  of  goods  unnaturally  costly  in  production,  larger  than  the  home 
market  will  consume,  and  too  high  priced  for  exportation.  The 
operatives  find  their  wages  decreased,  either  in  the  sum  paid  weekly, 
or  by  suspension  of  work.  Yet  the  cost  of  clothing,  houses,  food, 
and  necessaries  of  life,  cannot  be  properly  reduced,  because  of  the 
cost  of  production,  and  all  classes  are  compelled  to  pay  heavier 
charges  for  exchanges  and  transportation.  The  whole  community  is 
taxed.  The  greater  part  of  the  tax  is  passed  to  the  producers.  Of 
these  the  farmer  bears  the  largest  share  of  the  burden,  but  his  em 
barrassment  inevitably  recoils  upon  the  laborer  employed  in  manu 
factures.  Nor  can  the  phenomena  be  reasonably  ascribed  to  any 
other  cause  than  a  tariff  which  artificially  lifts  the  prices  of  manufac 
tured  products.  For  the  very  same  sequence  of  events — low  prices 
of  agricultural  products  and  disaster  to  manufacturers — followed  the 
protective  tariff  in  1S29-'30,  when  the  currency  was  neither  depre 
ciated,  inflated,  nor  fluctuating  in  value.  The  very  same  extraordi 
nary  depression  in  prices  of  agricultural  products  followed  the  pro 
tective  tariff  in  1843-'44,  when  the  currency  was  neither  depreciated, 
inflated,  nor  fluctuating.  The  same  increase  in  cost  of  manufactured 
products,  in  cost  of  production,  and  of  exchange,  accompanied  by 
low  wages  of  labor,  in  proportion  to  the  cost  of  living,  has  appeared 
under  every  other  protective  tariff  as  far  as  statistics  have  enabled  us 
to  examine  them.  The  secret  of  the  disorder  is  the  break  between 
the  remuneration  of  capital  and  labor  applied  to  agriculture,  and 
capital  and  labor  applied  to  manufactures,  and  that  break  is  caused 
by  the  artificial  increase  of  the  price  of  manufactured  products, 
while  it  is  not  possible  for  any  tariff  to  secure  an  equal  advantage 
to  the  farmer.  The  gulf  thus  artificially  created,  as  long  as  a  tariff 


THE  PRESENT  SITUATION.  325 

continues  to  widen  it,  can  only  be  temporarily  bridged  by  short  crops, 
to  the  disadvantage  and  loss  of  all,  or  filled  up  by  a  general  col 
lapse  of  industry,  to  the  utter  ruin  of  many. 

"  True,  the  cost  of  production  has  increased ;  but  that  is  because 
the  labor  is  better  paid,"  say  the  advocates  of  protection.  Labor 
does,  indeed,  receive  more  money  than  in  1860.  But,  in  that  which 
money  will  buy,  labor  is  paid  less  than  it  was  then.  The  cost  of 
labor  has  increased,  but  far  less  than  the  prices  of  manufactured 
products.  The  increase  of  wages  in  gold,  in  the  iron-mills,  according 
to  Mr.  Wells's  report  for  1868,  was  only  20  per  cent,  since  1860; 
but  the  increase  in  the  cost  of  bar-iron  was  70  per  cent,  in  gold. 
Since  that  time  wages  have  been  reduced,  but  bar-iron  still  sells  at 
$85  a  ton,  as  it  did  in  1868.  With  an  increase  of  only  15  per  cent, 
in  gold  in  wages  in  the  founderies,  the  cost  of  stoves  has  increased 
31,  and  of  nails  over  40  per  cent.  The  cost  of  labor  per  ton,  in 
making  pig-iron  in  Pennsylvania,  was  not  less  than  $2.30  in  gold; 
and,  in  1868,  it  was  stated  by  the  manufacturers  to  be  $4  in  cur 
rency,  increase  in  gold  58  cents,  or  about  twenty-five  per  cent. ;  but 
the  cost  of  pig-iron,  though  lower  now  than  then,  is  still  35  per 
cent,  higher  than  it  was  in  1860.  The  wages  of  men  employed  in 
cutlery  works  were  increased,  from  1860  to  1868,  only  3T^  per  cent, 
in  gold;  but  the  price  of  Collins's  axes  had  increased  10T67  per  cent, 
in  gold.  The  wages  in  sugar-refineries  had  increased,  in  gold,  14 
per  cent. ;  but  the  cost  of  refined  sugar  had  increased  20  per  cent, 
in  gold.  The  wages  in  glass-works  had  increased  17  per  cent,  in 
gold,  but  the  New- York  quotations  of  the  cheapest  glass  had  in 
creased  over  50  per  cent,  in  gold.  The  rate  of  wages  in  leather 
establishments  had  increased  in  gold  22  per  cent.;  but,  though 
hides  were  10  per  cent,  lower  in  gold,  the  price  of  hemlock  sole- 
leather  had  increased  25  per  cent,  in  gold.  The  wages  of  hands  in 
the  woollen-factories  had  increased  less  than  16  per  cent,  in  gold; 
but,  though  wool  cost  less  in  gold  in  1868  than  in  1860,  the  cost  of 
blankets  had  increased  30  per  cent,  in  gold,  and  the  cost  of  ingrain 
carpets  44  per  cent,  in  gold.  These  comparisons,  also,  might  be  in 
definitely  extended.  Because  manufactured  products  have  increased 
in  cost  more  than  the  wages  of  the  labor  employed  in  making  those 
very  same  products,  and  manufactured  products  generally  have  in 
creased  in  cost  more  than  the  wages  of  labor  employed  in  manufac 
tures,  the  laborer,  though  receiving  more  money,  actually  receives 
less  pay  than  he  did  before  the  war.  Where,  then,  is  the  leak  ? 
Labor  has  gained  nothing ;  the  products  which  it  consumes  are  en 


326  DOES  PROTECTION   PROTECT? 

hanced  in  cost  more  than  the  increase  of  its  wages.  The  people 
gain  nothing;  the  goods  which  they  buy  cost  more  in  proportion 
to  the  cost  of  raw  materials.  The  farmer  gains  nothing ;  his  wheat 
buys  less  iron;  his  hides  buy  less  leather;  his  wool  buys  less  cloth. 
Has  manufacturing  capital  gained,  while  all  labor  and  all  the  rest  of 
the  community  has  lost?  In  certain  monopolies  this  is  true.  But, 
in  the  majority  of  cases,  the  manufacturer  is  embarrassed  by  the  cost 
of  production,  by  a  restricted  market,  and  by  arrest  of  the  natural  in 
crease  of  consumption.  In  the  long-run  and  in  the  aggregate,  manu 
facturing  capital  also  must  realize  smaller  profits  than  if  let  alone. 
Nature's  laws  will  be  avenged.  Men  are  tempted  to  wasteful  em 
ployment  of  capital,  to  adherence  to  wasteful  methods,  by  the  expec 
tation  of  unnatural  profits.  The  capital  and  the  labor,  if  let  alone, 
would  be  more  economically  and  profitably  employed.  Everybody 
must  be  taxed  to  make  up  for  this  diversion  of  industry  from  the 
most  remunerative  employments  and  methods.  The  burden  is  dif 
fused  over  the  whole  people,  and  it  falls  upon  the  manufacturer  him 
self  as  well.  He  must  pay  more  for  his  machinery,  in  order  that 
somebody  may  make  iron  in  Pennsylvania,  when  it  could  be  more 
cheaply  made  elsewhere.'  He  must  pay  more  for  his  buildings,  in 
order  that  somebody  may  cut  down  our  own  rapidly-wasting  forests, 
instead  of  using  the  timber  of  Canada  also,  and  in  order  that  some 
body  else  may  realize  profits  in  making  linseed-oil  and  paints,  and 
in  order  that  somebody  else  may  get  rich,  in  making  glass,  faster 
than  he  did  before  the  war.  He  must  pay  more  for  his  labor,  be 
cause  his  workmen  have  to  pay  somebody  for  making  their  blankets 
and  carpets,  their  clothing  and  boots,  an  unnatural  price,  and  must 
pay  in  every  pound  of  prepared  meat  or  fish  they  consume  a  part  of 
the  bounty  to  the  salt  monopoly.  When  all  these  taxes  have  been 
met,  the  manufacturer  often  finds  that  the  cost  of  production  has  so 
increased  as  to  eat  up  his  expected  profits.  Meanwhile,  the  laborer 
is  taxed  more  than  his  wages  are  increased ;  the  community  is  em 
barrassed  in  all  its  exchanges;  the  farmer  sells  his  sheep  for  cloth 
really  worth  one-half  the  value  of  the  wool  on  the  sheep's  back. 
Everybody  is  taxed,  and  nobody  permanently  and  really  benefited — 
nobody,  save  those  whose  monopolies  are  sucking  up  the  life-blood 
of  the  country. 


THE  PRESENT  SITUATION. 


027 


RETAIL  PRICES  IN  1860-'61,  AND  IN  1867-'68. 

In  towns  in  New  York  State,  and  the  average  in  the  States  of  Maine.  New  Hampshire,  Ver 
mont,  Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  Rhode  Island,  New  York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania, 
and  Delaware,  with  percentage  of  increase,  and  prices  of  1867-'68  reduced  to  gold  values. 
From  the  Report  of  Commissioner  Wells  for  1868. 

ARTICLES. 

N.WYOK*.              £• 

h 

11 

C  T3 

ids 

C  c 

1860-'61. 

1867-'68. 

1860-'61. 

1867-'68. 

PROVISIONS. 

Flour,  wheat,  superfine,  bbl. 
kk              "       ft... 
Flour,  rye,  bbl  
Corn-meal,  bbl  
Beef,  fresh,  roasting-pieces,  ft 
soup-pieces,  ft., 
rump-steaks,  ft.. 
corned,  ft.          .   .  . 

$7  02 
3.86 
486 
2  94 
10.25 
5.25 
10.33 
7.67 
7.25 
9.14 
11.43 
8.8 
9.63 
10.14 
9.75 
10.25 
10.75 
11.25 
9 
11 
12 
5 
9.18 
18 
10.7 
46 
6 
6.36 
4.25 

63 
15.4 
20 
8.20 
9.50 
48 
45.54 
63 
8.63 
10.73 
5  62 
4  50 
341 
87.5 

9.63 
13 
10.25 
12 
13.33 
19.50 
11.3 
18.5 
11.33 
61.20 
347 

4  20 

578 

3  15 
2  53 

$13  32 
T.« 

9  00 
5  47 
20.5 
10.35 
20.  1C 
14.2v 
14.11 
17.& 
22 
11.75 
16.67 
18 
15.11 
16 
17.5 
20.17 
16.5 

is.  as 

18.36 
9 
13.45 
35 
17.7 
90 
13.27 
11.18 
7.50 

1  44 
32.7 
40.44 
14.10 
16.20 
1  00 
93.63 
1  22.4 
12.36 
14  63 
7  48.33 
6  94 
5  25 
62.5 

20 
25 
22 
24 
31.8 
37 
18 
25.3 
18.75 
98 
5  05 

6  85 
9  37 

4  75 
4  00 

9C 

1     8S 
s: 
8€ 
IOC 
98 
•    94 
85 
95 
,     90 
92 

§; 

77 
;     55 
56 
64 
!     79 

Z 

52 
80 
47 
94 
65 
96 
110 
76 

76 

128 
112 
102 
72 
70 
108 
105 
91 
43 
39 
34 
54 
55 
(* 

107 
94 
115 
100 
138 
90 
60 
36 
67 
60| 
46 

51 
62 

51 

58 

$7  48 
j         3.99 
1     444 
3  13 
11.46 
5.78 
12.25 
8.46 
8.06 
10.27 
12.92 
8.02 
10.29 
11.39 
9.54 
10.39 
10.28 
12.36 
9.46 
11.6 
12.47 
4.87 
8.01 
19.7 
11.38 
55.34 
6.09 
6.96 
4.64 

67.72 
14.96 
18.26 
8.34 
9.02 
49.74 
44.1 
9.79 
7.86 
9.91 
5  58 
4  44 
3  23 
87.05 

9.62 
11.79 
11.15 
13.56 
13.14 
18.57 
11.59 
18.02 
10.24 
56.43 
3  30 

444 

6  02 

2  75 

1  86 

$14  55 
7.7] 
8  11 
5  33 
22.  6f 
11.  Ot 
24.4 
15.  9c 
14.54 
18.48 
22.  If 
14.  5£ 
19.01 
19.  7S 
16.79 
17.  5S 
17.63 
22.21 
17.08 
19.67 
17.88 
8.72 
13.59 
37.72 
19.61 
98.94 
13.31 
13.37 
7.49 

1  34.88 
33.19 
38.67 
14.65 
15.80 
1  02.22 
88.87 
1  15.75 
12.72 
14.9 
8  11 
7  14 
5  31 
64.28 

19.39 
23.31 
23.16 
26.79 
28.09 
39.33 
18.37 
25.33 
17.79 
84.81 
531 

739 
9  83 

4  69 

3  38 

94.5? 
93.21 
78.6$ 
70.3 
97.  7S 
91.  3S 
99.38 
109.6 
80.41 
,  89.95 
'  71.54 
81.92 
84.75 
73.69 
76.10 
69.31 
71  ~)f. 
1  79i69 
80.54 
69.6 
46.84 
79.31 
69.51 
91.48 
72.27 
78.79 
118.73 
92.05 
61.45 

99.19 
121.82 
111.74 
75.67 
75.13 
105.49 
115.14 
65.85 
61.82 
50.39 
45.53 
60.87 
64.44 
35* 

101.56 
97.71 
107.68 
97.59 
113.68 
111.78 
58.48 
40.56 
73.75 
50.30 
60.61 

66.31 
63.32 

70.  as 

81.47 

$10  39 
5.51 
5.79 
3  81 
16.19 
7.9 
17.5 
11.4 
10.4 
13.2 
15.83 
10.42 
13.58 
14.14 
12 
12.56 
12.6 
15.86 
12.20 
14.05 
12.72 
6.24 
9.71 
26.95 
14 
70.67 
9.51 
9.55 
5.35 

96.34 
23.71 
27.62 
10.46 
11.29 
73.02 
63.48 
82.68 
9.09 
10.64 
5  80 
5  10 
3  78 
45.92 

13.  85 
16.65 
16.54 
19.14 
20.06 
28.1 
13.13 
18.10 
12.71 
60.58 
3  79 

5  28 
7  02 

385 
241 

Veal,  fore-quarters,  ft  

hind-quarters,  ft  

cutlets,  ft  

Mutton,  fore-quarters,  ft  ... 
legs,  ft  

chops,  ft  

Pork,  fresh  ft 

corned,  or  salted,  ft  ... 
bacon.  ft  

hams,  smoked,  ft  
shoulders,  ft  

sausages,  ft  

Lard   ft                            

Codfish  drv  ft 

Mackerel,  pickled,  ft  
Butter,  ft           

Cheese  ft 

Potatoes,  bushel  

Rice,  ft  

Beans    quart 

Milk,  quart  

GROCERIES,  ETC. 

Tea,  Oolong,  or  good  Black,  ft 
Coffee,  Rio,  green,  ft  
roasted..  . 

f  ,  ""ar  good  brown  ft     ... 

yellow  C.  ft  
Molasses,  New  Orleans,  gall.. 
Porto  Rico,  gall  
Syrup,  gall  
Soap,  common,  ft  
Starch    ft 

Fuel  coal  ton 

wood,  hard,  cord  

pine,  cord  
Oil  coal  gallon 

DOMESTIC  DRT-GOOD8,   ETC. 

Shirtings,  brown,  4-4,  stand'd 
qualitv,  yard  

Shirtings,  bleached,  4-4,  do... 
Sheetings  brown  9-8       do. 

bleached,  9-8,  do... 
Cotton  Flan'l,  ''Hamilton,"  yd 
Tickings,  good  quality,  yard. 
Prints,  Merrimack.  yard  
Mousseline  de  Laine.  dora.,  yd 
Crash,  domestic,  yard  
Satinet,  medium  quality,  yard 
Boots,  men's  heavy,  pair  

HOUSE-RENT. 

Four-roomed  tenements,  m'th 
Six-roomed  tenements,  month 

BOARD. 

For  men.  week  

For  women,  week  

\  Calculated  at  $1.40. 


328 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


THE  RATE  OF  WAGES  IN  ISeO-'ei  AND  IN  1867-'68  COMPARED,  WITH  THE  PER 
CENTAGE  OF  INCREASE. 

From  the  Report  of  Commissioner  Wells,  for  1868. 
COTTON-MILLS. 

Table  allowing  the  average  rates  of  wages  paid  to  persons  employed  in  the  cotton-mills  of 
the  United  States  in  the  respective  years  1860-'61,  analSQl;  also  the  percentage  of 


e  latter  year. 


OCCUPATION. 

AVERAGE  RATES  OF  "WAGES  OR  EARNINGS  PER  WEEK. 

1 

"3 

I 

39 
54 
59 
63 
64 
64 
54 
60 
56 

44 

59 

74 
81 
80 

48' 
68 
77 
76 
64 
65 
52 

42 
65 
67 
62 
76 

41 
62 
57 
60 
53 

35 
56 
52 
66 

In 

Massachusetts. 

New  England. 

In  the 

Middle  States. 

Average  in  the 
United  States. 

In  1860 
-1861. 

Iu  1867. 

In  1860 
-1861. 

In  1867. 

In  1860 
-1861. 

In  1867. 

In   1860 
-1861. 

In  1867. 

CAKDINO. 

Overseer 

$17  18 
9  18 

5  00 
2  83 
2  87 
3  61 

5'  78 
5  17 

16  65 
8  85 
5  93 
1  64 
3  33 

15  15 
8  30 
6  50 
3  40 
3  96 
3  72 
5  10 

15  94 
8  83 
7  12 
4  50 
345 

1489 
8  82 
9  09 

6*  15 

13  31 

7  46 
5  85 
3  57 

*20  00 
13  33 
7  42 
4  70 
5  02 
626 

9'80 

7  18 

20  60 
13  21 
11  16 
3  17 
6  05 

21  44 
13  45 
10  75 
6  49 
6  81 
6,75 
9  89 

21  11 
14  23 
11  83 
9  06 
6  02 

19  20 
13  75 
13  83 
14  00 
9  17 

17  03 
10  54 
8  92 
5  50 

$12  90 
7  36 
4  77 
2  80 
3  00 
3  54 

5'  85 
4  54 

11  88 
6  93 
6  10 
1  83 
283 

12  19 
7  70 
5  57 
3  12 
359 
3  75 
703 

12  73 
7  08 
5  89 
4  63 
4  07 

12  65 

8  71 
8  70 
6  42 
5  98 

11  31 
6  77 
595 
3  21 

$17  61 
11  25 
8  22 
4  51 
5  00 
596 

9'37 

786 

16  98 
10  90 
10  18 
3  14 
5  18 

18  09 
12  42 
9  18 
4  71 
6  09 
6  41 
11  40 

17  84 
11  42 
9  10 
7  80 
6  65 

18  11 
13  65 
13  66 
10  78 
9  09 

14  41 
9  77 
8  97 
5  14 

$9  58 
6  26 
4  78 
3  67 
2  81 
3  07 
2  92 

5'  12 

9  80 
5  55 
6  25 
1  72 
2  13 

8  75 
5  76 

2*48 
4  13 
4  15 
7  22 

1031 
6  66 
6  25 
4  75 
4  50 

11  65 
7  92 
9  39 
11  50 
6  00 

7  32 

483 

$16  30 
10  55 
8  84 
5  75 
4  16 
5  16 
450 

7'50 

16  72 
10  04 
11  18 
3  46 
4  50 

16  50 
13  00 
13  50 
3  99 
5  87 
6  66 
13  17 

16  08 
11  17 
9  50 
6  85 
8  00 

17  25 
13  20 
14  13 
18  00 
9  38 

11  19 
9  00 

$1266 
7  23 
5  13 
2  83 
2  93 
3  54 
2  92 
5  85 
4  74 

11  71 
6  46 
5  80 
1  69 
2  64 

12  02 

7  44 
5  71 
2  85 
3  62 
4  10 
7  64 

12  18 
6  95 
5  60 
5  24 
4  10 

12  60 
8  60 
8  78 
7  24 
5  96 

9  75 
5  93 
5  90 

282 

$1760 
11  14 
8  18 
4  61 
4  82 
5  81 
4  50 
9  37 
7  41 

16  90 
10  27 
10  14 
3  09 
4  76 

17  70 
12  53 
10  11 
5  03 
6  00 
6  77 
11  66 

17  36 
11  50 
9  40 
8  48 
7  21 

17  77 
13  95 
13  76 
11  61 
9  14 

13  22 
9  25 
8  96 
468 

Second  hand 

Picker  tenders  

Railway  tenders    ... 

Drawing-frame  tenders 

Speeder  tenders  

Picker-boy  

Grinders 

Strippers  

SPINNING. 

Second  hand  .  .  . 

Mule  spinners  

Mule  backside  piecers  

Frame  spinners 

DRESSING. 

Overseer 

Second  hand  

Third  hand    

Spoolers 

Warpers 

Drawers  and  twisters  

Dressers    .  .       .         ... 

WEAVING. 

Overseer   .  . 

Second  hand  

Third  hand... 

Weavers 

Dra  wing-in  hands  

REPAIR-SHOP,  ENGINE-ROOM,  ETC. 

Foreman  or  overseer 

Iron-  workers 

Wood-workers  

Engineer  

Laborers  

CLOTH-ROOM,  ETC. 

Overseer  .     . 

Secondhand      .. 

Other  hands  —  males  

Females  

2  44 

4  23 

Hours  of  labor  per  week  66 

Apparent  average  increase  of  wages  in  1867  over  those  in  1860-'61,  per  cent         .    56 
True  average,  per  cent  63 

THE  PRESENT  SITUATION. 


329 


WOOLLEN-MILLS. 

Table  showing  the  average  rates  of  wages  paid  to  persons  employed  in  the  woollen-mills 
of  the  United  States  in  the  respective  years  I860-' 61  and  1867-' 68,  with  the  percentage 
of  increase  in  the  latter  year  y  also  the  rat  fs  paid  in  England,  with  the  percentage  of 
excess  in  the  rates  paid  in  the  United  States  over  that  country. 


OCCUPATION. 

AVERAGE  WEEKLY  WAGES  OR  EARNINGS. 

In  New  Eng 
land. 

In  New  York 

State. 

General  average 
m  New  England 
and  New  York. 

1 
•s 

f 

& 

1 

« 
8 

if 

IN  ENGLAND 

1 

11 

£W 

£P 

28.33 
20.41 
19.27 
33.55 

I 

i 

!| 

72  £ 

1.1 
oST 

i'j 

<  S 

CO 

i 

d 

! 

I 

a 

]p 

s 

f 
1 
A 

? 

£ 

? 

a 

PREPARING. 

Wool-sorter* 

$8  05 
5  65 
6  13 
1200 
8  50 

5  25 

4  15 
6  74 
5  48 
2  90 
11  50 
7  50 

444 
3  14 

11  70 

6  00 
5  00 
6  50 
6  50 
4  50 
2  25 
5  00 
7  88 
7  50 

9  62 
9  31 

6  13 
13  50 

$1235 
9  46 
10  13 
19  13 
11  50 

803 

5  96 
11  34 
9  04 
4  62 
18  43 
11  10 

7  73 
5  34 
17  75 

8  88 
8  81 
9  00 
9  00 
9  00 
3  50 
7  50 
14  25 
12  00 

14  00 
1598 

10  50 
18  00 

$7  53 
5  13 
4  80 
12  38 
7  75 

490 

4  00 
7  00 
5  00 
2  50 
12  38 
7  88 

4  88 
2  69 
13  13 

5  88 
4  50 
4  13 
5  38 
3  75 
6  00 
4  50 
11  75 
803 

10  50 

8  84 

5  83 

$1100 
8  31 
8  22 
22  00 
11  00 

8  63 
6  35 
11  25 
11  00 
3  67 
23  25 
13  13 

8  38 
4  50 

24  75 

10  69 
7  88 
8  50 
8  75 
7  50 
9  00 
8  25 
17  25 
11  00 

20  75 
16  00 

7  50 

$7  84 
5  42 
5  46 
12  19 
8  13 

5  11 

4  08 
6  84 
5  27 
2  73 
11  85 
7  69 

4  66 
2  92 
12  33 

5  93 
4  77 
5  55 
6  05 
4  12 
3  50 
4  75 
11  12 
806 

9  97 
10  54 

6  00 
13  50 

$1186 
9  00 
9  17 
20  56 
11  25 

8  25 
6  12 
11  30 
9  88 
4  21 
20  27 
12  00 

8  02 
4  95 
20  55 

9  78 
8  34 
8  80 
8  90 
8  25 
5  m 
7  75 
18  62 
11  00 

16  70 
15  98 

9  64 

18  00 

51.28 
66.05 
68.32 
68.66 
38.38 

61.45 
50.00 
65.20 
87.48 
54.21 
71.06 
56.04 

72.10 
69.52 
66.67 

64.92 
74.84 
59.45 
47.10 
100.00 
52.28 
63.15 
68.34 
48.88 

67.50 
51.61 

60.66 
33.33 

$8  47 
6  43 
6  56 
14  69 
8  04 

5  89 
4  37 
8  07 
706 
3  01 
14  48 
857 

5  73 
3  04 
14  68 

6  99 
5  96 
6  29 
6  36 
5  89 
3  81 
5  54 
13  30 
8  57 

11  93 
11  41 

6  84 
12  86 

$6  00 
4  85 
5  00 
10  00 

$6  60 
534 
5  50 
11  00 

Wool  -washers  
Dvers          

Overseers 

Assistants  

CARD'G  AND  SPIN'G. 
Pickers 

4  60 

3  50 
5  50 
5  12 
2  50 
10  00 

4  25 

2  25 
10  00 

5  25 
5  00 
5  50 
5  25 
3  75 
2  50 
5  00 
10  00 

5  06 
3  85 
6  05 
5  63 
2  75 
11  00 

4  67 

248 
11  00 

5  77 
5  50 
6  05 
5  78 
4  13 
2  75 
5  50 
11  00 

16.40 
13.50 
33.38 
25.40 
9.46 
31.64 

22.70 
22.58 
33.45 

21.14 
8.36 
4.00 
10.04 
42.15 
38.55 
00.73 
21.00 

Carders 

\\  arp's  &  Beamers. 
Reelers. 

Overseers  
Assistants  

WEAVING. 

Weavers 

Burlers  

Overseers  

DRESSING  AND    FIN 
ISHING. 

Fullers      

Dressers  or  Giggers 
Finishers 

Press  Tenders  
Drawers 

Packers    

Overseers  
Assistants 

ENGINE-ROOM,  ETC. 

En°ineers  

7  50 
750 

4  50 

7  50 

8  25 
8  25 

495 

8  25 

44.61 
38.30 

38.18 

55.88 

Mechanics  

Laborers,  W'hmen, 
and  Yard  Hands.  . 
Foremen  

NOTE. — General  average  hoars  of  labor  per  week  in  New  England  and  New  York,  for 
1860-'61,  71 ;  and  for  1867-'68,  66 ;  in  England,  60 ;  adding  10  per  cent.,  66.  Average  increase 
in  rates  of  wages  in  1867-'68  over  those  of  1860-'61,  60.65  per  cent.  Average  advance  in  rates 
of  wages  paid  in  the  United  States- over  those  of  England  (both  in  gold),  24.63  per  cent 


330 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


LEATHER  MANUFACTORIES. 


Table  showing  the  average  weekly |  wages  paid  to  persons  employed  in  manufactories  of 
leather  in  the  United  States  in  I860-' 61  and  in  1867  /  also  the  rates  paid  in  Scotland 
in  1866,  as  compared  with  those  in  the  United  States  in  1867. 


OCCUPATION. 

AVERAGE  WEEKLY  EARNINGS  IN  — 

United    States. 
1860-'61. 

United   States, 
1867-'68. 

Percentage  of 
increase  in  '67. 

Wages  in   1867 
in  gold. 

Edinburgh, 
Scotland,  in 
1866. 

Percent,  of  exc. 
in    U.   S.    over 
Scotland. 

Tanners 

$7  00 

9  00 
9  00 
10  00 
7  00 
6  00 

$15  00 
15  00 
15  00 
18  00 
10  00 
9  00 

114 
67 
67 
80 
48 
50 

$10  71 
10  71 
10  71 
12  86 
7  14 
6  43 

$6  25 
8  50 
8  50 
6  25 
6  25 
3  75 

4.46 
2.21 
2.21 
6.61 
0.89 
2.68 

Curriers  

Dressers.        .... 

Beam-men  
Shed-men 

Tanners1  labor's. 

Average  increase  of  wages  in  1867  over  1860-'61,  71  per  cent.    Average  advance  of  rates  in 
the  United  States  in  1867  over  those  of  Scotland  in  1866,  48  per  cent. 

GLASS-WORKS. 

Table  showing  the  average  earnings  of  persons  employed  in  glass-works  of  the  United 
States  in  the  years  I860-' 61  and  1867-' 68,  with  the  percentage  of  increase  in  the  lat 
ter  year:  also  the  earnings  in  glass-works  of  England  in  1866,  compared  with  those 
in  the  United  States  in  1867. 


OCCUPATION. 

Av.  weekly  enrn 
1860-'61. 

ings  in  the  U.S. 
1867-'68. 

Percentage  of 
increase. 

Earnings  of  '67 
in  gold. 

Earn'gs  in  Eng 
land  in  1866. 

Percentage  of 
excess  in  U.  S. 
over  England. 

Glass-blowers..  . 
Phial-blowers..  . 
Assistants  
Batch-mixers..  . 
Master-teasers.  . 
Assistant  "  ... 
Potmakers 

$14  00 
12  00 

6  00 
8  50 
12  00 
6  50 
11  50 

$22  73 
18  00 
10  00 
14  25 
18  00 
13  00 
19  00 

62.36 
50.00 
65.67 
67.65 
50.00 
100.00 
65.22 

$16  23 

12  86 
7  14 
10  18 
12  86 
9  28 
13  57 

$12  00 

10  50 
5  41 
6  25 

6  25 

35 
22 
32 
63 

48 

Assist't  "  
Packers  

7  00 

7  50 

12  00 
14  50 

71.43 
93.33 

8  57 
10  35 

e'25 

65 

Blacksmiths  
Carpenters  
Demijohn-cover's 
Skilled  boys  
Engineers  
Laborers  

13  00 
8  50 
8  05 
3.25 
10  25 
5  50 

17  50 
14  25 
14  00 
6  00 
15  00 
9  32 

42.31 
67.65 
75.00 
84.61 
46.34 
69.45 

12  50 
10  18 
10  00 
4  28 
10  71 
6  66 

7  50 
7  00 

53 

45 

Apprentices  
Foremen  

2  50 
13  50 

4  25 
19  50 

70.00 
44.44 

3  03 
13  93 

•• 

Average  increase  of  earnings  in  1867  over  1860-'61,  63  per  cent.    Average  excess  in  United 
States  over  England,  45  per  cent. 

PAPER-MILLS. 

Table  showing  the  average  weekly  wages  paid  to  persons  employed  in  paper-mills  in  the 

the  per- 


<t,v  Biwwwty  biiiv  uvvfwyv  'uivvKvy  'wuyvs  puia*  «/i>  pvreune  vrrvpwyevt  vn  paper-'rri'tii/s  rt7t 

United  States  in  the  respective  years  1860-'61  and  1867-'68,  with  the  percentage  of 
increase  in  the  latter  year  ;  also  the  rates  paid  in  Scotland  in  1866,  with  the  p  ' 


centage  of  advance  in  the  United  States. 


OCCUPATION. 

Av.  weekly  earnings  in  the  U.  S. 

Percentage  of 
inc.  in  1867-'68. 

United  States 
in  1867  (gold). 

Edinburgh  and 
vicinity  in  '66. 

Percent,  in  adv. 
in  U.  S.  o'r  Sc'd 

1860-'61. 

1867-'68. 

Machine-tenders. 

$9  67 

$15  67 

62 

$11  19 

$5  50 

103 

Assistant     " 

4  50 

9  00 

100 

6  43 

Rag-cutters,mal's 
"        females 

7  17 
3  67 

12  17 
6  00 

70 
60 

8  69 
4  29 

4'66 

117 

Loft-men  or  dry's 

6  17 

10  83 

75 

7  74 

4"66 

93 

Callender-men... 

8  75 

14  25 

63 

10  18 

Finishers  

7  50 

12  67 

69 

9  05 

4"  50 

loi 

Engine-men  

7  50 

12  00 

60 

8  57 

5  00 

71 

Helpers  on  Eng's 

4  75 

8  50 

79 

6  07 

Bleachers  

7  00 

11  00 

57 

7  86 

4  50 

75 

Fizers 

4  50 

10  25 

127 

7  32 

4  44 

65 

Millwrights  

10  50 

19  00 

81 

13  57 

7  00 

94 

Masons  

10  00 

20  00 

100 

14  29 

6  25 

128 

Carpenters  

9  50 

16  50 

73 

11  78 

6  25 

88 

Blacksmiths  

9  00 

14  00 

55 

10  00 

5  75 

74 

Laborers,  etc  — 

5  92 

8  92 

50 

6  37 

3  75 

69 

Apprentices  

4  00 

6  00 

50 

4  29 

Firemen  

9  00 

14  00 

55 

10  00 

4'50 

122 

Average  increase  of  wages  in  1867-'68  over  1860-'61,  84  per  cent.    Average  advance  in 
rates  paid  in  the  United  States  in  1867  over  Scotland  in  1866,  93  per  cent. 


THE  PRESENT  SITUATION. 


331 


IRON-ROLLING  MILLS. 


Table  showing  the  average  weekly  earnings  of  workmen  in  the  iron-rolling  mills  of  the 
United  States  in  the  respective  years  I860-' 61  and  1867-' 68,  with  the  percentage  of 
increase  in  the  latter  year  /  also  the  earnings  in  England  in  the  year  1867,  with  a 
comparison  of  the  earnings  in  the  two  countries. 


AVERAGE 
EAR' 

WEEKLY 

<INOS. 

«i 

i 

1 

i 

.STS 

I! 

OCCUPATION. 

I 

A 

E 

! 

5 

o~ 

II 

1* 

j 

So 
a 

|2 

ffl 

Earnings  in  E 
in  1867. 

Percentage  of  t 
V.  States  over 

Puddlers 

$13  37 

$23  17 

73  30 

Sl»i  M 

$8  75 

89  03 

Puddlers'  Helpers        

7  27 

13  46 

85  14 

9  61 

4  50 

113  55 

Shincrler8                         .... 

12  06 

22  27 

84  66 

15  90 

11  25 

41  33 

Shin^lerV  Helpers 

5  33 

9  50 

78  24 

6  79 

6  75 

Puddle-Mill  Rollers 

9  77 

19  02 

94  68 

13  58 

11  25 

20  71 

Top  and  Bottom  Rollers  
For^e  Rollers 

10  75 
10  25 

25  06 
21  25 

133.12 
107  32 

17  90 
15  18 

15  00 
11  25 

19.33 
44  93 

Merchant-Mill  Finishers  
Rail-Mill  Rollers          

18  50 
27  00 

35  00 
37  69 

99.31 
39.60 

18  50 
26  92 

13  75 
12  00 

35.57 
124  33 

Sheet  and  Plate  Rollers  
Second  Rollers 

12  00 
8  97 

20  67 
16  41 

72.25 
82  94 

14  76 
11  72 

20  00 
6  00 

dec.  26.20 
inc  95  33 

Third  Rollers  
Fur'e-men  or  Heaters'  H'lps. 
Shearmen                        .... 

8  75 
7  39 
9  04 

13  87 
11  91 
14  98 

58.51 
61.16 
65  71 

9  90 
8  51 
10  70 

4  50 
6  00 
6  00 

120.00 
41.83 
78  33 

6  71 

14  80 

120  57 

10  57 

6  00 

76  16 

Roucrhers  .          

8  67 

20  24 

133.45 

14  46 

8  00 

80  75 

Heaters             

14  S3 

25  36 

71  00 

18  11 

12  50 

44  88 

Foremen  or  Superintend1  ts.. 
Machinists  

14  87 
12  08 

24  90 
18  11 

67.45 
49.92 

17  78 
13  64 

12  00 

7  50 

48.17 
81  86 

Engineers    ...                 .... 

9  64 

14  28 

48  13 

10  20 

7  50 

36  00 

Carpenters 

8  44 

15  46 

82  70 

11  01 

7  00 

57  28 

Blacksmiths  

8  07 

14  66 

81.66 

10  47 

7  50 

39  60 

Laborers,  etc            

5  34 

9  10 

70  41 

6  50 

4  00 

62  50 

Teamsters 

6  00 

10  25 

70  83 

7  32 

4  00 

83  00 

Apprentices  and  Boys  

2  80 

4  34 

55.00 

3  10     i 

2  50 

24.00 

Average  increase  of  watres  in  1867  over  the  rates  in  1860-'61,  76  per  cent. 

Average  price  of  puddling  in  the  New  England  and  Middle  States  in  1867,  $6.63  per  ton ; 
in  1868,  $6  per  ton. 

The  prices  for  puddling,  rolling,  etc.,  having  declined  in  1868,  the  average  increase  of  1868 
over  1860  is  thereby  reduced  to  about  67  per  cent.  But.  although  the  cost  of  labor  has  ad 
vanced  but  67  per  cent.,  the  real  advance  over  1860,  in  the  cost  of  making.iron,  is  believed  to 
be  about  75  per  cent. 

The  average  advance  in  the  earnings  of  the  workmen  employed  in  the  rolling-mills  of  the 
United  States  over  those  of  Great  Britain  (both  in  gold)  is  48.34  per  cent. 

STEEL-WORKS. 

Table  showing  the  average  weekly  earnings  of  workmen  employed  in  the  steel-works  of 
Pittsburg,  United  States,  in  1867-'68,  as  compared  with  those  in  Sheffield,  England, 
in  1866-' 67. 


OCCUPATION. 

Av.  weekly  earnings  In  Pittsbnrg,  '67-'68. 

Av.  weekly  earnings 
in  Sheffield,  '66-'67. 

Percent,  of  excess  in 
Pittsburg  in  '67-'68. 

Currency. 

Gold. 

Converter  

$19  50 
12  00 
9  00 
32  50 
16  25 
12  00 
12  00 
30  00 
12  00 
38  00 
18  00 

$13  93 
8  57 
6  43 
23  21 
11  61 
8  57 
8  57 
21  43 
8  57 
27  14 
12  85 

$10  00 
5  25 
4  50 
11  25 
8  00 
5  00 
5  00 
12  50 
6  00 
18  00 
7  50 

3.93 
3.32 
1.93 
11.96 
3.61 
3.57 
3.57 
8.93 
2.57 
9.14 
5.35 

Converters'  Laborer  

Common  Laborers 

Melter  

Puller-out 

Moulders  ... 

Cokers  

Forgeman  and  Tilter  
Forgeman'  s  Heater  
Roller        

Roller  Furnace-man.  .  . 

Average  advance  of  wages  in  the  steel-works  of  Pittsburg  over  those  of  Sheffield,  62.23  per  ct. 


332 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


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THE   PRESENT  SITUATION. 


333 


HARDWARE   MANUFACTORIES. 

Table  showing  the  average  weekly  wages  of  persons  employed  in  the  hardware  manufac 
tories  of  the  United  States  in  I860-'  61  and  1867,  with  the  percentage  of  increase  in 
the  latter  year ;  also  the  rates  in  similar  establishments  in  Great  Britain  in  1866, 
compared  with  those  of  the  United  States  in  1866. 


OCCUPATION. 

AVERAGE  WEEKLY  WAGES  OB  EARNINGS. 

9 

1 

I 

5 

i 

I11 

J 

I 
•S  . 

Wasres  In  England 
In  1866. 

:1I 

P 

Jill 

Moulders             ....          

$7  95 
7  15 
706 
7  57 
7  33 
11  03 
6  61 
887 
8  11 
7  92 
12  00 
11  48 
10  70 
6  00 
729 
388 
13  00 
834 
3  75 
10  50 
10  50 
900 
12  00 
12  00 
9  19 
11  50 
9  64 
11  10 
10  50 
10  50 
7  75 
6  26 
9  22 
648 
13  06 
3  59 

$13  18 
1065 
11  02 
11  21 
11  58 
17  25 
10  18 
12  16 
11  58 
11  50 
15  00 
18  18 
16  50 
9  60 
12  00 
5  85 
2040 
11  79 
6  00 
15  00 
15  00 
14  25 
1500 
13  50 
13  94 
17  86 
16  52 
16  20 
16  50 
1800 
10  50 
1010 
14  53 
9  50 
19  87 
5  64 

65.79 
48.95 
56.09 
48.09 
57.98 
56.39 
54.01 
37.09 
42.79 
45.20 
25.00 
58.36 
54.21 
60.00 
64.61 
50.77 
56.92 
41.37 
60.00 
42.86 
42.86 
58.33 
25.00 
12.50 
51.69 
55.30 
71.37 
45.95 
57.14 
71.43 
35.48 
61.34 
57.59 
46.60 
52.14 
57.10 

$941 
7  61 
7  87 
8  02 
827 
12  32 
7  27 
869 
827 
8  21 
1071 
12  99 
11  79 
6  86 
8  57 
4  18 
1457 
8  42 
4  29 
10  71 
10  71 
10  18 
10  71 
964 
9  96 
1276 
11  80 
11  57 
11  79 
12  86 
7  50 
7  21 
1038 
6  79 
14  19 
4  03 

$7  50 

6  25 

8  50 
5  00 
6  50 

6  75 
7  50 
7  50 
7  50 
750 
5  25 

250 
1000 

6  75 
850 
7  00 
10  00 

750 
5  00 
10  00 
3  12 

25.46 

28.32 

45.00 
45.40 
33.69 
22.51 
9.46 
42.80 
73.20 
57.27 
30.60 

67.20 
45.70 

47.85 
50.00 
68.57 
15.70 

38.40 
35.80 
41.90 
22.75 

Cupola-tenders    

Annealing-furnace  Tenders 

Filers                                                

Japanners                          

Helpers 

Grinders                                  

Polishers  

Machinists                            

Engineers     .  .                   

Packers 

41    Females 

Diemakers                             

Rollers                                      

Welders                               

Finishers                               

Trip-hammer  Men                        ... 

Twisters           .                      

Blacksmiths            '  

Helpers        

Apprentices  or  Boys          .          .... 

Hours  of  labor  per  week                        60 

Average  increase  in  rates  of  waees  in  1867  over  1860-'61...                              ...percent..    50 

23 


334 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


MANUFACTORIES  OF  EDGE  TOOLS. 

Table  showing  the  average  weekly  earnings  of  persons  employed  in  manufactories  of  edge 
tools  in  the  United  States  in  I860-' 61  and  in  1867,  with  the  percentages  of  increase  in 
the  latter  year;  also  the  comparative  rates  in  similar  establishments  in  Sheffield, 
England,  in  1866-' 67. 


• 

AVERAGE  WEEKLY  EARNINGS. 

OCCUPATION. 

15 

Is 

•s2  . 

1 

fi 

W 

pi 
1} 

if 

Ill 

K 

If 

w 

S5 

,502 

2  B  o 

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Forgers    .  .        

$13  50 
10  50 

$17  50 
13  50 

29.63 

28  57 

$«5? 

$8  50 
5  00 

47. 
92 

Helpers 

Temperers 

10  50 

15  00 

42  86 

10  71 

6  50 

65 

Grinders  

12  00 

18  00 

50.00 

12  86 

9  25 

39 

Polishers 

10  50 

14  50 

38  10 

10  36 

6  75 

53 

Laborers 

6  00 

10  25 

70  83 

7  32 

5  50 

33 

Carpenters  

10  50 

16  50 

57.14 

11  79 

7  50 

57. 

Foremen    

11  00 

17  25 

5682 

12  32 

10  00 

23 

Apprentices  or  Boys 

6  00 
12  00 

8  00 
18  00 

33.33 

50  00 

5  71 
12  86 

3  75 
7  50 

52. 
71 

Machinists 

Trip-hammer  Men  

15  00 

21  00 

40.00 

15  00 

10  00 

50. 

Hours  of  labor  per  week 

Average  increase  of  earnings  in  1867  over  1860-'61 

Average  excess  of  earnings  in  the  United  States  over  England 


per  cent. 
.  .  .do 


MANUFACTORIES  OF  AGRICULTURAL  IMPLEMENTS. 

Table  showing  the  average  rate  of  wages  paid  to  persons  employed  in  manufactories  of 
agricultural  implements  in  the  United  States  in  the  respective  years  I860-' 61  and 
1867-' 68,  with  the  percentage  of  increase  in 


OCCTTPATION. 

Aver'ge  weekly  earnings 

Percentage  of  in 
crease. 

js 

g 

i 

a 

Moulders  

$10  97 
8  68 
8  50 
5  75 
8  75 
777 
9  00 
6  82 
7  87 
9  08 
8  97 
18  22 
9  00 
5  33 
2  62 
13  12 

$17  29 
15  69 
15  57 
8  90 
14  61 
12  23 
1500 
10  52 
12  05 
17  25 
1269 
31  96 
15  00 
9  92 
4  53 
23  54 

57.61 
80.76 
80.32 
54.78 
66.90 
57.40 
66.67 
54.25 
53.11 
89.97 
41.47 
75.96 
66.67 
86.12 
72.90 
79.42 

Machinists  

Blacksmiths  

Blacksmiths'  Helpers  

Wood-workers  

Painters  

Plough-makers  

Teamsters  

Grinders  

Pattern-makers  .-  

Watchmen  

Clerks  

Engineers  

Laborers  and  unskilled  Workmen  

Apprentices  or  Boys  

Foremen  or  Overseers  

Hours  of  labor  per  week 

Average  increase  of  wages  in  1867  over  1860-'61. 


.percent..    68 


THE  LABOR  BAROMETER.  335 

CHAPTER  XXIV. 

THE    LABOR    BAROMETER. 

WITH  good  reason,  the  movement  of  population  from  one  country 
to  another  has  been  regarded  by  all  writers  as  a  very  conclusive  in 
dication  of  the  relative  condition  of  the  laboring  classes  in  those  coun 
tries.  Other  causes  besides  suffering  in  one  country  or  hope  of  wealth 
in  another  do  indeed  prompt  men  to  migrate,  l)ut  the  effect  of  these 
is  comparatively  slight,  and  can  readily  be  traced.  But  it  is  a  rule  of 
almost  universal  application  that,  when  men  remove  in  large  numbers 
from  one  land  to  another,  the  great  majority  of  them  do  so  in  the  hope 
of  bettering  their  condition.  A  famine  or  a  revolution  at  home  may 
drive  them  away,  but  the  world  is  wide,  and,  if  they  select  one  country 
rather  than  another  for  their  future  abode,  the  great  majority  do  so 
because  they,  expect  there  to  earn  better  wages  and  to  live  more 
comfortably  than  elsewhere.  Hence,  whenever  opponents  of  the  sys 
tem  of  protection  have  endeavored  to  show  that  it  renders  certain 
workmen  of  this  country  less  able  than  similar  workmen  in  other 
countries  to  purchase  articles  of  common  use,  the  advocates  of  pro 
tection  have  answered,  with  convincing  effect,  "  Yet  the  laborers  do 
come  in  great  numbers  from  the  land  where  you  say  their  burdens 
are  light,  to  the  land  where  you  say  their  burdens  are  heavy ! "  There 
the  argument  must  needs  end.  Everybody  understands  that  laborers 
do  not  knowingly  and  intentionally  migrate  from  comfort  into  pov 
erty.  When  Moses  would  lead  the  children  of  Israel  out  of  a  griev 
ous  bondage,  he  promised  them  not  freedom,  but  "  a  land  flowing 
with  milk  and  honey,"  and  from  that  day  to  this  nothing  less  than 
the  hope  of  material  gain  has  been  potent  enough  to  uproot  large 
bodies  of  men  from  their  native  soil  and  transplant  them  in  other  lands. 

The  protectionist  is  right ;  there  never  has  been  a  time,  since  the 
second  war  with  England,  when  the  general  condition  of  the  labor 
ing  classes  in  this  country  was  not  better  than  their  condition  in  the 
older  countries  of  Europe.  But  that  is  merely  an  adroit  evasion  of 
the  real  question  ;  granting  that  the  laborer  at  all  times,  and  under 
all  forms  of  duty  and  taxation,  has  been  on  the  whole  in  better  con 
dition  here  than  in  older  countries,  the  real  question  is,  whether  his 
condition  has  been  better  here  under  one  system  of  taxation  than 
under  another. 

The  great  richness  of  this  land,  its  vast  resources  still  undeveloped, 


336  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

and  the  enterprise,  energy,  and  rapidity  of  growth,  which  free  insti 
tutions  favor,  have  made  the  demand  for  labor  greater  here,  at  all 
times,  than  in  any  country  of  Europe.  But  at  what  times  has  that 
demand  been  greatest  ?  Our  natural  and  political  advantages  have 
rendered  this  country,  at  all  times,  more  attractive  to  the  industrious 
laborer  than  other  new  countries,  but  under  what  system  has  that 
superiority  over  other  new  countries  been  greatest  ?  If  under  pro 
tective  duties  a  larger  number  of  immigrants  have  come  to  this  coun 
try  from  Europe,  and  a  larger  proportion  to  this  as  compared  with 
other  new  countries  than  under  non-protective  duties,  then  it  must 
be  frankly  admitted  that  the  condition  of  the  laborer  on  the  whole 
has  been  improved  by  the  system  of  protection.  Does  it  not  also 
follow  that,  if  the  contrary  is  true,  the  condition  of  the  laborer  on  the 
whole  has  been  improved  by  low  duties  and  non-protective  tariffs  ? 

Realizing  the  logical  necessity  of  meeting  this  test  in  some  way, 
Mr.  Henry  C.  Carey  has  invented  a  way  of  his  own.  In  language 
not  at  all  ambiguous,  he  says :  "  The  effects  of  the  protective  tariff 
of  1829  exhibited  themselves  in  the  arrival"  of  359,000  persons  in 
the  six  years  1832-'7  inclusive,  "  against  140,000  for  the  ten  British 
free-trade  and  semi-protective  years  by  which  that  tariff  had  been  pre 
ceded."  It  is  difficult  to  notice  such  language  without  doubting  the 
honesty  of  the  writer.  It  is  hard  to  suppose  that  Mr.  Carey  really 
believes  that  the  effect  of  the  tariff  of  1828  upon  immigration  did  not 
begin  until  the  very  year  in  which  that  tariff  was  repealed  !  One 
would  suppose  that  his  high  reputation  must  have  restrained  him  from 
the  intentional  misrepresentations  so  common  in  discussions  of  this 
question.  Yet  it  seems  hardly  possible  that  it  was  a  mere  oversight 
in  him  to  style  the  ten  years,  1819-'28  inclusive,  "British  free-trade 
and  semi-protective  years."  The  characteristics  of  the  tariffs  of  1816 
and  1818  have  been  mentioned,  and  readers  will  find  it  not  easy  to 
believe  that  this  language  was  used  except  in  the  hope  that  people 
would  neither  know  nor  take  the  trouble  to  ascertain  what  sort  of 
tariff  was  really  then  in  force.  In  its  purpose  and  its  essential  fea 
tures,  the  tariff  of  1816  was  as  strictly  a  protective  measure  as  any 
ever  adopted  ;  it  was  proposed,  advocated,  and  carried  by  the  then 
friends  of  the  protective  policy  ;  it  was  the  first  act  in  our  history  to 
apply  the  minimum  price  to  foreign  goods — the  very  feature  of  all 
others  which  has  since  been  held  by  protectionists  the  most  effective, 
and  by  non-protectionists  the  most  odious ;  it  was  shaped  from  be 
ginning  to  end  with  intent  to  discriminate  between  industries,  fa 
voring  some  and  not  others.  The  minimum  on  cottons  was  in  effect 


THE  LABOR  BAROMETER.  337 

absolutely  prohibitory  as  to  the  coarser  qualities.  On  rolled  iron  the 
duty  was  $1.50  per  cwt.,  or  $30  a  ton,  then  "  equal  to  85  per  cent,  on 
its  cost."  (Bishop's  "History  of  Manufactures,"  vol.  ii.,  p.  228.) 
The  duty  on  anchors  and  bolt  iron  was  the  same ;  on  hammered  iron 
45  cents,  and  on  sheet,  rod,  and  hoop  iron,  $2.50  per  cwt.  Yet  this 
is  the  lowest  tariff  which  was  in  force  in  all  those  years  which  Henry 
C.  Carey,  a  writer  of  reputation,  ventures  to  call  "  British  free-trade 
years  " — for  he  elsewhere  calls  the  tariff  of  1824  "  semi-protective." 
Can  it  be  that  he  does  not  comprehend  the  difference  between  "  Brit 
ish  free  trade  "  and  a  tariff  absolutely  prohibitory  on  coarse  cottons, 
and  of  85  per  cent,  on  British  iron  ?  It  is  a  habit  of  that  gentleman 
to  accuse  others  of  intentional  suppression  or  misrepresentation  of 
facts.  But  he  may  well  consider  whether  one  who  stands  in  such 
need  of  charitable  judgment  had  not  better  set  the  example  of 
ascribing  errors  of  statement  to  ignorance.  In  1818  still  higher 
duties  were  desired  by  the  iron-makers,  and  granted.  The  duty  on 
pig-iron  was  fixed  at  50  cents  per  cwt.,  or  $10  per  ton,  actually 
higher  than  it  is  to-day.  Yet  this  is  what  Mr.  Carey,  a  writer  of 
reputation,  ventures  to  call  "  British  free-trade  !  " 

If  we  turn  to  the  figures  given  by  Mr.  Carey,  we  are  forced  to 
remark  that  they  correspond  neither  with  the  records  of  the  State 
Department,  with  the  statistics  given  in  the  census  of  1860,  nor 
with  reports  from  newspaper  authority,  but  seem  to  have  been 
evolved  from  his  inner  consciousness.  Thus  for  1832  he  gives 
45,000  as  the  total  immigration ;  the  census  volume  says  53,179 ; 
the  State  Department  returns,  quoted  by  Tucker,  say  34,970,  and 
tables  of  actual  arrivals  published  by  the  New- York  Times  show 
that  48,589  persons  arrived  at  that  port  alone.  For  1835  he  gives 
53,000;  the  census  table  says  45,374;  the  State  Department  re 
turns,  quoted  by  Tucker,  say  45,444 ;  but  Mr.  Carey  was  apparently 
under  the  necessity  of  fitting  the  figures  to  his  theory  that  the  tariff 
caused  "  an  almost  regular  rise."  Also,  to  preserve  regularity,  he 
gives  for  1836  the  figures  62,000,  while  the  census  table  says  76,242, 
the  State  Department  returns  76,923,  and  the  Times  table  shows 
that  there  were  60,541  arrivals  at  New  York  alone.  It  would  seem 
that  "  regularity  "  had  been  preserved  at  the  expense  of  exactness. 
And,  again,  comfortably  assuming  that  the  tariff  ceased  to  protect 
in  1837,  carefully  suppressing  mention  of  the  currency  panic  of  that 
year,  asserting,  contrary  to  facts  by  himself  accidentally  recorded, 
that  "  British  free-trade  prevented  increase  of  mills  and  furnaces " 
after  that  year,  he  says :  "  The  movement  (of  immigration)  was  irreg- 


338  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

ular,  but  the  general  result  to  and  including  1844  showed  a  diminu 
tion,  the  average  having  been  but  75,000."  Now,  "  an  average  of 
75,000  "  is  not  a  diminution,  but  is  larger  than  any  of  the  previous 
years  by  him  quoted  except  one.  And  the  records,  which  he  is 
careful  not  to  give,  show  that  there  was  an  increase  to  84,066  in 
1840,  and  to  104,565  in  1842.  It  will  astonish  every  reader  to  learn 
that  this  same  Henry  C.  Carey,  even  while  accusing  Mr.  Wells  of 
suppressing  facts,  himself  utterly  suppresses  mention  of  the  failure 
of  crops  and  the  great  famine  in  Europe  in  the  years  1846  and  1847, 
and  ascribes  all  the  immigration  which  followed  that  famine  to  the 
tariff  of  1842,  which  expired  in  1846  !  Yet  this  is  exactly  what  he 
does.  That  his  language  may  be  observed,  we  quote  (Carey  to 
Wells,  page  46) : 

Counter-news  arriving  in  1844,  and  men  learning  how  great,  under  the  protec 
tive  system  of  1842,  had  here  become  the  demand  for  labor,  and  how  liberal  its  re 
ward,  we  find  the  arrivals  now  running  up  from  the  74,000  of  1844  to  102,000  in 
1845,  to  147,000  hi  1846,  240,000  hi  1847,  229,000  in  1848,  and  300,000  hi  1849, 
giving  a  total  of  1,018,000  in  the  five  years  which  followed  the  commencement  of 
the  movement,  against  one  of  less  than  400,000  by  which  that  movement  had  been 
preceded,  giving  a  gain  under  protection  of  more  than  600,000. 

The  italics  are  our  own,  and  it  is  only  necessary  to  remark  that 
this  gain  did  not  take  place  "  under  protection,"  but  under  the  non- 
protective  tariff  of  1846.  But  far  more  astonishing  is  the  audacity  of 
one  who,  professing  to  state  facts,  utterly  suppresses  all  mention  of 
the  European  famine,  and  ascribes  this  movement  to  the  protective 
system  which  had  already  expired !  Had  this  been  done  by  an  ob 
scure  or  possibly  ill-informed  writer,  it  would  have  been  easy  to 
suppose  that  he  was  ignorant  of  the  truth.  Readers  must  judge 
whether  such  a  misrepresentation  as  this,  coming  from  a  writer  who 
surely  cannot  have  been  ignorant  of  the  truth,  does  not  destroy  all 
confidence  in  the  correctness  of  his  statements. 

It  is  only  necessary  to  add  that,  in  discussing  the  movement 
since  1860,  Mr.  Carey  ignores  the  effect  of  the  civil  war,  first  de 
terring  immigration,  and  afterward,  by  creating  a  great  scarcity  of 
labor,  increasing  immigration. 

Turning,  now,  from  the  figures  presented  by  that  writer,  to  the 
facts,  we  adopt  as  a  basis  the  table  given  in  the  census  report  of 
1860,  which  corresponds  in  the  main  with  other  reliable  records', 
and  extends  further  than .  any  other  to  us  accessible.  Tucker,  who 
appears  to  have  discussed  this  subject  with  care  and  with  excellent 
sources  of  information,  maintains  that  the  returns  of  the  State  De- 


THE  LABOR  BAROMETER. 


339 


partment  were  incorrect  for  the  years  1831  and  1832,  and  gives 
107,104  as  the  true  immigration  for  those  years.  At  the  same  tune 
he  points  out  the  fact  that  a  considerable  proportion — not  less  than 
10  per  cent. — of  the  immigrants  of  that  period  merely  passed  through 
tin's  country  on  their  way  to  Canada.  This  fact  alone  shows  how 
little  benefit  sixteen  years  of  protection  had  conferred,  since  they 
had  not  rendered  this  country  so  much  more  attractive  than  Canada 
as  to  prevent  immigrants  going  directly  thither  from  New  York. 
But,  in  the  main,  the  census  table  is  as  reliable  and  correct  as  any 
that  can  now  be  obtained  or  constructed. 


ALIEN  PASSENGERS 

ARRIVING  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES  FROM  FOREIGN 

COUNTRIES  FROM  1820  TO  1860,  INCLUSIVE. 

From  the  Census  Report  of  1860. 

Tear  ending  Sept.  30,  1820.      8,385 

Year  ending  Dec.  31,  1841  .      80,289 

1821. 

9,127 

1842. 

104.565 

1822. 
1823. 

6,911 
6,354 

Three-quarters  ending  Sept.  30,  1843. 
Year  ending  Sept.  30,  1844. 

52,496 

78,615 

1824. 

7,912 

1845. 

114,371 

1825. 

10,199 

1846. 

154,416 

1826. 

10,837 

1847. 

234,968 

1827. 

18,875 

1848. 

2-26.527 

1828. 

27,382 

1849. 

297,024 

1829. 

22,520 

1850. 

310,004 

1830. 
1831. 

23,322 
22,633 

Quarter  ending  Dec.  31,  1850. 
Year  ending  Dec.  31,  1851  . 

59,976 
379,466 

1832. 

53.179 

1852. 

371,603 

Quarter  ending  Dec.  31 
Year  ending  Dec.  31 

,  1832. 
,1833. 

7.303 
58.640 

'  1853. 
1854. 

368.645 
427,838 

1834. 

65,365 

18.53. 

200,877 

1&35. 

45,374 

ia56. 

200,436 

1836. 

76,242 

1857. 

251.306 

1837. 

79,340 

1858. 

123,126 

1838. 

38,914 

1859..  121,282 

1839. 

68,069 

I860..  153,640 

1840. 

84,066 

Examination  of  these  statistics  will  satisfy  every  reader  that  any 
change  in  the  relative  condition  of  the  laboring  class,  on  either  side 
of  the  ocean,  affects  immigration  instantly,  and  not,  as  Mr.  Carey 
and  his  followers  assert,  only  after  the  lapse  of  several  years.  The 
first  considerable  change  was  caused  by  the  general  distress  and 
breaking  of  the  banks  in  England,  which  occurred  in  1825,  and  in 
that  very  year — and  not  five  years  afterward — the  immigration  in 
creased  more  than  one-quarter,  and  rose  to  10,199.  In  1829  there 
was  general  distress  here,  especially  among  those  employed  in 
manufacturing,  and  in  that  very  year — and  not  five  years  afterward 
— the  immigration  decreased  from  27,382  to  22,520.  Just  before 
the  close  of  the  fiscal  year  1837  the  banks  suspended,  and  the  great 
panic  occurred.  In  the  year  1838 — within  eighteen  months,  and 
not  some  years  afterward — immigration  was  reduced  more  than  one- 
half,  from  79,340  in  1837  to  38,914  in  1838.  Yet  this  was  in  spite 


340  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

of  the  fact  that  the  English  crops  of  1837  were  not  large,  and  those 
of  1838  decidedly  bad.  Again,  the  crops  in  England  and  Ireland 
were  inferior  in  1845,  and  in  1846,  the  price  of  wheat  rising 
rapidly,  and  in  1847  the  general  failure  of  crops,  and  especially  of 
the  potato-crop,  produced  a  famine.  In  1845,  in  precise  corre 
spondence,  immigration  began  to  increase  largely;  in  1846  the 
number  of  immigrants  was  154,416,  and  in  1847 — the  very  year  of 
the  famine — the  number  was  234,968.  This  was  more  than  double 
the  immigration  for  any  previous  year  except  1846.  And,  again, 
the  panic  of  1857  was  instantly  followed  by  a  falling  off  of  more 
than  half  in  immigration,  for  the  number  for  the  year  1857  was 
251,306,  and  the  number  for  1858  was  123,126.  Finally,  when  the 
civil  war  interrupted  business  here,  in  1861,  the  effect  was  instan 
taneous  ;  immigration  fell  from  153,640  in  1860  to  91,920  in  1861. 
These  facts  are  certainly  conclusive.  In  view  of  them,  the  theory, 
that  the  change  wrought  by  a  tariff  in  the  condition  of  labor  does 
not  affect  the  movement  of  immigration  until  after  that  tariff  has 
ceased  to  exist,  must  be  dismissed  as  adapted  only  to  the  needs  of 
those  who  have  to  get  around  very  inconvenient  facts,  and  set  them 
selves  to  make  "  the  worse  appear  the  better  reason."  If  further 
proof  were  needed  of  the  absurdity  of  Mr.  Carey's  statement,  above 
quoted,  it  might  be  found  in  the  fact  that  immigration  from  Great 
Britain  to  Canada  and  Australia,  and  other  countries  besides  the 
United  States,  increased  in  the  same  years  in  which,  he  asserts, 
immigration  was  drawn  this  way  by  the  protective  tariff.  For,  in 
1844,  the  emigration  from  Great  Britain  to  other  places  besides  the 
United  States  was  27,026 ;  in  1845  it  was  34,963 ;  in  1846  it  was 
47,612,  and  in  1847  it  was  116,116,  and  this  increase  was  more  rapid 
than  that  from  Great  Britain  to  this  country,  since,  in  1844,  about 
62  per  cent,  of  all  emigrants  from  Great  Britain  came  to  the  United 
States,  while  in  1847  only  55  per  cent,  of  emigrants  from  Great 
Britain  came  to  the  United  States.  It  is  barely  possible  that  a  man 
may  believe  that  a  tariff  in  this  country  had  some  effect  upon  immi 
gration  hither  after  it  had  ceased  to  exist ;  but  not  even  Mr.  Carey 
will  pretend  that  a  tariff  in  the  United  States,  after  it  had  ceased  to 
exist,  attracted  immigration  from  Great  Britain  to  Canada  and  Aus 
tralia  ! 

The  movement  of  immigration,  it  has  been  proved,  is  a  faithful 
measure  of  the  relative  condition  of  labor  in  this  as  compared  with 
other  countries,  which  records  instantly  every  material  change  on 
either  side  of  the  ocean,  and  is  as  sensitive  as  a  barometer  or  steam- 


THE  LABOR  BAROMETER.  341 

gauge.  Whenever  the  demand  for  labor  rises  here  or  falls  in 
Europe,  immigration  increases,  and  prostration  of  industry  here 
checks  it  instantly.  Famines  or  revolutions  in  the  Old  World  have 
been  the  main  cause  of  migration ;  men  are  moved  to  emigrate  never 
so  powerfully  by  rumors  of  prosperity  elsewhere,  as  by  the  sight  of 
the  gaunt  wolf  of  famine,  or  the  grim  demon  of  war,  at  their  own 
doors.  But  it  must  also  be  observed  that,  under  favoring  circum 
stances,  immigration  causes  increased  immigration.  People  in  the 
old  country  are  induced  to  migrate  hither,  in  a  great  degree,  by  the 
personal  solicitation  or  direct  aid  of  friends  already  here.  Every 
immigrant  becomes  an  active  agent  to  induce  his  countrymen  to 
follow  him,  and  often  remits  the  necessary  funds,  which  the  pinched 
laborer  in  Europe  could  obtain  only  after  years  of  delay,  if  ever. 
Thus  every  great  event  which  immediately  produces  a  large  im 
migration,  causes  also,  after  the  lapse  of  a  year  or  two,  a  second 
wave  larger  than  the  first.  Sixty-eight  thousand  immigrants  who 
arrived  here,  driven  by  English  disaster,  in  1827-'29,  began  by  the 
years  1831-'32  to  attract  their  friends  in  large  numbers ;  the  234,968 
immigrants  who  came  here  in  1847,  the  year  of  the  Irish  famine, 
attracted  so  many  that  the  number  amounted  to  297,024  in  1849, 
and  310,004  in  1850.  With  these  general  principles  in  mind, 
let  us  see  whether  tariffs  here  have  materially  affected  the  move 
ment. 

The  protective  period  of  1824-'28  witnessed  the  first  considerable 
movement  of  immigration  to  this  country,  and  there  is  no  room  to 
doubt  that  the  rapid  increase  at  that  time  was  caused  by  the  great 
industrial  and  financial  disorders,  to  which  McCulloch  thus  refers 
("  Commercial  Dictionary,"  vol.  i.,  p.  101)  :  "  The  destruction  of  the 
country  banks  has  upon  three  different  occasions,  in  1792,  1814r-'16, 
and  in  1825  and  1826,  produced  an  extent  of  bankruptcy  and  misery 
that  has  never  perhaps  been  equalled,  except  by  the  breaking  up  of 
the  Mississippi  scheme  in  France."  He  shows  that  in  1825  thirty- 
seven  banks  broke,  and  forty-three  in  1826.  Just  at  this  time  the  first 
strong  current  of  immigration  began  to  set  toward  this  country,  and 
immigration  rose  to  27,382  in  1828,  but  was  then  checked  by  the 
disaster  here  in  the  next  year,  and  in  1830.  Nor  did  it  revive  until 
1832,  the  very  year  in  which  the  protective  tariff  was  repealed. 
The  movement  for  these  eight  years  of  protection,  ending  September 
30,  1832,  was  in  the  aggregate  188,947,  or  an  average  of  23,818 
yearly.  It  is  worthy  of  note  that  the  large  increase  in  1832,  the 
last  year  of  this  period,  is  partly  due  to  the  failure  of  revolutionary 


342  DOES  PKOTECTION  PROTECT? 

movements  in  Germany,  and  the  persecution  feared  or  suffered,  which 
drove  not  less  than  ten  thousand  Germans  to  this  country. 

The  non-protective  period  which  followed  witnessed  no  con 
siderable  change  in  immigration  caused  by  foreign  events,  though 
the  exodus  from  Germany  increased,  in  consequence  of  political 
oppression,  to  23,035  in  1837.  But  the  entire  immigration  increased 
much  more  largely,  and  though  the  table  plainly  shows  the  great 
reduction  caused  by  the  currency  explosion  in  1838,  the  aggregate 
for  the  eight  years  1835-'42  under  low  duties  was  576,859,  or  an 
average  of  72,107  yearly,  an  increase  of  nearly  200  per  cent.  Yet 
these  were  the  years  of  reduced  duties,  and  non-protection,  during 
which,  it  has  been  asserted,  the  condition  of  our  laborers  was  ex 
ceedingly  bad.  The  barometer  indicates  that  it  was  at  least  100  per 
cent,  better  than  that  of  the  protective  period  which  preceded. 

The  protective  tariff  which  went  into  effect  with  the  year  1843 
was  coincident  with  a  decided  falling  off  of  immigration — from 
104,565  in  1842  to  52,496  for  nine  months  of  1843,  equal  to  about 
70,000  for  a  year,  and  to  78,615  in  the  year  1844.  The  migration 
caused  by  disasters  in  England  raised  the  aggregate  for  the  whole 
period,  1843-'46,  inclusive,  to  399,898,  or  an  average  of  99,974  a  year. 
But  the  aggregate  for  the  four  years  preceding,  1839-1842,  was 
332,989,  and  the  average  83,247  yearly ;  so  that,  with  the  English 
short  crops  to  aid  it,  the  protective  tariff  only  attracted  to  this  coun 
try  an  average  of  16,727  more  than  had  come  hither  during  the  four 
years  of  hard  times,  bank  suspension,  and  commercial  disorder.  It 
is  not  strange  that  the  advocates  of  that  tariff  seek  to  make  it  ap 
pear  that  its  blessings  were  realized  mainly  after  it  had  been 
repealed ! 

Contrasting,  with  this  protective  period  of  four  years,  the  non- 
protective  period  1847-'50  inclusive,  we  find  that  in  the  protective 
period  the  aggregate  number  of  immigrants  was  399,898,  and  in  the 
non-protective  period  the  aggregate  was  1,188,499,  and  the  yearly 
average  282,124,  an  increase  of  282  per  cent.  If  any  opponent  of 
protection  could  stoop  to  imitate  Mr.  Carey,  in  suppressing  all  men 
tion  of  the  Irish  famine,  he  might  make  an  argument  at  least  as 
effective  as  the  one  already  quoted.  But,  in  fairness,  the  greater 
part  of  this  immigration  must  be  ascribed  to  causes  in  Europe. 
Following  the  Irish  famine,  came  the  great  migration  caused  by  the 
failure  of  revolutionary  movements  in  Germany,  in  1849  and  1850. 
But,  with  full  allowance  for  these  causes  of  increase,  there  is  still 
evidence  that  the  condition  of  laborers  here  was  such  as  to  offer 


THE  LABOR  BAROMETER.  343 

greater  inducements  to  immigrants  than  had  been  offered  during  the 
four  years  preceding. 

It  has  been  observed  that  the  proportion  of  immigrants  from 
Great  Britain  who  came  to  this  country  was  62  per  cent,  in  1844, 
and  only  55  per  cent,  in  1847.  But  in  the  next  year,  1848,  it  rose 
to  75  per  cent. ;  in  1849  it  was  73  per  cent. ;  and  in  1850  and  1851 
it  was  80  per  cent.  These  facts  surely  have  great  significance.  Of 
persons  driven  from  that  country  to  seek  homes  in  a  new  world,  it 
appears  that  50  per  cent,  cnose  this  country  in  1843,  and  62  per  cent, 
in  1844  and  1845,  63  per  cent,  in  1846,  and  only  55  per  cent,  in 

1847.  These  years  mark  the  relative  condition  of  labor  in  this 
country  during  a  period  of  protection — for  the  migration  of  1847 
was,  of  course,  mainly  influenced  in  selection  by  what  was  known 
prior  to  that  year.     But,  in  1848-'51,  the  proportion  of  those  who 
chose  this  country  suddenly  rose  to  80  per  cent.     Of  British  emi 
grants  to  North  America  during  the  years  1843-'46,  under  protec 
tion,  121,684  went  to  Canada,  and  212,772  to  this  country,  the 
proportion   being   60   to  100.      But   in   1848-'51   that  proportion 
fell  to  16  to  100.     It  may  naturally  be  supposed  that  this  difference 
was  due  to  the  discovery  of  gold  in  California,  and  a  part  of  it 
doubtless  was.     But  it  must  be  remembered  that  a  very  small  por 
tion  of  British  immigrants  went  to  the  mines ;  the  great  body  of 
them  came  to  find  labor,  either  on  farms,  or  in  cities,  or  in  mechani 
cal  employments,  and  they  found  it  readily.     Nor  can  it  be  supposed 
that  the  same  cause  continued  to  affect  immigration  after  the  mining 
excitement  died  out,  but  the  immigration  to  Canada  did  not  recover 
its  proportion  to  that  which  chose  this  country  during  the  whole  of 
the  period  of  low  duties  which  followed,  and  was  only  16  to  100  in 

1848,  17  to  100  in  1855,  15  to  100  in  1856,  and  11  to  100  in  1860. 
Thus,  during  this  long  period  of  non-interference  with  natural  laws, 
the   proportion  of   emigrants  from  Great  Britain  who  chose  this 
country  as  their  home  rather  than  Canada  steadily  increased,  so  that, 
where  60  had  chosen  Canada  under  the  protective  tariff,  only  11 
chose  that  country  in  1860.     It  is  not  possible  to  ascribe  the  whole 
of  this  change  to  the  discovery  of  gold  in  1848.     It  simply  corre 
sponds  with  the  fact,  already  well  established,  that,  during  the  decade 
1850-'GO,  labor  of  all  kinds  in  this  country  was  improving  in  con 
dition,  and  the  demand  for  it  was  increasing. 

It  only  remains  to  show  that  the  great  decrease  in  immigration 
in  1855  was  not  owing  to  any  unfavorable  change  in  this  country, 
but  to  improvement  elsewhere.  The  immigration  to  this  country  fell 


344  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

from  427,000  to  200,000  in  a  single  year ;  but,  in  the  same  year,  the 
British  immigration  to  Canada  also  fell  from  43,000  to  18,000 ;  and 
the  migration  to  Australia  from  83,000  to  52,000.  The  cause, 
whether  it  was  the  increased  demand  for  labor  arising  from  the 
Crimean  War,  or  some  other,  was  evidently  not  a  change  in  this 
country,  and,  as  has  been  shown,  it  did  -not  prevent  a  still  larger 
share  of  immigrants  choosing  this  country  in  preference  to  Canada. 

Since  1860,  the  movement  has  been  retarded  and  afterward  ac 
celerated  by  the  war,  which  created  an  enormous  demand  for  labor  in 
the  years  1863, 1864,  and  1865,  and  it  has  since  been  greatly  increased 
by  changes  abroad.  The  crops  in  England  have  repeatedly  proved 
insufficient.  Political  disturbances  in  Ireland  have  driven  a  throng 
of  refugees  to  this  country.  The  general  prostration  of  manufac 
tures  in  England  has  had  a  material  effect.  At  the  same  time,  the 
war  involving  Prussia,  Austria,  and  Italy,  and  the  great  apprehension 
of  a  general  strife,  have  led  thousands  to  leave  Europe ;  the  annexa 
tion  of  new  provinces  to  Prussia  in  1866,  with  the  consequent 
prospect  of  military  service,  drove  away  great  numbers,  and  the 
opening  of  States  formerly  held  by  slave  labor,  and  yet  peculiarly 
rich  in  natural  resources,  like  Virginia,  Tennessee,  and  Missouri,  has 
given  an  additional  attraction  to  foreign  labor.  Nor  must  it  be  for 
gotten  that  our  depreciated  currency  carries  with  its  many  evils  one 
blessing — it  gives  our  laborers  wages  nominally  higher  than  are  paid 
anywhere  else,  and  in  Europe,  where  the  coin  value  of  our  dollar  is 
known,  while  its  depreciation  is  not  fully  understood,  these  high 
wages  seem  peculiarly  attractive.  Nevertheless,  with  all  these 
potent  causes  working  together  to  increase  immigration,  the  number 
of  arrivals  during  the  four  years  1865-'68  was  only  1,162,247, 
against  1,128,499  in  the  four  years  1847-'50,  and  1,546,547  in  the 
four  years  1851-'54.  With  a  combination  of  causes  never  existing 
before  to  drive  or  attract  migration  to  this  country,  we  are  receiving 
less  accessions  than  we  did  fifteen  years  ago  under  low  duties,  and 
scarcely  more  than  we  did  nineteen  years  ago  under  the  same  non- 
protective  tariff. 

Any  inference  from  this  fact  alone  must  be  conjectural.  For  the 
weight  of  the  influences  mentioned,  other  than  the  present  condition 
of  labor  here,  cannot  be  measured,  except  in  conjecture.  But  this, 
at  least,  is  certain,  that  the  present  immigration  does  not  contradict 
the  teaching  of  the  whole  history  prior  to  the  war.  And  so  fatal  is 
that  record  to  the  theories  of  protectionists,  that  they  have  been 
forced  to  the  theory  that  the  magical  prosperity  of  the  laborer  here, 


CONSUMPTION.  345 

under  protective  tariffs,  begins  to  have  its  effect  upon  immigration 
when  those  tariffs  are  repealed,  while  the  exceedingly  wretched  con 
dition  of  labor  here,  in  times  of  low  duties,  does  not  begin  to  have 
its  effect  upon  immigration  until  protection  has  been  restored ! 
"Who  so  excuses,  accuses." 


CHAPTER    XXY. 

CONSUMPTION. 

IT  doubtless  has  not  escaped  observation  that  certain  articles, 
known  to  bear  heavy  duty,  have  not  been  at  all  times  or  corre 
spondingly  enhanced  in  price.  Tea,  coffee,  and  sugar,  are  the  most 
important  of  these,  and  it  has  been  noticed,  in  England  as  well  as 
here,  that  the  prices  of  these  articles  have  been  comparatively  little 
affected  by  changes  of  duty.  Giving  the  statistics  which  prove  that 
tea  in  England  has  risen  in  price  as  duties  have  been  removed,  Mr. 
Wells  remarks,  "  There  is  practically  but  one  producing  country,  and 
the  trade,  therefore,  partakes  of  the  features  of  a  monopoly."  Per 
haps  the  phenomenon  may  be  more  fully  explained  if  we  also  con 
sider  that  countries  which  produce  a  large  surplus  of  any  article,  and 
are  compelled  to  rely  mainly  upon  the  export  of  that  for  their  foreign 
exchanges,  are  placed  in  an  unnatural  dependence  upon  their  chief 
consumers.  Any  refusal  by  such  a  consumer  to  purchase  their  prod 
ucts,  or  to  purchase  of  them  except  at  a  lower  price,  throws  so  large 
a  surplus  of  the  product  upon  the  markets  that  the  price  is  reduced. 
We  were  so  situated  with  regard  to  cotton  before  the  war,  and 
China  is  in  the  same  way  dependent  upon  the  chief  consumers  of 
her  tea,  Brazil  of  her  coffee,  and  the  West  Indies  of  sugar.  If  Eng 
land  declined  to  buy  freely  of  our  cotton,  it  fell  rapidly  in  price.  In 
like  manner,  either  England  or  the  United  States  consumes  so 
largely  of  sugar,  coffee,  and  tea,  that  either  can  to  some  extent 
force  the  producer  to  pay  any  duty  which  threatens  to  check  their 
consumption.  Whatever  cause  we  may  assign,  it  is  the  fact  that 
the  prices  of  these  three  articles  are  not  affected  to  the  full  amount 
of  duties,  but  not  infrequently  fall  in  spite  of  an  increased,  or  rise 
in  spite  of  a  decreased  duty.  Thus,  in  spite  of  the  reduction  of  the 
duty  on  sugar  from  3  to  2£  cents  in  1832,  the  price,  which  had  been 
6  cents  in  1831,  and  6J  in  1832,  rose  to  7J  in  1833,  and  to  7  in  1834. 
But,  under  the  same  duty,  the  price  fell  to  4}  in  1842,  and  rose  to 


346  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

6f  again  in  1846 ;  and,  though  the  change  of  duty  to  30  per  cent, 
brought  down  the  price  at  first  to  4  cents,  it  rose  again,  and,  in  spite 
of  a  still  further  reduction  of  duty  to  24  per  cent.,  stood  steadily  at 
6  cents  in  1858  and  1859,  and  at  5-J  in  1860.  Similar  facts  may  be 
observed  in  the  table  of  the  price  of  coffee.  The  removal  of  a  duty 
of  5  cents  a  pound  in  1830-'32  only  increased  the  price  from  11J-  to 
12£  cents.  The  price  of  tea  was  more  affected,  yet  it  is  observed 
by  economists  that  this  article  is  usually  less  affected  in  price  than 
almost  any  other  by  changes  of  duty. 

It  happens  that  coffee  and  tea,  two  articles  which  are  almost  uni 
versally  consumed,  were  absolutely  free  of  duty  if  imported  in 
American  ships  from  '1832  to  1862,  a  period  of  thirty  years.  Nor 
can  it  be  said  that  the  duties  prior  to  1832  had  affected  the  price  of 
these  articles  nearly  as  much  as  other  duties  had  affected  the  prices 
of  other  articles  of  general  use.  Of  all  articles,  therefore,  these  are 
the  very  best  to  test  the  general  condition  of  the  people  at  different 
periods.  To  these  we  may  add  sugar,  for  the  duty  on  that  article 
has  been  very  slightly  changed.  In  1816,  the  duty  on  the  quality 
most  largely  imported  was  fixed  at  3  cents  a  pound ;  in  1832  it  was 
changed  to  2J  cents,  and  the  same  rate  was  preserved  by  the  tariff 
of  1842 ;  in  1846  it  was  changed  to  30  per  cent. — a  reduction  of 
less  than  one  cent — an4  in  1857  to  24  per  cent. ;  a  change  very  slight 
indeed.  These  three  articles  are  consumed,  in  different  quantities, 
indeed,  by  different  classes  and  persons,  but  so  generally  that  the 
consumption  affords,  perhaps,  the  best  test  attainable  of  the  progress 
of  the  people  as  a  whole  toward  comfort  and  prosperity.  In  pro 
portion  as  the  country  has  thriven,  the  increase  of  consumption  of 
these  articles  has  been  accelerated,  and,  when  the  country  has  suf 
fered,  the  consumption  has  either  increased  more  slowly,  or  has  been 
temporarily  reduced.  Thus  the  panic  of  1837  reduced  the  consump 
tion  of  tea  from  .915  thousandths  of  a  pound  per  capita  to  .467 ;  the 
consumption  of  coffee  from  6.1  pounds  in  1835,  and  5  pounds  in  1836, 
to  4.8  in  1837;  and  the  "hard  times"  of  1843  again  reduced  it  to 
4.6  per  capita.  In  the  same  year  the  consumption  of  sugar  fell  to 
11.29  pounds,  though  it  had  averaged  over  13  pounds.  In  like 
manner  the  panic  of  1857  cut  down  the  consumption  of  sugar  from 
30.62  pounds  to  26.10  pounds,  and  of  coffee  from  about  8  pounds  to 
6  pounds ;  and  the  prostration  of  1861  reduced  the  consumption  of 
sugar  from  35.51  pounds  to  28.45  pounds ;  of  coffee  from  7.3  pounds 
to  5.8  pounds,  and  of  tea  from  over  one  pound  per  capita  to  .79 
hundredths  of  a  pound. 


CONSUMPTION.  347 

Attention  has  been  called  to  these  details,  because  in  England, 
and  in  other  countries  where  extreme  poverty  and  suffering  exist,  it 
has  been  found  that  the  poor  consume  tea  largely  in  place  of  more 
solid  food.  But  no  considerable  class  of  persons  in  this  country  have 
ever  been  reduced  to  that  point,  nor  is  there  reason  to  believe  that 
the  actual  lack  of  bread  and  meat  has  at  any  time  driven  any  appre 
ciable  proportion  of  the  population  to  seek  a  substitute  in  the  articles 
named.  These  articles  have  therefore  been,  in  this  country  and  in 
all  times,  not  absolute  necessities,  but  comforts,  if  not  in  some  sense 
luxuries,  and  accordingly  we  find  that  in  years  of  general  prostration  the 
consumption  of  them  is  suddenly  diminished,  while  in  times  of  great 
prosperity  the  consumption  of  these  articles  is  very  rapidly  increased. 
No  man  of  either  party  will  deny  that  the  years  1853-'54  were  years 
of  extraordinary  prosperity.  The  consumption  of  sugar,  only  23.90 
pounds  per  capita  in  1851,  increased  to  .over  33  pounds  per  capita  in 
the  years  1853  and  1854.  It  cannot,  indeed,  be  supposed  that  the 
exact  consumption  for  any  year  is  known ;  in  fact,  it  is  stated,  by  men 
most  familiar  with  the  tea-trade,  that  not  less  than  thirty  million 
pounds  were  at  one  time  on  hand  in  this  country,  and  any  estimate 
based  upon  imports  and  exports  only  will  be  unreliable  as  to  single 
years.  But,  for  periods  embracing  several  years,  the  consumption 
cannot  vary  materially  from  estimates  based  upon  the  imports,  ex 
ports,  known  stock  on  hand  as  reported  by  the  most  competent 
authorities,  and  the  domestic  product  in  the  case  of  sugar.  From 
these  data  the  following  tables  have  been  prepared,  which  show  the 
amount  of  coffee,  tea,  and  sugar,  placed  upon  the  market  for  con 
sumption  each  year,  the  average  prices  each  year  in  New  York,  and 
the  rates  of  duty.  Opposite  the  quantity  entered  as  "  consumed  " 
each  year  is  also  entered  the  proportion  of  that  quantity  to  the  popu 
lation  in  that  year,  but  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  these  figures 
represent  with  exactness  the  actual  consumption  in  different  years 
taken  singly,  for  the  reason  just  stated.  Thus  it  will  be  observed,  in 
tea  and  coffee  especially,  that  unusually  large  imports  in  any  year  are 
often  followed  by  imports  unusually  small,  when  the  actual  con 
sumption  was  an  average  between  the  two.  From  1850  onward,  as 
the  commissioner  of  the  revenue  has  observed  upon  authority  of  the 
leading  tea-dealers  in  this  country,  the  amount  imported  was  largely 
in  excess  of  the  actual  consumption,  so  that  the  stock  on  hand  was 
swollen  to  about  thirty  million  pounds,  and  afterward,  for  several 
years,  ending  in  1860  and  1861,  the  stock  was  steadily  reduced,  the 
imports  being  less  than  the  consumption.  The  average  yearly  con- 
24 


348 


DOES  PROTECTION   PROTECT? 


sumption  for  the  whole  decade,  1851  to  1860  inclusive,  is  therefore 
given,  with  the  rate  per  capita.  In  other  columns  are  presented  the 
results  for  periods  of  several  years  each,  during  which,  it  is  believed, 
the  actual  consumption  cannot  have  varied  to  any  appreciable  ex 
tent  from  the  statements  thus  prepared. 

CONSUMPTION  OF  SUGAR. 


YEAR. 

Duty. 

Taken  for 
Consumption. 

Per. 
Cap. 

Consumption  per  Cap 
In  Periods  of  Years. 

Average 
Price. 

1821..    . 

3  cents  "$  R>. 

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u 
i< 
« 

2  cents  $  ft>. 

3  cents  $  ft,, 
u 
(1 
(( 
u 
(( 

59,512,835 
88,305,670 
60,789,210 
94,379,764 
71,771,479 
84,902,955 
76,701,629 
56,985,951 
63,307,294 
86,483,046 
109,014,654 
66,451,288 
97,688,132 
115,389,855 
126,036,230 
191,426,115 
161,092,811 
201,624,719 
241,262,173 
194,764,937 
232,103,397 
243,274,422 
209.056,749 
278^264,053 
298,728,920 
287,059,764 
376,655,814 
474,637,773 
453,456,333 
445,474,361 
568,406,575 
706,086,000 
835,495,360 
863,067,520 
846,164,480 
848,422,400 
743,825,600 
965,780,480 
1,072,370,880 
1,040,867,520 
922,096,000 
1,082,379,200 
762,720,000 
628,320,000 
922,880,000 
990,110,209 
875,362,142 
1,145,444,163 

6. 

8.57 
5.73 
8.66 
6.52 
7.38 
6.44 
4.67 
5.05 
6.75 
8.19 
4.88 
6.92 
7.95 
8.56 
12.42 
10.19 
12.44 
14.49 
11.45 
13.26 
13.51 
11.29 
14.64 
15.30 
14.35 
18.32 
21.65 
20.60 
19.33 
23.90 
28.70 
33.02 
33.02 
31.45 
30.62 
26.10 
32.85 
35.51 
33.58 
28.45 
46.03 
31.25 
23.23 
30.76 
27.89 
23.98 
30.54 

4  years. 

7.24 

4  years. 
6.25 

4  years. 
6.22 

5  years. 
9.21 

5  years. 
13.03 

.     4  years. 
13.34 

}4  years. 
19.47 

I     4  years. 
29.66 

I     4  years, 
j        30.25 

I      2  years. 
)        34.54 

.     5  years. 
31.95 

K     3  years. 
|       27.47 

IH 

H 
H 

iif 
H 

8{ 
8* 

H 

J» 

6 

9- 

ft 

9 

6f 
6f 

6f 
6| 

6 
4£< 

Bi: 

6J 

1822  

1823..    . 

1824 

1825  
1826  
1827  

1828  . 

1829 

1830. 

1831  
1832..    .. 

1833 

1834  

1835.. 

1836  

1837.. 

1838  
1839  

1840 

1841  

1842  

1843  

1844. 

1845  

6} 
6j: 
H 

4£ 
5 
5 
4; 
41- 

4;- 
Bj- 
fi- 
84- 

6 
6 

6£ 

7 

1846. 

1847  

1848... 

1849  

1850  

1851  

1852  

1853.. 

1854  

1855  

1856  

1857  

1858.. 

1859  

1860. 

1861  

1862.. 

1863. 

1864.... 

1865.. 

1866  

1867  
1868  

CONSUMPTION. 


349 


CONSUMPTION  OP  COFFEE. 


YEAK. 

Duty. 

Consumed  (Ibs.). 

Per 

Capita. 

Consumption  per  Cap., 
yearly,  in  Periods. 

Pric 
(Rio] 

1821    .  . 

5  cents  ^  K>. 

11,886,063 

1.2 

W 

1822  
1823  

u 
(( 

18,515,271 
16,437,045 

1.8 
1.5 

-   1.60 

255 
W\ 

18^4 

« 

20,797,"069 

1.9 

18^ 

1825  
1826 

u 
ti 

20,678,062 
25,734,784 

1.8 
2.2 

17 
15 

1827  

u 

28,354,197 

2.4 

2.40 

141 

1898 

«< 

39,156,733 

3.2 

l^a 

1829  

u 

33,049,695 

2.6 

l?,a 

1830 

(( 

38,363,687 

2.9 

11^ 

1831  

Free. 

75,700,757 

5.7 

>•  3.45 

II1 

1832  .. 

« 

36,471,241 

2.6 

19,1 

1833  

« 

75,057,906 

5.3 

' 

12a 

1834  .  . 

« 

44,346,505 

3.0 

in 

1835 

u 

91,763,002 

6.1 

L  4.84 

113 

1836  .. 

u 

77,647,300 

5. 

111 

1837 

u 

76,044,071 

4.8 

103 

1838 

(( 

82,872,633 

5.1 

\ 

101 

1839 

u 

99,872,517 

6. 

11 

1840  .  .'  . 

(1 

86,297,761 

5.1 

I  5.66 

10 

1841  

u 

109,200,247 

6.2 

10 

1842  .  . 

u 

107,383,567 

6.9 

«fl 

1843  

(( 

85,916,666 

4.6 

« 

1844  .. 

u 

149,711,820 

7.8 

6i 

1845  

u 

94,358,939 

4.8 

5.80 

<H 

1846... 

(( 

124,336,054 

6. 

7 

1847 

(( 

150,332,992 

7.3 

7 

1848  

u 

143,561,050 

6.7 

6 

1849  

(( 

150,954,271 

6.9 

6.62 

6^ 

1850  

u 

129,699,396 

5.6 

i4 

1851  . 

u 

148,920,491 

6.2 

9 

1852  

(I 

204,991,595 

8.3 

8£ 

1853  
1854  

u 
(( 

175,687,790 
179,481,083 

6.9 
6.8 

7.05 

8f 

10* 

1855  . 

« 

210,378,287 

7.8 

101 

1856  

tc 

218,225,490 

7.9 

10$ 

1857  . 

(( 

172,565,934 

6. 

7.55 

u 

1858  

u 

251,255,099 

8.5 

10$ 

1859  . 

(( 

222,610,300 

7.3 

iH 

I860  

Ci 

177,111,923 

5.6 

£•  6.45 

13* 

1861 

11 

187,045,786 

5.8 

» 

133 

1862  

5  cents  ^  5>. 

88,989,911 

3.8 

22 

1863 

K 

79,719,641 

3.2 

}-  4.20 

1864  

u 

109,086,703 

4. 

1865 

« 

128,146,356 

4.2 

1866  

« 

159,918,881 

4.5 

) 

1867...  . 

u 

203,506,671 

5.6 

J.  5.33 

1868 

cc 

223,200,937 

5.9 

) 

350 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


TEA. 


FISCAL  TEAKS. 

Quantity 
consumed. 

Consumption 
per  Capita. 

Price, 
Average, 
Y.  Hyson. 

Per  Capita, 
yearly, 
by  Periods. 

Av.  Price. 

1821        

4,586,223 

.463 

.93 

1822  

5,305,588 

.515 

.90 

1823  

6,474,934 

.610 

.92 

.575 

.94 

1824 

7,771,619 

.713 

1.02 

1825 

7  173  740 

640 

1  00 

1826     

8,482,483 

.737 

.87 

1827  

3,070,885 

.258 

.964 

.538 

.94 

1828   .      .. 

6,289,581 

516 

.934- 

1829  
1830  

5,602,795 
6,873,091 

.448 
536 

.92 

.884 

1831 

4  656  681 

350 

98 

.491 

.91 

1832  

8,627,144 

.630 

.88 

1833.  . 

12  927  043 

916 

75 

1834  

13,193,553 

.910 

.61 

1835  

12,331,638 

827 

.58 

.901 

.64 

1836 

14  484  784 

940 

634 

1837  

14,465,722 

915 

.UWJ 

.614 

1838     .  . 

11  978  744 

740 

58 

1839  

7,748,028 

.467 

.63 

1840  . 

16  860  784 

990 

68 

.712 

65 

1841  

10,772,087 

.615 

.74 

1842  

13,482  645 

749 

64 

1843  

12,785,748 

.691 

.60 

1 

1844  

13,054,327 

686 

60 

1845...  

17,162,550 

.858 

.60 

V     .759 

.59 

1846  

16,891,020 

804 

58 

! 

1847   .      .. 

14  221  910 

711 

52 

^ 

1848  

20,876,861  est. 

.975 

484 

1849   .  .    . 

20,876,861 

952 

474 

}-     .969 

.49 

1850 

28  752  817 

1  239 

494 

| 

1851  

••*vj[ 

51 

1852 

Average  for 

494 

1853  

these  years, 

.ttf-j 
45 

1854   .      .. 

494. 

1855  

j-   27,363,965 

1  019 

.*-•§• 
37 

1856  

374 

i   1.019 

.38 

1857  

.0  <-f 

42 

1858  

354 

1859   .... 

J 

23 

1860  

26  331  193 

25 

1861  

25  520  000 

79 

43 

1862  

27,468  600 

1  17 

614 

1863  , 

26  906  365 

1  10 

.Ul-J 

564 

001 

1864  

23,137  546 

85 

1865  

29  853  433 

995    • 

1866  

41  517  286 

1  169 

\ 

1867  

39,379  574 

1  079 

/ 

V    1  Ofifi 

1868  

35  634  966 

950 

... 

\ 

CONSUMPTION.  351 

i 

From  1821  to  1824  inclusive,  when  the  duty  on  sugar  was  3 
cents  for  the  quality  usually  imported,  the  yearly  consumption  aver 
aged  7.24  pounds  per  capita.  On  tea  the  duty  was  40  cents  a  pound 
for  young  hyson,  and  averaged  from  30  to  34  cents  on  all  teas, 
and  the  consumption,  for  the  years  1821  to  1824  inclusive,  was  .575 
thousandths  of  a  pound  per  capita.  On  coffee  the  duty  was  5  cents  a 
pound,  and  the  consumption  was  1.60  pounds  per  capita.  These  duties 
remained  absolutely  unchanged  until  1831,  when  the  rate  on  coffee 
was  reduced  to  2  cents.  With  the  exception  of  the  last  year,  1832,  the 
duties  on  these  three  articles  were  not  altered  during  the  three  pe 
riods  of  increased  protection.  If  the  general  prosperity  was  great, 
if  the  condition  of  the  laboring  classes  was  really  and  materially 
improved,  it  is  reasonable  to  infer  that  the  consumption  of  these 
articles  must  have  rapidly  increased.  Yet,  excepting  coffee,  the 
consumption  actually  diminished !  In  the  second  protective  period, 
1825-'28  inclusive,  the  consumption  of  tea  was  .538  per  capita,  and 
the  consumption  of  sugar  only  6.25  per  capita.  In  the  third  protec 
tive  period,  that  of  the  highest  duties,  1829-'32  inclusive,  the  con 
sumption  of  tea  was  reduced  to  .491  per  capita,  notwithstanding  a 
reduction  of  the  price ;  and  the  consumption  of  sugar  fell  6.22  per 
capita,  notwithstanding  a  reduction  in  the  price.  Can  it  be  believed 
that  the  great  mass  of  the  people  were  enjoying  an  increasing  pros 
perity,  at  a  time  when  the  consumption  of  these  articles  was  thus 
reduced  ? 

That  the  reduction  of  price  of  tea  and  sugar  would  naturally 
have  caused  an  increased  consumption  of  those  articles,  it  is  fair  to 
infer.  If  the  condition  of  the  laboring  people  had  remained  the 
same,  it  is  surely  reasonable  to  suppose  that  those  who  were  able 
to  spend  in  a  given  time  one  dollar  for  sugar  or  tea  in  the  first  pe 
riod  would  have  been  disposed  to  spend  at  least  an  equal  sum  in 
the  second  and  third,  and  an  equal  sum  would  have  bought  a  larger 
quantity.  But  the  fact  is,  that  the  average  amount  expended  per 
capita  was  reduced.  The  price  of  sugar  in  the  first  period,  1821-'24, 
averaged  10  cents ;  *  in  the  second,  1825-'28,  only  8J-  cents ;  and  in 
the  third,  1829-'32,  only  6f  cents.  The  sum  actually  expended  for 
sugar  per  capita  in  the  first  period  was  72.4  cents  yearly ;  in  the 
second  period  it  was  53. 12  cents  yearly;  and  in  the  third  41.98  cents 
yearly,  so  that  the  sum  of  money  expended  on  the  average  yearly 
per  capita  for  sugar  was  reduced  from  72  cents  in  the  first  period, 
of  low  duties,  to  42  cents  in  the  third  period,  of  extreme  protection ! 

*  Wholesale  New-York  prices  are  used  for  comparison  in  all  these  estimates. 


352  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

Again,  the  average  price  of  tea,  taking  young  hyson,  the  most 
largely-imported  variety,  as  the  standard,  in  the  first  period,  was  94 
cents ;  in  the  second,  94  cents ;  and  in  the  third,  91  cents.  For  tea, 
therefore,  the  average  yearly  expenditure  per  capita  in  the  first 
period,  of  moderate  duties,  was  54.05  cents ;  in  the  second,  of  in 
creased  duties,  it  was  50.57  cents ;  and  in  the  third,  of  highest  duties, 
it  was  only  44.68  cents. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  no  change  of  duty  on  these  articles 
affected  either  their  price  or  the  consumption.  Nor  did  a  change 
of  duty  cause  the  great  fall  in  the  price  of  coffee,  which  was  reduced 
from  an  average  of  23£  cents  in  the  first  period,  to  14f  cents  in  the 
second,  and  12  cents  in  the  third.  This  very  large  reduction  in  the 
price  caused  an  increase  of  consumption.  The  consumption  in  the 
first  period,  of  moderate  duties,  was  1.60  pounds  per  capita;  in  the 
second,  of  higher  duties,  2.40  per  capita ;  and  in  the  third,  of  highest 
duties,  3.45  pounds  per  capita.  Thus  the  sum  actually  expended 
yearly  per  capita  in  the  first  period  was  37.98  cents ;  in  the  second, 
35.40  cents ;  and  in  the  third,  41.40  cents.  In  view  of  the  enormous 
increase  of  consumption  which  immediately  followed  the  removal  of 
protection,  this  increase  in  the  consumption  of  coffee,  without  any 
material  increase  in  the  sum  of  money  expended  per  capita  under 
protection,  does  not  indicate  an  improved  condition  of  the  laboring 
classes. 

It  cannot  be  claimed  that  the  use  of  any  other  articles  superseded 
these  three.  Nor  can  it  be  claimed  that  their  increased  cost  checked 
consumption.  There  was  no  change  in  the  duty  on  these  articles 
from  1821  to  1831,  and  during  the  last  year,  1832,  the  duty  on  coffee 
only  was  changed.  Yet  the  sum  yearly  expended  per  capita  for 
these  three  articles  of  comfort  and  almost  universal  use  was  in  the 
first  period,  1821-'24,  about  $1.64 ;  in  the  second  period,  1825-'28,  it 
was  $1.39 ;  and  in  the  third  period,  of  extreme  protection,  it  was 
only  $1.28.  Is  it  possible  to  avoid  the  conclusion  that  a  large  share 
of  the  people  restricted  their  use  of  these  articles  because  their  con 
dition  was  such  as  to  induce  greater  economy  ? 

From  1832  onward,  coffee  and  tea  imported  in  American  vessels 
were  absolutely  free  until  the  year  1862.  At  the  same  time,  as  has 
been  stated,  the  duty  on  sugar  was  but  slightly  changed,  and  its 
price  but  very  slightly  varied.  The  circumstances,  therefore,  render 
the  consumption  of  these  articles,  separately  and  in  the  aggregate, 
a  fair  test  of  the  general  condition  of  the  people  at  different  periods. 
For  convenience  we  may  divide  the  thirty  years  into  certain  periods : 


CONSUMPTION.  353 

first,  1833-'37  inclusive,  under  reduced  duties,  period  of  currency 
expansion ;  second,  1838-'42  inclusive,  under  very  low  duties,  period 
of  currency  contraction;  third,  1843-'46  inclusive,  period  of  protec 
tion  ;  fourth,  1S47-'50  inclusive,  non-protection ;  and,  finally,  1851- 
'60  inclusive,  a  decade  of  non-interference  with  the  natural  laws  of 
industry  and  of  growth.  The  contrast  between  these  periods  will 
be  found  decidedly  instructive. 

In  the  first  of  these  periods  the  consumption  of  sugar  suddenly 
jumped  to  9.21  pounds  per  capita,  of  coffee  to  4.84  per  capita,  and  of 
tea  to  .901  per  capita.  A  comparison  of  the  prices  shows  that  the 
increased  consumption  cannot  be  ascribed  to  a  lower  cost.  Sugar 
averaged  7.55  cents;  coffee,  11 J  cents;  and  tea  only  64 cents.  The 
sum  expended  yearly  per  capita  in  sugar  was  69.53  cents — an  in 
crease  of  27  cents;  in  coffee,  55.66  cents — an  increase  of  14  cents; 
and  in  tea,  57.66  cents — an  increase  of  13  cents  per  capita.  And 
the  whole  amount  spent  yearly  per  capita  for  these  three  articles 
was  $1.82  against  only  $1.28  in  the  preceding  period. 

Can  the  conclusion  be  avoided  that  this  largely-increased  con 
sumption  indicates  a  rapid  improvement  in  the  condition  of  the  la 
boring  classes  ? 

In  the  second  period  of  contraction  and  panic,  we  find  an  increased 
consumption,  except  of  tea,  though  the  rapidity  of  increase  is  checked. 
Of  sugar  there  were  consumed  13.03  pounds,  average  price,  5.9  cents ; 
cost  per  capita,  76.87  cents ;  of  coffee  there  were  consumed  5.66  pounds, 
price,  9.9  cents ;  cost  per  capita,  56.25  cents ;  and  of  tea  .712  per 
capita,  cost  .65  cents  ;  expense  per  capita,  46.28  cents.  The  aggre 
gate  yearly  expenditure  per  capita  for  these  articles  was  therefore 
$1.79  against  $1.82  in  the  preceding  period.  Here  can  be  seen, 
traced  with  unerring  hand,  the  record  of  general  depression,  retarded 
progress  in  wealth,  and  increased  economy,  which  it  is  known  were 
the  characteristics  of  that  period. 

But  if  the  panic  and  prostration  of  1838-'42  quite  plainly  checked 
consumption,  the  tariff  of  1842-'46,  with  its  extreme  protection, 
operated  still  more  powerfully  in  the  same  direction.  It  is  exceed 
ingly  curious  to  observe  how  plainly  the  averages  for  this  period 
disclose  that  embarrassment  of  the  working-classes,  and  particularly 
of  the  farmers,  the  great  body  of  consumers,  which  we  have  already 
inferred  from  other  records.  The  consumption  of  sugar  yearly  per 
capita  was  13.34  pounds,  not  a  third  of  a  pound  more  than  the  con 
sumption  in  the  period  of  panic.  The  consumption  of  coffee  was 
5.80  per  capita,  only  fourteen-hundredths  of  a  pound  more  than  in 


354  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT  ? 

the  period  of  prostration,  although  the  average  price  had  fallen  3 
cents.  And  the  consumption  of  tea  rose  to  .759  per  capita,  an  in 
crease  of  only  forty-seven  thousandths  of  a  pound,  though  the  price 
had  fallen  on  the  average  6  cents  a  pound.  Thus  the  aggregate  yearly 
expenditure  per  capita  for  these  articles  was  only  $1.67  under  the 
tariff  of  1842-'46,  though  it  had  been  $1.79  in  the  "hard  times" 
which  preceded  it.  Is  it  possible  to  make  more  conclusive  the 
demonstration  that  to  the  laboring  people  of  the  country  the  protec 
tive  tariff  of  1842  gave  times  harder  than  "  the  hard  times,"  even 
though  to  capital  employed  in  manufacturing  it  gave  enormous 
profits  ? 

The  removal  of  the  tariff  in  1846  enables  us  to  contrast  the  four 
years  under  its  operation  with  the  four  years  that  followed  under 
low  duties,  ending  with  1850.  In  that  period,  as  in  every  other 
when  high  duties  have  been  withdrawn,  consumption  started  for 
ward,  as  well  as  the  production  of  wealth,  as  a  powerful  spring  will 
bound  upward  when  the  weight  is  removed  which  has  held  it  down. 
The  consumption  of  sugar  was  19.47  pounds  per  capita,  an  increase 
of  nearly  50  per  cent. ;  of  coffee  6.62  pounds  per  capita,  an  increase 
of  nearly  one  pound;  and  of  tea  .969,  an  increase  of  two-tenths  of  a 
pound.  Thus  the  aggregate  yearly  expenditure  per  capita  for  these 
three  articles,  which  under  protection  had  been  $1.67,  was  increased 
to  $1.94. 

The  increase  in  the  consumption  of  sugar  and  coffee  in  the  four 
years  1851-'54  inclusive,  is  still  more  remarkable.  The  quantity 
of  sugar  consumed  yearly  per  capita  rose  more  than  ten  pounds,  to 
29.66,  the  price  having  changed  only  a  fraction  of  a  cent.  The  quan 
tity  of  coffee  increased  nearly  half  a  pound,  the  price  having  never 
theless  risen  more  than  1£  cent.  Supposing  the  consumption  of 
tea  to  have  been  the  same  during  these  years  as  during  the  whole 
decade — it  was  doubtless  less,  but  how  much  less  it  is  not  possible 
to  determine — the  aggregate  value  of  these  articles  consumed  yearly 
was  $2.36.  Again,  in  the  next  period  of  four  years,  though  the 
price  of  sugar  rose  to  7  cents,  the  consumption  increased  in  quantity ; 
and,  though  the  price  of  coffee  increased  to  10  J  cents,  the  consump 
tion  increased  half  a  pound.  Adding  the  decennial  average  for  tea, 
as  before,  the  aggregate  value  consumed  was  $3.28  per  capita.  The 
panic  of  1857  and  an  increase  of  price  checked  consumption  of  coffee 
in  1858-'60,  so  that  the  average  quantity  consumed  for  the  two 
years  1859-'60  is  slightly  smaller,  though  the  value  is  higher. 
Sugar  rose  rapidly  in  quantity,  but  the  price  was  so  much  reduced, 


CONSUMPTION  OF  TEA,  COFFEE,  AND  SUGAR,  AS  A  TEST  'OF  GENERAL 
PROSPERITY. 


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Aggregate  Cost  Tea, 
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CONSUMPTION.  355 

that  the  aggregate  value  is  only  $3.17  yearly.  -These  statistics  may 
be  more  readily  understood  by  aid  of  the  diagram,  which  shows  the 
average  cost  of  the  three  articles,  tea,  coffee,  and  sugar,  consumed 
in  each  period,  with  the  average  quantity  of  sugar,  and  it  will  be 
observed  that  the  reduced  price  of  sugar  in  1859-'60  causes  more 
than  the  whole  apparent  decrease  of  consumption  by  value.  The 
contrast  between  every  period  of  protection  and  the  nearest  period 
of  lower  duties  or  non-protection  will  strike  the  eye  at  once.  These 
figures  and  facts  are  not  needed  to  prove  that  the  country  has  ad 
vanced  more  rapidly  in  production  of  wealth  during  each  period  of 
low  duties,  and  especially  during  the  decade  of  non-interference, 
1850-' 60,  than  under  any  protective  tariff.  But  they  are  of  value 
because  they  show  that,  while  the  aggregate  wealth  of  the  country 
was  increasing,  it  was  so  fairly  distributed  that  the  working-people, 
the  farmers  and  mechanics  who  form  the  great  body  of  consumers, 
were  able  to  increase  more  rapidly  than  ever  before  their  expendi 
ture  for  articles  of  comfort,  and  their  consumption  of  such  articles. 
Tried  by  this  test,  every  protective  tariff  since  1821  has  either  actu 
ally  decreased  the  consumption  of  these  articles,  or  has  checked  the 
natural  increase,  and,  we  infer,  has  unfavorably  affected  the  condi 
tion  of  the  laboring  classes  as  a  whole.  Tried  by  this  test,  every 
non-protective  tariff  since  1821  has  greatly  increased  the  consump 
tion  of  these  articles,  and,  we  infer,  has  improved  the  condition  of 
the  laboring  classes  on  the  whole. 

The  tariff  period  of  18Cl-'69  is  no  exception  to  the  rule,  although 
it  has  been  purposely  omitted  from  the  examination  thus  far,  because 
it  may  be  said  that  the  war,  the  inflation  of  currency,  or  the  high 
prices,  have  affected  the  consumption.  The  prices  of  coffee,  sugar, 
and  tea,  however,  have  not  been  higher  in  proportion  than  those  of 
other  articles  generally,  and  the  use  of  coffee  and  sugar  for  the 
army  largely  added  to  the  consumption.  Whatever  causes  may  be 
assigned,  the  fact  remains  that  in  this  period,  both  during  and  since 
the  war,  the  consumption  of  these  articles  has  been  reduced  or  its 
natural  increase  checked.  For  the  war  period,  1861-'65,  the  con 
sumption  of  sugar  was  31.95  pounds  per  capita,  estimating  only  by 
the  population  within  our  military  lines,  and  since  the  war,  1866-'68 
inclusive,  the  consumption  has  been  only  27.47  pounds  per  capita — 
more  than  three  pounds  less  than  the  consumption  before  the  war. 
The  consumption  of  coffee  was,  during  the  war,  only  4.20  pounds, 
and  since  the  war  only  5.33  pounds  per  capita — less  by  nearly  two 
pounds  than  the  consumption  before  the  war.  And  the  consump- 


356 


DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 


tion  of  tea  during  the  war  was  only  .981,  and  since  the  war  1.066 
pounds  per  capita — a  very  slight  increase  as  compared  with  the  con 
sumption  of  1.019  before  the  war.  Taking  the  average  of  the  whole 
protective  period,  the  consumption  of  sugar  was  30.28  pounds,  of 
coffee  4.6  pounds,  and  of  tea  1.012  pounds,  per  capita — a  decrease 
in  the  quantity  of  each  article,  as  compared  with  the  decade  before 
the  war.  The  prices,  stated  in  currency  or  in  gold,  would,  however, 
show  an  increase,  but  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  general 
average  of  prices  and  of  wages  has  been  at  least  correspondingly 
increased. 

The  principle  holds  good,  therefore,  that  high  duties  have  in 
every  case  reduced  or  checked  the  increase  of  the  consumption  of 
tea,  coffee,  and  sugar,  and  the  sum  of  money  which  the  laboring 
classes  have  been  disposed  to  expend  on  these  three  comforts.  On 
the  other  hand,  low  duties  have  in  every  case  rapidly  increased  the 
consumption,  both  in  quantity  and  in  the  sum  of  money  which  the 
laboring  classes  have  thus  expended.  Students  of  political  economy 
will,  we  think,  at  once  agree  that  the  three  articles  chosen,  as  they 
are  those  of  general  use,  the  consumption  of  which  can  be  most 
accurately  ascertained,  so  they  form,  taken  in  connection  with  the 
prices,  the  most  reliable  test  which  can  be  found  of  the  general  con 
dition  of  the  working-people.  Salt  is  an  article  of  absolute  neces 
sity  rather  than  of  comfort  or  luxury.  The  consumption  of  soap — 
which  some  profound  economists  have  regarded  as  the  best  test  of 
progress  in  civilization — cannot  be  accurately  ascertained.  Neither 
can  the  quantity  of  meat  consumed,  nor  of  clothing  used,  be  reliably 
ascertained.  Tried  by  the  best  obtainable  test,  then,  the  protection 
of  American  industry  proves  an  embarrassment  and  a  burden  to 
American  labor. 

CONSUMPTION  OF  TEA,  COFFEE,  AND  SUGAR,  AT  DIFFERENT  PERIODS,  PER 
CAPITA,  WITH  PRICE  AND  COST. 


CHARACTER  OF  TARIFF. 

1 

SUGAR. 

COFFEE. 

TEA. 

Total  Cost. 

i 

Ji 

1 

1 

$ 
II 

s 

1 

Cons.  P.  C. 

1 

I 

Protection,  29  p.  c  
Protection,  33  p.  c  
Protection,  38  p.  c  
Non-protection,  15£  p.  c 
Non-protection,  15|  p.  c 
Protection,  25  p.  c  
Non-protection,  19  p.  c. 
Non-protection,  19  p.  c. 
Non-protection,  19  p.  c. 
Non-protection,  14.7  p.  c. 
Protection  (war) 

1821-1824 
1825-1828 
1829-1832 
1833-1837; 
1838-18421 
1843-1846: 
1847-18501 
1851-1854 
1855-1858 
1859-1860 
1861-1865 
1866-1868 

7.24 
6.25 
6.22 
9.21 
13.03 
13.34 
19.47 
29.66 
30.25 
34.54 
31.95 
127.47 

10. 
8.5 
6.75 
7.55 
5.9 
6.25 
5. 
4.78 
7. 
5.75 

72.40 
53.12 
41.98 
69.53 
76.87 
83.37 
97.35 
131.77 
211.75 
198.60 

1.60 
2.40 
3.45 
:4.84 
5.66 
5.80 
6.68 
7.05 
7.55 
6.45 
4.20 
5.33 

23.75 
14.75 
12. 
11.50 
9.9 
6.9 
7.5 
9.19 
10.28 
12.37 

37.98 
35.40 
41.40 
55.66 
56.25 
40.02 
49.65 
64.78 
77.61 
79.78 

.575 
.538 
.491 
.901 
.712 
.'759 
.969 

1  1.019 

.981 
1.066 

.94 
.94 
.91 
.64 
.65 
.59 
.49 

38.7 

54.05 

50.57 
44.C.S 
57.66 
46.28 
44.78 
47.48 

39.43 

164.43 
139.09 
128.06 
182.85 
179.40 
167.40 
194.43 
235.98 
328.79 
317.81 

Protection  (peace)  

CONCLUSION.  357 

CHAPTER    XXVI. 

CONCLUSION. 

No  candid  inquirer  can  attempt  the  investigation  of  this  question 
without  a  constant  sense  of  the  imperfectness  of  his  information,  and 
the  liability  to  error  in  the  details  of  his  work.  But  I  have  honestly 
tried  to  present  the  facts,  as  far  as  I  could  ascertain  them,  without 
distortion  or  unfairness,  that  every  reader  may  judge  for  himself 
whether  they  sustain  the  conclusions  to  which  I  have  been  led. 

It  appears  to  me  that  protection  does  not  stop  excessive  impor 
tations,  nor  turn  the  balance  of  trade  in  our  favor ;  that  it  checks  im 
portations  only  for  a  short  time,  until  its  efiect  is  felt  in  the  arrest 
of  improvement  or  the  increased  cost  of  production  ;  and  that  it  re 
tards  exports  more  than  imports,  and  thus  enlarges  the  balance  of 
trade  against  us.  The  fact  that  in  every  period  of  high  duties  the 
proportion  of  manufactured  products  exported  has  decreased,  while 
in  every  period  of  low  duties  it  has  increased,  seems  to  prove  that 
the  protective  system  puts  our  manufacturing  industry,  as  a  whole, 
at  a  disadvantage  in  competition  with  that  of  other  countries.  Nor 
can  the  prostration  of  shipping  and  ship-building  be  regarded  as  a 
matter  of  small  moment. 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  natural  progress  of  this  country  in  the 
production  of  wealth  has  been  retarded  by  the  protective  system. 
From  agriculture  we  derive  about  three-fourths  of  that  production, 
and  the  progress  of  that  great  industry  has  certainly  been  greater 
in  non-protective  than  in  protective  periods.  I  cannot  find  any  evi 
dence  that  the  loss  by  retarding  the  progress  of  this  industry  has 
been  compensated — that  the  natural  growth  of  other  industries, 
producing  in  the  aggregate  only  one-fourth  as  much,  has  been  so 
greatly  accelerated  by  protection  as  to  pay  for  any  loss  through 
agriculture.  On  the  contrary,  it  seems  to  me  that  more  than  two- 
thirds  of  the  production  of  wealth  by  mechanic  arts  and  manufac 
tures  is  by  branches  of  industry  which  are  of  necessity,  and,  in  point 
of  fact,  ever  have  been,  retarded  in  their  natural  growth  by  the  pro 
tective  system. 

Neither  do  the  records  show  that  those  great  industries  which 
have  been  especially  protected  have  been  hastened  in  any  healthy 
growth  by  legislative  favor.  All  of  them  throve  before  they  were 
protected;  all  of  them  made  remarkable  progress  during  the  long 


358  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

period  of  low  duties,  from  1846  to  1861,  and  each  one  of  them 
achieved  the  greatest  triumph  in  solid  and  healthy  improvement, 
when  pressed  by  natural  competition  and  unchecked  by  artificial 
burdens.  But,  under  high  tariffs,  certain  pet  interests  have  been 
invested  with  the  tape-worm's  faculty  of  feeding  upon  the  vitals  of 
all  other  manufactures ;  and  while,  under  this  infliction,  our  industry, 
as  a  whole,  has  suffered,  these  favored  interests  have  grown,  like  the 
tape-worm,  not  in  self-sustaining  vigor,  but  only  in  useless  length 
and  destructive  .voracity. 

The  aggregate  ability  of  any  country  to  employ  labor  must  de 
pend  upon  its  production  of  wealth ;  and,  if  the  production  of  wealth 
in  the  aggregate  has  been  retarded  in  its  natural  growth,  the  de 
mand  for  labor,  and  the  remuneration  of  labor,  in  the  aggregate, 
must  likewise  have  been  retarded  in  their  natural  increase.  I  think 
the  facts  prove  that  the  wages  of  labor,  in  the  aggregate,  have  been 
lower,  measured  by  their  purchasing  power,  in  times  of  protection 
than  in  times  of  non-protection ;  that  the  rewards  of  agriculture 
have  been  diminished  by  high  tariffs,  its  expenses  increased,  and 
yet,  through  increased  friction  in  exchanges,  the  cost  of  agricultural 
products  has  not  been  in  like  degree  lessened  to  the  consumer ;  and 
that  even  the  manufacturing  laborers  have  not,  under  protective 
tariffs,  enjoyed  any  increase  of  wages  sufficient  to  compensate  them 
for  the  increased  cost  of  living. 

These  conclusions  as  to  the  condition  of  labor  in  different  periods 
have  been  confirmed,  at  every  point :  first,  by  the  record  of  the  move 
ment  of  immigration  to  this  country  as  compared  with  others ;  and, 
second,  by  the  record  of  the  consumption  of  articles  of  comfort  and 
general  use.  These  facts  seem  to  me  to  prove,  with  regard  to  pro 
tective  tariffs  generally,  that  which  Mr.  Wells  so  convincingly 
proved  with  regard  to  the  system  now  in  force — that  it  does  not 
benefit  but  injures  the  laboring  classes. 

Unless  these  conclusions  are  erroneous,  it  must  be  conceded  that 
American  labor  cannot  be  helped  by  loading  and  taxing  it ;  that  a . 
system  which  injures  a  country  in  its  foreign  exchanges,  which  re 
tards  its  natural  growth  in  the  production  of  wealth,  and  which 
leads  to  such  a  distribution  of  wealth  that  the  rich  grow  richer  and 
the  poor  poorer,  can  in  no  wise  benefit  a  nation ;  in  a  word,  that 
protection  does  not  protect. 

What  is  the  attempt  to  protect  but  a  confession  of  weakness  ? 
How  often  we  hear  it,  "  American  industry,  because  it  is  free,  needs 
protection."  Does  freedom,  then,  put  an  industry  at  a  disadvantage 


CONCLUSION.  359 

in  comparison  with  others?  Is  freedom  a  source  of  weakness? 
Surely,  history  proves  that  freedom  is  strength.  For  freedom  means 
intelligence,  hope,  activity  of  mind,  the  highest  stimulus  to  all  the 
faculties  ;  it  means  industry,  child  of  unbounded  aspiration,  married 
to  inventive  genius.  Brains  are  better  than  tariffs.  The  mechanic 
who  fears  pauper-labor  or  prison-labor  ranks  himself  below  its  level. 

Yet  "  we  must  build  up  a  home  market."  Statistics  prove  that 
manufactures  in  the  aggregate  have  not  increased  as  rapidly  with 
protection  as  without  it.  Protection  does  not  build  up  a  home 
market ;  it  only  retards  the  natural  progress  of  the  country  toward 
diversification  of  industry.  Not  only  this,  but  it  retards  the  increase 
of  those  facilities  of  transportation  which  bring  all  the  markets  of 
the  world  to  the  door  of  every  farmer,  and  double  the  value  of  his 
farm. 

It  will  be  said,  with  truth,  that  the  evils  which  have  been  traced 
as  resulting  from  protective  tariffs  have  been  partly  caused  by  an 
attempt  to  protect  too  many  interests  at  once.  It  is  a  common  mis 
take  to  suppose  that,  if  protection  is  good  for  one  industry,  it  must 
be  good  for  all.  High  duties  on  one  article  may  secure  the  market 
to  the  American  producer ;  therefore,  men  mistakenly  reason,  high 
duties  on  all  articles  will  protect  everybody  at  once.  A  duty  on 
one  article  may  not  affect  at  all  the  cost  of  producing  others.  But 
duties  on  three  thousand  articles,  each  duty  being  diffused  in  its 
effect  through  a  whole  community,  must  have  some  power  to 
increase  the  cost  of  producing  every  thing,  and  thus  must  not  only 
tend  to  neutralize  every  benefit  contemplated,  but  to  put  even  OUT 
most  natural  industries  at  a  disadvantage.  In  proportion  as  protec 
tive  tariffs  are  broad,  or  cover  many  industries,  they  defeat  them 
selves.  In  a  despotism,  single  interests  can  be  persistently  favored 
by  law — possibly  to  some  effect.  But  no  republic  will  tolerate  such 
exclusive  favoritism.  No  tariff  can  be  passed  for  protection  that  does 
not  promise  benefit  to  a  great  number  of  interests.  And,  therefore, 
in  republics,  where  labor  is  free  and  intelligent,  and  needs  less  pro 
tection  than  other  labor,  precisely  there  protection  most  surely 
defeats  itself.  In  this  country,  at  least,  it  is  a  necessary  feature  of 
any  protective  system  that  it  shall  cover  a  great  many  interests,  and 
so  greatly  increase  the  cost  of  production. 

Again,  it  will  be  said,  with  truth,  that  the  evils  which  have  been 
traced  are  largely  due  to  the  frequent  changes  of  the  tariff.  But 
this,  also,  is  an  inevitable  consequence  of  protection  by  a  republican 
government.  A  despotism,  deaf  to  all  popular  clamor,  can  cling  to 


360  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

a  fixed  policy  for  a  century.  A  free  government,  doing  the  same, 
would  cease  to  be  a  free  government.  If  the  taxation  designed  for 
protection  could  be  distributed  with  exact  equality,  and  the  benefits 
derived  could  also  be  distributed  with  exact  equality,  every  man  who 
should  receive  ten  dollars  in  the  increased  price  of  his  products, 
would  be  taxed  just  ten  dollars  in  the  increased  cost  of  articles  pur 
chased.  To  protect  everybody  equally  is  to  protect  nobody  at  all. 
The  only  possible  effect,  for  good  or  evil,  must  arise  from  such  un 
equal  distribution  of  burdens  and  benefits  as  may  help' some  at  the 
expense  of  others.  In  proportion  as  a  protective  tariff  is  just  to  all 
interests,  it  benefits  none.  It  can  only  have  effect  in  proportion  as  it 
helps  certain  classes  at  the  expense  of  other  classes ;  the  monopoly 
feature  of  protection  alone  prevents  it  being  a  nullity.  But,  in  a 
free  government,  any  monopoly,  whether  absolute  or  qualified,  is 
unpopular,  and  must  be  short-lived.  The  strife  of  interests  for  a 
greater  share  of  benefits,  or  for  release  of  burdens,  must  be  constant, 
and,  as  long  as  the  people  are  free,  there  must  result,  from  every 
attempt  to  protect,  frequent  changes,  and  constant  fear  of  change. 
Fear  of  change  neutralizes  the  stimulus  which  peculiar  favors  give. 
Frequent  change  prostrates  all  industry.  Hence,  in  proportion  as 
tariffs  are  protective,  they  tend  to  defeat  themselves,  and  to  expose 
all  industry  to  fluctuations. 

Once  more,  it  will  be  said  that  the  evils  which  have  been  traced 
result,  in  part,  from  defective  adjustment  of  duties  between  different 
interests.  This  is  also  true.  It  is  a  misfortune  that  even  our  wisest 
Congressmen  are  not  wiser  than  the  Creator.  The  laws  of  the  uni 
verse  which  He  has  devised  do  not  suit  the  advocates  of  protection, 
who  desire  to  mend  them.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  finite  wisdom 
is  not  yet  quite  equal  to  the  task ;  but  the  historian,  upon  a  candid 
review  of  its  performances,  must  sadly  confess  that  it  is  not.  The 
attempt  to  make  an  artificial  world,  instead  of  the  one  in  which  we 
live,  can  hardly  be  expected  to  meet  with  complete  success,  until 
men  become  able  to  mend  those  natural  laws  of  trade  which  the 
Creator  devised  as  the  most  beneficial  stimulus  for  human  industry. 
If  protection  could  accomplish  what  its  honest  advocates  desire  ;  if 
it  could  build  up  some  industries  without  injuring  others  more 
important ;  if  it  could  enhance  the  price  at  which  three  thousand 
domestic  products  may  be  sold,  and,  at  the  same  time,  not  enhance 
the  cost  of  production ;  if  it  could  get  revenue,  and  yet  exclude 
imports,  and  force  a  natural  borrower  to  cease  asking  for  money ; 
if  it  could  rid  manufacture  of  competition  without  depriving  it  of 


CONCLUSION.  361 

the  main  stimulus  to  improvement ;  if  it  could  contrive  to  so  please 
everybody  as  to  be  permanent,  and  yet  give  benefits  to  some  at  the 
expense  of  others ;  if  it  could  tax  the  whole  country  for  the  benefit 
of  capitalists,  and  yet  contrive  to  secure  to  all  labor  a  larger  share 
in  the  distribution  of  wealth  ;  if,  in  short,  it  could  take  these  United 
States  and  put  them  off  on  a  planet  by  themselves,  with  artificial 
sun  and  moon,  artificial  air  and  water,  and  create  for  us  a  world 
better  than  that  which  God  has  made — then,  protection  would  be  a 
good  thing  !  But  the  atttempt  has  not,  thus  far,  been  entirely  suc 
cessful. 

We  are  here,  in  a  world  of  labor  and  progress,  linked,  by  ties 
which  we  cannot  break,  to  our  fellow-men  in  other  lands.  Whether 
we  like  it  or  not,  we  are  forced  to  share  something  of  their  burdens, 
and  to  partake  with  them  of  the  blessings  which  the  progress  of 
humanity  secures.  Science  and  invention  have  marvellously  reduced 
the  cost  of  supplying  the  necessities  of  life,  and  this  nation  cannot 
be  altogether  deprived  of  a  share  in  the  blessing.  Our  manufactures 
must  either  keep  pace  with  the  progress  of  improvement,  or  they 
must  give  room  to  industries  more  thrifty  and  profitable.  With 
every  year,  increased  facilities  for  communication  bring  distant 
nations  closer  to  each  other,  and  weld  together  into  a  more  compact 
body  all  races  of  men.  France  orders  by  telegraph  thousands  of 
silk-cocoons  from  China,  and  ships  them  from  Canton,  by  railway 
across  this  continent,  to  Lyons.  Orders  from  New  York  are  delivered 
at  Liverpool  within  an  hour ;  German  bankers  receive  instructions 
at  two  o'clock,  sell  our  bonds  before  three,  transfer  the  gold  by  tel 
egraph  to  New  York,  and  sell  that  for  currency  before  it  is  three 
o'clock  in  Wall  Street.  No  longer  can  the  Atlantic  or  the  Pacific 
shut  out  a  people  from  the  influence  of  foreign  trade  and  foreign 
industry.  With  every  step  of  progress  it  becomes  more  clearly 
impossible  to  fence  up  a  nation  against  competition ;  and  high  tariffs, 
never  efficacious  for  protection,  are  constantly  losing  their  power  for 
good,  and  gaining  only  in  power  for  evil.  As  the  system  of 
exchange  becomes  more  perfect,  the  operations  of  commerce  more 
rapid,  the  means  of  intercommunication  more  complete,  the  burdens 
imposed  by  any  interference  with  natural  laws  are  diffused  the  more 
quickly  and  thoroughly  through  the  whole  community;  and  thus, 
with  every  year,  protective  tariffs  more  speedily  defeat  themselves. 
It  is  time  for  the  people  of  this  country  to  seriously  consider  the 
truth  that  high  duties  cannot  overturn  the  natural  laws  of  exchange, 
nor  wall  up  any  nation  against  foreign  competition.  If  the  system 
25 


3C2  DOES  PROTECTION  PROTECT? 

of  protection  was  ever  necessary,  it  is  not  now.  Its  burdens  are 
real — its  benefits  unsubstantial.  The  manufacturer  gets  higher 
prices,  but  his  goods  cost  him  more.  The  laborer  gets  higher 
wages,  but  living  costs  him  more.  A  short  season  of  large  profits 
and  unhealthy  growth  in  any  industry — unhealthy,  because  not 
based  upon  solid  improvement  in  comparison  with  like  industry 
elsewhere — is  followed  by  prostration,  ruinous  alike  to  the  most 
useful  and  the  most  useless  workers,  and,  more  quickly  than  ever 
before,  each  protective  tariff  is  followed  by  a  pitiful  appeal  for  more 
protection.  How  long  shall  it  take  us  to  discover  that  children  who 
are  always  carried  will  never  learn  to  walk  ? 

When  I  began  this  inquiry,  I  still  believed,  as  in  earlier  days  I 
had  been  taught,  that,  while  the  tariff  was  confessedly  defective, 
permanent  protection  in  some  form  and  degree  must  be  beneficial. 
The  inquiry  has  led  me  to  the  conviction  that  protection,  as  a  per 
manent  policy,  if  ever  useful,  no  longer  benefits  American  labor  as  a 
whole ;  that  its  supposed  benefits  are  mainly  unreal,  and,  when  they 
are  real,  fall  to  the  share  of  capital,  and  do  not  improve  the  condi 
tion  or  stimulate  the  energy  and  inventive  genius  of  labor ;  and  that 
this  country,  realizing  its  natural  superiority  of  resources,  and  its 
vast  advantages  in  political  freedom  and  intelligence  of  labor,  should 
henceforth  seek  prosperity  through  the  only  efficient  and  enduring 
protection  which  can  be  given  to  industry — the  removal  of  all  un 
necessary  burdens.  That  inquiry  has  convinced  at  least  one  person 
that  we  need  nothing  else  so  much  as  to  stimulate  the  native  vigor 
and  inventive  power  of  our  industry,  by  competition  with  the  labor 
and  skill  of  other  countries.  The  best  protection  for  industry  is  to 
let  it  alone.  Human  wisdom  cannot  better,  by  artificial  laws,  the 
conditions  under  which  the  Creator  has  placed  human  labor  by  the 
natural  laws  of  exchange.  The  world  which  He  has  given  us  is,  in 
those  provisions,  the  work  of  a  higher  intelligence  than  legislators 
have  at  their  command;  they  may  mar,  but  can  never  mend  it,  by 
interfering  with  its  fundamental  laws. 


DO)EX  OF  TABLES. 


PAGE 

Agricultural  Implements,  wages  in  manufacture  of,  1861-'67 334: 

"          Products,  1840,  1850,  1860,  1867,  1868 91 

"                "          price  of,  1825-'60 274 

"                "             "           at  New  York,  1845  and  1860 308 

and  manufactured  goods,  price,  1860  and  1870 317 

Agriculture,  value  of  farms,  1860  and  1867 96 

Anthracite  Coal,  production  of,  1820-'68 200 

Banks  of  the  United  States,  1811-'63 44 

"           Massachusetts,  1815-'51 45 

Consumption  of  Coffee,  1821-'68 349 

"                Sugar,           "         348 

"                 Tea,              "         350 

"                these  articles,  with  cost 356 

Cotton  Goods,  price,  1835-'49 289 

"       Manufacture,  progress,  1820-'69 130 

"                "            valuein!860 187 

"      Mills,  wages  in,  1861  and  1867 328 

Currency  and  Imports,  1790-1829 26 

"                with  rate  per  capita,  1829-'60 29 

Duration  of  Tariffs,  with  percentage 72 

Edge-tool  Manufacture,  wages  in,  1 861  and  1867 334 

Exports,  Coin  and  Merchandise,  1821-'68 24 

"        and  Imports,  gross  value  and  balance,  1790-1869 23 

"                    "          Merchandise,  1821-'69 60 

excess  of  each,  with  rate  per  capita 61 

"                    "          Specie,  1821-'69 49 

"        of  Manufactured  Products,  1821-'68,  with  rate  per  capita 57 

Farms,  value  of,  1860  and  1867 96 

Flour,  priceat  Philadelphia,  1796-1867,  each  month 110 

"            "            "          averages 112 

Glass  Manufacture,  wages,  1860  and  1867 330 

"    Window,  price  at  Philadelphia,  1835-'49 252 

"        "                  "      New  York,  1825-'63 252 

Hardware  Manufacture,  wages,  1860  and  1867 333 

Immigration,  1820-'60 339 

Imports  and  Currency,  1790-1829 26 

"                    "          with  rate  per  capita,  1829-'60 29 


364  INDEX  OF  TABLES. 

PAGE 

Imports  and  Exports,  gross,  and  balance,  1790-1869 23 

"                    "        of  Coin  and  Merchandise,  1821-'68 24 

"                    "        with  rate  per  capita 51 

«                    "        Merchandise,  1821-'69 60 

"      of  Iron,  quantities,  1818-'46 198 

"          "          values,  182 1-'46 199 

"          "          since  1840 221 

"      of  Manufactures  of  Wool,  1821-'45 155 

"      of  Specie,  and  Balance,  1821-'69 49 

"      of  Wool  and  Woollens,  1841-'68 154 

Iron  and  Nails  moved  on  Ohio  canals,  1841-'51 209 

"  Articles,  price  of,  1835-'49. , 297 

"  Duties  under  tariff  of  1842 202 

"  Founderies,  wages  in,  1860  and  1867 331 

"  Furnaces  built,  1833-'42 192 

"         "             "     1840-'49 215 

"        "        closed,  1841-'49 213 

"  Imports  of,  1818-'46 198 

"               "        1840-'68 221 

"  Manufacture,  1860,  classified 187 

"  pig,  bar,  and  sheet,  price,  1825-'63. 221 

"     "     price  of,  monthly,  1825-'63 222 

"  price  of  pig,  bar,  and  rail,  in  Great  Britain,  1810-'65 239 

"  production  of,  1840-'46 216 

"  rolling-mills,  wages,  1860  and  1867 331 

Lands,  sale  of,  1796-1868 36 

Leather  Manufacture,  wages,  1861  and  1867 330 

Manufacture  of  Cotton,  history,  1820-'69 130 

"               Cotton,  Wool,  Iron,  Glass,  Paper,  and  Salt,  1860 187 

Manufactured  Products  exported,  1821-'68 57 

Merchandise,  exports  and  imports,  1821-'68 24 

Paper  Manufacture,  wages,  1860  and  1867 330 

.population,  increase  each  decade 80 

"           of  the  United  States,  1791-1869 85 

Prices  of  Agricultural  Products,  1825-'63 274 

"                  New  York,  1845  and  1860 308 

"                  and  Manufactures,  1860  and  1870 317 

"      Cotton  Goods,  1835-'49 289 

"      Flour  at  Philadelphia  every  month,  1796-1867 110 

average  yearly  and  for  periods 112 

"      Iron,  pig,  bar,  and  rail,  in  England  and  here,  1810-'65 239 

"       Iron  Articles,  1835-'49 297 

"       Pig  Iron  every  month,  1825-'63 222 

"      Retail  Articles  in  1860  and  1868 327 

"      Salt,  Turk's  Island,  every  month,  1825-'63 262 

"      Window  Glass,  Philadelphia,  1835-'49 252 

"          New  York,  1825-'63 252 

"      Wool  at  New  York,  1860  and  1869 163 


INDEX  OF  TABLES.  365 

PAGE 

Prices  of  wool  at  New  York,  monthly,  1825-'63 166 

"        "      averages,  New  York  and  Boston,  1825-'60 167 

"         "      at  New  York  since  1860 167 

"      Woollen  Goods,  1836-'49 293 

"                     "            in  1860  and  1869 153 

"      French  Goods  in  1860  and  1869 154 

Property,  valuation  of,  New  York  and  Mobile,  1820-'51 37 

Protected  Manufactures,  census  of,  1860 187 

Public  Lands,  receipts  from  sale,  1796-1868 36 

Railroads  built,  1830-'68 109 

Retail  Prices,  1860  and  1868 327 

Salt  Manufacture,  progress,  1820-'60 258 

"    price  of,  at  New  York,  monthly,  1825-'63 262 

Steel  Manufacture,  wages,  1860  and  1867 331 

Ship-building,  1815-'62 113 

Specie,  Exports  and  Imports,  with  balance,  1821-'69 49 

Sugar,  Consumption  of,  1821-'68 348 

Tariff  on  Iron,  1842 202 

Tariffs,  duration  and  percentage  of 72 

Tea,  Consumption  of,  1821-'68 350 

Tonnage,  foreign,  with  rate  per  capita,  1815-'62 63 

"         total,  with  kinds  of  ships  built,  1815-'62 113 

Valuation  in  certain  States,  1861  and  1868 83 

"          Mobile  and  New  York,  1820-'51 37 

Wages,  at  Lowell,  1839-'59 806 

"      in  Cotton  Mills,  1860-'61  and  1867-'68 328 

"      hi  Woollen"              "                    "         329 

"      in  Leather  Works,     "                    "         330 

"      in  Glass          "          "                    "         330 

"      inPaper         "          "                    "         330 

"      hi  Rolling-MiUs,         «                    "         331 

«      hi  Steel  Works,        "                    "         331 

"      in  Iron  Founderies,  "                    "         332 

"      in  Hardware  Works, "                    "         333 

"      hi  Edge-tool      "       "                    "         334 

"      in  Agricultural  Implement  Works,  1860-'61  and  1867-68 334 

Wheat,  quantity  produced,  with  rate  per  capita,  1790-1868 97 

"      product  and  export  value,  1820-'69 99 

Wool,  price  of,  at  New  York,  monthly,  1825-'63 166 

«                «              "          averages,  1825-'60 167 

«                «              «          since  1860 163 

Woollen  Goods,  price,  1835-'49 293 

"         «          "       1860  and  1869 153 

"          Imports,  1821-'68 164 

"          Manufactures,  census  1860 x. 187 

"                   "            of  Massachusetts,  1832-' 60 149 

THE    END. 


14  DAY  USE 

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